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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Nowadays large multinational enterprises (MNEs) economically outperform not only purely 
domestic companies but also entire countries. Dominating international business in cross-
border investment and trade, multinationals constitute 69 of the 100 wealthiest economic 
entities in the world. The ten largest corporations, which include Apple Inc. and Royal Dutch 
Shell plc, earn more than 180 countries altogether, including Ireland, Greece, and South Africa.1 
It is therefore natural that individual countries and international organizations are becoming 
increasingly interested in the operations of multinational enterprises, their profits, and tax 
liabilities. In recent years, the taxation of MNEs has become one of the most debated topics, 
with accusations of large corporations strategically relocating profits from high-tax affiliates to 
the low-tax group members in order to minimize their consolidated tax liabilities. Examples 
include Apple Inc. allegedly paying an effective tax rate of 1% on its European profits2 and 
Royal Dutch Shell plc shifting its main tax-residence to the benign tax climate of the 
Netherlands3 and relocating its central brand management to low-tax Switzerland.4 
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has responded to the 
ongoing discussion on the taxation of multinational enterprises by releasing the Action Plan on 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) in 2013.5 This plan aims to prevent double non-taxation 
and low taxation of MNEs, which would ensure that corporate profits are taxed in accordance 
with the real economic activity and value creation. The European Commission has responded 
to the OECD by issuing its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package in 2016,6 which supports the Action 
Plan on BEPS and focuses on providing a stronger and better-coordinated handling of tax abuse 
                                                          
1 See Global Justice Now (2016). 
2 See European Commission (2016). 
3 See The Guardian (2009b). 
4 See Dischinger and Riedel (2011). 
5 See OECD (2013a). 
6 See COM (2016a). 
2    
within the European Union (EU). Policy makers and academics usually agree that the main 
channels of profit shifting include a strategic use of intra-firm transfer prices and related-party 
interest payments.7 In addition, they stress the importance of hindering the use of intangible 
assets in profit shifting, as intellectual property (IP) can be relatively easily transferred within 
a corporate group and its uniqueness often hinders the determination of the true arm’s length 
price.8 
The main aim of this doctoral thesis is to contribute to the academic research on base erosion 
and profit shifting by empirically investigating the use of its individual channels and the 
effectiveness of countermeasures. The focus is on a strategic use of intangible assets for profit 
shifting between affiliates of multinational enterprises. The thesis consists of five self-contained 
chapters that enhance the existing empirical literature on BEPS and deliver valuable 
conclusions for tax policy considerations. The chapters provide a thoughtful and detailed 
contribution to the political and academic discussion on the substitution between profit shifting 
channels, the effectiveness of anti-avoidance legislation, as well as the use of bilateral royalty 
payments, different types of intangible assets, and fiscal incentives for profit shifting. 
Chapter 2 reviews and summarizes various areas of corporate taxation that are relevant for this 
thesis, focusing on profit shifting by multinational enterprises and its main channels. The 
methodology of the chapter includes an analysis of descriptive statistics and a comprehensive 
review of the related empirical literature.  
The chapter begins by examining corporate income taxation in Europe and the United States 
and comparing it with the taxation of personal income, consumption, and property. According 
to the findings of this analysis, corporate taxation constitutes a relatively small part of the total 
tax revenues in Germany and other OECD member states. Therefore, the reforms of the 
corporate tax system have to be substantial in order to have a sizable effect on total tax revenues. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that there are vast differences in corporate taxation within the 
OECD. The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter and the reviewed empirical literature 
suggest that German and US multinational enterprises exploit these tax rate differentials to shift 
profits. Intangible assets appear to play an important role in tax minimizing strategies of 
multinational firms and are intensively used as a means of profit shifting. Finally, multiple 
                                                          
7 See Dharmapala (2014) for a review of empirical literature on base erosion and profit shifting. 
8 See OECD (2013a), Action 8. 
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proposals on reforming the current tax system are analyzed in this chapter, whereby it is noted 
that some suggestions focus on improving the existing tax system, while others embrace its 
fundamental change. 
Chapter 39 empirically contributes to the debate on base erosion and proﬁt shifting, which has 
been on the international policy agenda for several years now. The main topics in this discussion 
include the use of intra-group interest and royalty payments as well as related-party trade to 
relocate proﬁts within a multinational group in a tax minimizing manner. Anti-avoidance 
regulations have been introduced to limit cross-border shifting activities and the existing 
empirical literature analyzes the effectiveness of each type of countermeasures independently 
from one another. The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether ﬁrms substitute between 
proﬁt shifting strategies and whether this implies interdependency between different anti-
avoidance regulations.  
To examine this effectively in our study, we employ a sample of European multinationals to 
analyze the variation of anti-avoidance legislation over time. According to our findings, a 
substitution occurs between proﬁt shifting channels, which results in one set of regulations 
becoming ineffective if other rules remain unenforced. In order to strengthen our identiﬁcation 
strategy, we examine a reform of thin capitalization regulations in France and this difference-
in-difference approach conﬁrms the substitution hypothesis. In addition, we compare the 
substitution between profit shifting channels in the case of IP-intensive firms and other 
companies. According to our results, IP-intensive firms demonstrate more aggressive shifting 
behavior because they are less restricted in conducting profit shifting. Since the arm’s length 
price on the use of intangibles is often hard to determine, it can be more easily manipulated 
than transfer prices for tangible goods or intra-group interest payments, giving IP-intensive 
companies a leeway for profit shifting. 
The aim of Chapter 410 is to empirically analyze the relationship between corporate taxation 
and the intensity of international royalty flows. Royalties set between third parties are 
determined by the significance of the technology or the magnitude of research expenses, 
whereas royalties transferred between related parties may deviate from their true price with the 
                                                          
9 This is joint work with Katharina Nicolay and Hannah Nusser. 
10 This is joint work with Christoph Spengel and Johannes Voget. An earlier version of the paper has been 
circulated as a ZEW discussion paper (Dudar et al. (2015)). 
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aim of shifting profits from high-tax affiliates to low-tax group members of a multinational 
group.11 
We empirically test the influence of taxation on royalty flows by using the OECD statistics on 
bilateral royalty payments between 3,422 country-pairs in the period between 1995 and 2012. 
In our benchmark analysis, we apply a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator in a 
fixed-effects framework and subsequently test the robustness of our results using alternative 
identification strategies. According to our main findings, corporate taxation negatively affects 
royalty intensity, meaning that royalties tend to flow from high-tax to low-tax countries. 
Moreover, we find that the tax differentials, which measure a relative level of taxation in a 
recipient country compared to other potential royalty recipients, also have a significant 
influence on royalty payments. These findings support the hypothesis that multinational 
enterprises use royalties and license fees for profit shifting.  
For tax policy considerations, this chapter analyzes potential outcomes of the ongoing work on 
profit shifting by the G20, the OECD, and the European Commission. To give an example, we 
find that reform suggestions of the OECD Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting, such 
as the enforcement of the Nexus Approach or strengthening of anti-avoidance regulations, are 
likely to reduce the intensity of international royalty exchange. 
Chapter 512 contributes to numerous empirical studies that have analyzed the influence of 
corporate taxation on the location of intangible assets. The previous literature has tended to 
focus on studying the impact of taxation on patent location choices and has assumed that they 
represent all other intangibles as well. This chapter complements earlier studies by estimating 
and comparing the tax elasticities of two different types of intellectual property – patents and 
trademarks. In comparison to patents, trademarks are generally easier to register and incur lower 
development costs. Their development does not typically require detailed documentation and 
the location of other intangibles in the same family is less likely to be a decisive factor, as can 
often be the case with patents. Therefore, we expect trademarks to be more responsive to 
changes in corporate taxation than patents. 
                                                          
11 See Kopits (1976) for further details on this argument. 
12 This is joint work with Johannes Voget. An earlier version of the paper has been circulated as a ZEW discussion 
paper (Dudar and Voget (2016)). 
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We empirically test whether there is a difference in the tax elasticities of patents and trademarks 
by employing data on European and US patent and trademark applications in the period between 
1996 and 2012. We apply the identification strategy of Griffith et al. (2014) and estimate a 
mixed logit model, which incorporates various observed and unobserved factors that determine 
location choices. According to our key findings, trademarks are more sensitive to changes in 
taxation than patents, which implies that there is a more intensive use of trademarks in tax 
planning in contrast to the use of patents. We also find empirical evidence which suggests that 
one of the explanations for different tax elasticities of patents and trademarks lies in a larger 
agglomeration of patents within their families compared to trademarks.  
Chapter 613 provides a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of R&D tax incentives. It 
explains the economic justification behind the state support of research and development and 
summarizes its main types. In addition, it gives an overview of the existing R&D tax incentives 
in Europe and provides a thorough review of the empirical literature on the outcomes of fiscal 
incentives. Furthermore, the Devereux and Griffith model is used to determine the effective tax 
burden of multinational firms that reside in countries which implement R&D tax support and 
countries which do not. In line with Spengel and Elschner (2010) and Evers et al. (2015a), the 
model is developed further to reflect the potential use of R&D incentives for tax planning.  
The hypothesis developed in the model is tested through an empirical estimation, where we 
employ the OECD data on international co-operation in patents. According to our main 
findings, there are at least two reasons why input-oriented R&D tax incentives, such as tax 
credits and tax super-deductions, constitute a more suitable instrument for fostering research 
and development in comparison to output-oriented incentives, such as IP Boxes. The first 
reason is the robust evidence found in the empirical literature which shows the positive effect 
introducing input-oriented tax incentives has on a firm’s innovative activity, whereas studies 
on output-oriented tax incentives are not able to support this argument. The second reason 
identifies that in accordance with our theoretical and empirical analyses, output-oriented R&D 
tax incentives may be used by multinationals for tax planning as opposed to their intended aim 
of fostering research and development. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the key findings of each chapter and draws 
policy implications relevant for the current political discussion on BEPS. 
                                                          
13 This is joint work with Christoph Spengel. 
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The chapters of this doctoral thesis have been written in co-operation with multiple co-authors 
with the aim of being published in academic journals within the fields of public economics, 
taxation, and accounting. Table 1.1 acknowledges the co-authors and provides information on 
the current publication status chapter by chapter. It also highlights my own involvement and 
key contribution in each study. 
Table 1.1 Joint Work within the Thesis: Co-Authors and My Own Contribution 
Chapter Co-Authors 
Publication 
Status My Contribution 
Chapter 3. On the 
Interdependency of 
Proﬁt Shifting 
Channels and the 
Effectiveness of Anti-
Avoidance Legislation 
K. Nicolay, 
H. Nusser 
Under review 
in The Journal 
of Accounting 
and Economics 
- A definition of the motivation of the 
study and its key contributions; 
- A review of previous studies and 
positioning of our paper in the 
literature; 
- Data collection and the preparation 
of the main dataset; 
- Panel data analysis, focusing on the 
part with interest payments as a 
dependent variable; 
- Primary development of the 
difference-in-differences analysis; 
- An interpretation of the empirical 
results and drawing conclusions and 
implications for future research and 
politics. 
Chapter 4. The Impact 
of Taxes on Bilateral 
Royalty Flows 
C. Spengel, J. 
Voget 
Under review 
in 
International 
Tax and Public 
Finance 
- Development of the idea behind the 
paper and its positioning in the 
literature; 
- Development of the conceptual 
framework and an explanation of the 
study’s predictions; 
- Data collection, data preparation, and 
an elaboration of the identification 
strategy; 
- Regression estimations, including 
robustness checks and extended 
analysis; 
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- An interpretation of the key findings, 
defining their contribution to the 
previous literature and drawing policy 
implications. 
Chapter 5. Corporate 
Taxation and the 
Location of Intangible 
Assets: Patents vs. 
Trademarks 
J. Voget Prepared for a 
submission 
- Preparation of the introduction which 
explains the aim of the study, its 
motivation, and contribution to the 
previous literature; 
- Derivation of the main hypotheses 
based on the review of prior literature 
and a qualitative analysis of the 
differences between patents and 
trademarks; 
- Development of the identification 
strategy, including a preparation of 
data and a definition of the variables 
used in an empirical analysis; 
- An empirical analysis, including 
baseline estimations, multiple 
robustness tests, and extensions to the 
study; 
- Drawing conclusions and policy 
implications. 
Chapter 6. Tax 
Incentives for 
Research and 
Development and 
Their Use in Tax 
Planning 
C. Spengel Prepared for a 
submission 
- Development of the idea behind the 
paper and a definition of its key 
contributions; 
- A qualitative analysis of the 
justification behind fiscal support of 
research and development; 
- An overview of the existing R&D 
incentives in Europe; 
- A review of the empirical literature 
on the effectiveness of R&D tax 
incentives; 
- A quantitative analysis of the 
effective tax burden with and without 
R&D tax incentives using the domestic 
and cross-border investment scenarios 
in the Devereux and Griffith model; 
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- An empirical investigation, including 
data preparation and the development 
of the identification strategy; 
- An interpretation of the key findings 
and drawing of the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Corporate Income Taxation and Profit Shifting by 
Multinational Enterprises 
2.1    Introduction  
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence which suggests that multinational corporations undertake 
various profit shifting strategies with the aim of diminishing their tax liabilities.14 One of the 
latest examples is the ongoing dispute between Apple Inc. and the European Commission, 
according to which Ireland granted undue tax benefits of up to 13 billion EUR to Apple Inc. 
The Commission has concluded that this treatment was selective and therefore illegal under the 
European Union (EU) state aid rules, because it allowed Apple Inc. to pay a substantially lower 
amount of tax than other businesses. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager argues that it allowed 
Apple Inc. to pay an effective tax rate of 1% on its European profits in 2003 and 0.005% in 
2014.15 
The media reports that governments are allegedly missing billions of euros in tax payments 
each year because of profit shifting.16 While the precise amount of revenue losses remains 
largely unknown, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates that the net global corporate tax revenues lost due to profit shifting may lie within a 
range between 4% and 10% of corporate tax revenues, or 95 to 230 billion EUR annually.17,18 
At the same time, multinational enterprises (MNEs) find numerous justifications for tax 
planning behavior. For instance, firms argue that they have a responsibility towards their 
shareholders to maximize profits. Aside from this, multinationals complain about double 
                                                          
14 See Sullivan (2012) for an overview. 
15 See European Commission (2016). 
16 See Fortune (2016). 
17 See OECD (2015d), p. 102. 
18 Murphy (2012) argues that this figure may be even higher. 
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taxation of cross-border activities, which however is becoming rare with a growing number of 
multinational and bilateral tax treaties all around the world.  
The issue of profit shifting by multinationals is becoming a growing concern for policy makers. 
Several international organizations, including the G20,19 the European Commission,20 and the 
OECD,9 have recently argued against income shifting and have stressed the importance of 
taxation in place of value creation and real economic activity. For example, in 2013 the OECD 
developed an Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS),21 which suggests some 
of the direct steps that the international community should take in order to close the loopholes 
in current regulations and amend the existing laws and regimes that facilitate profit shifting. 
According to the OECD, income shifting does not only harm governments and individual 
taxpayers by depriving them of substantial amounts of tax revenues, but it also distorts market 
competition by providing multinational firms with an unfair advantage against their purely-
domestic counterparts,22 as in the aforementioned example of Apple Inc. The European 
Commission responded to the OECD Action Plan by releasing the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package in 2016,23 which aims to increase the transparency of corporate transactions and 
operations, to eliminate profit shifting, as well as to strengthen co-operation on tax matters 
within the EU. 
The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of different aspects of corporate 
taxation. The major topics therefore include the development of corporate tax rates over the 
years, the magnitude of profit shifting, the use of different channels to shift profits, as well as 
current suggestions for reforming the existing tax system. Particular attention is paid towards 
the issue of profit shifting by multinational enterprises via a strategic use of intellectual property 
(IP). The analysis is carried out with the help of numerous descriptive statistics and a review of 
the related empirical literature. As for the geographical focus of this study, Germany is the 
primary focus of the analysis and its statistics and trends are compared with other European 
countries and the United States.  
The study is comprised as follows: section 2.2 addresses the significance of corporate taxation 
in the composition of total tax revenues. The revenues from corporate taxation in Germany, the 
                                                          
19 See OECD/G20 (2014). 
20 See European Commission (2015a). 
21 See OECD (2013a). 
22 See OECD (2013a), p. 8. 
23 See COM (2016a). 
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EU15,24 and the US are analyzed and compared with other types of tax revenues. In addition to 
this, the development of corporate tax rates is studied here and compared with the development 
of tax rates on personal income, consumption, and property. Section 2.3 focuses on the issue of 
profit shifting by multinational enterprises. This part of the study defines concepts such as tax 
planning, tax avoidance, tax evasion, and profit shifting and explains the key channels used by 
multinationals to shift income. The focus is on shifting with the help of intangible assets. 
Furthermore, section 2.4 summarizes the main ideas on reforming the existing international tax 
system in order to hinder profit shifting and eliminate its other inefficiencies. Finally, the last 
section presents the key findings of the study and draws the main conclusions and policy 
implications. 
2.2    Corporate Income Tax  
This chapter begins with an analysis of general reasons for taxing corporate income and goes 
on to compare the development of corporate income tax (CIT) rates with the development of 
tax rates on personal income, consumption, and property. The focus of the analysis is on 
corporate income taxation in Germany, the EU15, and the US.  
2.2.1    Corporate Income Taxation 
In 1909 the United States enacted its first uniform Corporate Tax Act, which introduced an 
excise tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form.25 This tax on the profits of 
corporations is considered a predecessor of the modern corporate income tax, which is 
nowadays levied in all countries around the world (with the exemption of a few tax havens). 
Germany was among the first European countries to enact a uniform corporate income tax in 
1920. In the current tax system, profit is taxed primarily in the country in which it is generated 
(referred to as a source country). The United States is the only high-income country that seeks 
to add an additional layer of tax when the profit is repatriated to an American parent company, 
which introduces an element of a residence-based taxation. However, as Devereux (2008) notes, 
the sums raised from an additional layer of tax in the United States are usually rather small. 
                                                          
24.The EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
25 According to Keightley and Sherlock (2014), the US made a few unsuccessful attempts to introduce a uniform 
corporate taxation in the 19th century. However, the Supreme Court claimed these initiatives to be unconstitutional. 
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Hence, the author concludes that in the current tax system the international taxation of profit is 
levied primarily on a source basis.  
Corporate income taxation serves several goals. For example, it ensures the integrity of the tax 
system and spurs transparent documentation of annual accounts and business transactions of all 
corporations.26 In addition, along with revenues from other tax bases, corporate income taxation 
contributes to a country’s total tax revenues, which in turn constitute an important part of the 
overall government revenues. German tax revenues including social contributions amounted to 
around 85% of the total government revenues in 2012. This share is approximately the same in 
other European countries and is equal to 80% in the United States.  
In most countries, tax revenues result from various federal and local taxes on income, property, 
and consumption. Income taxation can be split into taxation of individuals and companies. The 
first category usually includes a personal income tax (PIT) and social security contributions, 
whereas the second one typically comprises a corporate income tax, a business tax, and other 
taxes on income of corporations. Property may be taxed via a real estate tax or a wealth tax. 
Consumption is often taxed with the help of excise taxes, a value-added tax (VAT), or a sales 
tax.  
Figure 2.1 reflects the composition of total tax revenues in countries of the EU15 and the US. 
According to this figure, German personal income tax combined with social security 
contributions amounts to more than 60% of the country’s total tax revenues. The second most 
important source of tax revenues in Germany appears to be consumption, as the VAT levied 
around 30% of the country’s total tax revenues in 2012. In contrast, the revenues from corporate 
income taxation add up only to around 5% of the total tax revenues. Property taxes account for 
an even smaller portion of total revenues. The given composition of tax revenues has remained 
stable in Germany since the mid-1970s. According to Figure 2.1, the structure of tax revenues 
in countries of the EU15 is similar to the German one. In these countries, personal income 
taxation and social security contributions along with consumption taxes constitute the most 
important sources of tax revenues. In line with Germany, the revenues from the CIT and 
property taxation are relatively small compared to other types of taxes. However, in countries 
such as Luxembourg, Portugal, and the UK the share of corporate tax revenues to the total tax 
revenues amounts to around 10%. This difference is partly due to the share of the legal forms 
                                                          
26 More information on the functions of the corporate tax system is given in section 2.4.2.4. 
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of companies that reside in each country. For example, in Germany around 70% of all firms are 
sole proprietors or business partnerships, which do not pay corporate income tax.27 By contrast, 
in the United Kingdom this share lies below 30%.28 
Figure 2.1 Composition of Total Tax Revenues, 2012 
 
Notes: Data comprises tax revenues on the federal, state, and local levels. Taxes on property and other taxes include 
recurrent taxes on immovable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, taxes on 
financial and capital transactions, non-recurrent taxes on property, other taxes on property, as well as taxes on 
payroll and workforce. Country codes and the corresponding country names are in the list of country abbreviations. 
SSC stands for social security contributions. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Source: OECD Stat, 
database Revenue Statistics – Comparative Tables.  
Furthermore, Figure 2.1 demonstrates that in the US, similarly to European countries, personal 
income taxation plays a rather important role in the composition of total tax revenues. However, 
the share of consumption taxation is a little lower and the portion of corporate income and 
property taxation is higher than in countries within the EU15. For example, while the CIT 
accounts for 5% of total tax revenues in Germany and on average 6% in the EU15, its share in 
the US reaches 10%. Thus, the United States seems to rely slightly more on corporate income 
taxation than European countries in the composition of its total tax revenues. 
                                                          
27 See Federal Statistical Office (2017). 
28 See Office for National Statistics (2017). 
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2.2.2    The Development of Tax Rates  
This section analyzes the development of corporate income tax rates and compares them to the 
development of taxes on personal income, consumption, and property in different countries. 
Germany is the central focus of this analysis and is compared with the US and the EU15-average 
along with some other high-tax and low-tax European countries such as Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the development of corporate income tax rates in Germany and other 
countries over the past two decades. In several OECD member states, corporate income taxation 
is levied not only on a federal but also on a local level. Figure 2.2 presents statistics on a 
combined CIT rate which incorporates all federal and local business income tax rates. Since 
local business taxes usually vary within countries, the combined CIT rates presented in Figure 
2.2 are calculated for countries’ economic centers. According to Figure 2.2, statutory corporate 
income tax rates have been declining rapidly over the past years. For instance, the combined 
corporate income tax rate in Germany decreased from 55% in 1990 to around 30% in 2012. In 
the EU15 it declined gradually from an average of around 41% in 1990 to 26% in 2012. By 
contrast, the American CIT rate remained at a rather constant level since its sharp fall at the end 
of the 1980s.  
As Devereux and Sørensen (2006) note, in many OECD countries a decrease in the CIT rate 
was accompanied by a simultaneous broadening of the corporate tax base. Therefore, when 
analyzing the development of corporate income tax rates, it is important to consider changes in 
both the statutory and the effective rates. Figure 2.3 presents statistics on the development of 
the effective average tax rates (EATRs) in Germany, the United States, and other countries 
since 1990. These rates were calculated at the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
following the Devereux and Griffith (1999) approach.29 EATR measures an effective tax burden 
of a hypothetical investment decision, which flows into five assets such as buildings, 
machinery, patents, financial assets, and inventories. The project is financed with the help of 
retained earnings, debt, and new equity. As a result, the Devereux and Griffith (1999) model 
includes various aspects of a country’s tax system. For example, it not only incorporates 
                                                          
29 See ZEW (2016). 
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statutory corporate income tax rates but also includes important tax base regulations and non-
income taxes.30 
Figure 2.2 Statutory CIT Rates Including Surtaxes, 1990-2012, % 
 
Notes: The combined CIT tax rate is the sum of an adjusted federal government CIT rate and a local rate. The local 
tax rate is based on the taxation in a country’s economic center. The adjusted federal government rate represents 
the net tax rate where the central government provides a deduction with respect to local income taxes. For 
Luxembourg no data on surtaxes is available for 1990-1999. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. 
Source: OECD Stat, database Corporate Income Tax. 
According to Figure 2.3, effective average tax rates have decreased in most countries under 
analysis since 1990. However, their decline is smaller than the fall of the statutory corporate 
income tax rates presented in Figure 2.2. For example, while Germany’s EATR decreased from 
approximately 45% in 1990 to around 28% in 2012, the average tax burden of the EU15 lost 10 
percentage points during this time and the US tax rate remained almost unchanged. The findings 
show that Ireland is the only country which has experienced a small increase in the effective 
tax burden. According to Norregaard and Khan (2007), some Irish industries, such as the 
manufacturing sector and international trading services, have benefited from a reduced 
corporate income tax rate of 10% before 2003. The remainder of the corporate sector was taxed 
at a much higher rate. As an example, Figure 2.2 shows that the standard CIT rate in Ireland in 
                                                          
30 These taxes include taxes on real estate, property, wealth, etc. 
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the 1990s amounted to around 40%. Since the Devereux and Griffith model calculates an 
effective tax burden for a manufacturing company, the reduced rate was applied to the 
calculations prior to 2003. The Irish tax reform of 2003 harmonized the corporate income tax 
rate for all sectors setting it at 12.5%, which resulted in a slightly higher EATR in the Devereux 
and Griffith model but a lower statutory CIT rate in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.3 Effective Average Corporate Tax Rates, 1990-2012, %  
 
Notes: The calculation is based on the model developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999). It measures the effective 
taxation of a corporation that undertakes a hypothetic investment in five predefined economic goods such as 
intangible assets, industrial buildings, machines, financial assets, and inventories. The project is financed by the 
means of retained earnings, borrowed capital, and new equity capital. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 
members. Source: ZEW (2016).  
Furthermore, Figure 2.3 divides the countries under analysis into low-tax and high-tax 
countries. Hence, the effective tax burden of countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg is below the EU15-average in 2012 and that is why they can be 
considered low-tax countries. By contrast, the EATRs of France, Germany, the UK, and the US 
exceed the EU15-average and can therefore be classified as high-tax countries.  
While the statutory and effective corporate income tax rates have decreased over the past years, 
taxes on personal income, consumption, and property have remained mostly unchanged. To 
illustrate this point further, Figure 2.4 shows the development of average tax rates on personal 
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income in Germany and other countries. A comparison of the previously mentioned countries 
shows that Germany had one of the highest average PIT rates in Europe in 2012. For example, 
the average personal tax rate was equal to approximately 17% in Switzerland, 19% in Ireland, 
and 24% in the UK. These rates are substantially lower than the German average PIT of almost 
40%. Moreover, Figure 2.4 shows that the personal income tax rate in the US is equal to 24%, 
which is subsequently lower than the German PIT rate and is also below the EU15-average. 
Therefore, Germany can be considered a country with a relatively high level of taxation not 
only in terms of corporate taxation but also in terms of personal income taxation. 
Figure 2.4 All-In Average PIT Rates, 2000-2012, % 
 
Notes: Average personal income tax rates (including social contributions) for single persons without children, 
calculated using the average wage. The results are derived from the OECD Taxing Wages framework (elaborated 
in the annual publication Taxing Wages). EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Source: OECD Stat, 
database All-in Average Personal Income Tax Rates at Average Wage by Family Type.  
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the development of the consumption tax rates during the past few 
decades in Germany and other countries under analysis. In contrast to income taxation, the 
harmonization of the consumption tax has been on the European Union agenda since the early 
years of its existence. As early as in 1967, the European Commission issued its first value-
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added tax directive,31 aiming to harmonize consumption taxation in the EU. The European 
Commission introduced its sixth VAT directive a decade later,32 which empowered member 
states to choose their rates of VAT while regulating the minimum rate that could be set. These 
directives, along with additional work from the European Union, have led to the harmonization 
and stabilization of the VAT rate in the EU. The German standard VAT rate of 19% was slightly 
below the EU15-average of 21% in 2012. It is worth mentioning that while in European 
countries consumption tax rates are usually uniform on the national level, the US sales tax rates 
vary from state to state. The development of the sales tax rate in Los Angeles, California is 
given in Figure 2.5 as an example and it appears to be lower than the consumption tax rates in 
most European countries. When comparing the taxation of personal income with the taxation 
of consumption in Europe and the United States, it is evident that they tax income more heavily 
than consumption. 
Figure 2.5 Standard VAT Rates, 1980-2012, % 
 
Notes: The combined sales tax rate of Los Angeles, CA has been taken as an example for the United States. Due 
to a lack of data, the EU15-average does not contain Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain in the years 1980 and 
1985; for the same reason the EU15-average excludes Finland in 1990. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 
members. Sources: OECD Stat, database Consumption Tax Rates and the California State Board of Equalization. 
                                                          
31 See European Commission (1967). 
32 See European Commission (1977). 
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Property taxation can be implemented by the means of recurrent and non-recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, net wealth, inheritance, and gifts. However, taxes on inheritance and gifts 
usually have generous tax allowances and most European countries and the United States do 
not currently have any net wealth taxes. Luxembourg is one of the exceptions, since its resident 
firms are subject to a 0.5% wealth tax on their net asset value. As for a real estate tax, most 
OECD countries split it into a federal and a local real estate tax, which leads to its variation on 
the local level within individual countries. Figure 2.6 shows the development of combined real 
estate tax rates (including real estate taxation on federal and local levels) in economic centers 
of different countries in the period between 1998 and 2012. According to this figure, the 
taxation of real estate in Germany has been lower than in the EU15 and the United States during 
the whole period of observation. While a real estate tax rate is under 1% in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the US, it reaches almost 2% in the economic centers 
of France and the UK. Furthermore, similarly to the tax rates on personal income and 
consumption, real estate tax rates have remained rather constant in Germany, the EU15, and the 
US since the 1990s.  
Figure 2.6 Effective Real Estate Tax Rates, 1998-2012, % 
 
Notes: The effective real estate tax rate includes both federal and local tax rates. The local tax rate is based on the 
taxation in a country’s economic center. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Sources: ZEW (2016), 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1995-2012). 
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In summary, Figures 2.2-2.6 show that the statutory and effective corporate income tax rates 
have declined in most countries since the end of the last century, whereas the taxation of 
personal income, consumption, and property has remained rather constant during this period. 
To illustrate this finding more clearly, consumption and real estate tax rates in Germany have 
increased slightly between 2000 and 2012. At the same time, the all-in average personal income 
tax rate has decreased by 8%. The statutory corporate income tax rate has experienced the most 
striking development falling by 41% between 2000 and 2012, with the effective average 
corporate tax rate decreasing by 28% during this period. According to Devereux (2008), a fall 
in corporate income tax rates is commonly attributed to countries that attempt to undercut each 
other in a tax competition in order to attract inward investment. The author argues that the 
decrease in tax rates might also be triggered by other reasons, such as a growing belief among 
policy makers that high tax rates are not appropriate. However, Devereux (2008) observes that 
in this case personal income tax rates would have strongly decreased as well, following the 
same pattern as corporate income tax rates. Figure 2.4 shows that this scenario does not 
represent the actual development of the PIT rates over the last couple of years. Thus, a growing 
competition for mobile firms, capital, and profits along with decreasing competition over 
individuals subject to personal taxes might be one of the factors which led to falling corporate 
income tax rates over the past couple of years.33 
Despite the declines in statutory and effective corporate income tax rates, in 2012 the German 
effective corporate tax burden of 28% was still higher than the EU15-average and significantly 
exceeded the EATRs of Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and most 
Eastern European countries. Multinational enterprises that operate in several high-tax and low-
tax countries might exploit such differences in corporate income tax rates for base erosion and 
profit shifting in order to minimize their consolidated tax liabilities. This issue has been 
analyzed in numerous empirical and theoretical studies and is the primary focus within the next 
section. 
                                                          
33 See Bretschger and Hettich (2005) for empirical evidence on the international tax competition (also known as a 
“race to the bottom”). 
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2.3  Multinational Enterprises and Profit Shifting 
Nowadays most countries apply a territorial or source-based corporate tax system.34 According 
to this approach, profit is taxed in the country where it is generated. However, it is not always 
straightforward where profits originate from, especially in the case of multinational enterprises. 
MNEs consist of multiple units that allow them to spread their operations, such as production, 
marketing, sales, treasury, research and development (R&D), and many others, all around the 
world. The operations of multinational groups may therefore involve numerous locations and 
Devereux (2008) argues that this gives MNEs an opportunity to choose where to locate their 
taxable profits. 
The previous section has shown that corporate income tax rates differ substantially across 
countries. Multinational enterprises are aware of these differences and may prefer to locate their 
profits in low-tax countries rather than the high-tax ones in order to minimize their overall tax 
liabilities. This section defines tax planning, tax avoidance, and tax evasion and explains the 
notion of profit shifting. Furthermore, it analyzes some descriptive statistics and summarizes 
the findings of the empirical literature on profit shifting behavior of multinational enterprises. 
The chapter concentrates on MNEs, even though domestic firms might use tax saving strategies 
as well. In addition, the focus is on the activities of German and US multinationals in several 
low-tax and high-tax European countries.  
2.3.1    Tax Havens and Tax Reducing Strategies 
2.3.1.1    Tax Havens 
Tax havens are countries that have low or no tax rates and therefore enable multinational firms 
to carry out profit shifting.35 According to the OECD (1998), tax havens are characterized not 
only by low tax rates but also by a lack of effective exchange of information and no transparency 
in the operation of legislative or administrative provisions. The OECD created an initial list of 
uncooperative tax havens in 2000,36 which included Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Liberia, 
and a few other countries. These countries have since been subject to international pressure to 
                                                          
34 After Japan and the UK moved to a source-based tax system in 2009, the US remained the only major economy 
that applies worldwide taxation, under which American companies are taxed on the income they earn in foreign 
countries in addition to the income they earn at home. See Business Roundtable (2011) for more information. 
35 See OECD (1998), p. 21-22. 
36 See OECD (2017b). 
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increase their transparency and to exchange information on tax issues, which has resulted in no 
jurisdiction currently being on the list. Even though the OECD definition of a tax haven takes 
other aspects of a tax system besides the tax rates into consideration, Gravelle (2015) argues 
that economists might define any low-tax country which has the aim of attracting capital as a 
tax haven.37 Therefore, a tax haven could be defined as any country which has low or non-
existent taxes, as suggested by the author. 
Even within Europe, the vast differences in corporate taxation enable countries to be divided 
into low-tax and high-tax countries. For instance, the Benelux countries (Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Ireland, and Switzerland either have low corporate income tax 
rates or offer favorable tax regulations that allow multinationals to lower their global tax bases. 
To give an example, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium have relatively high statutory 
corporate income tax rates, as Figure 2.2 illustrates. However, tax regulations in the Netherlands 
allow (or have permitted in the past) multinational enterprises to implement tax avoidance 
strategies, such as the Double-Dutch with an Irish Sandwich.38  
Furthermore, multinational corporations that reside in Belgium are entitled to generous tax 
deductions and tax exemptions and are able to benefit from the notional interest deduction 
(NID).39 Multinational enterprises in Luxembourg may negotiate a special tax arrangement with 
the local tax authorities. The European Commission considers these arrangements to be in 
breach of the EU state aid rules, since they give certain companies an unfair advantage against 
their competitors.40 All of these special tax regulations and arrangements may reduce the tax 
liability of firms located in Luxembourg, Belgium, or the Netherlands to nearly zero. In 
comparison, France, Germany, and the United States have relatively high CIT rates (see Figure 
2.2) and do not offer special treatment for multinational enterprises, which is why they might 
be considered high-tax countries. 
                                                          
37 See Gravelle (2015), p. 2. 
38 This tax avoidance technique involves sending profits from one Irish company to a Dutch affiliate and finally to 
a second Irish company with headquarters in a tax haven. The loophole in the Irish tax legislation that enabled this 
strategy was closed in 2015. However, companies with established business structures were allowed to benefit 
from the old system until 2020. 
39 NID allows a tax-free return on qualified equity and is therefore especially attractive for new companies with 
high equity investments. 
40 See European Commission (2015b). 
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2.3.1.2    Tax Planning 
Tax planning aims to organize tax affairs of a firm in the most effective way using various 
methods within the boundaries of the law. According to Russo (2007), the need for tax planning 
might arise, for example, when a multinational experiences double taxation. The OECD (2015e) 
defines double taxation as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more countries on the 
same taxpayer, the same tax base, and in the same period of time.41 According to the OECD, 
double taxation is harmful, as it hinders international exchange of goods and services and a free 
movement of capital.42 In addition to avoiding double taxation, tax planning can be used to 
exploit a tax saving potential of the existing business activities of a multinational firm. For 
example, a company might opt for a declining balance method instead of a linear depreciation 
of tangible and intangible assets if this step brings a temporary or a permanent tax advantage. 
2.3.1.3    Tax Avoidance 
A more harmful form of tax planning is called aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance. 
According to the European Commission (2012), “aggressive tax planning consists in taking 
advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax 
systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability.”43 Its objective is to use the loopholes in the 
existing laws and regulations in order to minimize a multinational’s overall tax liability. Even 
though tax avoidance is legal, lawmakers still do not welcome it, arguing that it takes unfair 
advantage of legal provisions in a way that differs from their originally intended use.44 
Examples of tax avoidance include a deduction of the same loss in multiple countries or a 
situation in which income that is not taxed in a source country is exempt in the country of 
residence, which results in double non-taxation. Campbell and Helleloid (2016) describe 
diverse tax avoiding strategies used by Starbucks Corp. for the minimization of its tax liability 
in the UK. According to the authors, the firm manipulated its transfer prices on transactions 
with its affiliates in the Netherlands and Switzerland to shift income generated in the UK 
abroad. Gravelle (2015) notes that if such manipulations of transfer prices cannot be overturned 
                                                          
41 See OECD (2015e), p. 7. 
42 It is important to note that double taxation is becoming rare nowadays with an increasing number of bilateral 
and international tax treaties all around the world. 
43 See European Commission (2012), p. 2. 
44 See OECD (2017a). 
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in court, for example because of a lack of evidence to establish the arm’s length price, this kind 
of behavior can be considered lawful.  
Sandmo (2005) argues that the simplistic definition of tax avoidance fails to distinguish 
between tax avoiding activities of MNEs and an impact taxation has on demand and supply via 
relative price effects. As an example, a multinational might decide to construct a factory in a 
low-tax jurisdiction to take advantage of low foreign corporate tax rates. An individual might 
choose to take a train instead of a flight because of increasing taxes on air travel. Even though 
these decisions could be classified as tax avoidance, Sandmo (2005) argues that such price 
effects should be distinguished from the active tax avoiding behavior of multinational 
enterprises. 
2.3.1.4    Tax Evasion  
The main distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance is in the legality of the taxpayer’s 
actions. Sandmo (2005) sees tax evasion as a managerial decision not to fully report taxable 
corporate profits in order to reduce tax payments. Since tax evasion always involves the 
concealment of income from tax authorities, Deak (2004) argues that it is often connected with 
the informal economy and is associated with crimes such as money laundering, tax fraud, or 
false accounting. According to Gravelle (2015), an example of tax evading behavior could 
include setting up a secret bank account in a tax haven without reporting the interest income. 
The line between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is often very thin. For instance, if 
it were possible to prove that the transfer prices used by Starbucks Corp. in the aforementioned 
example were too high or too low, the company’s behavior could be classified as a form of tax 
evasion rather than tax avoidance. 
2.3.2    Profit Shifting 
The OECD defines profit shifting as “an allocation of income and expenses between related 
corporations or branches of the same legal entity […] in order to reduce the overall tax liability 
of the group or corporation.”45 Depending on the degree to which a profit shifting activity lies 
within the boundaries of law, it might be considered a tax evading, tax avoiding, or tax planning 
behavior. Further analysis does not distinguish between legal and illegal profit shifting 
                                                          
45 See OECD (2017a). 
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activities; however, this separation is important and should be kept in mind, as explained in 
section 2.3.1. 
In order to establish whether multinational enterprises engage in profit shifting activities, 
researchers often analyze whether or not firms invest more in low-tax countries in comparison 
to their high-tax counterparts. Further analysis of whether these investments are proportional to 
the real business activity which occurs in these countries is also carried out. Feld and 
Heckemeyer (2011) give a thorough overview of numerous studies that empirically assess the 
impact of taxation on the location and magnitude of foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
authors conduct a meta-analysis and find a tax semi-elasticity of FDI to equal 2.5 (in absolute 
terms), which confirms that high taxation discourages multinationals to invest and expand their 
business and that a low level of taxation has an opposite effect. By contrast, Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2013) conduct a meta-analysis of the literature on profit shifting and find a tax semi-
elasticity of reported profits to equal 0.8 (in absolute terms). Comparing these two findings, 
corporate taxation appears to have a more profound effect on the real investment than on profit 
shifting of MNEs. Indeed, according to the Eurostat,46 German and American multinationals 
have been substantially increasing their FDI in European low-tax countries. For example, the 
FDI stock of German multinationals in the Netherlands amounted to 18% of their total foreign 
direct investments in 2012, while the share of German FDI in Luxembourg totaled 9%. In the 
case of US corporations, the corresponding shares add up to 14% in the Netherlands and 8% in 
Luxembourg. In order to see whether these investments might have a tax planning rationale, 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show statistics on German and American capital invested abroad per 
employee, following the approach introduced by Spengel (2003). 
According to Figure 2.7, German capital invested in high-tax countries such as France and the 
US is proportional to the number of employees in these countries. However, in the case of some 
low-tax countries such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the invested capital is much larger 
than the number of employees who work at the subsidiaries of German multinationals in these 
countries. This suggests that the capital invested by German multinationals in some low-tax 
European states might not correspond to their real business activity in these countries. 
Comparing Figures 2.7 and 2.8, it is apparent that the US has increased its investment in 
European low-tax countries on an even larger scale than Germany. As indicated by Figure 2.8,  
                                                          
46 See Eurostat (2017). 
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Figure 2.7 German Capital Invested Abroad per Employee, 1989-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members except for Germany. Source: Bundesbank, database 
Investiertes Kapital aus Deutschland pro im Partnerland Beschäftigtem für Verschiedene Steueroasen.  
Figure 2.8 US Capital Invested Abroad per Employee, 1989-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: No data for Luxembourg between 1999 and 2003. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Source: 
OECD Stat, database Outward Activity of Multinationals by Country of Location. 
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American capital invested abroad per employee has risen rapidly in Luxembourg since the mid-
1990s. The capital invested by American firms in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland 
substantially exceeds the number of persons they employ in these countries as well. However, 
the situation seems to be different in high-tax countries such as France, Germany, and the UK, 
where US corporations appear to invest as much capital as the number of workers they employ. 
In order to track the signs of profit shifting, the lucrativeness of German and US investments in 
low-tax and high-tax countries could also be compared. Hence, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 display 
statistics on the turnover per employee of the subsidiaries of German and American 
multinationals in various countries. Figure 2.9 illustrates that German subsidiaries in 
Luxembourg, Ireland, and Switzerland have reported an increasing turnover per employee ratio 
over the past few years. In comparison, the corresponding ratio for German subsidiaries in the 
US, France, and the EU15 appears to be significantly lower.  
Figure 2.9 Turnover per Employee of the Affiliates of German Multinationals, 1989-2012, 
Million EUR 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members except for Germany. Source: Bundesbank, database 
Investiertes Kapital aus Deutschland pro im Partnerland Beschäftigtem für Verschiedene Steueroasen. 
Figure 2.10 illustrates the ratio of turnover per person employed at the subsidiaries of US 
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ratio in low-tax and high-tax jurisdictions is even more striking than in the case of German 
MNEs (see Figure 2.9). For instance, in 2012 the subsidiaries of US multinationals in 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Ireland reported three times as much turnover per employee as 
their counterparts in France, Germany, and the UK. Interestingly, the ratio of turnover per 
employee by the affiliates of American multinationals also appears to be slightly higher in 
Belgium and the Netherlands than in France, Germany, and the UK. This is not surprising, since 
although Belgium and the Netherlands have relatively high corporate income tax rates, they 
still offer some beneficial tax schemes that may facilitate profit shifting, as described in section 
2.3.1.1. 
Figure 2.10 Turnover per Employee of the Affiliates of US Multinationals, 1989-2012, Million 
EUR 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Source: OECD Stat, database Penn World Table 9.0. 
Figures 2.7-2.10 demonstrate that German and American multinationals not only undertake 
more capital-intensive investments in low-tax countries but also report a higher turnover per 
employee in these countries than in high-tax jurisdictions. Aside from this, the tendency to 
invest capital and generate higher returns in low-tax countries seems to be stronger in the case 
of the US than that of Germany, at least in the low-tax countries under analysis. However, these 
figures can only point to a correlation between tax rates and foreign activity of multinational 
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companies. In order to argue in favor of or against any causal links, one has to take a look at 
the findings of the empirical literature.  
There are numerous empirical studies that employ accounting data to estimate the impact of 
corporate taxation on the reported pre-tax profits of affiliates of multinational companies. One 
of the first analyses in this field are those conducted by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines 
and Rice (1994), who find that tax rate differentials between foreign subsidiaries of American 
multinationals and their parents influence reported profits of the subsidiaries. According to the 
authors, this demonstrates that US parent firms shift their profits to low-tax subsidiaries. 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) find evidence which suggests that profit shifting occurs not only 
between a parent and its subsidiaries but also among subsidiaries. Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2013) conduct a meta-analysis of studies in this field of research and provide a consensus 
estimate of the tax rate elasticity of reported pre-tax profits. The authors argue that a one 
percentage point increase in an international tax differential that can be used for tax arbitrage 
leads to a -0.8% fall in the affiliate’s reported profits. 
A few empirical studies on profit shifting use alternative identification strategies than the 
approach described above. For example, Egger et al. (2010) and Finke (2013) identify profit 
shifting behavior by comparing profits and corporate tax payments of multinational and 
national enterprises. According to their findings, multinational firms pay significantly less taxes 
than their purely domestic counterparts. Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) use another alternative 
estimation approach which compares the distribution of a parent’s earnings shocks among low-
tax and high-tax subsidiaries. The authors argue that once a parent experiences an exogenous 
income shock, its low-tax group subsidiaries are likely to report more profits, while profits of 
the high-tax affiliates remain unchanged.  
In summary, there is abundant empirical and theoretical literature on profit shifting by 
multinational enterprises that includes studies based on different data samples, time periods, 
countries of observation, and identification strategies. Almost all of them identify a negative 
connection between corporate income taxation and reported profits of the affiliates of 
multinational firms, which points to the existence of profit shifting by MNEs. 
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2.3.3    Channels of Profit Shifting 
Fuest et al. (2013) argue that profits earned in high-tax countries can be channeled to low-tax 
group entities via financial and non-financial strategies. The first category includes issuing 
internal debt, which leads to intra-firm interest payments. The second group comprises trade in 
goods and services between related parties and the resulting exchange of transfer prices. 
Furthermore, Dharmapala (2008) and Dharmapala (2014) note that a strategic location of 
intellectual property plays an important role in profit shifting, especially in the case of IP-
intensive firms.47 This chapter analyzes the key profit shifting channels showing relevant 
descriptive statistics and reviewing the main findings of the empirical literature. 
2.3.3.1    Internal Debt 
A strategic use of intra-affiliate debt is one of the main profit shifting channels, as Fuest et al. 
(2013) note. Schreiber (2013) observes that the cost of debt (which is an interest payment) is 
deductible from a company’s profits for tax purposes. By contrast, the cost of equity (which is 
a dividend payment) is non-deductible in most countries. This asymmetry between the tax 
treatments of debt and equity financing gives a multinational firm an incentive to finance 
activities of its high-tax affiliates using debt issued by the low-tax subsidiaries. In addition to 
manipulating the level of internal debt, a multinational might also strategically adjust intra-firm 
interest payments that are transferred from a high-tax to a low-tax country to lower its 
consolidated tax liability.48 
In order to track a potential use of internal debt as a means of profit shifting, one could look at 
the methods used by German and US multinationals to finance their foreign direct investments. 
FDI is usually financed by either retained earnings or debt and the payments typically flow 
from an investor to an investee; however, it can also be the case that payments flow vice versa. 
Figure 2.11 presents statistics on the debt financing of German outward foreign direct 
investments in some high-tax countries such as France and the US and low-tax countries such 
as members of the Benelux Union, Ireland, and Switzerland. According to Figure 2.11, the 
overall stock of German net foreign corporate debt decreased by almost three quarters and 
                                                          
47 In addition, there are several further profit shifting channels, such as tax treaty shopping or hybrid-mismatch 
arrangements. However, they remain less researched due to the unavailability of data needed for empirical analysis. 
48 However, it should be noted that the interest rate on intra-group loans can be directly compared with the market 
interest rate, which limits the manipulation of intra-group interest payments. 
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reached 172 billion EUR in 2008. Interestingly, it remained positive during the whole period of 
observation in countries such as France, the UK, and the US. However, in low-tax countries 
such as the Benelux Union, Ireland, and Switzerland it was either equal to zero or even reached 
negative values in some years. This implies that during this period German enterprises were 
borrowing either as much or even more from their investees in low-tax countries than what they 
were lending to them.  
Figure 2.11 German Stock of Net Foreign Corporate Debt, 1994-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: No data available for Luxembourg before 2001. This data is based on the FDI statistics, which implies that 
the debt is given by a German parent to the direct investment enterprise in a foreign country. EU15 denotes an 
average of the EU15 members except for Germany. Source: Eurostat, database EU Direct Investment Positions, 
Breakdown by Country and Economic Activity [bop_fdi_pos]. 
Figure 2.12 presents statistics on the recent development of the US stock of net foreign 
corporate debt in high-tax countries such as France and Germany along with low-tax countries 
such as members of the Benelux Union, Ireland, and Switzerland. Even though Figure 2.12 only 
covers the period between 2009 and 2012, it is evident that US companies appear to be less 
indebted in low-tax countries than in their German counterparts (see Figure 2.11). However, 
the share of US foreign corporate debt in Switzerland is negative, which implies that American 
enterprises acquire more loans from Swiss companies than vice versa. To summarize, Figures 
2.11 and 2.12 show that German and American multinationals are more indebted with respect 
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to their low-tax affiliates than the high-tax ones, which supports the findings of the empirical 
literature on this topic.  
Figure 2.12 US Stock of Net Foreign Corporate Debt, 2009-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: No data available before 2009. This data is based on the FDI statistics, which implies that the debt is given 
by a US parent to the direct investment enterprise in a foreign country. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 
members. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, database U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a 
Historical-Cost Basis by Account for Selected Countries. 
A large body of empirical literature analyzes the strategic use of intra-affiliate debt for profit 
shifting. These authors usually regress the affiliates’ intra-firm interest payments or internal 
debt holdings on the statutory corporate tax rate or the tax differential with respect to other 
group members. For example, Desai et al. (2004) use this approach to analyze the capital 
structures of foreign affiliates of US multinational corporations. They find that higher local tax 
rates lead to higher debt-to-assets ratios of affiliates of multinational firms, with internal 
borrowing (as opposed to external borrowing) being particularly sensitive to taxes. Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2005) confirm these findings using a sample of German MNEs. The authors 
argue that, in comparison to other companies, the leverage of wholly owned subsidiaries of 
multinational firms is more sensitive to changes in tax rate differentials and less sensitive to 
macroeconomic effects, such as changing interest rates. The findings of studies in this field of 
research point to a tax semi-elasticity of debt that ranges between 0.2 and 1.7 (see as examples: 
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Huizinga et al. (2008), Buettner and Wamser (2013), Overesch and Wamser (2014)). These 
results suggest that a one percentage point increase in a local statutory tax rate leads to an 
increase of 0.2% to 1.7% in an affiliate’s internal debt. Feld et al. (2013) conduct a meta-
analysis of the empirical literature on the use of debt as a means of profit shifting and argue that 
the affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio rises by 0.3 percentage points if its host country’s marginal 
tax rate increases by one percentage point. 
2.3.3.2    Intra-Firm Trade 
Hines (1997) claims that business operations of multinational enterprises typically entail 
numerous transactions between affiliates located in different countries. The prices attached to 
these transactions are known as transfer prices. According to the OECD, transfer prices used in 
intra-firm trade should be at arm’s length or, in other words, they should correspond to the 
prices that would have been used in the transactions with third parties.49 However, Miller and 
Oats (2014) argue that firm-specific transfers often lack comparable transactions in the market 
and therefore multinationals have a considerable leeway in establishing their transfer prices. 
According to the authors, this makes intra-firm trade the main non-financial instrument used by 
multinationals to shift profits. Hence, an MNE might set higher prices for goods and services 
transmitted from a low-tax subsidiary to a high-tax one. As a result, the tax base of a low-tax 
subsidiary would increase and the tax base of the high-tax affiliate would decrease. This would 
eventually diminish an overall tax liability of the group. The same reasoning applies to setting 
prices at too low of a level when goods and services are provided by a high-tax affiliate to the 
low-tax one. In addition to manipulating transfer prices, a multinational might strategically 
adjust trade volumes by artificially increasing exports from its low-tax affiliates to high-tax 
group members and decreasing the intra-firm trade in the opposite direction. 
In order to see whether multinational enterprises trade differently with their low-tax partners 
than with their high-tax ones, Figures 2.13 and 2.14 present statistics on the balance of trade 
(exports minus imports) of German and American enterprises with companies in several 
European countries. In the case of Germany, the statistics on total trade between corporations 
                                                          
49 For more information on the arm’s length principle see the OECD (2010). 
34    
are shown, whereas in the case of the US, the data on total intra-firm trade is used.50 Figure 
2.13 presents the balance of trade between German enterprises and companies located in low-
tax countries such as the Benelux Union, Ireland, and Switzerland as well as high-tax countries 
such as France, the UK, and the US.  
Figure 2.13 Balance of Trade of German Enterprises with Other Countries, 2005-2012, Million 
EUR 
 
Notes: Data for Switzerland and the US is available only from 2009 onwards. EU15 denotes an average of the 
EU15 members except for Germany. Sources: OECD Stat, database TEC by Partner Zone and Country and Penn 
World Table 9.0. 
According to Figure 2.13, German firms had a negative balance of trade with Dutch companies 
in 2012 and the years prior to this, which implies that German enterprises imported more from 
the Netherlands than what they exported to there during this period of time. Furthermore, 
German balance of trade with the US and France appears to be higher than its counterpart with 
Switzerland or Luxembourg. Hence, German companies seem to have a lower balance of trade 
(and therefore larger amounts of imported goods and services) with low-tax countries than with 
the high-tax countries under analysis. 
                                                          
50 This implies that the US data shows trade only between affiliated companies, whereas the German statistics do 
not distinguish between trade with affiliated and non-affiliated firms. The difference in the data type is due to the 
data availability constraint. 
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Figure 2.14 presents statistics on the balance of trade of American multinationals. It shows not 
just the balance of trade between enterprises but rather the balance of intra-firm trade, which is 
defined as trade between related companies. As evident from the figure, the total balance of US 
intra-firm trade has been declining in the last couple of years, which means that American 
enterprises have imported more from their foreign affiliates than what they have exported to 
them. As an example, the US balance of intra-firm trade with Ireland reached its record low of 
-21,716 million EUR in 2012, which means that the US-based companies imported more goods 
and services from their Irish affiliates than what was exported to them. 
Figure 2.14 Balance of Intra-Firm Trade of US Enterprises with Other Countries, 1989-2012, 
Million EUR 
 
Notes: Data is not available for Ireland in 2009-2011 and France in 2009-2012. EU15 denotes an average of the 
EU15 members. Sources: OECD Stat, database Outward Activity of Multinationals by Country of Location and 
Penn World Table 9.0. 
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 depict a certain correlation between taxation and the balance of trade of 
German and American corporations with foreign firms. However, in order to investigate a 
potential causal link, the findings of the empirical literature must be analyzed. Empirical studies 
on a strategic use intra-firm trade as a means of profit shifting compare the impact of corporate 
taxation on the prices and volumes of related-party and third-party trade (see as examples: Lall 
(1973), Clausing (2003), Bernard et al. (2006), Davies et al. (2017), and Flaaen (2017)). 
-60,000
-50,000
-40,000
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
World Belgium France Germany Ireland
Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland UK EU15nited Kingdom
36    
According to the findings of this literature, a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax 
rate leads to a decrease between -0.5% and -1.9% in intra-firm transfer prices. Davies et al. 
(2017) use detailed data on French firms to investigate the role of intra-firm trade in profit 
shifting and confirm these results. Furthermore, the authors argue that the negative effect of 
taxation on transfer prices is mostly due to the profit shifting behavior of large multinational 
enterprises that have affiliates in tax havens and is probably not caused by medium and small 
enterprises that have subsidiaries in non-tax havens only. 
Moreover, there are studies that attempt to draw a comparison of the two major profit shifting 
instruments – internal debt and intra-firm trade – and to establish their significance for 
multinational firms. The interest rate on intra-group loans can be directly compared with the 
market interest rate, which limits profit shifting by means of internal debt. At the same time, 
Overesch and Schreiber (2010) observe that there is a large degree of discretion in setting 
transfer prices on group-specific transactions. Hence, there are good reasons to believe that 
transfer pricing (especially with respect to licensing of intangible assets, which is discussed in 
the next section) represents the predominant route used by multinationals to shift profits. The 
empirical evidence on this issue comes from several individual studies and one meta-analysis. 
For example, the results of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) find a larger magnitude of shifting 
via debt financing51 in comparison to shifting via transfer pricing. By contrast, the empirical 
estimation conducted by Grubert (2003) points to approximately equal shares of the two shifting 
channels. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) carry out a meta-analysis of the existing empirical 
studies on profit shifting and compare the relative importance of different shifting channels. 
The authors come to the conclusion that multinationals use for profit shifting intra-firm trade 
to a greater extent than intra-firm debt. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) suggest that transfer 
pricing accounts for around 70% of overall profit shifting activities, while intra-firm debt 
accounts for approximately 30%. 
                                                          
51 However, it is important to note that their estimation strategy does not allow for a distinction between the use of 
internal and external debt for profit shifting. 
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2.3.4    The Role of Intangible Assets in Profit Shifting 
2.3.4.1    Intangible Assets: Definition and Attributes 
The European Commission defines an intangible asset as “[…] an identifiable non-monetary 
asset without physical substance.”52 The examples of intangible assets include brand names, 
publishing titles, trademarks, patents, customer lists, recipes, formulae, models, designs, 
prototypes, copyrights, know-how, and other non-physical assets. Intangibles may result from 
a research and development process, which is defined by the OECD as “[…] creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge […] and the use 
of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.”53 In addition, intangibles might arise 
from a firm’s marketing or operating activities as well as from its work in the literary or artistic 
fields. Since the creation of intangible assets usually triggers substantial costs, owners of the 
resulting intellectual property protect their assets with intellectual property rights. These rights 
grant the owners either temporary or a permanent permission to control and manage the use of 
their intangible assets. 
Numerous empirical and theoretical papers have studied the importance of intangible assets for 
a firm’s financial performance, productivity, and competitiveness. In addition, various authors 
have tried to estimate social returns from IP, arguing that intangibles play an important role not 
only for their owners but also for other market agents, such as competitors and customers. For 
example, Hall et al. (2010) give a detailed overview of the literature on private and social returns 
from research and development. According to the authors, most studies in this field empirically 
estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function of a firm augmented with knowledge capital, 
which represents intangible assets resulting from R&D. Hall et al. (2010) conclude that the 
private returns of developing and using knowledge capital are between 20% and 30%. In 
addition, the authors argue in favor of even higher social returns, which however appear to be 
more variable and are measured imprecisely in many studies. Moreover, Aw et al. (2011) find 
that a firm’s innovative activity contributes directly to its productivity. According to the 
authors, R&D investment raises future productivity by 4.8% when undertaken alone and by 
5.6% when combined with a growing participation in export markets. Furthermore, Crass and 
Peters (2014) conduct an empirical analysis using panel data on German companies. Their 
                                                          
52 See EU Commission (2011a), p. 3. 
53 See OECD (2002), p. 30. 
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conclusion indicates that both R&D-related IP and intangible assets resulted from branding and 
marketing activities increase a firm’s performance.  
Intangible assets are not only crucial for boosting a firm’s productivity and financial 
performance, but they may also be used by multinational enterprises for profit shifting. This is 
due to the high mobility and uniqueness of intangible assets. Fuest et al. (2013) argue that 
intangibles are highly mobile within a multinational firm, especially in comparison to human 
capital and physical assets. This implies that an intangible can be relatively easily relocated 
from a high-tax affiliate, which developed it, to a low-tax group member, which receives 
royalties afterwards. Endres and Spengel (2015) summarize a few techniques that MNEs may 
use to strategically locate and relocate their intangibles. For instance, a multinational might 
implement a contract R&D project, under which one affiliate conducts research and 
development while another one agrees to bear the financial risks and consequently becomes the 
owner of the resulting IP. A cost sharing agreement would lead to equivalent outcomes. 
Alternatively, an affiliate in a high-tax country might develop and subsequently sell an 
intangible asset to a low-tax group member. Nevertheless, this step could potentially not only 
trigger a high selling price but an exit tax as well. Finally, an MNE might decide to carry out 
its real R&D activity at an affiliate in a low-tax country. 
Furthermore, the owner of an intangible asset is entitled to receive royalties from companies 
that use its IP. According to the international tax regulations, royalty fees have to be at arm’s 
length, which is similar to the transfer prices set in intra-firm trade, as described in section 
2.3.3.2. However, the true price for the use of intangibles is often hard to determine. Bartelsman 
and Beetsma (2003) argue that there often exists no comparable third-party market if one 
affiliate develops or produces IP-intensive intermediate goods and other group members use 
them afterwards. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) suggest that this triggers a concern that 
multinationals may shift profits earned in high-tax countries to the intangible-holding low-tax 
affiliates by overstating the arm’s length royalties.  
To summarize, intangible assets not only play an important role in boosting a firm’s 
productivity and profitability but also combine a few attributes that make them exceptionally 
suitable for profit shifting. Thus, a multinational may either strategically allocate its IP among 
affiliates or set intra-firm royalties above or below the true price in order to minimize its 
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consolidated tax liability. The next section looks for descriptive and empirical evidence on the 
role of intellectual property in tax minimizing strategies of multinational enterprises. 
2.3.4.2    Intangible Assets and Profit Shifting 
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence on the use of intangible assets for profit shifting. For 
example, Microsoft Corporation has been accused of strategically relocating a considerable part 
of its patents to Ireland.54 According to the media, Microsoft Corporation has established an 
Irish subsidiary Round Island One Ltd. to channel its profits from intellectual property and other 
assets to tax havens. The subsidiary remained almost unknown to the public but quickly became 
one of the biggest companies in Ireland with gross profits of around nine billion EUR in 2004. 
Similarly, the world’s largest spirits producer Diageo plc has been blamed for a tax-motivated 
relocation of its famous trademarks, such as Johnnie Walker Scotch, J&B Rare, Gilbey’s Gin – 
brands worth hundreds of millions of euros.55 Diageo plc has allegedly received a generous tax 
relief from the Dutch tax authorities on income generated by the firm’s intangible assets, which 
allowed the company to stack up profits from its famous trademarks virtually tax-free.  
As described in the previous section, the unique attributes of intangible assets allow 
multinationals to use them for profit shifting in at least two ways. First, multinationals may 
strategically locate or relocate intangible assets to low-tax affiliates and therefore change the 
direction of royalty payments. This can be done through either a contract R&D project or a sale 
of an intangible from one affiliate to another, even though the latter strategy might trigger not 
only a high selling price but an exit tax as well. Secondly, MNEs may overstate or understate 
the level of intra-firm royalties and therefore alter the amount of royalty payments. In order to 
establish the magnitude of strategical location or relocation of intangible assets, Figures 2.15 
and 2.16 present descriptive statistics on the international co-operation in patents. For example, 
Figure 2.15 shows data on foreign countries, in which companies register intangible assets 
originally developed in Germany. This figure identifies that almost 20% of all patents registered 
in Luxembourg and Switzerland in 2012 had been invented in Germany. Furthermore, patents 
invented in Germany correspond to more than 5% of all patents held in the Netherlands and in 
                                                          
54 See Simpson (2005) for more information on the alleged profit shifting strategies of Microsoft Corporation. 
55 See The Guardian (2009a). 
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Figure 2.15 Share of Domestic Patents Invented in Germany, 1978-2012, % 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members except for Germany. Source: OECD Stat, database 
International Co-Operation in Patents. 
Figure 2.16 Share of Domestic Patents Invented in the United States, 1978-2012, % 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. Source: OECD Stat, database International Co-Operation 
in Patents. 
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Belgium. At the same time, the share of German inventions in the composition of total patent 
registrations is under 2% in the US and the UK.  
Figure 2.16 presents comparable statistics for the United States. According to this figure, in 
2012 around 35% of all patents held in Ireland had been invented in the US and notably the 
share of American patents registered in Ireland has been steadily increasing since the 1990s and 
continues to grow. Furthermore, more than 15% of all patents registered in Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have been created in the United States, whereas the share of 
American inventions in the total number of patents is substantially smaller in high-tax Germany 
or France and is rather low in other members of the EU15. 
The anecdotal evidence along with descriptive statistics presented in Figures 2.15 and 2.16 
point to a correlation between taxation and the location of intangible assets. In order to see the 
statistical significance of this issue, the evidence from the empirical studies has to be analyzed. 
Huizinga et al. (2008) and Dischinger and Riedel (2011) employ firm-level accounting data and 
investigate IP intensity of multinational enterprises in different countries. The authors find that 
low-tax affiliates of MNEs tend to have a higher intangibles-to-total-assets ratio than their high-
tax counterparts. To quantify these results, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) conclude that on 
average a one percentage point decrease in the average tax differential between the given 
subsidiary and other group affiliates raises its IP investment by around 1.7%. The authors argue 
that this result is observed even after controlling for a subsidiary’s size and after taking into 
account a dynamic investment pattern. 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), Alstadsæter et 
al. (2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Dinkel and Schanz (2015), and Bradley et al. (2015) investigate 
the association between corporate taxation and the location of intangible assets using an 
identification strategy that differs from Huizinga et al. (2008) and Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011). They employ data on patent applications at international patent registration offices. This 
data contains information about the patents’ legal owners that apply for an international 
protection of their inventions. According to these studies, there is a negative association 
between a statutory corporate tax rate and the ownership of patents at MNE affiliates. For 
example, Griffith et al. (2014) argue that increasing a statutory corporate tax rate by one 
percentage point leads to a drop in patent applications in the given country by between -0.5% 
and -3.9%. In addition, Ernst et al. (2014) argue that the quality of patents also plays an 
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important role in the determination of their location. According to the authors, intellectual 
property of high quality and value is more sensitive to changes in taxation than other intangible 
assets. Dudar and Voget (2016) compare the sensitivity of location choices for patents and 
trademarks. The authors replicate the results obtained by Griffith et al. (2014) for patents and 
conduct a corresponding estimation for trademarks. They find that trademarks are almost twice 
as elastic to changes in taxation as patents. Dudar and Voget (2016) explain this result by a 
more mobile nature of trademarks compared to patents and point to a need for adjusting anti-
avoidance legislation in accordance with the individual characteristics of various types of 
intangible assets. 
Another approach to analyzing the use of intangible assets as a means of profit shifting is to 
look at the international flows of royalty payments, which are fees paid for the use of IP. As 
explained above, multinationals have an incentive to overstate royalty payments flowing from 
high-tax to low-tax affiliates in order to shift profits to group members in low-tax countries and 
consequently minimize their overall tax liabilities. In addition to this, the data on royalty 
payments reflects information about the strategic location or relocation of intangible assets 
within corporate groups, since the more intangibles an affiliate owns (and the higher their 
quality is), the greater amount of royalty payments it receives. Figure 2.17 shows the 
development of royalty outflows from Germany to other European countries and the US during 
the past few years. According to this figure, the greatest shares of royalty payments flow from 
Germany to the US and the UK. However, it is worth noting that royalties transferred to 
Switzerland and the Netherlands are also above the EU15-average.  
Figure 2.18 shows royalty outflows from the US to some low-tax and high-tax European 
countries. The development of these payments is even more striking than the statistics on 
German royalty outflows presented in Figure 2.17. For example, Figure 2.18 shows that in 2012 
a greater share of royalties was flowing from the US to Switzerland than to France or Germany. 
The amount of royalty flows to Ireland also exceeds the EU15-average and seems to have been 
growing rapidly over the last few years.  
According to Figures 2.17 and 2.18, there is a negative association between statutory corporate 
tax rates and the direction and amount of German and US royalty payments. There are also 
several empirical studies that investigate a causal link between corporate taxation and bilateral 
royalty flows. For instance, Hines (1995), Collins and Shackelford (1998), and Dudar et al.  
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Figure 2.17 German Outflows of Royalty Payments, 1999-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members except for Germany. Source: OECD Stat, database EBOPS 
2002 – Trade in Services by Partner Country. 
Figure 2.18 US Outflows of Royalty Payments, 1989-2012, Million EUR 
 
Notes: No data for Luxembourg. No data for Ireland before 2006. EU15 denotes an average of the EU15 members. 
Source: OECD Stat, database EBOPS 2002 – Trade in Services by Partner Country. 
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(2015) analyze the impact of corporate taxation on bilateral international royalty flows. Hines 
(1995) uses data on royalties transferred from the affiliates of US multinationals to their parents. 
The author concentrates on estimating the impact of taxation on royalty intensity, which he 
defines as a ratio of royalty outflows in relation to the total sales of a paying affiliate. According 
to Hines (1995), a 10% reduction in the withholding tax rate on royalties stimulates additional 
royalty payments which equal 0.1% of sales. Dudar et al. (2015) conduct a similar type of 
analysis estimating bilateral royalty payments that flow between 3,660 country-pairs during the 
period between 1990 and 2012. In line with Hines (1995), the authors find evidence for a 
negative influence of taxation on the direction and amount of royalty flows. Dudar et al. (2015) 
also argue that an enforcement of strict anti-avoidance rules is likely to reduce an international 
exchange of royalty payments. 
In addition to the literature on IP location choices and bilateral royalty payments, there are also 
studies that investigate the overall profitability of IP-intensive firms in low-tax and high-tax 
countries. For example, Grubert (2003) uses the 1996 Treasury files to gather accounting 
information on the parents of US multinational corporations and their manufacturing 
subsidiaries. In the first part of his analysis, the author evaluates the association between 
taxation and a firm’s profitability taking into account the presence of intangible assets at each 
company. Grubert (2003) finds that IP-intensive affiliates in low-tax countries report 
significantly more profits than other group members. In the second part of his analysis, Grubert 
(2003) examines the data on intercompany transactions and argues that IP-intensive subsidiaries 
engage in a greater volume of related-party transactions than other affiliates. According to the 
author, a greater number of transactions gives these firms more opportunities to shift profits. 
Desai et al. (2006) employ panel data on American multinationals from 1982 to 1999 to identify 
the types of companies that are active in tax havens. The authors find that the IP-intensive US 
multinationals are most likely to invest in tax havens. Desai et al. (2006) argue that tax haven 
operations facilitate tax avoidance of IP-intensive companies not only by allowing them to shift 
taxable income out of high-tax jurisdictions but also by reducing the burden of home country 
taxation on foreign income.  
In summary, a large body of empirical literature investigates the role of intellectual property in 
profit shifting. These studies apply various identification strategies analyzing either the location 
choices for IP, flows of royalty payments, or attributes and activities of IP-intensive firms. They 
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come to the conclusion that multinational enterprises use intangible assets as an important 
instrument of profit shifting. 
2.4  Reforming the International Tax System 
The previous section presented an overview of the empirical literature and analyzed descriptive 
statistics that point to profit shifting behavior of multinational firms. It concluded that a strategic 
use of intra-firm trade and internal debt constitute two major channels of profit shifting. 
Furthermore, it was argued that intellectual property plays an increasingly important role in 
profit shifting as well, because intangible assets are highly mobile and their true value is often 
difficult to determine. Over the past few years, these issues have gained importance in the tax 
policy agenda of individual countries and international organizations. Policy makers call for 
closer international co-operation in reforming tax laws and regulations in order to eliminate 
profit shifting and other inefficiencies of the current tax system. While some of these reform 
proposals aim to fix loopholes in the existing system, others discuss fundamental changes of 
the established principles and rules. This section summarizes the major reform suggestions 
which aim to eliminate profit shifting and analyzes them with the help of the related empirical 
and theoretical literature. 
2.4.1    Fixing the Existing System 
In recent years, both the OECD and the European Union have developed international-level 
initiatives to combat profit shifting. The OECD Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting 
(2013)56 aims to prevent double non-taxation and low taxation that result from income shifting. 
The focus of this plan is on strengthening the existing regulations and creating new ones to 
ensure that profits associated with the use and transfer of tangible and intangible assets are 
allocated in accordance with the value creation and not apart from it. The European 
Commission presented its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package in 201657 as a response to the OECD 
Action Plan on BEPS as well as to the demands from the European Parliament, several member 
states of the EU, and the general public that required a stronger EU-wide handling of corporate 
tax abuse. In line with the OECD Action Plan on BEPS, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package aims 
                                                          
56 See OECD (2013a). 
57 See COM (2016a). 
46    
to prevent aggressive tax planning, increase transparency, and create a fairer environment for 
businesses that reside within the European Union. It includes four documents such as an Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive,58 a Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation,59 
an amendment to the Directive on country-by-country reporting,60 and a recommendation on 
tax treaties.61 
While the BEPS initiative comprises fifteen Actions, this part of the study concentrates only on 
those which are most relevant for profit shifting channels and mechanisms discussed in the 
previous section. In addition, this section discusses the relevant suggestions of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package, focusing on measures included in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, 
which coincides with the Action Plan on BEPS in several aspects. 
2.4.1.1    Strengthening Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
One of the key suggestions of the OECD Action Plan and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
involves strengthening the anti-avoidance legislation, which includes thin capitalization or 
earnings stripping regulations, transfer pricing rules, and other regulations. In some countries, 
anti-avoidance legislation is non-existent or not fully effective because of its insufficient 
enforcement. Action 462 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS addresses income shifting via an 
excessive related-party debt financing. The OECD (2015c) recommends an implementation of 
interest barriers that limit the deductibility of net interest and economically equivalent payments 
at the level of a debt-financed firm. According to the OECD (2015c), interest payments should 
only be tax deductible to the extent of a fixed ratio of earnings before interests, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) (a country should be able to choose a ratio ranging 
from 10% to 30% of EBITDA). Moreover, the Action Plan argues in favor of an opportunity to 
carry forward unexploited expenses and/or interest capacity. The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive also addresses the issue of interest deduction limitation, with the aim of discouraging 
artificial debt arrangements designed to minimize tax liability. In line with the OECD Action 
Plan, the rule suggested by the European Commission limits the amount of interest that a 
taxpayer is entitled to deduct in a tax year. However, the Commission suggests limiting the 
                                                          
58 See COM (2016d). 
59 See COM (2016b). 
60 See COM (2016c). 
61 See COM (2016e). 
62 See OECD (2015c). 
Chapter 2: Corporate Income Taxation and Profit Shifting                 47 
 
 
deductibility of interest expenses based on a taxpayer’s gross operating profit instead of the 
EBITDA. 
Furthermore, Actions 8-1063 of the OECD Action Plan comprise a comprehensive set of 
amendments and reform suggestions for the existing transfer pricing rules. First, the OECD 
(2015b) confirms the arm’s length principle as a guiding concept in intra-firm trade and stresses 
the importance of its enforcement. Secondly, it provides a revision of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines (2010),64 which serve as a foundation for transfer pricing management in 
OECD countries. Here, the OECD (2015b) emphasizes that the outcomes of transfer pricing 
should reflect the actual place of value creation and should not be influenced by taxation. The 
new provisions clarify several aspects of transfer pricing, such as an identification of the actual 
transaction undertaken, the control of a risk, the circumstances in which a transaction may be 
disregarded for transfer pricing purposes, MNE group synergies, and other previously disputed 
issues. In addition, Action 1365 of the OECD Action Plan has introduced new guidelines on 
transfer pricing documentation requirements, which highlight the importance of increased 
transparency with respect to international operations of MNEs. 
Action 366 of the OECD Action Plan provides recommendations on an implementation of 
controlled foreign company (CFC) rules. It gives details on the main building blocks for 
designing effective CFC regulations, including a definition of a controlled foreign company, 
CFC exemptions and threshold requirements, as well as a definition, computation, and 
attribution of CFC income, and prevention and elimination of double taxation. The OECD 
(2015f) stresses that CFC rules do not have to be uniform across countries and thus the 
recommendations provide a certain degree of flexibility for countries to implement the rules 
that are consistent with their policy objectives. The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive also 
discusses the importance of an enforcement of CFC rules within the European Union. The 
Commission acknowledges that almost half of the EU member states have already implemented 
CFC rules. However, it also argues that the differences in these regulations among countries 
enable multinationals to circumvent their application. Therefore, the Commission suggests 
                                                          
63 See OECD (2015b). 
64 See OECD (2010). 
65 See OECD (2015g). 
66 See OECD (2015f). 
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providing member states with a common pattern for the implementation of CFC rules in order 
to achieve their standardized usage in Europe.67 
Moreover, the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive suggests two further anti-avoidance 
measures. First, the Commission recommends a switchover clause, which aims to shift away 
from the exemption method towards the tax credit approach in the case of taxation of income 
received by a resident firm from an entity resident in a low-tax country. This approach would 
prevent a double non-taxation of cross-border transactions that currently arises in some cases 
due to an application of the exemption method in both countries. Secondly, the Commission 
suggests an implementation of the general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) to counteract aggressive tax 
planning when other rules do not apply. The Commission argues that tax planning schemes are 
very elaborate and evolve faster than tax legislation. A GAAR would enable a relatively quick 
response to abusive tax practices despite an absence of specific anti-avoidance rules. In 
addition, the Commission provides a recommendation on tax treaties, which suggests an 
introduction of general anti-abuse rules into tax treaties. However, the Commission does not 
provide details on this suggestion and therefore several authors including Dourado (2016) 
criticize the general anti-abuse rule, arguing that it is too vague. 
Some aspects of the reforms suggested within the scope of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS 
and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive have been studied in the empirical literature. These 
studies conclude that anti-avoidance regulations may indeed hinder profit shifting if enforced 
properly. For example, many countries have already implemented thin capitalization or 
earnings stripping rules, which regulate the amount of interest payments on corporate debt that 
a company is allowed to deduct for tax purposes.68 Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), 
Overesch and Wamser (2010), Büttner et al. (2012), Buslei and Simmler (2012), and Blouin et 
al. (2014) have analyzed the effectiveness of this type of anti-avoidance legislation. They find 
that strict thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules are effective in eliminating excessive 
internal-debt financing and help in hindering profit shifting.  
                                                          
67.See Ginevra (2017) p. 125-131 for a further analysis of the CFC rules changes proposed within the framework 
of the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. 
68 Thin capitalization rules are regulations that forbid the tax deduction of interest payments to related parties based 
on a specified debt-to-equity ratio. Earnings stripping rules restrict tax deductibility comparing interest payments 
with a certain fraction of a firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Furthermore, 
some countries have introduced a mixture of the two kinds of rules. For more information on different thin 
capitalization and earnings stripping rules see Mardan (2017).  
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Furthermore, numerous empirical studies have analyzed the impact of an introduction or an 
enforcement of transfer pricing regulations on the use of related-party trade for profit shifting. 
Here, it has been shown that the strictness of transfer pricing regulations plays an important 
role in determining their overall effectiveness. Zinn et al. (2014) give a worldwide overview of 
these rules and show that they differ significantly in their strictness and the scope of 
implementation. To give an example, some countries simply introduce the arm’s length 
principle into their national law, while others enforce transfer pricing documentation 
regulations. Furthermore, transfer pricing documentation has to be either ready for a submission 
upon request from the tax authorities or needs to be automatically submitted on a yearly basis. 
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Klassen and Laplante (2012), Lohse and Riedel (2013), Beer 
and Loeprick (2015), and Saunders-Scott (2015) have shown that strengthening transfer pricing 
regulations effectively decreases the use of intra-firm trade for profit shifting.  
Finally, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) analyze the effectiveness of controlled foreign company 
rules. The authors evaluate the 2001 tax reform in Germany and conclude that German CFC 
rules are effective in restricting artificial investments in low-tax countries. Voget (2011) 
examines the influence of CFC rules on the strategic relocation of multinationals’ headquarters. 
The author employs data on 140 MNEs that have relocated their headquarters in recent years 
and compares them to a control group of 1943 multinationals that did not relocate. Voget (2011) 
finds that the presence of CFC legislation increases the probability of a relocation of 
headquarters and explains this outcome through a reduced possibility of deferring taxes and 
shifting profits within the group once CFC rules are introduced. 
In order to analyze the overall impact of anti-avoidance legislation, one has to consider not only 
its effect on profit shifting but also its influence on real investment. Ruf and Schindler (2015) 
argue that anti-avoidance rules in general and thin capitalization restrictions in particular 
increase a country’s cost of capital and might adversely affect its inbound investment. 
According to the authors, an introduction or tightening of anti-avoidance regulations might have 
a positive effect on tax revenues and a negative effect on real investment, which is why the 
overall effect is theoretically ambiguous. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) argue that investors 
might in addition regard anti-avoidance rules as a signal of a future tax increase, which could 
have a further negative influence on real investment. Buettner et al. (2016) conduct an empirical 
analysis of the influence of thin capitalization and transfer pricing rules on investment activities 
of multinational firms. The authors find that an introduction or an enforcement of thin 
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capitalization rules exert adverse effects on foreign direct investment and employment in high-
tax countries. By contrast, the authors do not find transfer pricing rules to have a statistically 
significant impact on either FDI or employment. Therefore, Buettner et al. (2016) confirm that 
the introduction of strict anti-avoidance rules in the European Union might prove to be less 
effective if one takes into consideration their influence on real investment in addition to their 
impact on profit shifting. 
2.4.1.2    Increasing Transparency and Co-Operation 
Along with enforcing anti-avoidance rules that concern specific profit shifting channels, the 
OECD and the EU Commission also argue in favor of increasing an overall transparency of 
business transactions and operations with the help of additional sets of rules. For example, 
according to the OECD Action Plan on BEPS, the existing international treaties and domestic 
laws are not always capable of efficiently grasping the complex structures of multinational 
enterprises. Therefore, Action 1369 argues in favor of introducing country-by-country (CbC) 
reporting, which requires large multinational enterprises to annually report detailed accounting 
information for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business. This information includes but 
is not limited to data on revenues, profits, taxes paid, employees, capital, retained earnings, and 
assets. In addition, multinationals are required to identify each affiliate within the group as a 
resident of a particular tax jurisdiction and to indicate the specific type of business it conducts. 
Starting from 2016 country-by-country reports have to be filled by the ultimate parents of large 
multinational enterprises and shared between jurisdictions in which a multinational operates. 
The Anti-Tax Avoidance Package of the European Commission also includes an amendment 
on country-by-country reporting, which aims to increase transparency in tax-related matters and 
puts into focus the implementation of CbC reporting in the European Union. 
A recent case-study analysis by Johannesen and Larsen (2016) evaluates the effectiveness of 
country-by-country reporting in countries and industries, in which it has already been 
introduced. The authors conclude that this type of disclosure rules increases the shifting costs 
for MNEs and consequently decreases their rents from profit shifting, which leads to an overall 
fall in profit shifting. By contrast, Evers et al. (2015b) argue that country-by-country reporting 
cannot be regarded as a convincing measure to combat international income shifting because 
                                                          
69 See OECD (2015g). 
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its benefits are largely uncertain and its costs appear to be significant. According to the authors, 
country-by-country reporting is likely to trigger substantial compliance costs for firms. The size 
of these costs will in turn depend on whether companies can easily retrieve the required data 
from their accounts or whether they have to generate it from scratch. Hence, it remains unclear 
whether the introduction of CbC reporting in the European Union will have an overall positive 
effect on the region’s welfare. 
In addition to increasing the transparency of multinationals’ operations within the European 
Union, the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package stresses the importance of fostering international 
co-operation and communication on tax matters with the third countries. On that account, the 
Commission provides a recommendation on an external strategy for effective taxation. This 
proposal presents a stronger and more coherent EU approach on working on tax matters with 
third countries. 
2.4.1.3    The Role of Intangible Assets 
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS addresses the strategic use of intellectual property in several 
Actions. For instance, Action 870 provides guidance on identifying intangibles for transfer 
pricing purposes, characterizing transactions involving intangibles, determining arm’s length 
conditions, and clarifying several other issues on transfer pricing of transactions involving 
intangible assets. In addition, Action 8 gives guidance on the cost contribution arrangements 
(CCAs), which are contractual arrangements between firms that share contributions and risks 
associated with a joint development of intellectual property. Moreover, the OECD Action Plan 
on BEPS addresses harmful tax practices that involve intangible assets. To give an example, 
Action 571 introduces a so-called Nexus Approach, according to which an application of a 
preferential tax treatment with respect to income from intangible assets should be dependent on 
the level of real research and development carried out in the country where the IP is located. 
Starting from 2015 the Nexus Approach requires all existing and new IP Boxes to apply only 
to self-developed and not to the acquired intangibles. Furthermore, the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive of the European Union suggests an exit taxation of tangible and intangible assets in 
the case of their relocation. This recommendation is especially relevant in the case of 
                                                          
70 See OECD (2015b). 
71 See OECD (2015a). 
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intellectual property because intangible assets are usually very mobile and can be relatively 
easily relocated within a multinational group, as described in section 2.3.4.1. According to the 
Commission, assets transferred abroad have to be taxed on their incorporated unrealized profits. 
As discussed in section 2.4.1.1, several empirical studies have found evidence for the 
effectiveness of transfer pricing rules. Since royalties paid for the use of intangible assets are 
transfer prices, these rules apply to royalty payments as well. Beer and Loeprick (2015) 
investigate the impact of an enforcement of transfer pricing regulations on the profitability of 
IP-intensive firms, and contrary to their expectations, find that an introduction of 
documentation requirements has no observable effect on high-tax subsidiaries of multinational 
firms with high IP intensity. The authors conclude that transfer pricing rules are less effective 
in curbing profit shifting of IP-intensive subsidiaries compared to firms active in other sectors. 
Dudar et al. (2015) find that multinational enterprises may use IP Boxes that apply to the 
acquired intangibles but not IP Boxes that apply exclusively to self-developed intellectual 
property for profit shifting. Therefore, they argue that an implementation of the Nexus 
Approach might be an effective step in hindering the strategic use of intangible assets. 
2.4.2    Fundamental Change of the Current Tax System 
The OECD Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting along with the EU Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package try to combat profit shifting within the traditional framework of 
international taxation. However, there are also more fundamental reform suggestions that aim 
to change the overall structure of the current tax system and its key principles. As Cerioni 
(2016) argues, the fundamental reform proposals provide solutions that deprive initiatives such 
as the Action Plan and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package of their own purpose. Devereux (2004) 
argues that profit shifting is only one of several inefficiencies that the current tax system yields. 
According to the author, besides leading to double taxation or double non-taxation, the existing 
rules trigger high administrative and compliance costs. Compliance costs may contribute to the 
distortion of a firm’s decisions regarding its location, organizational form, and other aspects of 
international business. Administrative costs arise from the complexity of the current tax system. 
Moreover, Devereux and Vella (2014) argue that the current tax system is prone to competition 
between governments, which constitutes its another weakness. The authors observe that tax 
competition has not only led to progressively reduced corporate tax rates but is also gradually 
leading to progressively reduced tax bases. This section analyzes several suggestions for 
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fundamental changes of the existing tax system that attempt to eliminate all (or several) of its 
inefficiencies, including profit shifting.  
2.4.2.1    Formulary Apportionment 
According to Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011), formulary allocation refers to solely allocating 
income between affiliates of a multinational firm via an allocation formula, instead of trying to 
determine a market price of the relevant related-party transactions that produced the income.72 
As a result, formulary apportionment tries to approximate the actual degree of economic activity 
that a multinational undertakes in each jurisdiction. The authors argue that the formula should 
only include factors that are robust against manipulation, otherwise multinationals would be 
given an incentive to shift the factors between locations. As stated by Avi-Yonah and 
Benshalom (2011), a company’s fixed assets, payroll, and sales are generally assumed to 
represent real economic activity of a firm and therefore suit the idea behind formulary 
apportionment. 
Formulary apportionment is already used at the subnational level to apportion income between 
the local tax authorities within Canada, the US, Switzerland, and Germany.73 The European 
Commission has considered a reform leading to formulary apportionment in the European 
Union and has made a proposal for a Council Directive on the common consolidated corporate 
tax base (CCCTB) in 2011.74 This proposal suggests a single set of rules for the computation 
of taxable profits of multinational companies that operate in several EU member states.75 The 
Commission relaunched this initiative releasing a new draft in 2016. The draft acknowledges 
difficulties connected with an immediate introduction of the CCCTB and proposes a two-step 
approach instead. The first step includes an establishment of mandatory rules for a common 
corporate tax base (CCTB). The second step comprises an EU-wide consolidation of group 
accounts, consequently using a formula to allocate profits among member states. 
Bettendorf et al. (2010) explore the impact of introducing the CCCTB regime in the EU using 
an applied general equilibrium model. The authors conclude that this initiative is unlikely to 
yield substantial welfare gains in Europe and there are several reasons for such an outcome. 
                                                          
72 See Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011), p. 380. 
73 See McLure (2002) and Mayer (2009) for more information. 
74 See European Commission (2011b). 
75 See Spengel (2008) for a detailed analysis of this proposal. 
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The first reason is that corporate tax revenues constitute a relatively small portion of the total 
tax revenues in most EU countries, as section 2.2 shows. Hence, the increase in corporate tax 
revenues should not be expected to drastically change the welfare of member states. A second 
reason is that a consolidation of the corporate tax base does not seem to affect the cost of capital 
and therefore does not solve the key distortion in marginal investment choices. Furthermore, if 
corporate tax rates across the EU members are not harmonized, multinationals may still use the 
tax differentials between countries to shift profits. Indeed, Bettendorf et al. (2010) stress that a 
simulation with the assumption of full harmonization of tax rates leads to greater welfare gains 
than an estimation without an assumption of tax harmonization. 
2.4.2.2    Destination-Based Tax 
Devereux (2004) argues that the international taxation literature distinguishes mainly between 
taxation on a source basis (where goods are produced) and a destination basis (where they are 
sold). A most prominent example of the destination-based taxation is a value-added tax. 
Auerbach et al. (2017) suggest that a value-added element of the destination-based corporate 
taxation should, similarly to VAT, leave exports untaxed and only tax imports. In addition, the 
authors propose a so-called cash-flow element to the destination-based CIT. The idea is to give 
companies an immediate relief on all expenses, including capital expenses, and taxing revenues 
as they accrue. 
The Republican Party has issued a tax reform plan for the United States in 2016.76 Among other 
suggestions, this plan proposes to move towards destination-based cash flow taxation of 
businesses that reside in the US.77 Patel and McClelland (2017) evaluate the impact of replacing 
the current US corporate tax system with a destination-based cash flow tax. The authors 
conclude that this plan seems promising because it would make the US tax system simpler, 
provide incentives for growth, and result in fewer distortions of firm location choices. However, 
Patel and McClelland (2017) point out a list of issues that remain to be resolved for a successful 
implementation of this reform. For example, the plan is ambiguous on topics such as the 
treatment of partnerships, the treatment of losses, as well as transition rules under a destination-
                                                          
76 See Grand Old Party (GOP) (2016). 
77 See Pomerleau (2016). 
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based tax. According to the authors, resolving these issues will be crucial in determining the 
feasibility of an implementation of a cash flow tax in the United States. 
Bond and Devereux (2002) evaluate an introduction of a universal destination-based corporate 
tax and argue that it would bring several advantages. First, this tax would be neutral with respect 
to a multinational’s decision on where to locate production. Secondly, it would remove many 
of the current system’s inefficiencies, including the need to set transfer prices and an 
opportunity to deduct intra-firm interest payments. Furthermore, Auerbach et al. (2017) argue 
that a universal destination-based tax system would provide long-term stability, since countries 
would have an incentive to adopt it: either to gain a competitive advantage over countries with 
a source-based taxation or to avoid a competitive disadvantage relative to countries that have 
already implemented destination-based corporate taxation. Auerbach et al. (2017) also claim 
that this system would be resistant to tax competition among countries. Fuest et al. (2015) 
conclude that a universal implementation of a destination-based tax requires a high degree of 
international coordination and a willingness for reform. This might be hard to achieve given the 
fact that some countries benefit under the current system. Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin (2016) 
also express concerns of whether a destination-based tax would be in line with the current legal 
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral tax treaties between 
countries. 
2.4.2.3    Residence-Based Tax 
Devereux (2008) summarizes the concept of residence-based taxation, under which income 
earned by an investor (which may be a company or an individual) would be taxed by the country 
in which the investor resides. According to Devereux (2004), residence-based taxation can take 
at least two following forms: the ultimate individual shareholders could be taxed in accordance 
with their residence or firms could be taxed based on their place of residence. 
Devereux (2004) analyzes this reform idea and argues that residence-based taxation could 
distort a firm’s decision on locations if a company is mobile. If a company is not mobile, a 
residence-based corporate income tax could distort the capital ownership neutrality. 
Furthermore, the author argues that tracing tax liability back to the ultimate shareholder would 
be virtually impossible due to high administrative costs resulting from tracking an individual’s 
worldwide income. In addition, Devereux (2008) suggests that corporation taxes based on 
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residence would need to be completely harmonized across countries in order for production 
efficiency to be realized. The author concludes that this is clearly unlikely, unless corporation 
taxes are competed down to zero. 
2.4.2.4    Eliminating or Lowering Corporate Income Tax Rate in the US 
The link between personal and corporate income taxation is a topic that European policy makers 
discuss very rarely, as Devereux (2008) notes. However, there has been a discussion within 
academia on the abolishment of corporate income tax in order to focus on the shareholder 
taxation78 instead. Even though this reform suggestion is unlikely to be implemented even in 
the long run, the reasons for keeping CIT are still worth mentioning. For example, section 2.2 
demonstrates that corporate taxation generates less tax revenues than other major types of taxes. 
However, it represents a stable source of revenues, since its share in the total tax revenues of 
Germany and other countries under analysis has remained steady over the past few decades. 
Aside from this, the share of corporate income tax is more significant in the composition of 
total tax revenues of low-income countries than the high-income ones.79 In addition to the 
collection of revenues, there might be other reasons for taxing corporate income. For example, 
Zucman (2014) argues that the absence of a CIT might prompt individuals to incorporate and 
keep their profits within corporations in order to avoid paying personal income taxes. As a 
result, corporation tax serves as a back-up for personal income tax and a scenario without CIT 
triggers the need for an anti-avoidance rule, as Devereux (2008) notes. This rule would prevent 
small businesses and individuals from evading personal income tax by incorporating their 
profits, although it might be costly to develop and manage. However, Devereux (2008) suggests 
that the costs of establishing this reform and enforcing anti-avoidance regulations might still be 
smaller than the compliance and administrative costs that arise from the complexity and 
inefficiency of the current system. In addition, corporate taxation spurs transparent 
documentation of annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations, which in turn 
increases transparency and accountability of the economy as a whole. Therefore, corporate 
income tax fulfills several administrative and regulative goals besides tax revenue generation.  
                                                          
78 For example, Grubert and Altshuler (2016) analyze three plans for shifting the tax on corporate income to the 
personal level. 
79 See OECD (2017c) for data and Abramovsky et al. (2014) for a detailed analysis of corporate income taxation 
in low-income countries. 
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Fehr et al. (2013) formulate and assess a model which simulates an abolishment of the US 
corporate income tax. The authors argue that in the case of no changes in corporate tax rates in 
other regions, eliminating corporate taxation in the US and replacing it with wage or 
consumption taxes can increase US domestic investment, output, real wages, and economic 
growth. However, the economic outcomes for other regions outside the US as well as an overall 
welfare effect seem to be more ambiguous and might even be negative. This is due to the fact 
that capital investments are expected to flow from abroad to the US, which as a capital tax-free 
country, puts all other countries at a disadvantage. 
Bärsch et al. (2017) analyze the newest tax reform suggestion in the United States, which was 
published by the Republican Party in April 2017. Among different changes to the US corporate 
tax system, this plan considers lowering the statutory CIT rate to 15% and moving from the 
worldwide to territorial tax system. According to Bärsch et al. (2017), this tax reform would 
lead to fundamental changes in the international corporate taxation, in particular with respect 
to the activities and transactions between the United States and Germany. For example, the 
authors predict that the reform will have an impact on both the financing of business activities 
and the tax planning strategies of German and US corporations. Bärsch et al. (2017) expect an 
increase in German direct investment in the US as well as a shift of profits from Germany to 
the US, following the implementation of this reform. 
2.4.2.5    The Role of Intangible Assets 
The fundamental reform suggestions do not usually place an emphasis on the use of intangible 
assets for profit shifting but instead try to improve an overall efficiency of the current tax 
system. However, several proposals would have a direct impact on the application of intangible 
assets. For example, the formulary apportionment proposal suggested by the European 
Commission does not include intangible assets into the formula, since they are highly mobile 
and can be strategically relocated between affiliates. Röder (2012) analyzes this aspect of the 
reform suggestion and argues that nowadays intangible assets play an ever-growing role in the 
generation of income. Thus, their exclusion from the formula is very likely to cause arbitrary 
results. Even though the Commission states that intangibles are indirectly included in the 
apportionment formula via researchers’ salaries and tangible assets used for research, Röder 
(2012) argues that there is no meaningful correlation between the value of assets used for 
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creating intangibles and the salaries of research staff. On that account, the author opposes the 
idea of leaving intangible assets out of the formula.  
Other fundamental reform proposals such as a destination-based tax system, a residence-based 
tax system, or an integration of corporate and income taxation would eliminate the opportunity 
for using intellectual property as a means of profit shifting. For example, Bond and Devereux 
(2002) argue that a destination-based tax system would remove the need to set transfer prices, 
which are difficult to determine and are thus often misused in transactions that involve 
intangible assets.  
2.4.3    Comparative Analysis of Reform Suggestions 
Policy makers and academics have developed various reform suggestions which aim to 
eliminate profit shifting by multinational firms. Some of these suggestions include minor 
alterations to the existing tax system, whereas others embrace fundamental changes. For 
example, the OECD Action Plan on BEPS and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package attempt to 
increase the transparency of cross-border operations of multinationals enterprises, raise the 
effectiveness of anti-avoidance legislation, and improve the efficiency of tax administration. 
Empirical literature in this field of research shows that anti-avoidance rules might indeed be 
effective in hindering profit shifting if implemented properly. However, the Action Plan and 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package do not address the fundamental inefficiencies of the current 
tax system and therefore it remains unclear whether or not new loopholes for profit shifting will 
arise once the old ones are closed. In addition, these reform suggestions add complexity to the 
existing tax system, which is already rather complicated. Aside from this, their implementation 
and enforcement most likely come at a cost of additional compliance expenditure for firms and 
administration expenses for governments. Furthermore, Dourado (2016) argues that some 
measures in the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package may contribute to a “race to the bottom” 
scenario between countries. According to the author, some proposed measures such as a 
switchover clause and CFC rules take a country’s tax rate as a benchmark for defining the 
regulations and may therefore intensify the tax competition between countries. Furthermore, 
Ginevra (2017) notes that the OECD and the Commission stress the importance of giving a 
certain degree of flexibility to all countries that implement the anti-avoidance legislation. 
However, the author argues that the flexibility may give rise to legal uncertainty, overly 
complicated implementation patterns, and even inconsistent taxation of the participating 
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countries. Moreover, the interaction of individual policies within the scope of the Action Plan 
and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package remains largely unanalyzed and hence its total outcomes 
are uncertain.  
Fundamental reform suggestions, such as an introduction of a destination-based corporate tax 
system or formulary apportionment, aim to hinder profit shifting and to solve other 
inefficiencies of the current tax system, such as its complexity, high administrative and 
compliance costs, tax competition between countries, and other issues. However, these 
proposals are likely to contradict the existing double taxation treaties and the WTO rules, which 
makes their implementation rather difficult. In addition, the success of these reforms would 
depend on the participation of countries and the intensity of collaboration between them. For 
example, even if the EU implements the CCCTB proposal, it might still prove inefficient if 
other countries outside of the European Union do not co-operate. The need for international 
collaboration also arises within the framework of the OECD Action Plan and the EU Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package. However, the extent of needed co-operation and its intensity certainly rises 
with the magnitude of changes suggested by the reforms. 
2.5  Conclusion 
The main aim of this study is to comprehensively analyze different aspects of corporate 
taxation, focusing on the issue of profit shifting by multinational enterprises. With the help of 
the study, a few important conclusions can be drawn. First, corporate tax revenues represent a 
rather small part (between 5% and 10%) of total tax revenues in most high-income countries 
and this trend has remained unchanged for years. Fixing the international tax system in order 
to eliminate profit shifting by multinationals could increase this share; however, changes in tax 
regulations have to be substantial in order to lead to a sizable increase in corporate tax revenues.  
Secondly, the statutory and effective corporate tax rates have been falling rapidly in Germany 
over the past few decades. However, in comparison to several other European countries, such 
as members of the Benelux Union, Ireland, and Switzerland, Germany can still be considered a 
high-tax country. European low-tax countries either have low tax rates for corporations or offer 
tax regulations and arrangements that facilitate tax-minimizing strategies of MNEs. 
Thirdly, there is plenty of descriptive and empirical evidence that supports the existence of 
profit shifting by multinational enterprises. However, the magnitude of profit shifting found in 
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empirical literature appears to be smaller than the estimations claimed by policy makers, such 
as the OECD which argues that the net global corporate tax revenues lost due to profit shifting 
may lie between 95 to 230 billion EUR annually. For example, Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2013) conduct a meta-analysis and find a tax semi-elasticity of reported profits to equal 0.8 (in 
absolute terms). At the same time, the meta-analysis of Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) indicates 
that a tax semi-elasticity of FDI equals 2.5 (in absolute terms). According to these findings, 
corporate taxation appears to have a more profound effect on the real investment than on 
reported earnings of MNEs. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis of this study points to a more 
vivid profit shifting behavior of US multinationals compared to German MNEs.  
Finally, there are numerous reform suggestions which aim to eliminate base erosion and profit 
shifting. While the OECD Action Plan on BEPS and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package aim 
to fix loopholes in the existing tax system, a few initiatives that are more ambitious suggest 
fundamental changes. Thus, the main goals of the Action Plan and the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package lie in increasing transparency of cross-border operations of multinational enterprises, 
raising the effectiveness of anti-avoidance legislation, and improving the efficiency of tax 
administration. Even though empirical literature has confirmed the effectiveness of the 
suggested measures in hindering profit shifting, they might still exert a negative impact on other 
areas of economic cooperation, such as real investment. For example, Buettner et al. (2016) 
confirm that an introduction or an enforcement of thin capitalization rules have an adverse effect 
on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. More fundamental reform suggestions include 
an introduction of the CCCTB scheme or an implementation of the destination-based corporate 
taxation. Rather than merely solving the problems of the current tax system, they attempt to 
redesign it and eliminate all of its inefficiencies, including profit shifting. All reform 
suggestions require intensive co-operation not only between the EU or the OECD member 
states but also with the third countries and the degree of needed co-operation rises with the 
scope of changes proposed by a reform. Therefore, reforming the international tax system might 
prove to be difficult, especially considering that some countries benefit from the status quo. In 
addition, a successful implementation of the reforms does not guarantee an increase in the 
overall welfare of the EU or OECD countries. This is because CIT accounts for a relatively 
small share of government revenues in most countries, the tax elasticity of the reported profits 
of MNE affiliates is also rather small, and some reforms might even exert a negative effect on 
real investment, which diminishes their overall success.
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Chapter 3 
On the Interdependency of Proﬁt Shifting Channels 
and the Effectiveness of Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
3.1  Introduction 
The issue of base erosion and proﬁt shifting (BEPS) has been on the international policy agenda 
for several years now. The key element of this discussion comprises the use of intra-group 
interest payments and transfer prices by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to strategically 
reallocate proﬁts within a group in a tax minimizing manner. In view of the induced revenue 
losses and distortions in the competition between multinational and domestic ﬁrms, many 
countries have unilaterally implemented measures to limit proﬁt shifting. In particular, they 
have introduced different forms of interest deduction restrictions80 and transfer pricing 
regulations.81 In its final reports on BEPS, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) also recommends the implementation of anti-avoidance regulations to 
restrict multinationals’ tax planning opportunities.82 
Previous studies have shown that anti-avoidance rules that restrict the tax deductibility of 
interest payments indeed affect the ﬁnancing behavior of multinational ﬁrms (see as examples: 
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), Overesch and Wamser (2010), Buettner et al. 
(2012)). Another strand of empirical research suggests that transfer pricing regulations are 
effective in reducing the tax sensitivity of reported earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
                                                          
80 Interest deduction restrictions include thin capitalization rules, which limit interest deductibility based on a 
firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, and earnings stripping regulations, which limit interest deductibility based on a 
company’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
81 Zinn et al. (2014) give an overview of the existing transfer pricing rules. According to the authors, these rules 
range from an informal enforcement of the arm’s length principle to a requirement to annually disclose detailed 
transfer pricing documentation. 
82 See OECD (2015c). 
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(see as examples: Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Lohse and Riedel (2013), Saunders-Scott 
(2013), Beer and Loeprick (2015)). While earlier studies separately analyze the effectiveness 
of either interest deduction rules or transfer pricing regulations, the literature remains mostly 
silent on the relationship between these two countermeasures and their mutual effect on BEPS. 
In order to evaluate the combined effectiveness of the two types of anti-avoidance legislation, 
it is crucial to know whether the restriction of one proﬁt shifting channel is substituted by the 
intensiﬁed use of the remaining channels or whether they achieve an overall reduction in 
shifting behavior. 
To the best of our knowledge, Saunders-Scott (2015) appears to be the only study that addresses 
the issue of substitution between profit shifting channels. The author obtains evidence that 
suggests interest deduction rules affect the reported EBIT and goes on to conclude that there 
exists a substitution of profit shifting using intra-group interest payments by profit shifting via 
the transfer pricing channel once interest deduction rules have been introduced. Expanding on 
the research conducted by Saunders-Scott (2015), we investigate this relationship further by 
providing a few valuable contributions: first, we test whether multinationals substitute the use 
of internal debt by manipulating transfer prices and whether they substitute manipulating 
transfer prices by the use of internal debt. Secondly, in addition to investigating the influence 
of one set of rules on profit shifting in the presence of the other set of regulations, we also 
analyze the mutual effect of different anti-avoidance regulations on a multinational’s behavior 
by including a triple interaction into our baseline specification. Estimating the mutual effect of 
multiple anti-avoidance rules is crucial, as it enables us to predict the changes in the total profit 
shifting activity and the consequences this has on investment and real economy once several 
anti-avoidance regulations have been implemented simultaneously. Thirdly, we compare the 
substitution between profit shifting channels in the case of intellectual property (IP)-intensive 
firms and companies of other sectors. IP-intensive firms are less restricted in conducting profit 
shifting, because the arm’s length price on the use of intangibles is often hard to determine and 
can therefore be more easily manipulated than transfer prices for tangible goods or intra-group 
interest payments.83 Finally, as opposed to analyzing the impact of the introduction of interest 
deduction restrictions and transfer pricing rules on profit shifting, we consider the strictness of 
these regulations and their level of enforcement instead.  
                                                          
83 See Dischinger and Riedel (2011), p. 691-692. 
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Our identification strategy includes two empirical approaches. We take our first approach by 
using a firm-level panel on European companies in the period between 2004 and 2012 to exploit 
the variation in tax rates and the strictness of anti-avoidance regulations across countries and 
years. With the help of this data, we analyze both the impact of restricting interest deduction 
rules on shifting through the transfer pricing channel and an influence of strengthening transfer 
pricing regulations on the use of the debt channel. The second empirical method is based on a 
quasi-experimental setting in France in the year 2007, where thin capitalization rules were 
strengthened for one group of firms while remaining unchanged for the other group. As transfer 
pricing rules remained constant in France during our period of observation, this reform provides 
an appropriate setting in order to investigate the substitution of shifting via the debt channel by 
shifting via the transfer pricing channel. According to our main findings, the substitution 
between proﬁt shifting channels exists in the case where the debt channel is substituted by the 
use of intra-firm trade and in the case where intra-firm trade is substituted by the use of debt. 
In addition, we find that interest deduction limitations are not effective in reducing total proﬁt 
shifting activity if no strict transfer pricing rules are in place. Therefore, the combination of the 
two sets of regulations and their level of enforcement determine the effectiveness of a country’s 
anti-avoidance legislation in hindering profit shifting. Finally, we establish that IP-intensive 
firms substitute between profit shifting channels more aggressively than other types of 
companies. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses related literature on profit shifting 
channels and anti-avoidance rules. Section 3.3 goes on to present the theoretical model and 
outlines the main hypotheses, with section 3.4 providing the main data sources and defining 
variables used in empirical estimations. In section 3.5, we explain our two empirical approaches 
in detail, which enables us to present the key findings of the panel data analysis and the quasi-
experimental estimation in section 3.6. The final section summarizes our main findings and 
concludes. 
3.2  Literature Review 
The conceptual framework in the profit shifting literature has been established by Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994). These authors find that low-tax affiliates of 
multinational firms report higher profits than their high-tax counterparts. Huizinga and Laeven 
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(2008) contribute to this literature by concluding that the reported profits of affiliated 
companies are influenced by the corporate taxation that they face, as well as the international 
tax differences between affiliates and parent companies and between affiliates in different host 
countries. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) provide a comprehensive survey of this strand of 
literature and qualitatively and quantitatively analyze 25 empirical studies on profit shifting in 
both public economics and accounting research. They reach the conclusion that on average a 
one percentage point increase in the tax differential between a firm and its foreign affiliates 
reduces its reported profits by around -0.8%, holding other factors constant. While most studies 
on profit shifting use corporate income tax (CIT) rates as a source of identification, Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013) examine exogenous earnings shocks at the parent level and investigate their 
impact on low-tax and high-tax multinational subsidiaries. The authors find a tax-motivated 
increase in the reported profits of low-tax group members in response to a parent’s earnings 
shock and no changes in the profitability of the high-tax affiliates. 
Furthermore, numerous empirical studies focus on analyzing single profit shifting channels. 
According to this strand of literature, multinationals shift income earned in high-tax countries 
to low-tax entities via debt financing or via non-financial transactions, such as intra-group 
transfers of goods and services and licensing of intellectual property. With regard to debt 
financing, Desai et al. (2004) apply a firm-level dataset provided by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) to show that multinationals use intra-company loans to diminish tax payments 
of subsidiaries in high-tax locations. Desai et al. (2004) argue that a one percentage point 
increase in the statutory tax rate increases internal debt of US foreign affiliates on average by 
1%, holding other factors constant. Huizinga et al. (2008) find a comparable effect for the 
sample of European firms and Buettner and Wamser (2013) confirm these results for the 
affiliates of German multinationals. These outcomes are also in line with Newberry and 
Dhaliwal (2001) who identify a positive relationship between the likelihood of US 
multinationals issuing bonds to a foreign subsidiary and the existence of foreign tax credit 
limitations that restrict the use of domestic interest deductions. 
As for the use of intra-firm trade as a channel of profit shifting, Clausing (2001, 2006) shows 
that taxation significantly influences the intra-group trade flows between US firms and their 
foreign affiliates. For example, Clausing (2006) argues that on average a one percentage point 
increase in a country’s statutory corporate income tax rate is associated with a -1.9% drop in 
the intra-group trade between affiliates in this country and their parent companies. Clausing 
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(2003) finds that tax rate changes influence both the magnitude of intra-group trade and the 
prices used in intra-group transactions. Bernard et al. (2006) employ a dataset that tracks US 
exports during the 1990s to examine how prices set by MNEs vary across arm’s length and 
related-party customers. Consistent with Clausing (2003), the authors claim that the transfer 
prices set in the case of arm’s length customers are substantially larger than the prices set for 
affiliated firms. Flaaen (2017) extends the research by Clausing (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006) 
using new data and methodology. The author argues that the gap between the arm’s length and 
related-party export prices increases for low-tax countries in the period after a one-time 
dividend repatriation tax holiday in the United States. By contrast, the comparable gap between 
the arm’s length and related-party import prices decreases for low-tax countries during this 
period. Flaaen (2017) concludes that both of these results point to a strategic use of transfer 
prices for profit shifting by US multinationals. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) find similar 
outcomes using data on intra-sectoral trade between OECD countries. Overesch and Schreiber 
(2010) also confirm these findings for the sample of German multinationals and Davies et al. 
(2017) for the sample of French firms. Furthermore, there is robust evidence that suggests 
intangible assets play an important role in profit shifting via the channel of transfer pricing. 
This is because a strategic allocation of intellectual property between affiliates of a 
multinational group induces transactions of intra-firm royalty payments that may deviate from 
the arm’s length price. To extend on this point further, Desai et al. (2006) identify in their 
analysis that large international firms with extensive intra-firm trade and a high research and 
development (R&D) intensity are most likely to have affiliates in tax havens.  
Although there are good reasons to believe that transfer pricing and licensing of IP represent 
the predominant routes used by multinationals to shift profits,84 the empirical evidence on this 
issue is not straightforward. An evaluation of the general evidence on profit shifting by 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) shows that around one-third of all shifted profits is shifted 
via the channel of internal debt financing and two-thirds via related-party trade. By contrast, 
the results of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) suggest a larger effect of debt financing, whereas 
the findings of Grubert (2003) point to equal shares. 
                                                          
84 The interest rate on intra-group loans can be directly compared to the market interest rate and for this reason 
profit shifting is limited to it. By contrast, there is more discretion and therefore a larger leeway in setting transfer 
prices on highly specific transactions (for example, in the case of royalty payments), as pointed out by Overesch 
and Schreiber (2010). 
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The effectiveness of anti-avoidance legislation is a further topic which is explored within the 
profit shifting literature. Wamser (2014), Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), and 
Overesch and Wamser (2010) analyze the impact of the 2001 reform in Germany, which 
resulted in thin capitalization regulations being tightened. They argue that a direct consequence 
of the reform was a reduction in intra-group loans granted to German companies by their foreign 
affiliates. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) also study the effect of thin capitalization 
rules on real investment of multinational enterprises; however, they do not ﬁnd a visible impact. 
Buslei and Simmler (2012) and Dressler and Scheuering (2012) investigate the new German 
interest stripping rule which was introduced in 2008, with their investigation showing that the 
companies affected by this reform responded by decreasing their debt-to-assets ratios. Buettner 
et al. (2012) use comprehensive micro-level data from the Microdatabase Direct Investment 
(MIDI) databank on German outbound investment to study the effect of interest deduction 
restrictions on the leverage of foreign affiliates of German multinationals. The authors argue 
that an introduction of thin capitalization rules reduces tax sensitivity of intra-group debt and 
gives firms an incentive to use external debt.  
A recent study by Blouin et al. (2014) investigates the influence of interest deduction 
restrictions on a company’s leverage using micro-level data on US multinationals and their 
foreign subsidiaries in 54 countries over the period between 1982 and 2004. Contributing to 
previous studies, the authors draw a comparison between the effect a mere existence of anti-
avoidance measures has and the impact of an increase of their stringency and enforcement. 
They find that a presence of interest deduction restrictions reduces an affiliate’s debt-to-assets 
ratio, with more pronounced results in the case of the limitations on borrowing from a parent 
company compared to other group members. Furthermore, Blouin et al. (2014) argue that 
interest deduction restrictions on leverage have a stronger impact in countries that automatically 
apply anti-avoidance rules, in contrast to countries that have a discretionary enforcement. 
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) carried out one of the first attempts to measure the influence 
of transfer pricing regulations on profit shifting. They empirically tested the effect of a broad 
range of factors on profits reported by multinationals using sectoral data. The authors claim that 
the international differences in corporate income tax rates along with several other attributes of 
the tax system including an enforcement of transfer pricing regulations constitute major 
incentives or discouragements for MNEs to shift profits. Lohse and Riedel (2013) elaborate on 
the study of Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) using micro-level panel data on affiliates of MNEs 
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in 26 European states. In the first step of their analysis, the authors confirm general findings in 
the related literature stating that corporate tax rates have a negative impact on reported pre-tax 
profits of multinationals. In addition, Lohse and Riedel (2013) find that transfer pricing 
regulations substantially reduce tax incentives to shift profits. According to the authors, firms 
located in high-tax jurisdictions where strict transfer pricing regimes are in place are less likely 
to shift income than companies located in high-tax jurisdictions where transfer pricing rules are 
not enforced. Beer and Loeprick (2015) confirm these findings arguing that within four years 
of the introduction of the mandatory documentation requirements, the amount of profits shifted 
between subsidiaries of MNEs decreases by around 60%. They show that the profit shifting 
behavior of subsidiaries with high intangibles-to-total-assets ratios is less influenced by 
documentation requirements than the profit shifting behavior of affiliates with a low fraction of 
intangible assets.  
Klassen and Laplante (2012) investigate the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations by 
employing micro-level data on US multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries. Their study 
significantly contributes to the previous literature through recognizing that profit shifting not 
only depends on the enforcement of transfer pricing regulations in a certain country but also on 
the implementation of transfer pricing rules in other jurisdictions. Saunders-Scott (2013) 
contributes to the previous literature on the relationship between reported profits and transfer 
pricing rules by explaining all possible channels through which these regulations might 
influence total tax revenues. The author develops a theoretical model and finds empirical 
evidence to support the idea that a strict enforcement of transfer pricing laws limits both profit 
shifting outflows and inflows. According to Saunders-Scott (2013), if a company has more 
subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions, it reports lower profits once strict transfer pricing 
regulations have been introduced. By contrast, if the affiliates of this firm are located in low-
tax countries, it reports higher profits after the enforcement of transfer pricing rules. 
Furthermore, Saunders-Scott (2013) argues that tighter transfer pricing laws induce greater 
compliance costs for firms and these additional expenses subsequently reduce companies’ 
profitability, which contributes to an overall negative effect of the enforcement of transfer 
pricing regulations on reported profits and consequently on the total tax revenues.  
We believe Saunders-Scott (2015) is the only study that investigates the impact of interest 
deduction restrictions of an affiliate’s reported proﬁts, rather than on its debt. The author 
therefore combines identification strategies of two branches of profit shifting literature: studies 
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on a strategic use of related-party trade and papers on intra-group debt financing. Saunders-
Scott (2015) uses the Orbis database provided by the Bureau van Dijk to extract firm-level 
financial information on multinational enterprises from 55 countries in the period between 2006 
and 2012. The author shows that the implementation of interest deduction restrictions in an 
affiliate’s country reduces its earnings before interest and tax by -3.8%. Saunders-Scott (2015) 
attributes this ﬁnding to a substitution of debt shifting by transfer pricing manipulation. The 
author argues that the costs of shifting via transfer pricing manipulation depend on the total 
volume shifted and if the total volume is limited by interest deduction restrictions, the marginal 
costs of shifting via transfer pricing manipulation decrease. 
Our study contributes to the previous literature on profit shifting channels through a 
comprehensive analysis of the interdependency between different types of anti-avoidance 
legislation. Therefore, our analysis is most closely related to Saunders-Scott (2015) and 
contributes to it by investigating not only how interest deduction restrictions influence shifting 
via intra-firm trade but also by analyzing how transfer pricing regulations affect shifting via 
debt. Furthermore, in addition to examining the effectiveness of transfer pricing rules and 
interest deduction restrictions separately, we also analyze the mutual impact of an interaction 
of the two types of anti-avoidance legislation on a multinational’s shifting behavior. Moreover, 
we indirectly contribute to the empirical literature that investigates the influence of anti-
avoidance rules on real investment of multinational firms. Namely, a substitutive relationship 
between the two channels of profit shifting would explain why previous studies were not able 
to establish a clear link between anti-avoidance regulations and the investment behavior of 
MNEs. For instance, Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) show that interest deduction 
restrictions do not affect the real investment of large enterprises, whereas Buettner et al. (2017) 
argue that interest deduction limitations affect firms’ real investment to a greater extent than 
transfer pricing rules. 
3.3  Theoretical Considerations 
3.3.1    The Model 
In line with Saunders-Scott (2015), we consider a multinational corporation that consists of two 
affiliates that reside in two different countries: a high-tax country with a tax rate τH and a low-
tax country with a tax rate τL. The high-tax affiliate can shift part or all of its true pre-tax profit 
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πH to the affiliate in the low-tax country. πH is defined as the taxable profit that would have been 
reported in the absence of profit shifting.85 The true profit can be shifted from the high-tax to 
the low-tax affiliate by increasing internal debt or manipulating interest rates on intra-group 
loans. It can also be relocated by increasing intra-group trade or overpaying for intangible 
assets, tangible goods, and services provided by the low-tax affiliate. S denotes the combined 
volume of shifted profits via the channel of internal debt and intra-group trade. The respective 
intra-group payments are deductible from the tax base of the high-tax affiliate and increase the 
low-tax affiliate’s profits πL. 
Profit shifting may induce costs C, which are assumed to be not tax deductible.86 These costs 
may be split into the general (or non-channel-specific) costs and the channel-specific costs, 
depending on whether they arise from the use of a particular profit shifting channel or from 
profit shifting as such. The general costs may result from an increased audit risk, an increased 
need for mitigation strategies, as well as potential adjustments of intra-group transactions via 
one or both channels if profits are below a certain threshold. In addition, shifting high volumes 
of profits carries the risk of a reputational damage for MNEs. Moreover, a multinational might 
bear costs from complying with the regulations that tackle intra-group profit shifting and from 
establishing circumvention strategies. For example, an arm’s length principle is a basic anti-
avoidance regulation, which requires intra-group transactions, including interest payments and 
transfer prices, to follow the same conditions as transactions between independent parties.87 
The channel-specific costs include negative channel-specific side effects from profit shifting. 
Despite a potentially lower capacity to raise external debt, there are no obvious costs from side 
effects of profit shifting via intra-group debt.88 By contrast, profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation results in conflicts within internal performance measurement and incentive setting 
systems.89 This subsequently leads to inefficiency costs that increase with a growing difference 
between the real transfer price and the tax-optimal transfer price.90 If companies use two sets 
                                                          
85 See Fuest et al. (2011). 
86 Some costs may in fact be tax deductible (see Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)). Assuming a deductibility of 
shifting costs does not fundamentally affect our results. 
87 See Eden (2009) and Zinn et al. (2014) for a cross-country overview. 
88 Costs from secondary effects that arise from external debt financing, in particular bankruptcy costs and costs 
from information asymmetries, do not play a relevant role in determining internal financing under a precondition 
that the total third-party debt of a multinational corporation defines a bankruptcy risk. See Chowdhry and Nanda 
(1994), Gordon (2010), and Overesch and Wamser (2014) for further details. 
89 These costs arises from tax induced intra-group transactions that deviate from the optimal structure of intra-
group trade from a management’s perspective. 
90 See Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012). 
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of books for tax-optimal transfer prices and internal transfer prices, these inefficiency costs may 
be avoided, which results in the shifting costs being limited to additional administrative 
expenses needed to operate a two-book system.91 Moreover, some countries have introduced 
channel-specific anti-avoidance regulations such as transfer pricing rules and interest deduction 
limitations.  
Assuming that C represents both the channel-specific and the general costs of profit shifting, 
the aim of the multinational corporation is to maximize its total after-tax profit Π as shown in 
equation 3.1. 
Π = (1 − τH )(πH − S) +  (1 − τL )(πL + S) − 𝐶 (3.1) 
It can be identified from equation 3.1 that the optimal amount of shifting out of the high-tax 
country S* arises when the tax advantage from profit shifting equals marginal costs: 
∂C
𝜕𝑆∗
= (τH − τL )  with τH = 0  for 𝑆 − πH  if 𝑆 > πH (3.2) 
According to equation 3.2, the tax advantage from profit shifting will be zero or negative for 
each unit of profits shifted in excess of the high-tax affiliate’s true profits because the 
corresponding deductions will not reduce its taxable income in the same year.  
Transfer pricing manipulation and excess interest payments are considered to be the two input 
factors used to produce the output – shifted profits S. Since both shifting channels serve exactly 
the same purpose of reducing profits in the high-tax country and increasing profits in the low-
tax country, the value of shifting one unit via certain channel equals the value of shifting one 
unit via the other channel. Hence, the multinational is indifferent in using these two input factors 
and will always choose the cheaper shifting channel. This means that the conditional input 
demand for shifting profits via transfer pricing manipulation ST
* equals: 
                                             S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )   if  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) <  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
S𝑇
∗  (S) = [0 + 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 ), 𝑆 − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )]  if  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) =  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
                                              0 + 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )  if  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) >  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
(3.3) 
 
 
                                                          
91 See Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012), p. 4. 
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and the conditional input demand for shifting profits via intra-group debt SD
* equals: 
                                              S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )   if  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) <  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
S𝐷
∗  (S) = [0 + 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 ), 𝑆 − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )]  if  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) =  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
                                              0 + 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )  if  𝐶𝐷 (S − 𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) >  𝐶𝑇 (S − 𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 )) 
(3.4) 
with  S𝐷
∗  (S −  𝛥𝑆) =  𝑆𝑇
∗(𝑆 − 𝛥𝑆 ) = 0 if S = 1 (3.5) 
Consequently, the total cost function of profit shifting is derived from the minimum cost 
combinations of the two input factors (which equal the two shifting channels) for all potential 
output levels: 
  C (S𝑇
∗  (S), S𝐷
∗  (S)) =  ∑ 𝐶𝑇
𝑥−𝑆𝑇
∗ (𝑆)
𝑥−0
(𝑥) + ∑ 𝐶𝐷
𝑦−𝑆𝐷
∗ (𝑆)
𝑦−0
(𝑦) (3.6) 
In equation 3.6, CT(x) and CD(y) denote the costs of shifting unit x via transfer pricing and unit 
y via debt. Whether a substitution between the two profit shifting channels is optimal depends 
on how these costs per shifted unit are determined. By following the existing literature, we 
assume that all profit shifting costs are convex in the amount of shifted profits.92 This can be 
formalized as follows: 
𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑖), 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑆𝑖) > 0   and   𝐶𝑖
′′(𝑆𝑖) > 0   with    𝑖 [𝐷, 𝑇, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙] (3.7) 
3.3.2    Substitution between Profit Shifting Channels 
If the costs for each profit shifting channel depend only on the volume of profits shifted via this 
channel (i.e. CT(ST) and CD(SD)),
93 the optimal amount of profit shifting from the high-tax 
country to the low-tax country via each channel is determined by equations 3.8 and 3.9. 
∂𝐶𝐷(𝑆𝐷
∗ )
𝜕𝑆𝐷
∗ = (τH − τL )  with τH = 0  for 𝑆 − πH  if 𝑆 > πH (3.8) 
                                                          
92 See as examples: Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), p. 7 and Saunders-Scott (2015). 
93 See Saunders-Scott (2015) for different assumptions regarding the cost function. 
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∂𝐶𝑇(𝑆𝑇
∗ )
𝜕𝑆𝑇
∗ = (τH − τL )  with τH = 0  for 𝑆 − πH  if 𝑆 > πH (3.9) 
Whether it is optimal to substitute towards one channel following a cost increase of the other 
channel depends on the level of total profit shifted in the optimum before the change in costs. 
If the optimal amount of profit shifting has been below the total true profits (S* < πH), an 
increase in the marginal channel-specific costs will decrease the optimal amount of profits 
shifted via this channel. However, the amount shifted via the other channel should remain 
unchanged as neither its costs nor the determination of the tax benefits are influenced by the 
reduction in the amount shifted via the first channel and in this case a substitution will not occur. 
By contrast, if it has been optimal to shift total true profits (S* = πH), an increase in the channel-
specific costs may either have no impact or reduce the optimal amount shifted via this channel. 
In the given example of profit shifting from a high-tax country to a low-tax country, the 
marginal benefit function is a step function which is constant with the positive values of the tax 
differential (τH  – τL) up to the amount of total true profit and turns negative for all units above 
the total true profits (S – πH). Thus, it is possible that the last unit shifted via one or both profit 
shifting channels in the optimum bears marginal costs below the tax advantage (τH – τL). Up to 
the level of the true profits, the company will always choose the cheaper channel for each unit 
shifted. For this reason, if the costs of one channel increase while still remaining below the tax 
rate differential and additionally leaving the price ratio of the two channels for all units of 
shifted profits unaffected, the shifted amount via both channels should remain unchanged. 
If, ceteris paribus, the price ratio reverses for certain units of shifted profits (meaning that the 
other channel now yields a lower cost), the amount shifted via the channel with increased costs 
should decline and the amount shifted via the other channel should increase. With respect to 
equations 3.8 and 3.9, this substitution between the two channels in response to a reversion of 
the price ratio for certain units of shifted profits results from a change in the value of τH (from 
its real value to zero and vice versa) in both equations.94  
                                                          
94 In addition, if it is optimal to shift total true profits, an increase in the cost of one channel also decreases the 
amount shifted via this channel if the marginal costs rise above the tax advantage (τH  – τL). A substitution towards 
the other channel will only then be optimal if the last unit shifted via the other channel yields costs below the tax 
differential. 
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However, companies may also substitute between the profit shifting channels if it is optimal to 
shift less than the total true profits. This is the case when we consider the non-channel-specific 
shifting costs CTotal(STotal) that are convex in the total amount to be shifted via both channels 
(which implies that C´Total(STotal) > 0 and C´´Total(STotal) > 0). As discussed above, these costs 
may result from increased audit or reputational risks. In this case, the high-tax affiliate 
determines the optimal amount of shifting using the two channels according to the following 
conditions: 
∂𝐶𝐷(𝑆
∗)
𝜕𝑆∗
= (τH − τL )  with τH = 0  for 𝑆 − πH  if 𝑆 > πH (3.10) 
∂𝐶𝑇(𝑆
∗)
𝜕𝑆∗
= (τH − τL )  with τH = 0  for 𝑆 − πH  if 𝑆 > πH (3.11) 
Equations 3.10 and 3.11 establish that an increase in the channel-specific costs of a certain 
channel will increase the marginal costs of profit shifting and consequently reduce the optimal 
amount shifted via this channel. The reduction in the shifted amount S should then reduce the 
marginal costs of shifting via the other channel with unchanged channel-specific costs, which 
in turn may increase the optimal level of profits shifted via this channel. 
In summary, if the shifting costs are channel-specific, companies may only substitute between 
the channels if it is optimal to shift total true profits. However, if there are other non-channel-
specific costs, which depend on the total amount shifted via both channels, companies may 
substitute between the channels even if it is optimal to shift less than total true profits.  
3.3.3    Hypotheses Derivation 
The considerations above show that a substitution between shifting channels depends on the 
structure of their cost functions. In this section, we concentrate on the channel-specific anti-
avoidance regulations and develop our hypothesis based on the assumptions about the 
components and structure of the cost functions of the two shifting channels. 
With regard to intra-group debt, Burnett (2014) identifies that there is usually a large range of 
possible arm’s length amounts of debt and corresponding interest rates, which form a 
comparison group for the intra-group borrowing of multinationals. In the case of intra-group 
royalty payments, an arm’s length price is often hard to determine due to the highly specific 
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nature of intangible assets. Therefore, it is relatively easy to justify high levels of profits shifted 
via this channel, even under an application of the arm’s length principle. With respect to the 
transfer of common tangible goods and services, Dawson and Miller (2009) note that companies 
should find themselves more restricted in their profit shifting behaviour even in the absence of 
detailed transfer pricing regulations, since tax authorities may compare related-party 
transactions to the available third-party payments. As a result, for corporations that trade 
tangible assets or services that are easy to value, severe transfer pricing manipulation may result 
in double taxation even if no strict transfer pricing regulations exist. Based on these 
considerations, we derive Hypothesis 1 of our study: 
In the absence of strict anti-avoidance regulations, non-IP-intensive companies mainly 
shift profits via intra-group debt, whereas IP-intensive firms shift profits via royalty 
payments. 
If a high-tax country has interest deduction limitations in place, interest payments on debt above 
the safe harbor ratio will no longer be deductible and will face double taxation. Consequently, 
the tax benefit of profit shifting will turn negative for excess interest payments. For companies 
that shift high levels of their total profits via interest payments, it will be optimal to reduce the 
amount shifted via intra-group interest payments. These companies may substitute shifting high 
levels of debt by an increased use of transfer pricing manipulation if the costs of shifting via 
the other channel do not exceed the tax benefit. Hence, according to Hypothesis 2: 
If a country introduces interest deduction limitations, companies that have been shifting 
profits via intra-group debt will reduce their interest payments and increase shifting via 
the transfer pricing channel.  
If a high-tax country introduces transfer pricing rules, a multinational corporation will face 
additional fixed costs if any intra-group transactions are present. In addition, strict transfer 
pricing regulations increase the threat of being audited. Transfer pricing rules following the 
OECD guidelines generally apply not only to intra-firm trade but also to the interest rates on 
intra-group loans, although less focus is usually placed on the level of intra-group debt.95 Most 
countries handle intra-group borrowing with the help of more specific thin capitalization or 
                                                          
95 See OECD (2012). 
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earnings stripping rules. As a result, the additional fixed costs and reduced potential for 
receiving a tax advantage from profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulation should make 
shifting via interest payments cheaper once transfer pricing rules are introduced. For this reason, 
a reduction in shifting via transfer pricing manipulation and an increase in shifting via internal 
debt can be expected.96 Hypothesis 3 thus reads: 
If a country introduces strict transfer pricing regulations, companies that have been 
shifting profits via intra-firm trade will reduce transfer pricing manipulation of tangible 
and intangible assets and increase shifting via the debt channel. 
If it is the case where an anti-avoidance regulation is introduced which targets one profit shifting 
channel while another anti-avoidance rule restricts the other shifting channel, the observable 
substitution will depend on how firms have previously used the two shifting channels. For 
example, if interest deduction restrictions exist, they should not allow a substitution towards 
the debt channel if transfer pricing documentation rules are introduced and if a company already 
fully exhausts the debt channel up to the permitted threshold. It is worth noting that transfer 
pricing regulations are typically more flexible than interest deduction limitations. Determining 
the arm’s length price is often very difficult, particularly in the case of firm-specific IP due to 
missing comparable transactions. Even if transfer pricing documentation rules do exist, firms 
should have greater flexibility for substituting towards the transfer pricing channel in the case 
that interest deduction limitation rules are introduced. However, the leeway for transfer pricing 
manipulation is likely to be smaller in the case of tangible goods compared to intangible assets. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 4 states: 
If transfer pricing regulations exist and interest deduction limitations are introduced, 
most companies may have some leeway to substitute towards the transfer pricing 
channel. In addition, the substitution should be more pronounced for IP-intensive firms 
as compared to non-IP-intensive companies. 
                                                          
96 Of course, such a substitution will only take place in firms that have been shifting parts of their profit via transfer 
pricing manipulation before the introduction of strict transfer pricing regulations. 
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3.4  Data 
3.4.1    Firm-Level Data 
We use firm-level data from the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau van Dijk in the 
empirical part of our paper. This database includes accounting information on group structures 
of more than 21 million companies in Europe. However, we only consider firms that report 
unconsolidated accounts, since we require information on the activities of single companies. In 
addition, we only focus on the affiliates of MNEs and exclude purely domestic firms from our 
sample. In order to determine multinational enterprises, we use information on direct parent 
firms and their subsidiaries.97 Since intra-group profit shifting requires a substantial ownership 
share, we follow Beer and Loeprick (2015) and only consider affiliates with an ownership share 
of at least 90%. Furthermore, we exclude headquarter ﬁrms from our sample due to the ﬁndings 
of Dischinger and Riedel (2010) and Dischinger et al. (2014) who argue that the location of 
proﬁts and proﬁtable assets may be biased in favor of the headquarters. However, these firms 
are included back in the sample as part of one of our robustness checks. Moreover, loss-making 
firms from the benchmark estimations are excluded because they face different tax planning 
incentives than profitable enterprises (see Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011)). Finally, we eliminate firms active in the financial sector and years with 
implausible values for our main variables of interest. 
Our empirical analysis includes two identification strategies: the first identification strategy 
employs a panel of European companies which belong to a multinational group.98 This analysis 
covers the period between 2004 and 2012 and includes ﬁrms located in 32 countries. In total, 
103,714 firms provide the information required for the analysis of the substitution of debt 
shifting by intra-firm trade manipulation and 85,949 companies provide necessary data for the 
analysis of the substitution of transfer pricing shifting by debt manipulation. Table A.1 in the 
appendix gives an overview of a cross-country distribution of observations in this sample. The 
second identification strategy is established by conducting a difference-in-difference estimation 
of a tax reform that was introduced in France in 2007. For this analysis, we use a balanced panel 
of 1,040 French affiliates of multinational groups in the period between 2004 and 2009.  
                                                          
97 Since data on ownership is static in the Amadeus database, we use information on ownership structures in 2012 
and assume that it did not change in the previous years.  
98 We define a company as a part of a multinational group if at least one firm in the group resides in a different 
country. 
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3.4.2    Data on Tax Rates and Anti-Avoidance Regulations 
The data on tax rates was obtained from the CBT Tax database99 provided by the University of 
Oxford and the Global Corporate Tax Handbooks100 published by the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The information on transfer pricing regulations was collected 
from the transfer pricing guides published by Deloitte,101 Ernst & Young,102 KPMG,103 and 
PwC.104 Data on thin capitalization and earnings stripping rules was obtained from Global 
Corporate Tax Handbooks. In the case of both – transfer pricing rules and interest deduction 
restrictions – we consider not only their presence but also their level of strictness, since rules 
that bite are more likely to have an impact on proﬁt shifting behavior of MNEs.  
Our study follows Beer and Loeprick (2015), with the years since the introduction of mandatory 
transfer pricing documentation requirements used as an indicator for the strictness of transfer 
pricing rules. Transfer pricing documentation requirements constitute a crucial element of 
increasing transparency of the transfer prices determination. It should be noted that time is an 
important factor of these rules, as it normally takes tax authorities several years or more to gain 
experience and knowledge of intra-group transfer prices to effectively detect mispricing. The 
advantages of this measure include its clear definition and interpretation as well as the fact that 
it brings a lot of variation. However, there are authors who use different variables to measure 
the strictness of transfer pricing rules and in order to ensure that our findings are robust, we test 
our baseline results by employing a binary transfer pricing variable comparable to the one used 
by Lohse and Riedel (2013). This variable also focuses on formal transfer pricing 
documentation rules; however, it does not take into consideration the effect of time and 
therefore exhibits significantly less variation in our dataset. The variable is set to one if formal 
transfer pricing documentation rules exist and equals zero otherwise.105 In a further robustness 
check, we take into account the existence of informal transfer pricing documentation rules.106 
We use a measure for the existence of informal transfer pricing rules while simultaneously 
                                                          
99 See Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2016). 
100.See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1995-2012). 
101 See Deloitte (2014). 
102 See Ernst & Young (2005-2012). 
103 See KPMG (2015). 
104 See PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012). 
105 In addition, Saunders-Scott (2015) employs a transfer pricing index based on Mescall and Klassen (2014). 
However, we cannot construct this measure for a sufficient number of country-year combinations due to the data 
availability issues. 
106 In some countries, transfer pricing documentation requirements have not been enforced by the national law but 
are required to exist in practice. 
78    
controlling for the years since the introduction of formal transfer pricing regulations. The 
respective variable is set to zero if neither formal nor informal transfer pricing documentation 
rules exist and it is equal to one if informal transfer pricing documentation rules are present. 
Furthermore, starting from the year in which formal transfer pricing documentation rules are 
introduced, the years following on from their introduction are also counted. Table A.2 in the 
appendix gives an overview of the formal and informal transfer pricing documentation rules 
across all countries in our sample. 
With regard to interest deduction restrictions, we face the challenge of constructing a measure 
that includes both thin capitalization rules, which limit interest deductibility based on a firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio, and earnings stripping regulations, which limit interest deductibility based 
on a company’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). For 
these reasons, in our baseline analysis we rely on a comprehensive variable that enables thin 
capitalization rules and earnings stripping regulations to be taken into account. This variable 
classifies interest deduction restrictions into three different categories as follows: all countries 
that do not have rules restricting the deductibility of interest payments (which go beyond a 
general application of the arm’s length principle) are assigned to category 1. Countries that 
apply thin capitalization rules with a safe harbor ratio above the average safe harbor ratio in our 
sample (which is 3) are assigned to category 2. Countries that do not use a general thin 
capitalization rule but apply some anti-avoidance regulation against excessive intra-group debt 
shifting are also classified into this category.107 In addition, countries that have a general thin 
capitalization rule with a safe harbor ratio of 3 or less but exclude a broad range of transactions 
from their application are also assigned to category 2.108 Category 3 comprises all countries that 
apply a thin capitalization rule with a safe harbor ratio of 3 or below without broad exceptions. 
The earnings stripping rules applicable in Germany (from 2008), Italy (from 2008), and Spain 
(from 2012) are assigned to category 3 as well. This reflects the idea that particularly in Italy 
and Spain the earnings stripping rules have been perceived to be stricter than the thin 
capitalization rules that were previously applicable. In Germany, assigning earnings stripping 
rules to category 3 reflects an unchanged level of strictness compared to prior years where a 
                                                          
107 Table A.4 in the appendix provides information on these special interest deduction limitations. 
108 An example includes France during the years between 2004 and 2006, when only interest payments to parent 
companies resident in certain non-EU countries where covered by thin capitalization rules. 
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thin capitalization rule with a debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 was present. Table A.5 in the appendix 
summarizes our main indicator for interest deduction limitations by country and year. 
In addition, we implement a robustness check by including an alternative proxy for interest 
deduction restrictions in our benchmark estimation. Here, we attempt to reflect the safe harbor 
debt-to-equity ratio109 in countries with thin capitalization rules. According to Buettner et al. 
(2012), a direct use of this ratio is not feasible, since it approaches infinity when no restrictions 
are imposed. Therefore, we follow Buettner et al. (2012) who conduct a non-linear 
transformation of the safe harbor ratio denoted by   and use it as a proxy for the strictness of 
thin capitalization rules.110 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
1
1 + σ 
 (3.12) 
In equation 3.12, Strictness stands for the measure of the strictness of thin capitalization rules 
and  denotes a country’s safe harbor ratio. Strictness can only be determined for countries that 
apply a thin capitalization rule; therefore, it is equal to zero if a country does not have this type 
of regulations. The level of the safe harbor ratio varies between 1 and 8 in our sample, which 
yields a maximum value of the strictness indicator of 0.5. Table A.3 in the appendix gives an 
overview of the debt-to-equity ratios applied under thin capitalization rules in the countries 
under analysis.  
3.4.3    Macroeconomic Controls 
The data on gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth, and GDP per-capita was extracted 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators111 and is measured in constant USD. We also 
obtained the information on the unemployment rate from the World Bank’s Development 
Indicators. It reﬂects a country’s total unemployment rate in percent of its total labor force as 
estimated by the International Labor Office. Information on corruption is derived from the 
World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator.112 Data on inflation is taken from the database 
                                                          
109 A safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio indicates up to which level interest deduction is safely granted by the host-
country’s tax system. See OECD (1987) for more details. 
110 See Buettner et al. (2012), p. 933. 
111 See World Bank (2015). 
112 See World Bank (2016c). 
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World Economic Outlook113 provided by the International Monetary Fund and it reflects the 
percentage change in average consumer prices. Finally, we construct a measure for growth 
opportunities, which we define as the median annual sales growth per industry in each country. 
Table A.6 in the appendix provides detailed descriptive statistics on all variables included in 
the panel estimation. Table A.7 gives an overview of all variables included in the analysis of 
the French tax reform. 
3.5 Identification Strategies 
3.5.1    Estimation Based on the Variation of Tax Parameters over Time 
3.5.1.1    Substitution of Debt Shifting by Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
In order to investigate whether multinationals substitute profit shifting via internal debt by 
shifting via intra-firm trade, we look at the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT at different strictness 
levels of interest deduction restrictions and transfer pricing regulations. Earnings before interest 
and taxes should not be influenced by profit shifting via internal debt because they explicitly 
exclude interest payments. This allows us to separately analyze the effect of anti-avoidance 
rules on shifting via the transfer of goods, services, and intangibles. We conduct this analysis 
in two steps: the first step refers to Lohse and Riedel (2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015) in 
investigating the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations in hindering profit shifting via the 
channel of intra-firm trade. This allows us to control for the strictness of transfer pricing rules 
and effectively analyze their interaction with the corporate income tax rate. The second step 
involves extending previous research by adding a triple interaction term between the tax rate 
and two types of anti-avoidance regulations in order to test the impact of transfer pricing rules 
on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT with and without strict interest deduction restrictions. This 
is done with the help of equation 3.13. 
        𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 +          
                                + 𝛽5𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 
                                       + 𝛽8 𝑿´𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.13) 
                                                          
113 See International Monetary Fund (2016). 
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In equation 3.13, Log(EBIT) is the dependent variable that denotes a natural logarithm of 
earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i in year t. CIT represents a corporate income tax 
rate augmented by local taxes on profits levied in year t in the country where ﬁrm i resides. In 
accordance with Lohse and Riedel (2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015), we employ this 
variable as the main indicator for profit shifting incentive and expect its coefficient to be 
negative. Furthermore, in line with Lohse and Riedel (2013), Beer and Loeprick (2015), and 
Saunders-Scott (2015), we expect that strict transfer pricing regulations TP effectively reduce 
the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT (𝛽3 > 0). Assuming that some companies have the required 
leeway to substitute between the two dominant proﬁt shifting channels – debt shifting and 
transfer pricing manipulation – the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT should increase if interest 
deduction restrictions are tightened but transfer pricing regulations remain weak.114 This is 
shown in equation 3.13 through an interaction term between the tax rate and interest deduction 
restrictions TC and therefore we expect 𝛽5 < 0. The triple interaction of the tax rate CIT, 
interest deductibility variable TC, and transfer pricing indicator TP takes into account that if a 
certain scope exists in substituting proﬁt shifting via debt by profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation, the effectiveness of one anti-avoidance regulation will be conditional on the 
enforcement of the other one. The investigation of this effect constitutes one of the major 
contributions of this study to the previous literature. 
Finally, 𝑿´ represents a vector of relevant ﬁrm and country-level controls chosen following the 
previous literature on the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations, such as Lohse and Riedel 
(2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015). 𝑿´ includes a company’s main input factors – ﬁxed assets 
and costs of employees – that reflect its true profits (as opposed to shifted revenues). In addition, 
it contains a host country’s characteristics including its GDP, GDP per-capita, a GDP growth 
rate, and an unemployment rate. µ𝑖  and 𝛿𝑗𝑡  are company and industry-year ﬁxed effects 
respectively, with 𝜀𝑖𝑡 representing an error term. 
3.5.1.2    Substitution of Transfer Pricing Manipulation by Debt Shifting  
In order to investigate whether there is a substitution of the transfer pricing channel by debt 
shifting, we look at the tax rate sensitivity of interest payments at different strictness levels of 
anti-avoidance rules. Here, we use a similar approach as in equation 3.13 but with the natural 
                                                          
114 This is especially true for companies that have previously shifted via intra-group debt. 
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logarithm of interest paid as the dependent variable. In equation 3.14, Log(Interest Paid) is the 
dependent variable and it denotes a natural logarithm of interest payments made by firm i in 
year t. Previous authors in this field of literature have used an affiliate’s total or internal debt as 
a dependent variable (see as examples: Desai et al. (2004), Overesch and Wamser (2010), 
Buettner and Wamser (2013), and Wamser (2014)). However, since the information on a 
company’s debt is not available to us, we continue by using interest payments to investigate the 
role of debt in profit shifting.115 
    𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 
                       + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +    
                             + 𝛽7𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑿´𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.14) 
In equation 3.14, the main independent variables of interest CIT, TP, and TC are identical to 
the ones described in equation 3.13. The vector 𝑿´ includes controls chosen following Desai et 
al. (2004). For example, in line with the authors we include firm-level controls such as a 
logarithm of a company’s sales, its ratio of EBITDA to total assets, and its ratio of net property, 
plant, and equipment to total assets into our estimation. Sales are used as a proxy for a firm’s 
size and we expect that larger companies have better access to credit markets and therefore have 
higher interest payments. This also appears to be the case for profitable firms, which are 
measured and controlled for by the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. A high level of tangible 
fixed assets may serve as collateral and should facilitate external borrowing as well. Moreover, 
𝑿´ contains country-level controls such as Corruption, Inflation, and Growth Options. In line 
with Desai et al. (2004), we expect a negative effect of inflation on leverage and consequently 
on interest expenses because of a higher risk premium required to obtain a credit. Corruption 
index is used as a proxy for creditor rights and political risk. Growth Options denotes the 
median annual sales growth per industry and country. In line with equation 3.13, µ𝑖 and 𝛿𝑗𝑡 in 
equation 3.14 are company and industry-year ﬁxed effects respectively and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents an 
error term. 
                                                          
115 The major limitation of using Interest Paid as a dependent variable is that it does not distinguish between intra-
group and external interest payments. Hence, we can draw only imprecise conclusions about the substitution of 
transfer pricing manipulation by the debt channel. Further research using data on internal interest payments or debt 
ratios is required to validate our findings. 
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3.5.2    Quasi-Experimental Analysis of a French Tax Reform 
The estimation approach presented in the previous section relies on analyzing ﬁrms’ reactions 
to changes in relevant tax parameters over time. A common concern for studies that use this 
approach is that the detected results are potentially prone to confounding effects that are not 
fully controlled for in the regression analysis. For example, if countries change transfer pricing 
rules and interest deduction restrictions either in the same period or within a short time span, it 
becomes difficult to disentangle the effectiveness of individual regulations. In order to improve 
the identiﬁcation strategy of the relationship between shifting strategies, we use the difference-
in-difference approach to analyze a quasi-experimental reform setting in France. Here, a 
comparison between the reported profits of firms that were affected and firms that were 
unaffected by the thin capitalization rules reform is made. Both the corporate income tax rate 
and the strictness of transfer pricing regulations remained unchanged in France during the years 
considered in our analysis. In addition, we are not aware of any other reforms that might have 
had different effects on the treatment and control groups.  
In 2007, a reform act extended the application of French thin capitalization rules to related 
parties within the European Union (EU). Before that, French thin capitalization rules were 
restricted only to interest payments made to controlling shareholders.116 Due to the EU case 
law,117 these rules were no longer applicable to interest payments to controlling shareholders 
that reside in the EU from 2004 onwards. Furthermore, the rules did not apply to interest 
payments made to controlling shareholders resident in countries that had signed a required 
treaty with France.118 The Finance Act of 2006119 has introduced new interest deduction 
restrictions for ﬁscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2007. These rules limited the tax 
deductibility of interest payments on loans granted by related parties and in addition to interest 
transactions to parent companies, interest payments to other associated firms were also covered 
by the new thin capitalization rules.120 Whereas a debt-to-equity ratio of only 1.5:1 applied 
                                                          
116 A controlling shareholder was deﬁned as a shareholder that directly owned more than 50% of a company’s 
share capital or voting rights. Under this thin capitalization rule, a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5:1 applied. 
117 See European Court of Justice (2002). 
118 This treaty either contained a non-discrimination clause similar to Art. 24(5) of the OECD Model Convention 
or did not explicitly authorize the application of French thin capitalization rules and has been negotiated or 
renegotiated after July 23, 1992. 
119 See Ernst & Young (2008). 
120 Associated companies are defined as two companies in which one holds directly or indirectly a minimum of 
50% of the other firm’s capital or as two companies in which a third enterprise holds directly or indirectly 50% of 
the capital. 
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before 2007, the new thin capitalization rules introduced an additional test in which it was 
decided that interest payments should be deductible only if they do not exceed 25% of a 
company’s EBITDA. The interest that exceeds the higher of the two thresholds is considered 
non-deductible for tax purposes.121 We use the following difference-in-difference specification 
to study the impact of the 2007 reform: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 
                                     + 𝛽4 𝑿´𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.15) 
In equation 3.15, Log(EBIT) is the dependent variable that denotes a natural logarithm of a 
firm’s i earnings before interest and taxes in year t. Treat is a binary variable that is equal to 
one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies 
assigned to the control group. We classify a firm as a treated one if it was facing unrestricted 
debt shifting opportunities prior to the reform and became subject to interest deduction 
restrictions from 2007 onwards. We define three criteria a company has to fulfil in order to be 
assigned to the treatment group. The first criterion states that its parent company must reside in 
one of the countries covered by the exemption of thin capitalization rules between 2004 and 
2006 (EU member states or certain treaty-exempted countries). As a second criterion, its 
reported median interest payments in the three years prior to the reform must exceed 150,000 
EUR, since this amount of interest remained deductible after the reform irrespective of a 
company’s debt-to-equity ratio.122 As a third criterion, only companies with higher tax rates 
than their parent firms are included in the treatment group. This step is made with reference to 
Graham (2013) who suggests that other enterprises have a disincentive to feature high levels of 
intra-group debt and are unlikely to be affected by interest deduction restrictions before or after 
the reform. Consequently, the control group includes companies with parent firms that reside 
in countries covered by thin capitalization rules before 2007 as well as companies without a tax 
incentive and firms with low interest payments. The variable After equals zero for pre-reform 
years between 2004 and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 
2007 and 2009.  
                                                          
121 If the non-deductible interest is 150,000 EUR or less, all interest is considered to be deductible. 
122 We rely on the interest payments reported before the reform to ensure exogenous treatment. 
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The coefficient of interest in equation 3.15 is 𝛽3. The identifying assumption is that in the 
absence of a reform the dependent variable would have followed a similar trend in both 
treatment and control groups. Since treated ﬁrms face a higher cost of shifting proﬁts via interest 
payments, they are expected to rely more on trade mispricing upon policy intervention if they 
have some discretionary leeway of doing so. Consequently, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative. This 
would suggest that firms affected by the reform are more likely to reduce their EBIT than the 
unaffected companies. 𝑿´ in equation 3.15 comprises firm-level controls such as fixed assets 
and the costs of employees. In addition, equation 3.15 contains industry-year ﬁxed effects 𝛿𝑗𝑡 
and company fixed effects µ𝑖. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
3.5.3    IP-Intensive Firms vs. Non-IP-Intensive Companies 
According to Hypothesis 1, we expect that companies belonging to groups with a high IP 
intensity mainly shift their profits via transfer pricing manipulation, while other companies 
engage in profit shifting via intra-group debt if none of the profit shifting channels are restricted 
by anti-avoidance rules. Apart from this, Beer and Loeprick (2015) show that the profit shifting 
behavior of subsidiaries with high intangibles-to-total-assets ratios is less influenced by anti-
avoidance legislation than the profit shifting behavior of affiliates with a low fraction of 
intangible assets. In order to test our hypothesis and take into account the fact that firms differ 
in their potential to substitute between the two profit shifting channels,123 we estimate the 
benchmark models presented in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive 
companies. We classify IP-intensive firms as those that belong to MNEs with an IP intensity 
above the median of our sample,124 with IP intensity defined as the ratio of intangible assets to 
total fixed assets.125  
Since certain countries, such as Germany, do not allow the capitalization of self-created 
intangible assets, we additionally assign all companies active in R&D-intensive industries to 
the subsample of IP-intensive firms. We define R&D-intensive industries based on the 
                                                          
123 IP-intensive firms are less restricted in conducting profit shifting, because the arm’s length price on the use of 
intangibles is often hard to determine and can therefore be more easily manipulated than transfer prices for other 
transactions or intra-group interest payments. See Dischinger and Riedel (2011) for details. 
124 We refer to the IP intensity of a group, because the opportunity to shift profits via royalty payments does not 
depend on the company’s own level of IP intensity but rather on the existence of valuable intangible assets at the 
level of any of the group’s affiliates. 
125 We test alternative definitions of IP intensity in the robustness checks. 
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Stifterverband report,126 which shows the aggregate internal R&D investments per industry in 
2008. Hence, we classify all industries that invested more than the sample’s average of one 
billion EUR in R&D in 2008 as R&D-intensive. This includes the following sectors: 
 Manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products; 
 Manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; 
 Manufacturing of computers, electronics, and optical products; 
 Manufacturing of electrical equipment; 
 Manufacturing of machinery and equipment; 
 Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; 
 Manufacturing of air and spacecraft; 
 Information and communication; 
 Scientific research and development. 
3.6  Results  
3.6.1    Estimation Based on the Variation of Tax Parameters over Time 
3.6.1.1    Substitution of Debt Shifting by Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
This part of the paper presents the results of estimations described in section 3.5.1.1. The main 
independent variables of interest in column I of Table 3.1 include a corporate income tax rate, 
an indicator for the strictness of transfer pricing rules TP, and their interaction. In column II, 
we additionally consider the interest deduction restrictions TC and a triple interaction between 
both anti-avoidance rules and a corporate income tax rate. The last two columns show the results 
after splitting the sample into IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive firms. 
Column I of Table 3.1 displays a negative and statistically signiﬁcant tax sensitivity of reported 
EBIT. Holding other factors constant, on average a one percentage point increase in the tax rate 
leads to a -0.35% decrease in a company’s reported proﬁts. This negative relationship has 
already been established in the earlier literature on profit shifting (see the meta-study of 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) for an overview). The effect size is, however, somewhat 
smaller (in absolute terms) than the average effect size derived in this meta-study. Furthermore, 
this column reinvestigates the influence of transfer pricing regulations on a ﬁrm’s proﬁts. 
                                                          
126 See Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2013). 
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Consistent with Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Lohse and Riedel (2013), Saunders-Scott 
(2013), and Beer and Loeprick (2015), we ﬁnd that an implementation of transfer pricing 
documentation rules in high-tax countries leads to an increase in ﬁrms’ reported earnings before 
interest and taxes. The coefficient on the interaction term between the corporate income tax rate 
and the transfer pricing rules is positive and statistically significant with a t-value of 4.3. It 
indicates that on average the tax rate sensitivity decreases by -0.1 percentage points each year 
after the introduction of transfer pricing documentation requirements. The effect size is 
comparable to the one reported by Beer and Loeprick (2015) who use the same measure for the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations. As for the other variables, input factors such as fixed 
assets and the cost of employees seem to play an important role in determining a company’s 
proﬁts, which is also consistent with our predictions and the ﬁndings of earlier studies, such as 
Lohse and Riedel (2013), Beer and Loeprick (2015), and Saunders-Scott (2015). Furthermore, 
a higher GDP growth rate appears to be positively correlated with reported proﬁts, while a 
higher unemployment rate is likely to decrease ﬁrms’ earnings.  
The effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations depends on whether profit shifting via transfer 
pricing can be substituted by profit shifting via interest payments and vice versa. To take into 
account this substitution and test Hypothesis 3 of our study, we increase the regression in 
column I by an indicator for interest deduction restrictions targeting the potentially substitutive 
shifting channel of intra-group debt. Column II of Table 3.1 demonstrates the results of this 
estimation based on equation 3.13. It includes the corporate income tax rate and strictness 
indicators for transfer pricing rules and interest deduction restrictions, which are the main 
independent variables of interest. In addition, pairwise interactions and an interaction term 
between all three variables of interest are also included. The triple interaction takes into account 
that the effect of transfer pricing documentation rules on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT 
depends on the strictness of interest deduction restrictions.  
In the presence of the triple interaction, the two-way interaction between the transfer pricing 
rules and CIT reflects the case where only formal transfer pricing rules exist, whereas interest 
deduction limitations do not. The coefficient on two-way interaction is statistically significant 
and its magnitude is substantially larger than the size of the coefficient in column I, which 
suggests that in the absence of thin capitalization rules companies in high-tax countries seem  
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Table 3.1 Regression Results: Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
 I II III VI 
CIT -0.351*** -0.013 -0.507** 0.563* 
 (0.107) (0.194) (0.252) (0.308) 
TP 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT*TP 0.103*** 0.517*** 0.564*** 0.442*** 
 (0.024) (0.079) (0.104) (0.123) 
TC  0.027*** 0.004 0.052*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT*TC  -0.358*** -0.065 -0.702*** 
  (0.109) (0.142) (0.171) 
TP*TC  -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.027*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT*TP*TC  -0.228*** -0.266*** -0.170** 
  (0.044) (0.057) (0.070) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.399*** 0.385*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) 0.432** -0.109 0.102 -0.341 
 (0.189) (0.207) (0.273) (0.320) 
Log(GDP/capita) -0.268 0.349* 0.141 0.574* 
 (0.174) (0.195) (0.259) (0.296) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 103,714 103,714 60,732 42,982 
No. of Observations 541,323 541,323 325,494 215,829 
R2 (within) 0.087 0.087 0.092 0.082 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures 
the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. 
Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a company’s 
fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of 
unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. 
Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a natural 
logarithm of a country’s GDP per-capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms 
as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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to shift less via the transfer pricing channel if transfer pricing rules exist.127 The interaction term 
between the corporate income tax rate and the indicator for interest deduction restrictions in 
column II reflects the case where only interest deduction restrictions exist but transfer pricing 
documentation rules do not apply. The coefficient on these restrictions is negative and 
statistically significant and the combined coefficient suggests that in the absence of strict 
transfer pricing documentation rules, strict interest deduction restrictions decrease the tax 
sensitivity of EBIT on average by -0.37 percentage points, with each decrease in the three-stage 
indicator for interest deduction restrictions. This yields a tax rate sensitivity of EBIT of around 
-0.73 in countries with strict interest deduction restrictions (TC is equal to 2) but no transfer 
pricing documentation requirements. Since EBIT does not include interest payments, this 
relationship indicates the existence of a substitutive relationship between the two profit shifting 
channels and therefore confirms Hypothesis 3 of out study. 
According to columns II-IV of Table 3.1, the triple interaction between CIT, transfer pricing 
rules, and interest deduction restrictions is negative and statistically significant. This suggests 
that transfer pricing documentation rules are less effective in reducing transfer pricing 
manipulation if strict interest deduction restrictions are present. To give an example, the average 
marginal effect yields a tax rate sensitivity of -0.54 with strict interest deduction limitations and 
1.53 without them three years after formal transfer pricing documentation rules have been 
introduced. Figure 3.1 shows the average marginal effects of corporate income tax on EBIT 
with and without interest deduction restrictions.  
According to Figure 3.1, the tax rate elasticity of EBIT is positive after transfer pricing 
regulations have been introduced if no interest deduction limitations exist. This suggests that 
transfer pricing regulations eliminate profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulation and the 
rules become more effective each year after their introduction. Figure 3.1 also shows that the 
tax rate sensitivity is negative irrespective of the level of transfer pricing strictness if interest 
deduction limitations are strict and it is statistically significant within six years of transfer 
pricing rules being introduced.  
 
                                                          
127 Whether they substitute this channel by shifting via internal debt (which in this case is not restricted) depends 
on the effect of the interaction term in regressions with interest payments as a dependent variable. We carry out 
this analysis in the next section. 
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Figure 3.1 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on EBIT: Full Sample 
 
In column II of Table 3.1 we do not observe a negative tax sensitivity for the case that neither 
strict interest deduction restrictions nor transfer pricing regulations exist. A reason for this 
might be that not all companies shift profits using intra-firm trade in the absence of anti-
avoidance regulations. Some firms will rely mainly on shifting via internal debt, particularly if 
costs from secondary effects of transfer pricing manipulation are higher than costs from shifting 
via intra-group debt. This is likely to be the case for multinational groups without valuable 
intangible assets or other intra-group transactions for which transfer prices can be easily 
manipulated. 
According to Hypothesis 1, IP-intensive companies shift mainly via transfer pricing 
manipulation, while other firms engage in shifting via intra-group debt if none of the profit 
shifting channels is restricted by anti-avoidance rules. In order to test this hypothesis, we split 
the baseline sample into IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive companies. In line with Hypothesis 
1, columns III and IV of Table 3.1 show that IP-intensive firms shift profits via transfer pricing 
manipulation in the absence of any anti-avoidance regulations. For this subgroup, we find a 
negative tax rate sensitivity of EBIT. For companies with a low IP intensity, an increase in the 
tax rate even has a weak positive effect on EBIT. A reason for this might be that despite the 
absence of strict channel-specific anti-avoidance rules, countries usually apply the arm’s length 
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principle. As a result of this, firms that largely rely on shifting via intra-group debt have an 
incentive to increase EBIT because in an arm’s length comparison higher levels of EBIT may 
justify higher levels of debt.128 
Most non-IP-intensive companies do not seem to engage in transfer pricing manipulation in the 
absence of strict anti-avoidance legislation for both profit shifting channels. Therefore, the 
negative coefficient on the interaction between interest deduction restrictions and CIT in 
column IV of Table 3.1 indicates that companies engage in profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation if strict interest deduction limitations are in place. This interaction term is not 
statistically significant for companies with a high IP intensity. This is plausible if Hypothesis 1 
remains to be true, so that most of these companies do not extensively shift via the debt channel 
in the absence of strict transfer pricing rules and are consequently not affected by an 
introduction or a tightening of interest deduction restrictions.  
The interaction of the indicator for the strictness of transfer pricing rules and CIT is positive for 
both IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive firms (see columns III and IV of Table 3.1), but its 
coefficient is slightly higher for companies with a high IP intensity. The average marginal 
effects suggest that an increase in the tax rate does not trigger profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation for companies in both subsamples if only transfer pricing documentation rules but 
no interest deduction limitation rules are present (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). According to 
columns III and IV of Table 3.1, the coefficient on triple interaction is negative for both 
subsamples. Looking at the average marginal effects, we find that for IP-intensive firms the 
negative tax rate sensitivity given strict interest deduction restrictions is statistically significant 
for all levels up to seven years after the introduction of transfer pricing documentation rules 
(see Figure 3.2). For non-IP-intensive firms, the negative tax rate sensitivity is only statistically 
significant in the first four years after transfer pricing documentation rules have been introduced 
if strict interest deduction restrictions exist (see Figure 3.3). The size of the coefficient and its 
statistical significance declines with each additional year of the existence of transfer pricing 
documentation rules. 
 
                                                          
128 This argument is only reasonable as long as the increase in EBIT is lower than the increase in the respective 
interest payments. 
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Figure 3.2 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on EBIT: IP-Intensive Firms 
 
Figure 3.3 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on EBIT: Non-IP-Intensive Firms 
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These findings suggest that strict transfer pricing rules are less effective in reducing transfer 
pricing manipulation if interest deduction restrictions are also strict, which indicates that there 
is a substitutive relationship between the two profit shifting channels. While transfer pricing 
documentation rules increase the costs of shifting via the transfer pricing channel and induce a 
substitution towards the debt channel, they still leave considerable leeway for transfer pricing 
manipulation in the case that the debt channel is restricted. However, this leeway is reduced 
year by year after transfer pricing documentation requirements have been introduced. This 
reduction suggests that the increasing experience of the tax authorities enhances their 
effectiveness in tackling transfer pricing manipulation. 
Following the results in columns II-IV of Table 3.1, we conclude that IP-intensive firms shift 
profits mainly via transfer pricing manipulation in the absence of anti-avoidance regulations. 
This finding confirms Hypothesis 1 of our study. An introduction of interest deduction 
limitations induces firms to increase shifting via the transfer pricing channel, which is in line 
with Hypothesis 2. If shifting via both channels is restricted by anti-avoidance regulations, 
transfer pricing rules appear to be less effective in reducing shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation, especially in the case of IP-intensive firms, which confirms Hypothesis 4.  
3.6.1.2    Substitution of Transfer Pricing Manipulation by Debt Shifting  
The previous section has shown that restricting the possibility of profit shifting via internal debt 
leads to an increase in shifting via intra-firm trade. Thus, we conclude that there is a substitution 
between the two profit shifting channels. In order to validate this finding, we examine in this 
section whether hindering shifting via transfer pricing manipulation has an impact on shifting 
via debt. We implement this analysis by empirically estimating the effect of changes in a 
country’s corporate income tax rate and anti-avoidance regulations on corporate interest 
payments. The details on this identification strategy are given in section 3.5.1.2. 
Table 3.2 shows the results of estimating the model shown in equation 3.14. Parallel to Table 
3.1, the first column of Table 3.2 presents the results without considering the triple interaction 
term. Here, we replicate the outcomes achieved by Desai et al. (2004) and other previous 
authors, such as Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), Overesch and Wamser (2010), and 
Buettner et al. (2012). According to column I, the interaction term on CIT and interest deduction 
limitations TC is negative and statistically significant. This implies that companies pay less  
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Table 3.2 Regression Results: Log(Interest Paid) as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV 
CIT 1.859*** 1.101** 0.190 3.126*** 
 (0.485) (0.496) (0.647) (0.824) 
TC 0.044*** 0.013 0.020 -0.019 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) 
CIT*TC -3.227*** -2.330*** -2.046*** -2.834*** 
 (0.262) (0.274) (0.365) (0.437) 
TP  0.005 0.020 -0.015 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
CIT*TP  0.610*** 0.881*** 0.044 
  (0.191) (0.245) (0.308) 
TP*TC  0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
CIT*TP*TC  -0.218** -0.350*** 0.089 
  (0.106) (0.136) (0.170) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.336 0.336 0.214 1.423*** 
 (0.298) (0.298) (0.227) (0.075) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) 
Log(Sales) 0.618*** 0.620*** 0.636*** 0.604*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) 
Corruption 0.209*** 0.129*** 0.117** 0.142** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.048) (0.064) 
Inflation -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.011** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Growth Options -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 -0.167*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.033) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 85,949 85,949 52,761 33,188 
No. of Observations 375,573 375,573 238,004 137,569 
R2 (within) 0.059 0.060 0.062 0.064 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(Interest Paid), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s interest payments. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction limitations. Net PPE/Assets, 
EBITDA/Assets, and Log(Sales) are firm-level controls and represent a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, 
and equipment to total assets, its ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total 
assets, and a natural logarithm of its sales respectively. Corruption represents a corruption index and indicates the 
level of governance and political risk in a country. Inflation stands for a country’s rate of inflation. Growth Options 
denotes the median annual sales growth per industry and country. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a 
sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies.  
interest out of high-tax countries with strict anti-avoidance rules, which suggests that strict 
interest deduction restrictions effectively hinder profit shifting using interest payments. With 
regard to other control variables, a company’s sales appear to have a positive effect on interest 
paid, which is consistent with the findings of Desai et al. (2004), Overesch and Wamser (2010), 
Buettner and Wamser (2013), and Wamser (2014). In addition, Inflation exhibits a negative 
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effect on interest payments, which is also consistent with earlier literature, including Desai et 
al. (2004). In line with Desai et al. (2004), Corruption, which indicates the level of governance 
and political risk in a country, is positively correlated with interest outflows. 
Column II of Table 3.2 displays the results of estimating equation 3.14 using the full sample, 
while column III considers only IP-intensive firms and column IV shows the outcomes for 
companies with a low IP intensity. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and our findings presented in 
Table 3.1, IP-intensive firms do not seem to heavily engage in profit shifting via interest 
payments if no anti-avoidance regulations for either channel exist. However, we find a positive 
tax rate sensitivity for these companies if strict transfer pricing documentation rules are present 
but no interest deduction limitations apply. This suggests that the reduction in shifting via 
transfer pricing manipulation found for this subsample in Table 3.1 is compensated by an 
increase in shifting via debt. 
The coefficient on the two-way interaction between interest deduction limitations and corporate 
income tax rate in columns II-IV of Table 3.2 is negative and statistically significant. Its large 
size indicates the effectiveness of strict interest deduction limitations in reducing profit shifting 
via interest payments if no transfer pricing regulations exist. The coefficient on the triple 
interaction turns out to be negative and statistically significant in the case of IP-intensive firms. 
Figures 3.4-3.6 show the average marginal effects of a corporate income tax on Interest Paid 
with and without anti-avoidance legislation. While Figure 3.4 displays the outcomes for the full 
sample, Figure 3.5 concentrates on the IP-intensive firms and Figure 3.6 on the non-IP-intensive 
companies. According to Figure 3.4, tax rate elasticity of Interest Paid is positive after transfer 
pricing regulations have been introduced if no interest deduction limitations exist. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 3 of our study. Moreover, the tax rate sensitivity is negative irrespective 
of the level of transfer pricing strictness if interest deduction limitations are present, which is 
in line with Hypothesis 4. 
According to column IV of Table 3.2, in the sample of non-IP-intensive firms the tax rate seems 
to have a positive impact on interest paid if no anti-avoidance regulations exist. This supports 
Hypothesis 1, according to which these companies shift via intra-group debt rather than transfer 
pricing manipulation in the unrestricted case. Hence, it is also conclusive that the coefficient on 
the interaction term between tax rate and interest deduction limitations is higher (in absolute 
terms) for the sample of non-IP-intensive companies as compared to their IP-intensive 
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counterparts. The interaction between the tax rate and the transfer pricing rules is positive but 
not statistically significant in the case of non-IP-intensive enterprises. This also matches our 
assumption that in the non-restricted case companies with a low IP intensity do not make 
extensive use of shifting via transfer pricing manipulation. For this reason, an introduction of 
transfer pricing documentation rules does not necessarily have to influence these companies. 
The coefficient on the triple interaction is negative and statistically significant only for 
companies with a high IP intensity. Hence, in the case of non-IP-intensive firms, interest 
deduction limitations seem to be effective in reducing profit shifting via interest payments 
irrespective of the transfer pricing regulations. 
Figure 3.4 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Interest Paid: Full Sample 
Figure 3.5 shows that if strict interest deduction limitations and strict transfer pricing 
regulations exist, IP-intensive companies feature a negative tax rate sensitivity of interest paid. 
This suggests that a simultaneous application of both sets of anti-avoidance rules effectively 
decreases shifting of IP-intensive firms via the channel of interest payments. As shown in the 
previous section, an application of both sets of regulations has a less effective outcome in the 
case of shifting via intra-firm trade. Hence, we conclude that IP-intensive firms have a 
substantial leeway for profit shifting by means of transfer pricing manipulation even if formal 
transfer pricing regulations exist, which is in line with Hypothesis 4. By contrast, Figure 3.6 
shows that anti-avoidance regulations on both profit shifting channels are less effective in the 
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case of non-IP-intensive companies. However, these firms respond to interest deduction 
limitations, which points to a smaller dependency of non-IP-intensive firms on profit shifting 
via the channel of transfer pricing in the absence of anti-avoidance regulations. 
Figure 3.5 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Interest Paid: IP-Intensive Firms 
 
Figure 3.6 Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Interest Paid: Non-IP-Intensive Firms 
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In summary, following the results in columns II-IV of Table 3.2, we conclude that non-IP-
intensive firms shift profits mainly via interest payments in the absence of anti-avoidance 
legislation, which confirms Hypothesis 1 of our study. An introduction of transfer pricing rules 
induces firms to increase shifting via the debt channel, which is in line with Hypothesis 3. If 
shifting via both channels is restricted by anti-avoidance legislation, interest deduction 
restrictions appear to be more effective than transfer pricing regulations, especially in the case 
of IP-intensive firms, which confirms Hypothesis 4. On that account, the regression results 
based on equations 3.13 and 3.14 provide evidence which shows that an introduction or 
tightening of anti-avoidance regulations tackling one profit shifting channel may trigger a 
substitution towards the other shifting channel. While total profit shifting might slightly 
decrease if strict transfer pricing documentation regulations and interest deduction limitations 
exist, the effectiveness of transfer pricing documentation rules appears to be less noticeable 
than prior studies suggest if the potential for a substitution is taken into consideration. 
3.6.1.3    Robustness Tests 
We conduct several robustness checks to reassess our findings. For example, we replace the 
indicators for anti-avoidance rules with alternative measures. The results for these robustness 
checks with EBIT as a dependent variable are provided in Table A.8 and the results of the 
robustness tests with interest paid as a dependent variable are given in Table A.9 in the 
appendix. Following Buettner et al. (2012), we use a non-linear transformation of the debt-to-
equity ratio as an alternative indicator for interest deduction limitations (see columns I and II 
of Tables B.8 and B.9). If no thin capitalization rules exist, the indicator is equal to zero and in 
countries that apply an earnings stripping ratio this variable is set to missing.129 Furthermore, 
following Lohse and Riedel (2013) we use an alternative measure for the strictness of transfer 
pricing regulations. This is a binary variable, which equals one if formal transfer pricing 
documentation rules exist in a country and zero otherwise (see columns III and IV of Tables 
B.8 and B.9). Moreover, we additionally incorporate informal transfer pricing documentation 
rules using a variable that is set to one for all countries with an informal transfer pricing 
documentation requirement. We combine this measure with our main variable of interest to take 
into account the effect of time. Consequently, this variable increases by one each year after 
                                                          
129 Section 3.4.2 provides more details on the construction of this variable. 
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formal transfer pricing documentation rules have been introduced (see columns V and VI of 
Tables B.8 and B.9). 
If we use the level of the debt-to-equity ratio as an indicator for interest deduction limitations, 
the results of the estimations according to equation 3.13 (with Log(EBIT) as a dependent 
variable) and equation 3.14 (with Log(Interest Paid) as a dependent variable) remain 
comparable to our baseline findings. One major difference is that the interaction between the 
interest deduction restrictions and the corporate income tax rate in column II of Table A.8 still 
remains negative for non-IP-intensive firms but it is no longer statistically significant. The 
negative triple interaction suggests that companies mainly substitute towards the transfer 
pricing channel if both interest deduction limitations and transfer pricing regulations are 
present. The results show a higher positive coefficient on the interaction between the tax rate 
and the transfer pricing rules indicator for non-IP-intensive companies in column II of Table 
A.8 and column II of Table A.9 as compared to our findings for these firms in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2. This suggests that more substitution towards the debt channel occurs only in the presence 
of transfer pricing regulations.  
If we use an alternative transfer pricing variable based on Lohse and Riedel (2013), most of our 
baseline results are confirmed. The only difference is that the tax rate sensitivity of IP-intensive 
firms is negative but no longer statistically significant once we use an alternative measure (see 
column III of Table A.8). Moreover, the interaction between the tax rate and transfer pricing 
rules (in the regression with Log(EBIT) as a dependent variable) is no longer statistically 
significant for companies with a low IP intensity. However, these results have to be treated with 
caution, since the binary TP variable exhibits considerably less variation in our sample 
compared to our benchmark indicator for transfer pricing regulations. The transfer pricing 
variable which incorporates both informal transfer pricing documentation rules and the effect 
of time on the strictness of transfer pricing regulations (see columns V and VI of Table A.8) 
shows no substantial difference to the baseline findings.  
In addition to using alternative definitions of the anti-avoidance regulations, we also apply 
alternative definitions of IP intensity. The results for regressions with EBIT as a dependent 
variable are shown in Table A.10 and the results for estimations with interest paid as a 
dependent variable are provided in Table A.11 in the appendix. In the first variation (see 
columns I and II of Tables B.10 and B.11), we split the sample according to a group’s ratio of 
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intangible assets to total assets. Under this definition, companies active in R&D-intensive 
industries are (contrarily to our main regression results) not automatically assumed to be IP-
intensive. In the second alternative (see columns III and IV of Tables B.10 and B.11), we define 
IP intensity based on the level of intangible assets held by an affiliate instead of the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. In a third alternative (see columns V and VI of Tables B.10 and 
B.11), we use the ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets and additionally include all firms 
active in R&D-intensive industries in the sample of IP-intensive companies. The variations in 
the definition of IP intensity do not alter our baseline findings. 
Finally, we add headquarter companies back to our sample. The results of this robustness test 
for both EBIT and interest paid as dependent variables are shown in Table A.12 in the appendix. 
The empirical findings that arise from using this sample closely resemble our benchmark 
results. However, the magnitudes of the tax sensitivity of EBIT and interest paid in the absence 
of anti-avoidance regulations are somewhat smaller (in absolute terms) than our baseline 
findings. This also applies to the tax sensitivity in the case where both anti-avoidance 
regulations are strict, which confirms the previous findings by Dischinger and Riedel (2010) 
and Dischinger et al. (2014) who claim that headquarter firms are less prone to shift profits than 
other group affiliates. 
3.6.2    Quasi-Experimental Analysis of a French Tax Reform 
3.6.2.1    Baseline Findings 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section suggests that multinational enterprises 
are able to substitute between proﬁt shifting channels. In order to validate this finding, we 
additionally examine the outcomes of a reform in France using a difference-in-difference 
approach. As described in section 3.5.2, we divide the sample into treatment and control groups 
in this part of the analysis. Figure 3.7 shows that the average EBIT of treatment and control 
groups followed a parallel trend during the three years prior to the reform introduction in 2007. 
However, the average reported profits declined more for treated firms than for the untreated 
ones in the post-reform years. On that account, the parallel trend assumption required for a 
difference-in-difference setting can be confirmed for both the full sample (Panel A) and the 
subsample of IP-intensive firms (Panel B).  
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Figure 3.7 Common Trend of EBIT in Treatment and Control Groups 
Panel A. Full Sample                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. IP-Intensive Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the difference-in-difference estimation. Column I presents 
the regression results with both industry-year and firm fixed effects but not the firm-level time-
variant variables. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator is negative and 
statistically significant at the level of 1%. It remains negative and statistically significant once 
we add fixed assets and employee compensation to the benchmark specification (see column 
II). This finding confirms Hypothesis 2 along with our previous results, suggesting that firms 
react to an introduction or tightening of interest deduction restrictions by using transfer pricing 
manipulation more aggressively. 
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In order to test the idea that treated ﬁrms differ in their potential to manipulate transfer prices, 
we conduct the benchmark analysis separately for IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive companies. 
The results shown in columns III and IV of Table 3.3 indicate a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator for IP-intensive companies and 
an insignificant coefficient for non-IP-intensive firms. The magnitude of the coefficient for IP-
intensive companies is more negative than the coefficient for the full sample. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 4, according to which companies with a high IP intensity have more 
leeway in substituting debt shifting by transfer pricing manipulation. In order to validate these 
results, we conduct a triple difference-in-difference estimation instead of splitting the sample 
into two parts. This is carried out by including an indicator variable for intangibles’ intensity 
IP into the benchmark model. The coefficient on the triple difference estimator appears to be 
negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, with an F-value of 6.4 the joint coefficient 
is also highly significant. These results further support Hypothesis 4. 
Table 3.3 Regression Results of the Difference-In-Difference Estimation: Log(EBIT) as a 
Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP Full  
 I II III IV V 
After 1.525 -0.868** -0.273*** -1.216** -0.891** 
 (0.966) (0.410) (0.053) (0.523) (0.405) 
Treat*After -0.367*** -0.314** -0.573*** -0.097 -0.066 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.157) (0.164) (0.166) 
After*IP     0.056 
     (0.046) 
Treat*After*IP     -0.497** 
     (0.227) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 938 938 506 432 938 
No. of Observations 5,628 5,628 3,036 2,592 5,628 
R2 (within) 0.072 0.124 0.165 0.104 0.125 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. Treat is a binary 
variable that is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is equal to zero for all 
companies assigned to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which 
represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. FE stands for 
fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a 
sample of all other companies. 
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3.6.2.2    Robustness Tests 
As a robustness test, we check whether our benchmark results remain the same once we define 
the treatment group differently. The corresponding estimation outcomes are shown in Table 3.4 
and we begin by assigning only companies that have a tax incentive and a parent firm in an EU 
member state or a country with a required treaty to the treatment group. The additional 
requirement of interest payments above 150,000 EUR is ignored. Here, treated firms are 
indicated by the variable Teat2. As a second alternative, we refer to the mean instead of the 
median interest payments in the three years prior to the reform to determine whether companies 
fulfil the requirement of interest payments above the exempt amount (see Teat3).  
Table 3.4 Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of Treatment and Control Groups as 
Well as a Placebo Test: Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample 
 I II III IV 
After -0.866** -0.868** 0.060  
 (0.409) (0.410) (0.132)  
Treat2*After -0.104*    
 (0.057)    
Treat3*After   -0.308**   
  (0.120)   
Treat4*After   -0.315**  
   (0.135)  
After(Placebo)    -0.184 
    (0.574) 
Treat*After(Placebo)    -0.082 
    (0.133) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 1,040 938 204 938 
No. of Observations 6,240 5,628 1,224 3,752 
R2 (within) 0.115 0.124 0.115 0.158 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. After(Placebo) is 
equal to zero for 2004 and 2005 and takes on the value of one for 2006 and 2007. Treat is a binary variable that 
is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies assigned 
to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which represent natural 
logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. 
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Finally, rather than referring to the tax incentive as a precondition of being assigned to the 
treatment group, we classify all companies with a parent in the EU or a treaty-exempted country 
with interest above 150,000 EUR as the treatment group (see Teat4) instead. According to 
columns I-III of Table 3.4, the alternative definitions of the treatment group yield results that 
are similar to the baseline findings. Moreover, we conduct a placebo test, in which we assume 
that the reform was enforced in 2006 instead of 2007. According to column IV of Table 3.4, 
the results of a placebo test turn out to be statistically insignificant. 
In line with the analysis presented in section 3.6.1.3, we test the findings of this part of the 
paper using two alternative definitions of IP intensity. According to Table 3.5, the results 
remain almost unchanged once IP-intensive firms are defined differently. The coefficient on 
the difference-in-difference estimator is negative and statistically significant in the case of IP-
intensive firms, which demonstrates the robustness of our baseline findings. 
Table 3.5 Robustness Tests Using Different Definitions for IP Intensity: Log(EBIT) as a 
Dependent Variable 
 
IP: intangible assets/total assets 
of a group > median of all 
groups 
IP: intangible assets of a group 
> median of all groups 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV 
After 0.838*** 0.108*** 0.831*** 0.110** 
 (0.253) (0.040) (0.247) (0.046) 
Treat*After -0.563*** -0.126 -0.529*** -0.039 
 (0.170) (0.181) (0.177) (0.145) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 427 385 434 378 
No. of Observations 2,562 2,310 2,604 2,268 
R2 (within) 0.192 0.118 0.197 0.122 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. Treat is a binary 
variable that is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies 
assigned to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which represent 
natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. 
IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the substitution between two proﬁt shifting 
channels such as the strategic use of intra-firm trade and internal debt. The main contribution 
of this study is the combination of two strands of empirical literature: the first strand analyzes 
the inﬂuence of transfer pricing rules on an affiliate’s reported proﬁts (see as examples: 
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Lohse and Riedel (2013), Saunders-Scott (2013), Beer and 
Loeprick (2015)). The second strand of literature investigates the impact of interest deduction 
restrictions on a company’s internal leverage (see as examples: Weichenrieder and 
Windischbauer (2008), Overesch and Wamser (2010), Buettner et al. (2012), Blouin et al. 
(2014)). Expanding on the research conducted by Saunders-Scott (2015), we examine whether 
or not there is a substitution between these two channels of profit shifting. 
The empirical analysis of our study is based on two identification strategies. We begin by 
conducting a panel data analysis using firm-level data on European companies over the period 
between 2004 and 2012. Afterwards we employ data on French firms to estimate the outcomes 
of the 2007 reform in France, which strengthened thin capitalization rules for one group of firms 
while leaving them unchanged for another.  
A few conclusions can be drawn from our study: first, in line with previous literature we ﬁnd 
that an enforcement of strict transfer pricing regulations in a high-tax country leads to an 
increase in earnings reported by its resident companies. At the same time, an introduction of 
strict interest deduction limitations in a high-tax country reduces firms’ interest payments. 
These results confirm the effectiveness of these two types of anti-avoidance regulations when 
they are considered apart from of one another. Secondly, we find that if the debt shifting is 
restricted by interest deduction limitations, more proﬁt shifting occurs via the transfer pricing 
channel as long as transfer pricing regulations are not strict. In addition, a tightening of transfer 
pricing rules intensifies the use of interest payments for profit shifting. Therefore, we conclude 
that there is a substitution between proﬁt shifting via debt and proﬁt shifting via intra-firm trade. 
Thirdly, by taking into account that ﬁrms might be able to choose between transfer pricing 
shifting and debt shifting and that anti-avoidance rules might interact, we explicitly consider a 
triple interaction of the corporate income tax rate, transfer pricing rules, and interest deduction 
restrictions. According to our findings, firms continue to use intra-firm trade for profit shifting 
even if both transfer pricing rules and interest deduction restrictions exist. Finally, we find 
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different results for IP-intensive firms and non-IP-intensive firms. In line with Beer and 
Loeprick (2015), we conclude that IP-intensive companies can engage more easily in profit 
shifting, because the arm’s length price on the use of intangibles is often hard to determine and 
can therefore be more easily manipulated than transfer prices on other transactions or intra-
group interest payments. 
As for policy recommendations that arise from this study, our results show that disregarding 
the conditional effect might provide biased conclusions about the effectiveness of transfer 
pricing regulations and interest deduction restrictions. Thus, policy makers should consider the 
substitution between different profit shifting channels when introducing new reforms. 
Moreover, policy makers should take into account that IP-intensive firms have more 
opportunities for profit shifting and engage more aggressively in tax planning than other 
companies. 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Taxes on Bilateral Royalty Flows 
4.1  Introduction 
In recent years, the issue of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) has increasingly gained 
importance in the tax policy agenda of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD),130 the G20,131 and the European Commission.132 These organizations 
have formally recognized the harmfulness of BEPS and developed an Action Plan133 to combat 
it. One of the key objectives of this plan is to restrict the strategic use of intangible assets for 
profit shifting. For example, Action 8 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS (2013) suggests that 
an important task of the international community is “[…] ensuring that profits associated with 
the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with […] value 
creation.”134  
There are several ways in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) may strategically use 
intangible assets. First, firms that use foreign intellectual property (IP) have to pay royalties to 
the IP owners. Kopits (1976) notes that royalties set between non-related parties are determined 
by the significance of the technology, availability of alternatives, research expenses, and other 
factors. By contrast, royalties transferred between related parties might deviate from the true 
price in order to shift profits from high-tax affiliates to low-tax group members and eventually 
to minimize an overall corporate income tax (CIT) burden of a multinational group. Secondly, 
a multinational might decide to locate its IP-creating unit at a low-tax subsidiary, as Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011) suggest. Moreover, the authors argue that even if the initial asset is created 
in a high-tax country, a relocation of the intangible’s ownership to a low-tax affiliate at a later 
                                                          
130 See OECD (2013a). 
131.See OECD (2015a). 
132.See COM (2016a). 
133 See OECD (2013a) and OECD (2015a). 
134 See OECD (2013a), p. 20. 
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date may still be attractive from a multinational’s point of view. Manipulating intra-group 
royalty payments and strategically locating or relocating intangible assets within a corporate 
group would increase the royalty transfer from high-tax to low-tax affiliates. That is why the 
main aim of this paper is to establish whether corporate taxation affects bilateral royalty flows 
and to confirm or reject the argument that multinational enterprises use intangible assets for 
profit shifting. 
Figure 4.1 presents some insights into the data on international royalty flows. It shows fifteen 
countries with the largest share of royalty inflows in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2012. In addition, this figure details R&D intensity of these countries measured as a ratio of 
business expenditure on research and development (R&D) in relation to GDP.135  
Figure 4.1 The Ratio of Royalty Inflows in Relation to GDP (Top 15 Recipients), 2012, % 
 
Notes: GDP stands for gross domestic product and R&D stands for research and development. Sources: OECD, 
database Trade in Services – EBOPS136 and Eurostat, database Total Intramural R&D Expenditure (GERD) by 
Sectors of Performance [rd_e_gerdtot] – Business Enterprise Sector.137 
According to Figure 4.1, some of the top recipients of royalty payments are low-tax countries 
such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It should be noted that several of these 
                                                          
135 See OECD (2016b). 
136 See OECD (2002, 2010). 
137 See Eurostat (2016). 
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countries have a high R&D intensity as well. For example, in Switzerland the share of business 
R&D expenditure in relation to GDP was 2.1% in 2012, which is of the same magnitude as in 
the United States (1.9%) and Japan (2.6%). However, with regard to other low-tax countries 
that are less R&D-intensive, taxation might be one of the factors that determines their royalty 
inflows. This research question constitutes the focus of our study. 
We investigate the link between taxation and royalties using the OECD statistics on bilateral 
royalty flows. Our sample includes 3,422 country-pairs that we observe in the period between 
1995 and 2012. As for the identification strategy, we apply the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator in a fixed-effects framework in our baseline model. According to our main 
findings, the elasticity138 of royalty intensity with respect to taxation is -2.3. This implies that 
increasing the taxation of royalties by 1% leads to a -2.3% drop in bilateral royalty payments 
in relation to sales. The following example demonstrates the economic significance of these 
results. An average ratio of royalties to sales in our dataset equals 0.01%, or 30 million USD. 
Assuming that royalty taxation does not influence sales, a one percent decrease in the taxation 
of bilateral royalty flows would increase an average bilateral royalty flow by 690 thousand 
USD, a sizable amount. 
The contribution of this study to the previous literature is threefold: first, our analysis closely 
relates to the empirical research on the effect of taxation on bilateral royalty payments (see as 
examples: Kopits (1976), Hines (1995), Grubert (1998), Collins and Shackelford (1998), Mutti 
and Grubert (2009)). We contribute to this literature by applying a different identification 
strategy, which allows us to control for unobserved country or country-pair specific effects that 
may be heavily correlated with tax levels. In addition, earlier studies used to focus on the US 
multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries, whereas our analysis includes a broader range of 
countries. Hines (1995) finds that the tax elasticity of the intensity of royalty payments is 
between 0 and -1.0. Our preferred identification strategy, in turn, results in a -2.3 elasticity of 
royalty intensity with respect to taxation and this finding is robust against using the estimation 
approach chosen by Hines (1995).139 We also extend the research questions of earlier studies 
by identifying, for example, that both tax rates and tax differentials between countries affect 
bilateral royalty flows. 
                                                          
138 Elasticity is defined as a percentage change in the dependent variable in response to a percentage change in the 
independent variable. 
139 Section 4.4.1 provides a more detailed comparison of our results to the previous literature. 
110    
Secondly, we contribute to the empirical literature on taxation and the location of intangible 
assets (see as examples: Huizinga et al. (2008), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and 
Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Bradley et 
al. (2015), Dinkel and Schanz (2015)). These authors argue that the low-tax affiliates of 
multinational enterprises tend to hold a larger number of intangible assets than their 
counterparts in high-tax countries. Ernst et al. (2014) show that multinationals are not just likely 
to locate their intangibles in tax havens, they also seemingly tend to place their most valuable 
assets there. We expand on these studies by estimating the effect of taxation on royalties, which 
are fees paid for the use of intangibles. The estimates that we find using data on royalty 
payments reflect both effects – the tax elasticity of the location of intangible assets and the tax 
elasticity of their quality.140 
Finally, we contribute to the ongoing work on the OECD Action Plan on BEPS by analyzing 
several of its reform suggestions and quantifying their potential outcomes. For instance, this 
paper provides an empirical investigation which shows how enforcing the Nexus Approach,141 
together with an implementation of controlled foreign company rules and an introduction of 
strict transfer pricing regulations, could affect bilateral royalty flows.142 We find that anti-
avoidance measures suggested within the scope of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS are likely 
to limit the use of intangibles as a means of profit shifting and will therefore reduce bilateral 
royalty flows. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 4.2 describes the conceptual framework behind our 
empirical analysis. Section 4.3 presents the model of estimation and explains the construction 
of the main variables. Section 4.4 provides a summary of the key findings followed by a few 
robustness checks and extensions. Finally, section 4.5 draws an overall conclusion and 
identifies what changes could be made when carrying out any future empirical analyses within 
this field. 
                                                          
140.Any elasticity with respect to patent counts is consistent with even larger elasticities regarding license payments 
(as a single patent may suffice to induce a very large sum of license payments). 
141 See OECD (2015a) for more information. 
142 The Nexus Approach, controlled foreign company rules, and transfer pricing regulations are addressed 
respectively in Actions 5, 3, and 7 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS. See OECD (2013a). 
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4.2  Conceptual Framework 
4.2.1    Motives behind Profit Shifting 
To explore the motives behind profit shifting, in Figure 4.2 we provide an illustration of a 
royalty flow between two companies. A multinational company shown in this figure consists 
of a parent firm and its wholly owned foreign subsidiary. The parent provides its affiliate with 
new technology and receives royalties in return, which results in royalty payments being 
transferred from a source country S to the recipient country R. Without a loss of generality, we 
further assume that the statutory corporate income tax rate is 40% in S and 10% in R. 
 
 
 
Kopits (1976) argues that if firms located in S and R are not related, a royalty payment is 
determined by the significance of the technology, availability of alternatives, market demand 
structure, R&D expenditure, and other institutional and legal factors. By contrast, royalties 
transferred between related parties (as shown in Figure 4.2) might be independent of market 
forces or technological conditions and may instead depend on the tax burden incurred in each 
country of operation. For instance, if the multinational represented in Figure 4.2 were interested 
in shifting profits from a subsidiary to the parent, it would increase royalty payments above the 
arm’s length price. Since the true price for the use of intangible assets is often hard to determine 
due to the lack of comparable arm’s length transactions, the tax authorities may be unable to 
argue against royalty fees that deviate from the arm’s length value. As a result, part of the 
subsidiary’s profits is shifted to the low-tax country, which ultimately minimizes a 
multinational’s overall tax liability. 
Furthermore, instead of manipulating the amount of royalty payments, a multinational could 
relocate its intangible assets to the low-tax group member.143 The multinational represented in 
Figure 4.2 would then relocate all intellectual property to the parent in order to increase its 
                                                          
143 See Dischinger and Riedel (2011), p. 691-693. 
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Figure 4.2 An Illustration of a Royalty Flow between Two Companies 
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royalty payments to the low-tax country. Endres and Spengel (2015) provide an overview of a 
few tactics that an MNE could use for a strategic location or relocation of intangible assets 
between group members. To give an example, under a contract R&D project a high-tax affiliate 
conducts research, while the low-tax affiliate agrees to bear the financial risks. The latter 
becomes the owner of a resulting intangible and consequently receives royalties from other 
group members that use this intellectual property. Alternatively, an affiliate in a high-tax 
country might sell an intangible asset to a group member located in a low-tax jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, this strategy might trigger not only a high selling price but an exit tax as well. 
Finally, a multinational could decide to carry out its research and development in a low-tax 
country. However, as one of the major inputs of R&D is human capital, this decision might 
generate high expenses in the case where domestic researchers are relocated or local researchers 
have to receive training. 
4.2.2    Theoretical Considerations 
4.2.2.1    Baseline Model 
We apply a theoretical framework based on Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), Hines (1995), 
Grubert (2003), and Huizinga et al. (2008) to analyze the effect of taxation on international 
royalty flows. In line with these authors, we develop a model of a profit-maximizing 
multinational enterprise that transfers intra-group royalties. Furthermore, we consider the tax 
consequences that companies face when they exchange royalties under different methods of 
double taxation avoidance such as a tax credit, an exemption, and a deduction method. 
In line with Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), we assume that the affiliate shown in Figure 4.2 
earns pre-tax profits πs and its parent earns πr. In addition, the subsidiary’s country charges a 
corporate tax τs and the parent’s country levies τr. We also assume that the subsidiary generates 
sales using local inputs of capital, labor, and intermediate products as well as intellectual 
property provided by the parent firm and its own technology. Referring to Hines (1995), we 
define S as a subsidiary’s sales in the local market, R as the technology provided by the parent 
firm, R* as the technology that the affiliate generates on its own, and we set φ to represent other 
input factors of the local market. An affiliate’s profits can then be defined as πs = (S(R, R*, φ) 
– R* – r), where r stands for a royalty payment transferred from the subsidiary to the parent.144 
                                                          
144 See Hines (1995), p. 232. 
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At the same time, we assume that profits of the parent company consist of exogenously earned 
profits πr and royalty income r. 
As discussed above, multinationals may set royalties below or above the arm’s length value for 
profit shifting reasons. However, deviations of royalty payments from the arm’s length price 
could bring about different types of costs. For example, Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) argue 
that profit shifting might increase a multinational’s expenses on legal and accounting services 
if a situation occurs where the level of royalty payments has to be justified to the local tax 
authorities or needs to be defended in court. Furthermore, according to Grubert (2003), a 
multinational engaged in profit shifting not only faces the risk of tax penalties but also bears 
the cost of economic inefficiencies created by profit shifting. There might also be concealment 
costs or costs associated with negative publicity if advocacy groups, such as the Tax Justice 
Network,145 disseminate the effective tax rate of a multinational, as Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013) note. Consistent with the works of Hines (1995), Grubert (2003), Huizinga et al. (2008), 
and Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), we assume that the need for a strong justification of the 
size of royalty payments increases with a growing difference between the true value of 
transferred technology R and royalties paid by a subsidiary to its parent firm r. In addition, we 
follow Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and assume that shifting costs 
are decreasing with growing R. This reflects the idea that a firm’s accounts have to be distorted 
relatively little to accommodate profit shifting if the true value of transferred technology is 
relatively large. As a result, we express the total shifting costs of a multinational shown in 
Figure 4.2 as a(𝑅 – r)2/𝑅, where 𝛼 is a constant factor. 
Some of the costs associated with profit shifting are tax deductible and others are not. In the 
baseline scenario, we follow Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) along with Grubert (2003) and 
Huizinga et al. (2008) and assume that shifting costs are not tax deductible.146 Hence, the 
multinational enterprise presented in Figure 4.2 maximizes its after-tax profit 𝛱 which is 
expressed as follows:  
                                                          
145 More information can be found at: http://www.taxjustice.net/ 
146.According to Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), if the shifting costs were assumed to be deductible, it would not 
be entirely obvious in which country they would be incurred and a multinational would have an incentive to shift 
these deductions from one country to another. However, as a robustness check we follow Hines (1995) and assume 
that the shifting costs are deductible at the level of a shifting subsidiary. We present the corresponding theoretical 
analysis along with the empirical outcomes in appendix B1. As it is evident from Table B.1, the results are not 
fundamentally affected if the shifting costs are assumed to be tax deductible; however, the interpretation of the 
findings becomes more complex. 
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𝛱 = (1 − τs )(𝑆(𝑅, 𝑅
∗, 𝜑)– 𝑅∗) + (1 −  τr)𝜋𝑟 + 
+ (τs − τ𝑟)𝑟 −  𝛼
(𝑅 −  𝑟)2
𝑅
                    
(4.1) 
The first term of equation 4.1 represents the subsidiary’s after-tax profits, while the second term 
shows the parent’s after-tax profits. The third term describes the after-tax royalty payments 
transferred from a source country S to a recipient country R. Finally, the last term indicates 
costs that arise from profit shifting. τs denotes the statutory corporate income tax rate in a source 
country and τr is the statutory CIT rate in the recipient country. The first order condition of 𝛱  
describing an optimal choice of transferred royalties then reads as 
∂Π
𝜕r
= (τs − τ𝑟) +  
2𝛼 (𝑅 − r)
𝑅  = 0 
(4.2) 
which yields 
𝑟 =  𝑅 (1 −  
(τ𝑟 −  τ𝑠)
2𝛼
 ) 
(4.3) 
According to equation 4.3, optimal royalties transferred from a subsidiary to the parent increase 
with an increasing corporate income tax rate in a subsidiary’s country τs and decrease with an 
increasing corporate income tax rate in the parent’s country τr. In addition, transferred royalties 
should increase with the growing true value of transferred technology. 
4.2.2.2    Elaboration of the Baseline Case 
Calculations presented in equations 4.1-4.3 apply to the majority but not to all royalty 
transactions. This is due to different double taxation relief (DTR) systems that exist across 
countries. These regulations determine a country entitled to levying taxes on bilateral royalty 
flows, which helps to avoid double taxation. Table 4.1 summarizes taxation of royalty payments 
under different systems of double taxation relief. According to Table 4.1, an exemption implies 
that the tax on royalty payments from a source country S to a recipient country R is equal to a 
withholding tax ws. If an ordinary tax credit applies, the taxation of royalty flows consists of 
either a withholding tax ws  or a corporate income tax in the recipient country τr. The amount of 
a tax burden in this case depends on whether the withholding or corporate income tax rate is 
higher. If the recipient country allows taxes that are paid on royalties abroad to be deducted, 
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the tax rate consists of a withholding tax as well as τr on the income after inference of a 
withholding tax. 
Table 4.1 Taxation of Bilateral Royalty Payments 
Exemption      𝑤𝑠 
Ordinary Tax Credit 
if 𝑤𝑠 ≥ τ𝑟      𝑤𝑠 
if 𝑤𝑠 < τ𝑟      τ𝑟 
Deduction      𝑤𝑠 + (1 − 𝑤𝑠) τ𝑟 
Notes: Taxation is stated from the perspective of the recipient country, i.e. it calculates the tax burden, which 
effectively applies to royalties paid by a firm in the source country to a firm in the recipient country. The 
exemption method leads to the smallest tax burden, whereas the deduction results in the largest tax burden 
for companies. In a given instance for a country such as Germany, the source country levies an additional 
tax on royalty payments, which is taken into account in our calculations.147 
Referring to Table 4.1, if two countries use an exemption method to avoid double taxation of 
bilateral royalty payments, we adjust equation 4.1 as follows: 
𝛱 = (1 − τs )(𝑆(𝑅, 𝑅
∗, 𝜑)– 𝑅∗) + (1 −  τr)𝜋𝑟 + (τs − 𝑤𝑠)𝑟 −  𝛼
(𝑅 − 𝑟)2
𝑅
 (4.4) 
The first term of equation 4.4 represents taxation of the subsidiary’s profits, the second term 
shows taxation of the parent firm’s profits, the third term represents the taxation of a royalty 
transaction, and the last term shows the costs associated with profit shifting. Taking the first 
order condition of 𝛱 with respect to r and rearranging yields 
𝑟 =  𝑅 (1 − 
(w𝑠 − τ𝑠)
2𝛼
 ) (4.5) 
As indicated by equation 4.5, an optimal amount of royalties transferred from a source country 
to a recipient country decreases with a growing withholding tax ws and increases with a growing 
corporate income tax in a source country τs. Hence, the effects of taxes on royalty flows are 
                                                          
147 The German Trade Tax Act (Gewerbesteuergesetz, section 8 No. 1(f)) requires that 6.25% of royalties are added 
to the tax base of the trade tax on income. Trade tax rates differ across German municipalities and in order to 
quantify the value of this tax, we follow the OECD calculation of the effective corporate income tax rates and take 
the trade tax rate in the capital city of Berlin as a representative rate (i.e. 14.35% in 2012, which is also close to 
the average of all federal states). The German local tax rate on royalty outflows is then calculated as follows: 
6.25%*14.35% = 0.89688%. 
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analogous to the ones presented in equation 4.3, with the only difference being in the types of 
taxes that enter the equation. 
Some countries offer a tax credit on taxes paid abroad and where this happens to be the case, 
the taxation of a royalty transaction depends on whether a withholding tax rate in a source 
country or a corporate income tax rate in the recipient country is higher. If a withholding tax 
rate ws exceeds the CIT rate τr, effectively148 only the withholding tax is levied on royalties and 
as a result the scenario presented in equations 4.4-4.5 applies. By contrast, if ws is smaller than 
τr, the CIT of the recipient country is effectively levied on a royalty payment, so that the scenario 
described in equations 4.1-4.3 takes place. 
If a deduction method applies in a recipient country, the parent firm is allowed to deduct a 
withholding tax paid at source from its corporate income tax base. A multinational will then 
maximize its profits as in equation 4.6. 
𝛱 = (1 − τs )(𝑆(𝑅, 𝑅
∗, 𝜑)– 𝑅∗) + (1 − τr)𝜋𝑟 + 
             + ((1 −  τr) (1 − 𝑤𝑠) −  (1 −  τs))𝑟 −  𝛼
(𝑅 − 𝑟)2
𝑅
 
(4.6) 
In equation 4.6, the first term represents the taxation of an affiliate’s profits, while the second 
term shows taxation of the parent. The third term reflects taxation of a subsidiary’s income 
shifted as a royalty payment. According to the third term, the parent deducts a withholding tax 
paid abroad from its taxable income. The final term of equation 4.6 represents costs associated 
with profit shifting. An optimal choice of royalties in this case equals 
𝑟 =  𝑅 (1 − 
((1 −  τ𝑠 )  +  (1 − 𝑤𝑠) (1 −  τ𝑟))
2𝛼
 ) (4.7) 
According to equation 4.7, statutory corporate income tax rates in the source and recipient 
countries along with a withholding tax rate on royalty outflows influence the royalty fees 
transferred from the subsidiary to its parent. 
                                                          
148 With the word “effectively”, we mean the following: both a withholding tax and a corporate income tax are 
paid on a royalty transaction; however, a company in a recipient country receives a tax credit on withholding taxes 
paid abroad. Since a withholding tax rate exceeds the corporate income tax rate, the tax credit does not suffice to 
make up for withholding taxes paid abroad. As a result, the amount of taxes paid on a royalty transaction equals 
the withholding tax rate. 
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4.3  Empirical Strategy and Specification 
4.3.1    Sample 
We test predictions formulated in section 4.2 by empirically analyzing data on bilateral royalty 
flows. Our sample includes fifty-nine countries and covers the time span between 1995 and 
2012. Since the empirical analysis is carried out on the country-pair level, 3,422 country-pairs 
enter our dataset. Figure 4.3 displays a map of countries covered in our study, with a list of 
these countries enclosed in Table B.2 in the appendix. As shown, all thirty-four OECD members 
and additionally twenty-five non-OECD states149 are included in our analysis. 
Figure 4.3 Coverage Map 
 
4.3.2    Baseline Specification 
In order to determine whether taxation affects bilateral royalty flows, we estimate the following 
benchmark model: 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1τst +  𝛽2 𝑇𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3  𝑿
′
𝑟𝑡 + 
                                           +  𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑡𝑤. 𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅)𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝜇𝑠𝑟  +   𝜗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑠𝑟𝑡 
(4.8) 
                                                          
149 The non-OECD countries that are included in our study are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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According to equation 4.3 in the previous section, taxation influences royalty payments. In line 
with this argumentation, we refer to Hines (1995) and Mutti and Grubert (2009) and use Royalty 
Intensitysr as a dependent variable in our baseline empirical specification. Royalty Intensitysr 
represents the share of royalty flows from a source country S to a recipient country R in relation 
to the output of corporate sector in country S.150 τs denotes statutory corporate income tax rate 
in S. Tsr stands for a tax rate on royalty flows from S to R. In order to construct this variable, 
we analyze double taxation avoidance methods (as shown in Table 4.1) between each country-
pair and formulate Tsr either following equation 4.3, 4.5, or 4.7, depending on which double 
taxation relief applies. 
𝑿′𝑟𝑡 is a vector of the recipient country’s characteristics such as Log(R&D Exp.), 
Log(Population), Log(GDP/capita), and Property Rights. Log(Trade btw. S and R)𝑠𝑟 depicts 
a logarithm of the total exports and imports of goods between countries S and R. µsr and ϑt 
denote country-pair and time fixed effects respectively, with ɛsr representing an error term. 
Table B.3 in the appendix gives definitions of all variables and contains information on the 
data sources. The next section provides a detailed explanation of the construction of the main 
variables of interest. 
4.3.3    Main Variables of Interest 
4.3.3.1    Royalty Intensity  
Referring to previous studies on royalty payments (see Hines (1995) and Mutti and Grubert 
(2009)) along with our theoretical considerations presented in section 4.2, we define the 
dependent variable of the baseline specification as a ratio of total bilateral royalty flows151 in 
relation to the total output of corporate sector in country S. Both the numerator and the 
denominator of Royalty Intensity are measured in millions of USD.152 As many countries do 
not exchange royalties at all, this variable is concentrated at zero. 
                                                          
150 For our benchmark regressions with the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator, this implies that the 
total value added of the corporate sector is used as an exposure variable. 
151 If there are discrepancies in the definitions of royalty flows across countries, this could be seen as a 
measurement error in the dependent variable, which may cause an attenuation bias. However, the available 
technical description of the OECD database does not give a reason to expect substantial differences in the 
definitions of royalty flows across countries. 
152 Royalty Intensity is constructed using nominal-terms data; however, calculating this variable with real-terms 
data does not influence the outcomes of the empirical analysis. 
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4.3.3.2    Tax Variables 
4.3.3.2.1    Tax Rates 
Following equation 4.3, τs enters the baseline specification and this variable represents the 
statutory corporate income tax rate in S. Furthermore, we combine the findings from equations 
4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 to construct Tsr which reflects the taxation of bilateral royalty flows, depending 
on a system of double taxation avoidance applied between two countries. As shown in Table 
4.1, the methods used to avoid double taxation of royalty payments include an exemption, an 
ordinary tax credit, and a deduction. Table 4.2, in turn, provides statistics on how often each 
method occurs in our dataset, and according to this table, in around 87% of cases a company 
that has paid a withholding tax on royalties at source receives a tax credit in the recipient 
country. In around 8% of cases, a firm that has paid a withholding tax on royalties at source is 
exempt from further taxation of these royalties in the recipient country. All other country-pairs 
allow a company that receives after-withholding tax royalties to deduct the withholding tax paid 
at source from its tax base. 
Table 4.2 Systems of Double Taxation Relief in Our Sample 
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Exemption 5,278 8.57 8.57 
Ordinary Tax Credit 53,541 86.92 95.49 
Deduction 2,777 4.51 100.00 
Total 61,596 100.00  
Tsr comprises royalty taxation either in accordance with equation 4.3, 4.5, or 4.7, depending on 
which DTR system applies. A following example demonstrates the calculation of this variable 
when we take royalties transferred from Germany to Poland in 2012 into consideration. 
According to the tax treaty between these two countries, an ordinary tax credit applies to the 
withholding tax paid on royalties at source. However, the withholding tax rate on royalties 
flowing from Germany to Poland is 0% due to the European Union (EU) Interest and Royalties 
Directive (2003).153 Since ws is smaller than τr (0% < 19%), royalties transferred from Germany 
to Poland are taxed according to equation 4.3, which implies that they are taxed at the Polish 
                                                          
153 See European Commission (2003b). 
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statutory corporate income tax rate τr. In addition, royalties flowing from Germany from 2008 
onwards have not been fully deductible from the tax base of a local trade tax on income. This 
implies that royalties are partially taxed with a trade tax when they are leaving the country.154 
As a result of this, the effective tax rate on royalty payments Tsr equals 19.897%, which is the 
sum of the Polish CIT rate and the German local tax rate on royalty outflows. 
Table 4.3 contains details on Tsr and its components, with the values of this variable ranging 
from 0% to 60% and its average amounting to around 30%. The higher rates of Tsr occur in the 
1990s, especially between countries that avoid double taxation with the help of a deduction 
method, which proves to be less favorable from a company’s point of view than an ordinary tax 
credit or an exemption. Furthermore, Table 4.3 demonstrates that a withholding tax ws, which 
enters the calculation of Tsr, corresponds to one of the three following withholding tax rates. 
The first one is a unilateral withholding tax rate that is set by each country and applies to royalty 
outflows if there are no bilateral tax treaties. The second one is a bilateral withholding tax rate, 
which is set according to a tax treaty between two countries and is usually lower than a unilateral 
withholding tax rate. Finally, the third one is an EU-level withholding tax rate according to the 
EU Interest and Royalties Directive (2003).155 It applies between the countries of the European 
Union and overrules the unilateral and bilateral withholding tax rates if they exist.  
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics on Tsr and Its Components 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tsr: 61,596 0.30 0.08 0.00 0.60 
 τr 61,596 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.50 
 ws 61,596 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.40 
Unilateral WHT in S 61,596 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.40 
Bilateral WHT between S and R 61,596 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.40 
EU-Level WHT in S1 61,596 0.003 0.02 0.00 0.10 
 Local Tax on Royalties in S2 61,596 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Notes: 1EU Interest and Royalties Directive (2003) provides for a transitional regime applicable to new members 
of the European Union, such as Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Poland, and Portugal, where the withholding tax is set 
at 5% instead of 0%. 2See footnote 147 for an example; the exclusion of this tax from Tsr does not alter our 
empirical findings. All variables in the table are measured in percent from 0 to 1. WHT stands for withholding tax 
on royalties. Countries S and R represent the royalties’ source and recipient countries respectively. 
                                                          
154 See footnote 147. 
155 See European Commission (2003b). It is therefore assumed that the conditions under which the EU Interest and 
Royalties Directive (2003) applies are fulfilled in our dataset. 
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4.3.3.2.2    Tax Differences 
Another independent variable of interest is Tax Difference. We calculate it following the 
framework developed by Huizinga et al. (2008), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), and Ernst et al. 
(2014). This variable indicates a profit shifting incentive for multinationals. In other words, Tax 
Difference reflects a relative level of taxation in the given recipient country compared to the 
taxation in other countries. This variable is measured using five various methods, with (τr – τs) 
representing the first one. It is an unweighted difference between the tax rates on royalty income 
in recipient country R and source country S. A lower level of taxation in the recipient country 
R as compared to the source country should attract more royalty inflows into R. However, it 
should be the case that even more royalties flow into the recipient country R if its tax rate on 
royalty income is not only lower in comparison to a source country S but also in comparison to 
the tax rates in all of the potential royalty recipients. Therefore, we calculate (τr – τj) as an 
alternative measure of Tax Difference. As shown in equation 4.9, (τr – τj) is an unweighted 
average of tax differences between τr, which is the statutory tax rate on royalty income in R, 
and τj, that represents an average of statutory tax rates on royalty income in the remaining fifty-
eight countries J.  
(τr –  τj)𝑟  =  ∑
1
𝑁
( 𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑟
,    𝑟 ≠ j (4.9) 
We demonstrate the calculation of (τr – τs) and (τr – τj) with the example shown in Figure 4.4, 
where it is assumed that country S only pays royalties to two countries R and A.  
Figure 4.4 An Illustration of International Royalty Flows 
 
 
 
 
If the tax on royalty income is 10% in R while it is 40% in S and 20% in A, then (τr – τs) amounts 
to -30% (resulting from 10% – 40%) and (τr – τj) is equal to -20% (resulting from 1/2(10% – 
40%) + 1/2(10% – 20%)). Negative values of these variables indicate that the taxation of royalty 
            S 
 τs = 40% 
2 affiliates 
R  τr = 10% 
     1 affiliate 
A  τa = 20% 
      6 affiliates 
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income in R is relatively low, which gives multinationals an incentive to increase their royalty 
payments to R. 
The first two measures of tax differences are easy to calculate and interpret, although they may 
be imprecise because they do not include weights on tax differences. Therefore, we calculate 
(τr – τj)(affil.weight), which is a weighted average of tax differences between a statutory tax rate 
on royalty income in R and the statutory tax rates in other countries J. In order to construct the 
weight, initially we analyze the ownership structures of multinational firms.156 Afterwards, we 
calculate the number of multinationals’ foreign affiliates in each country, which enables us to 
determine the strength of each country-pair’s connection through multinational groups.157 The 
tax differences of country-pairs that are more closely connected are given a larger weighting, 
since shifting by means of royalty payments is easier if a firm has multiple affiliates in the 
source and target countries. The calculation of (τr – τj)(affil.weight) can be demonstrated using 
the example given in Figure 4.4. If it is assumed that there is a multinational company that 
consists of one affiliate in R, two affiliates in S, and six affiliates in A, (τr – τj)(affil.weight) will 
then amount to -15% (resulting from 2/8(10% – 40%) + 6/8(10% – 20%)). 
(τr – τj)(affil.weight) may still measure the tax difference imprecisely, because the number of 
affiliates might not exactly indicate the easiness of profit shifting in or out of the country. A 
more precise weight would use the companies’ total assets, rather than the number of foreign 
affiliates and this is precisely what the fourth measure of Tax Difference does. (τr – τj)(assets 
weight) is a weighted average of tax differences between a statutory tax rate on royalty income 
in R and the statutory tax rates in other countries J. The weight in this case is a ratio, the 
numerator of which includes the total assets of R’s foreign affiliates in each country J and the 
denominator of which comprises the total assets of R’s affiliates. The last measure of tax 
differences is (τr – τj)(FDI weight), which is identical to (τr – τj)(assets weight) apart from the 
different weight here that corresponds to an amount of R’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
each country J relative to its total FDI. As a result, the last two measures of Tax Difference give 
more weight to the tax differences between R and the countries in which it carries out real 
economic activity. 
                                                          
156 Following Ernst et al. (2014), we consider a parent firm to own a subsidiary if its ownership share exceeds 
50%.  
157 Due to data availability restrictions, the information about ownership structures of multinational firms is 
available only for the year 2012. Therefore, in the regressions in which this data is used we assume that the 
ownership structures of multinationals remained constant between 1995 and 2012. 
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4.3.3.3    Other Control Variables 
In addition to the main independent variables of interest, a few other control variables enter our 
baseline specification. For example, in line with Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and 
Riedel (2012), and Griffith et al. (2014), we control for the level of innovation in a recipient 
country. Log(R&D Exp.) is used as a proxy for this factor and measures country R’s expenditure 
on R&D. Referring to studies on the impact of taxation on patent location choices (see as 
examples: Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel 
(2012), Ernst et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014), Bradley et al. (2015)), we control for the market 
size in a recipient country, its wealth, and a level of governance. We accomplish this by 
including into the estimation Log(Population), Log(GDP/capita), and Property Rights 
respectively. Furthermore, in line with Collins and Shackelford (1998), we add Log(Trade 
btw.S and R) to our baseline model, which denotes the sum of total exports and imports between 
two countries158 and functions as a proxy for the strength of their economic partnership. Table 
4.4 summarizes descriptive statistics on variables that enter regression estimations, while Table 
B.3 in the appendix gives an overview of data sources. As it is evident from Table 4.4, the 
dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest τs and Tsr along with other 
control variables are strictly positive. The following section addresses this issue in more detail. 
4.3.4    Estimation Strategy 
The dependent variable Royalty Intensity is concentrated at zero. Apart from this, all variables 
in the benchmark estimation model only acquire positive values. Previous studies that worked 
with data on royalty flows have also encountered these issues, which is why authors such as 
Hines (1995), Collins and Shackelford (1998), Grubert (1998), and Mutti and Grubert (2009) 
applied a Tobit estimator in their baseline specifications. The Tobit model reflects a situation 
where some observations are concentrated at a certain value, such as zero. For this reason, this 
model appears to be a more suitable option for the estimation of royalty flows compared to the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, for example. However, Tobit regressions are known to 
be inconsistent when controlling for fixed effects and are also reliant on homogenous normally 
                                                          
158 Since the dependent variable Royalty Flows is a part of trade in services, we only consider the exports and 
imports of goods for the construction of Log(Trade btw.S and R). 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Royalty Flows 61,596 30.05 378.25 0.00 15562.45 
Output 61,596 809,603.6 1,896,839  6165.88  1.48e+07 
Royalty Intensity 61,596 0.0001 0.001 0.00 0.08 
τs 61,596 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.50 
Tsr 61,596 0.30 0.08 0.00 0.60 
ws 61,596 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.40 
(τr – τs) 61,596 0.00 0.12 -0.50 0.50 
(τr – τj) 61,596 0.00 0.07 -0.19 0.17 
(τr – τj)(affil.weight) 61,596 -0.03 0.07 -0.21 0.14 
(τr – τj)(assets weight) 61,596 -0.03 0.08 -0.42 0.28 
(τr – τj)(FDI weight) 61,596 -0.04 0.12 -0.38 0.27 
Log(R&D Exp.) 61,596 7.58 2.13 2.49 12.89 
Log(GDP/capita) 61,596 9.37 1.22 6.20 11.36 
Log(Population) 61,596 16.68 1.77 12.50 21.02 
Property Rights 61,596 65.80 24.26 0.00 95.00 
Log(Trade btw.S and R) 61,596 12.74 2.63 0.00 20.24 
IP_BoxAcq 61,596 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
IP_Box 61,596 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
B_Index 13,9501 0.91 0.19 0.00 1.18 
CFC Rules btw. S and R 61,596 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
TP Rules 61,596 2.14 1.57 0.00 5.00 
Notes: 1Data on B-Index is available only for thirty-one countries over the period between 2001 and 2012. 
Countries S and R represent a source country and a recipient country respectively. FDI means foreign 
direct investment. R&D stands for research and development. GDP stands for gross domestic product. 
CFC means controlled foreign company. TP stands for transfer pricing.  
distributed errors, as Greene (2007) notes.159 The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimator, which is used in our benchmark regressions, is apparently well suited for dependent 
variables with a large share of zero values and has become a very frequent choice with this type 
of data (see as examples: Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Silva and Tenreyro (2011)). According 
to Wooldridge (2002), Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011), 
the PPML model is suitable in a situation where many observations are concentrated at a certain 
                                                          
159 See Greene (2007), p. 875-882. In addition, Greene (2004) summarizes the problematics of using a Tobit 
estimator in the fixed effects framework. The author notes that the maximum likelihood estimator of the fixed 
effects Tobit model shows essentially no bias in the slope estimators; however, the small sample bias appears to 
show up in the estimator of the disturbance variance. According to Greene (2004), this bias is transmitted to 
estimates of marginal effects and is especially evident if the number of observations is small. 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Taxes on Bilateral Royalty Flows           125 
 
 
value. At the same time, this model enables a fixed-effects framework to be implemented 
without it being subject to an attenuation bias, which would typically apply in a linear 
regression. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) also stress the adequacy of the PPML estimator in a 
setting that is similar to ours. They argue that PPML helps to deal with the heteroscedasticity 
problem, which is characteristic of bilateral data. 
Another issue that arises from using country-pairs as units of observation is a potential 
correlation between standard errors across country-pairs. If we assume the opposite, standard 
errors generated in the PPML model might be too small and as a consequence the statistical 
significance of coefficients may appear too high. To address this problem, we refer to Cameron 
and Miller (2011) and Egger and Tarlea (2015) and correct for the cluster errors in all 
estimations. We implement this approach by using the Cameron et al. (2011) and Kleinbaum et 
al. (2013) method of multi-way clustering in a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model. 
Multi-way clustering in our estimations implies that the standard errors are clustered at and may 
be correlated within the following base groups: source country S, recipient country R, and the 
year. In addition, these standard errors are clustered at every combination of the three base 
groups. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1    Baseline Results 
Table 4.5 presents the outcomes of estimating the equation described in section 4.3.2. Royalty 
Intensity is the dependent variable160 and fixed effects on the country-pair and time levels are 
included in all estimations.161 Moreover, we correct all regressions for clustered standard errors, 
as discussed in section 4.3.4. In order to compare the goodness of fit across regression models, 
we report statistics on pseudo R2 for each specification. This measure represents a likelihood 
ratio index, also known as the McFadden’s R2.162 
Column I of Table 4.5 shows the results of an estimation with τs and Tsr as the only independent 
variables, whereas column II adds further controls. According to our baseline specification 
shown in column II, on average a one percentage point increase in the tax rate on bilateral 
                                                          
160 The ratio of royalties to output is analyzed by employing output as an exposure variable. 
161 Please note that country-pair fixed effects are perfectly collinear with (and therefore include) country-specific 
effects. 
162 See McFadden (1974) and McFadden (1979) for more information.  
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royalty payments Tsr leads to a -7.7% decrease in the ratio of bilateral royalty flows to output, 
holding other factors constant.163 The elasticity164 of royalties with respect to the tax rate on 
bilateral royalty payments is -2.3, which is calculated using estimates shown in Table 4.5 and 
mean values reported in Table 4.4. This implies that a tax rate increase of 1% leads to a -2.3% 
drop in the intensity of bilateral royalty payments.165 By contrast, the coefficient on τs turns out 
to be statistically insignificant, which is in line with earlier studies that do not find clear 
evidence on the impact of a source country’s taxation on royalty flows.166 Column III displays 
the results with a one-year lag of the two tax variables. This modification produces similar 
findings as the baseline estimation. Column IV presents an estimation where instead of Tsr its 
three scenarios are included, namely taxes described in equations 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7. According 
to this column, a statutory corporate tax rate in the recipient country τr has a greater economic 
significance for the determination of Royalty Intensity than a withholding tax on royalty 
payments.  
Panel B demonstrates the results of estimations with tax differences as the main independent 
variables of interest. For instance, columns V and VI show regression outcomes where two 
unweighted measures for tax differences (τr – τs) and (τr – τj) serve as the main independent 
variables of interest. Despite the fact that both of them are statistically significant, (τr – τj) has 
a much larger economic significance than (τr – τs). This finding suggests that a recipient country 
R may receive royalty payments for two possible reasons. The first reason is that the tax rate of 
a recipient country R may be lower than the one in a source country S, while the second reason 
is that its tax rate would be lower than the tax rates in all other countries. 
                                                          
163 This implies that the tax semi-elasticity of royalty flows is -7.7. Semi-elasticity is defined as a percentage 
change in the dependent variable in response to a percentage-point change in the independent variable. 
164 Elasticity is defined as a percentage change in the dependent variable in response to a percentage change in the 
independent variable. 
165 We interpret this result as the average treatment effect (ATE) of the treated observations, as defined by Angrist 
and Pischke (2009). Since we include country-pair fixed effects into the model, the PPML estimator does not 
consider country-pairs that do not exchange any royalties during our period of observation. Therefore, only 
country-pairs that have exchanged royalties at least once during 1995-2012 generate the effects reported in Tables 
4.5-4.7. 
166 While Hines (1995) does not find a statistically significant impact of a source country’s taxation on royalty 
intensity, Grubert (1998) and Mutti and Grubert (2009) find a negative effect. Kopits (1976) and Collins and 
Shackelford (1998) do not explicitly include a source country’s taxation into their estimations but rather 
concentrate on the impact of withholding taxes and a recipient country’s taxation on royalty payments. 
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Table 4.5 Regression Results: Royalty Flows and Taxation 
Panel A  Baseline Tax Rate Modifications  Panel B Unweighted Tax Differences Weighted Tax Differences 
I II III IV  V VI VII VIII IX II III IV 
τs -0.155 -0.086  -0.042  τr – τs 
  
-1.357***     
(0.379) (0.544)  (0.516)  (0.430)     
Tsr  -5.990*** -7.743***    τr – τj 
  
 -8.111***    
(1.730) (1.823)     (1.809)    
τs t-1   -0.183   (τr – τj)(affil.weight) 
  
  -7.290***   
  (0.594)     (1.959)   
Tsr t-1 
  
  -7.440***   (τr – τj)(assets weight) 
  
   -5.531***  
  (1.674)      (1.592)  
τr 
  
   -7.842***  (τr – τj)(FDI weight)     -4.396*** 
   (1.772)      (0.946) 
ws 
  
   -4.708**        
   (2.277)        
(1 – ws)(1 – tr)    -7.576***        
   (1.749)        
Log(R&D Exp.)  0.901*** 0.903*** 0.903***  Log(R&D Exp.) 0.875*** 0.906*** 0.900*** 0.899*** 0.925*** 
   (0.128) (0.125) (0.128)    (0.135) (0.124) (0.141) (0.139) (0.138) 
Log(GDP/capita)  -1.990** -1.973** -1.999**  Log(GDP/capita) -1.059 -2.024** -1.889** -1.929** -2.018** 
   (0.812) (0.791) (0.826)    (0.850) (0.829) (0.858) (0.849) (0.867) 
Log(Population)  2.820** 2.930** 2.852**  Log(Population) 1.289 3.013** 4.367*** 3.594*** 3.046* 
   (1.427) (1.433) (1.424)    (2.053) (1.461) (1.472) (1.366) (1.587) 
Property Rights  0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034***  Property Rights 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.029** 0.035*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log(Trade btw. S and R)  0.207 0.199 0.215  Log(Trade btw. S and R) 0.316** 0.218 0.256 0.244 0.239 
   (0.173) (0.176) (0.167)    (0.160) (0.159) (0.175) (0.164) (0.169) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes  Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Three-Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  Two-Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Pseudo R2 0.873 0.940 0.940 0.941  Pseudo R2 0.938 0.941 0.940 0.940 0.942 
Observations 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596  Observations 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Three-Way Cluster implies that standard errors are clustered at (and may be correlated within) base groups (country S, country 
R, and year) as well as every combination of the three. Pseudo R2 represents the likelihood ratio index, also known as McFadden’s R2. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model is applied in all 
estimations. Observational units are country-pairs. The dependent variable is the ratio of Royalty Flows (total royalty flows from country S to R) in relation to Output in S (total value added of firms 
in country S); the ratio of royalties to output is analyzed by employing output as an exposure variable. Tsr denotes a tax rate on royalty flows from S to R. ws is a withholding tax rate on royalty 
payments in a source country. τr and τs represent statutory corporate income tax rates in S and R respectively. τj is an average statutory tax rate in royalties-receiving countries J. Log (R&D Exp.) is 
a logarithm of total R&D expenditure in R. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per-capita in R. Log (Population) denotes a logarithm of country R’s total population. Property Rights represents a 
level of intellectual property rights protection in R. Log(Trade btw.S and R) depicts a logarithm of total trade in goods between S and R.  
128    
Columns VII-IX of Table 4.5 display the results of the estimations in which weighted tax 
differences serve as the main independent variables of interest. We weigh (τr – τj)(affil.weight) 
according to the number of R’s foreign affiliates, (τr – τj)(assets weight) according to the total 
assets of R’s foreign affiliates,167 and (τr – τj)(FDI weight) according to R’s FDI in each country 
J. As indicated by columns VII-IX, on average a one percentage point increase in the tax 
differential between a recipient country and other countries leads to a decrease of -4.4% to             
-7.3% in a share of royalty flows to output. 
As for other control variables shown in Table 4.5, the results seem to be in line with the previous 
literature. For example, consistent with Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel 
(2012), Griffith et al. (2014), and other authors who analyze patent location choices, we identify 
a positive and economically and statistically significant association between a country’s level 
of innovation (represented by Log(R&D Exp.)) and its share of royalty flows in relation to 
output. Moreover, a larger market size of the recipient country and its higher level of property 
rights protection also appear to contribute positively to royalty exchange. By contrast, growing 
trade between a country-pair, which indicates an increasing economic co-operation, turns out 
to be statistically insignificant. In addition, royalties seem to be negatively correlated with 
country R’s GDP per-capita. 
Our findings should be interpreted with caution due to several limitations that may have a 
bearing on the regression estimates. To begin with, previous studies on IP location choices use 
firm-level data, whereas we conduct our analysis using data aggregated on a country-pair level. 
Dharmapala (2014) identifies that earlier studies on profit shifting using aggregate data – such 
as Hines and Rice (1994) – appear to overestimate the semi-elasticity of profit shifting finding 
absolute values above 2, because they cannot use panel estimation methods in their cross-
sectional datasets. Later studies that used panel techniques in firm-level datasets found 
substantially smaller semi-elasticities with absolute values of around 0.8, as reported by 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013). It is possible to avoid a bias of such an order in our empirical 
analysis as it also employs panel techniques relying exclusively on within-variation over 
                                                          
167 Since the information on total firm assets is available only for the time period between 2003 and 2012, we use 
the data on total assets in 2003 for the period between 1995 and 2002 and therefore assume that firms’ total assets 
have remained constant between 1995 and 2003. Using the sample of 2003-2012 for this estimation does not alter 
the results. 
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time.168 It is important to note that it is not possible to rule out the likelihood of a bias remaining 
if unobserved firm-specific effects are correlated with tax rate changes.169 Under the assumption 
that controlling for country and country-pair specific effects does not correct any of the bias 
found in previous studies with aggregate data, the empirical estimates in this paper can be 
interpreted with the following discount: repeating this study with firm-level data, one would 
expect the semi-elasticity to be around one third of the estimate from the aggregate level. If 
firms react homogenously to taxes, estimates based on aggregate data or based on firm-level 
data can be interpreted in the same way. However, if firms react heterogeneously to taxes, then 
the estimates based on aggregate data represent a weighted average of the underlying firm-level 
tax elasticities (see Zellner (1962)). If royalty flows are proportional to firm size, then the 
decisions of large firms dominate in the aggregate and the estimates reflect mainly the tax 
elasticity of large firms and not an unweighted average elasticity across small and large firms 
which is frequently presented in a firm-level analysis. For this reason, heterogeneity across 
firms may suffice to give an explanation for the difference between the two approaches. From 
a tax policy perspective, the implicit consideration of heterogeneity in aggregate estimates is a 
positive feature. However, it would of course be preferable to have the micro-level data 
available, which would enable us to explicitly model and test for heterogeneity in tax 
elasticities.170 A second limitation is the inability to distinguish between different types of 
royalty payments, such as royalty fees for the use of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other 
assets.171 If different kinds of intangibles have different tax elasticities, then our results might 
be not representative of all types of intangible assets. A third limitation concerns the external 
validity of our results. As our findings represent an average effect of the fifty-nine countries 
that are included in the study, it could be the case that royalty flows between countries that are 
excluded from our analysis are more or less elastic to changes in tax rates.  
                                                          
168 Table 1 in Dharmapala (2014) reports that Huizinga and Laeven (2008), which rely on a cross-sectional firm-
level data, find much stronger semi-elasticities than later studies with panel firm-level data. This may reflect that 
the bias from exploiting cross-sectional variation is more serious than the bias due to the level of aggregation. The 
meta-regressions by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), Table 2, imply that the semi-elasticity increases by 2 
percentage points in absolute value for studies using aggregate data, although this may also reflect these studies’ 
lack of controlling for country fixed effects. 
169 This is mitigated by controlling for country-pair fixed effects, which include country-averages of firm-specific 
effects. 
170 In the empirical analysis of this study, royalty flows and tax rates are modelled as a log-linear relationship, 
which reflects the assumption that royalty flows scale with firm size. 
171 Data on subcomponents of royalty flows is only available for approximately 500 observations in total and (with 
the exception of Canada and the United States) only from 2010 onwards.  
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4.4.2    Robustness Checks  
Table 4.6 contains the results of a few robustness checks. For example, we use an alternative 
dependent variable Royalty Flows, which shows the amount of royalty payments transferred 
from a source country S to a recipient country R. Columns I-II of Table 4.6 present the outcomes 
of this robustness check, and in accordance with the results, an influence of taxation on the 
amount of bilateral royalty payments is similar to the effect of taxes on the share of royalties to 
sales (see columns I-II of Table 4.5). Column III of Table 4.6 shows the outcomes of including 
After2003 into the baseline estimation, which is a binary variable that is equal to one if a royalty 
exchange occurs after 2003 and to zero otherwise. Hence, it divides the observed time span into 
two parts. In this specification, Tsr indicates the impact of taxation on the intensity of royalty 
flows in the first half of the period of observation and the interaction term Tsr*After2003 shows 
the additional effect of Tsr in the second half of the time span. According to the results, the 
impact of taxation on royalty flows is more pronounced in the second half of the period of 
observation. 
Columns IV-VI of Table 4.6 demonstrate the outcomes of our baseline specification after it has 
been modified with respect to fixed effects and clustering. Column IV shows the results after 
time fixed effects have been removed and column V displays the outcomes after an additional 
exclusion of country-pair fixed effects. While the former modification almost does not 
influence the baseline findings, the latter seems to diminish the economic and statistical 
significance of the impact of taxation on royalty flows. Other than this, the coefficient on 
population appears to be negative once country-pair fixed effects have been removed. Column 
VI presents regression outcomes after the exclusion of a three-way cluster from the baseline 
model. This alteration results in the same regression coefficients as in the baseline specification 
(see column II of Table 4.5). However, it decreases the values of standard errors, which suggests 
that an assumption of independency of standard errors across country-pairs leads to an 
overestimation of the statistical significance of the results. This confirms the choice of 
clustering in our benchmark model. 
Columns VII-VIII of Table 4.6 display the results of using an alternative model of estimation. 
In column VII, we follow Hines (1995), Collins and Shackelford (1998), Grubert (1998), and 
Mutti and Grubert (2009) and apply a Tobit estimator instead of a Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood model. Tobit allows us to take zero values of the dependent variable into account as  
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Table 4.6 Robustness Checks 
  Royalty Flows Year-Split Fixed Effects Modifications No Cluster Tobit OLS 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
τs -0.393 -0.201 -0.072 -0.220 -0.426 -0.086 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.534) (0.700) (0.379) (0.610) (0.574) (0.326) (0.022) (0.025) 
Tsr -6.068*** -7.457*** -4.981*** -8.112*** -4.001** -7.743*** -0.123*** -0.052** 
  (1.586) (1.850) (1.933) (1.781) (2.029) (1.311) (0.035) (0.025) 
After2003   0.750      
    (0.507)      
Tsr*After2003   -3.177***      
    (1.203)      
Log(R&D Exp.)  0.899*** 0.921*** 1.234*** 1.347*** 0.901*** 2.477*** 1.354*** 
   (0.129) (0.115) (0.189) (0.121) (0.091) (0.100) (0.122) 
Log(GDP/capita)  -2.160*** -2.532*** -2.190** 0.007 -1.990*** -1.660 -2.947* 
   (0.736) (0.857) (0.886) (0.526) (0.558) (1.814) (1.653) 
Log(Population)  2.429* 2.370 4.994*** -0.555*** 2.820*** -0.144*** -0.097** 
   (1.445) (1.450) (1.252) (0.185) (1.063) (0.036) (0.042) 
Property Rights  0.033*** 0.030*** 0.034** 0.023** 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.048*** 
   (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.006) (0.024) (0.015) 
Log(Trade btw.S and R)  0.459*** 0.185 0.397*** 0.290* 0.207** 0.354* 0.033 
   (0.172) (0.138) (0.126) (0.159) (0.104) (0.201) (0.163) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Three-Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓  
Pseudo R2 0.869 0.940 0.942 0.936 0.790 0.940 0.138  
R2        0.305 
Observations 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Three-Way Cluster implies that standard errors are clustered at (and may be correlated within) base groups (source country 
S, recipient country R, and year) as well as every combination of the three. In columns I-IVI, Pseudo R2 represents the likelihood ratio index, also known as McFadden’s R2. Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood model is applied in estimations I-VI. Tobit estimator is used in column VII and OLS estimator is applied in column VIII. Observational units are country-pairs. The 
dependent variable in columns I-II is Royalty Flows, which denotes total royalty flows from country S to R. The dependent variable in columns III-VIII is the ratio of Royalty Flows in relation 
to Output in S (total value added of firms in country S). In the Poisson regressions shown in columns III-VI, the ratio of royalties to output is analyzed by employing output as an exposure 
variable. In the Tobit and OLS regressions shown in columns VII-VIII, the ratio of royalties to sales is the left hand side variable. Tsr is a tax rate on royalty flows from S to R. τs represents 
statutory corporate income tax rate in country S. After2003 is a binary variable; it equals one if the royalty transfer occurs after 2003 and zero otherwise. Log (R&D Exp.) is a logarithm of total 
R&D expenditure in R. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per-capita in R. Log (Population) denotes a logarithm of country R’s total population. Property Rights represents a level of intellectual 
property rights protection in R. Log(Trade btw.S and R) depicts a logarithm of total trade in goods between S and R.  
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the censored observations below the smallest value of royalty intensity observed in the sample. 
Column VIII presents the results when an OLS estimator is applied and the use of alternative 
estimators such as this one produces results that are similar to our baseline findings. The Tobit 
estimation leads to a tax semi-elasticity of royalty flows of -12.3, whereas in the case of the 
OLS estimation it appears to equal -5.2. Other control variables seem to have a similar influence 
on the dependent variable as in the case of the PPML estimation. However, the coefficient on 
Log(Population) becomes negative in the Tobit and OLS models, which could be due to the 
inconsistency of these estimators in a fixed-effects framework when the dependent variable is 
concentrated at zero. 
4.4.3    Extended Analysis 
In addition to the baseline results, we also analyze how several types of tax policies 
implemented on a national level or suggested within the scope of the OECD Action Plan on 
BEPS (2013) would affect the intensity of bilateral royalty flows. We categorize these policies 
into rewarding (see panel A of Table 4.7) and punitive ones (see panel B of Table 4.7).  
4.4.3.1    Rewarding Policies 
Rewarding policies, such as IP Box regimes, aim to foster R&D investment. In line with the 
OECD Nexus Approach, starting from 2015 all current and new IP Boxes should facilitate the 
taxation of profits from the transfer or use of intangible assets in the place of their creation.172 
However, not all countries have followed this requirement in the past. Some of them have 
introduced IP Boxes that allow preferential tax treatment to be applied to both self-developed 
and acquired intangible assets. These types of IP Boxes are inconsistent with the Nexus 
Approach, because they enable firms to develop intangible assets in high-tax countries and 
relocate them to the jurisdictions with IP Boxes in order to benefit from a reduced taxation of 
royalties. Therefore, while IP Box regimes that only recognize self-developed intellectual 
                                                          
172 See OECD (2015a). Countries with IP Boxes have already begun to implement the Nexus Approach. To give 
an example, according to Bradley et al. (2015), the UK agreed in 2014 to include a modified Nexus Approach into 
its IP Box. The Italian patent box regime which was enacted in 2014 likewise imposes nexus conditions. 
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property foster a firm’s R&D activity, those that also permit acquired intangibles might be used 
for profit shifting. Table B.4 in the appendix gives a worldwide overview of IP Box regimes.173 
Column I of Table 4.7 shows the outcomes of incorporating IP Boxes into our baseline model. 
IP_BoxAcq in S and IP_BoxAcq in R are binary variables, which are equal to one if acquired 
intangibles are eligible for an IP Box and to zero otherwise. IP_Box in S and IP_Box in R are 
also binary variables and are equal to one if self-developed intangibles are eligible for 
preferential tax treatment and to zero otherwise. In our sample, these two variables mainly differ 
across countries such as Belgium, China,174 the Netherlands, and Spain, since it is in these 
countries where intellectual property that qualifies for a lower IP Box tax rate only includes 
self-developed and not acquired intangible assets during the time period under analysis. In 
accordance with the findings shown in column I of Table 4.7, introducing an IP Box that is 
applicable to the acquired intangibles is likely to attract additional royalty inflows into a 
recipient country. However, this is not the case if an IP Box exclusively applies to self-
developed IP. 
Input-oriented R&D incentives constitute another type of rewarding policies and could serve as 
an alternative to IP Boxes. They include tax credits and tax allowances175 and focus on fostering 
the R&D process, whereas IP Boxes mostly support the output of R&D. Input-oriented R&D 
incentives are measured in the empirical literature by a so-called B-Index, which was developed 
by Warda (2001) and is defined as follows: 
𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  =
1 −  (𝐴 𝜏)
(1 −  𝜏)
 (4.10) 
In equation 4.10, τ denotes statutory corporate income tax rate, whereas A represents a 
combined net present value of allowances and tax credits applied to R&D expenses. If an R&D 
investment is fully expensed in the given fiscal year, both A and the 𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 are equal to one. 
However, if a super-deduction is available that allows the double of actual R&D expenses to 
be deducted, A will be greater than one, which results in the 𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 being smaller than one. 
                                                          
173 We collected information on IP Box regimes over the period between 1995 and 2012 from Evers et al. (2015a) 
and extended it through our own research. 
174 In China, intangibles developed abroad are not eligible for an IP Box, whereas intangibles developed at other 
Chinese companies are allowed to enter the IP Box. 
175 See Spengel and Wiegard (2011) for a detailed worldwide overview of the existing input-oriented incentives 
for R&D. 
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Therefore, the B-Index reflects the costs of research and development and its lower values 
correspond to a more attractive tax system for R&D investment. Table B.5 in the appendix 
provides an overview of B-Indices across countries.176 As for the impact of the B-Index on 
royalty intensity, column II of Table 4.7177 shows that this variable has a positive impact on 
royalty outflows in a source country. Since the B-Index can be seen as a cost of conducting 
research and development, this result implies that worsening conditions for research and 
development stimulate R&D outflows out of a country. However, this outcome is only 
statistically significant at a level of 10%. By contrast, a recipient country’s B-Index does not 
appear to play a role in the determination of royalty intensity. 
Numerous countries have introduced IP Boxes, tax credits, and tax allowances to foster 
corporate investment in research and development. In order to evaluate the impact of taxation 
on royalty intensity in R&D-intensive countries, we include an interaction term between 
Log(R&D Exp.) and the main tax variable in our baseline specification. Tsr*Log(R&D Exp) 
turns out to be positive and statistically significant in column III of Table 4.7, which implies 
that a higher level of R&D spending mitigates the negative effect of taxation on royalty 
intensity. 
4.4.3.2    Punitive Policies 
In addition to the rewarding policies, we also analyze the punitive policies that the G20 and the 
OECD supported in recent discussions on BEPS. These policies can be viewed as punitive from 
a firm’s point of view, as they aim to hinder profit shifting by means of royalty payments. They 
include, for example, an introduction and an enforcement of controlled foreign company (CFC) 
rules and transfer pricing (TP) regulations. Actions 3 and 7 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS 
(2013) state the importance of these anti-avoidance measures for hindering a strategic use of 
intangible assets.  
                                                          
176 We collected information on B-Index for thirty-one countries over the period between 2001 and 2012 from 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Thomson (2013), and Chen and Dauchy (2015) and completed it through our own 
research. 
177 The number of observations in column II of Table 4.7 is smaller than in other estimations because the data on 
B-Index is only available for thirty-one countries over the period between 2001 and 2012.  
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Table 4.7 Extended Analysis 
 Panel A Rewarding Policies  Panel B Punitive Policies 
  
IP Box B-Index R&D    
CFC Rules TP Rules 
I II III  IV V VI VII 
τs -0.571 0.304 -0.073  τs -0.021 0.027 0.035 0.084 
 (0.931) (0.525) (0.324)   (0.362) (0.338) (0.305) (0.340) 
Tsr -7.323*** -7.909*** -10.220***  Tsr -8.314*** -8.854*** -6.949*** -8.542*** 
  (1.599) (1.469) (1.719)    (1.618) (1.606) (1.631) (1.801) 
IP_BoxAcq in S 0.462    CFC Rules btw. S and R -0.349** -0.735   
  (0.384)      (0.139) (0.547)   
IP_BoxAcq in R 0.664**    Tsr*CFC Rules btw. S and R  3.090*   
  (0.283)      (1.856)   
IP_Box in S -0.286    TP Rules in S    0.086 0.074 
  (0.376)        (0.055) (0.049) 
IP_Box in R -0.079    TP Rules in R   0.154** 0.188*** 
 (0.261) 
       (0.069) (0.072) 
B_Index in S  0.753*   TP Rules in S*TP Rules in R   -0.043** -0.120** 
   (0.392)       (0.018) (0.049) 
B_Index in R  -0.075   Tsr*TP Rules in S*TP Rules in R    0.221* 
   (0.728)       (0.121) 
Log(R&D Exp.) 0.890*** 1.249*** 0.946***  Log(R&D Exp.) 0.898*** 0.911*** 0.923*** 0.929*** 
  (0.130) (0.092) (0.084)    (0.108) (0.110) (0.138) (0.125) 
Tsr*Log(R&D Exp.)   1.685***       
   (0.614)       
Log(GDP/capita) -1.913** -2.165** -1.915***  Log(GDP/capita) -1.862** -2.008** -2.152*** -1.911** 
  (0.795) (0.970) (0.554)    (0.841) (0.877) (0.805) (0.796) 
Log(Population) 2.011 0.706 1.578  Log(Population) 2.997** 2.944** 2.423 2.605 
  (1.427) (2.507) (1.134)    (1.502) (1.489) (1.613) (1.754) 
Property Rights 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.029***  Property Rights 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)    (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log(Trade btw.S and R) 0.230 0.355** 0.187*  Log(Trade btw.S and R) 0.188 0.201 0.228 0.249 
  (0.146) (0.155) (0.104)   (0.145) (0.140) (0.152) (0.152) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes  Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Three-Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓  Three -Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Pseudo R2 0.942 0.941 0.894  Pseudo R2 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.942 
Observations 61,596 13,950 61,596  Observations 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Three-Way Cluster implies that standard errors are clustered at (and may be correlated within) base groups (country S, country R, and year) as well as every combination of 
the three. Pseudo R2 represents the likelihood ratio index, also known as McFadden’s R2. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model is applied in all estimations. Observational units are country-pairs. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
Royalty Flows (total royalty flows from country S to R) to Output in S (total value added of firms in country S); the ratio of royalties to output is analyzed by employing output as an exposure variable. Tsr is a tax rate on royalty flows from S to 
R. τs represents statutory corporate income tax rate in country S. IP_BoxAcq in S and in R are dummy variables that indicate a presence of an IP Box regime applicable to acquired IP in countries S and R respectively. IP_Box in S and in R are 
dummy variables that indicate a presence of an IP Box regime applicable to self-developed IP in countries S and R respectively. B_Index in S and in R represent B-Indices in a source and a recipient country respectively; B-Index reflects the cost 
of R&D (the higher the B-Index, the less attractive a tax system is for an R&D investment). CFC Rules btw. S and R is a binary variable that is equal to one if CFC rules apply between S and R and to zero otherwise. TP Rules in S and in R are 
indices ranging from 0 to 5 and represent the strictness of transfer pricing rules in S and R respectively. Log (R&D Exp.) is a logarithm of total expenditure on R&D in R. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per-capita in R. Log (Population) denotes 
a logarithm of country R’s total population. Property Rights represents a level of intellectual property rights protection in R. Log(Trade btw.S and R) depicts a logarithm of total trade in goods between S and R. 
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Table B.6 in the appendix provides a list of countries that have CFC rules in place.178 These 
regulations typically apply to foreign affiliates of multinational firms. To give an example, if 
the tax rate of a country in which a foreign subsidiary of a German parent is located falls below 
25%, then German statutory corporate income tax rate applies to the passive income generated 
by this subsidiary. However, since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Cadbury Schweppes179 
case of 2006, CFC rules are not applicable within the European Economic Area.180 In columns 
IV-V of Table 4.7 a binary variable CFC Rules btw. S and R is added to the baseline model and 
it is equal to one if CFC regulations apply to the given country-pair in the given year and to 
zero otherwise.181 According to our findings, the implementation of CFC regulations negatively 
affects the intensity of bilateral royalty flows. Column V adds an interaction term Tsr*CFC 
Rules btw. S and R to the benchmark specification. The coefficient on the interaction is positive, 
which implies that the implementation of CFC rules diminishes the negative impact of taxation 
on the intensity of royalty flows. 
Furthermore, we analyze the impact of transfer pricing regulations on royalty intensity. Since 
royalties are transfer prices paid for the use of intangible assets, TP regulations apply to bilateral 
royalty flows. Several studies, such as Beer and Loeprick (2015) and Saunders-Scott (2015), 
investigate the impact of TP rules on profits and location decisions. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, we implement the first attempt to determine a relationship between these types of 
regulations and royalty payments. We take into account transfer pricing rules by incorporating 
the TP index suggested by Zinn et al. (2014)182 into our baseline specification. Table B.7 in the 
appendix provides a worldwide overview of this measure, which varies from 0 to 5 and reflects 
not only a mere existence but also the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. As shown in 
columns VI-VII of Table 4.7, implementing strict TP rules in both a source country and a 
                                                          
178.Data on CFC rules was collected from Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation for the period between 1995 and 2012. 
179 See Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-
196/04 (2006). 
180 Denmark is an exception in this case. After the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes case in 2006, Denmark did not relax 
the CFC rules for EU member states as other states did but instead enhanced them to include domestic companies. 
See Schmidt (2014) for more information. 
181 In order to determine whether CFC rules apply to a royalty transaction, firm-level data is needed. Since our 
study is based on a country-level analysis, we have to proceed by assuming that CFC rules apply to all bilateral 
royalty transactions if the rules exist between a country-pair. 
182 We have calculated the Zinn et al. (2014) index for some additional countries and years to achieve a full 
coverage of our sample. The research was done with the help of Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing Global Reference 
Guide 2005-2012, KPMG Global Transfer Pricing Review 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011-2012, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Transfer Pricing 2008-2012. 
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recipient country decreases the royalty exchange between them. The coefficient on the 
interaction term Tsr*TP Rules in S*TP Rules in R appears to be positive, which implies that, 
similarly to the CFC regulations, an introduction of strict transfer pricing rules in both countries 
mitigates the negative impact of taxation on royalty intensity. 
In summary, both rewarding and punitive policies appear to have an impact on bilateral royalty 
flows. While introducing strict anti-avoidance regulations decreases bilateral royalty payments, 
a lack of input-oriented R&D tax incentives seems to encourage royalty outflows and some 
types of output-oriented fiscal incentives (such as IP Boxes that are available for acquired 
intellectual property) appear to attract royalty inflows.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The main theoretical prediction of this study is that corporate taxation affects bilateral royalty 
flows. We test it by carrying out an empirical analysis that employs panel data on 3,422 country-
pairs for the time span between 1995 and 2012. We apply the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator in a fixed-effects framework in the baseline model, where the royalty 
intensity serves as the dependent variable and the tax rate on royalty payments constitutes the 
main independent variable of interest. According to our main results, the tax elasticity of royalty 
intensity is -2.3. This implies that increasing the statutory corporate income tax rate by 1% leads 
on average to a -2.3% drop in the intensity of bilateral royalty payments, holding other factors 
constant. In order to determine the economic significance of our findings, the following 
example is taken into consideration: the average ratio of bilateral royalty flows to output in our 
dataset equals 0.01%, or 30 million USD. If it is presumed that royalty taxation has no effect 
on sales, a one percent decrease in the taxation of royalties would increase an average bilateral 
royalty flow by 690 thousand USD, which can be regarded as a considerable amount. 
The contribution of our study to the previous literature is composed of three parts. We begin by 
contributing towards the previous research on the impact of taxation on stocks of intangibles, 
in which we investigate the influence of taxation on royalty intensity. Our second contribution 
is towards the earlier studies on bilateral royalty flows, whereby we estimate the impact of tax 
differentials on royalties. As indicated by our findings, on average a one percentage point 
increase in the tax differential between a recipient country and alternative recipient locations 
leads to a decrease between -1.3% and -8.1% in the intensity of royalty inflows into this country. 
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Finally, we contribute to the previous literature by analyzing how an implementation of the 
OECD Action Plan on BEPS (2013) could affect royalty exchange. This plan includes several 
rewarding and punitive policies that aim to encourage research and development and enable 
taxation in accordance with value creation. For example, these policies embrace an enforcement 
of the Nexus Approach as well as an implementation of strict anti-avoidance legislation. 
Enforcing the Nexus Approach implies an elimination of IP Boxes that are applicable to 
acquired intangibles and only allows self-developed assets to benefit from reduced taxation. 
According to our findings, this step is likely to trigger a decrease in royalty inflows into the 
countries that currently have IP Boxes applicable to acquired IP. In addition, an implementation 
of strict controlled foreign company regulations and an enforcement of transfer pricing rules 
could reduce the intensity of international royalty flows as well. Therefore, our findings lead to 
the conclusion that an implementation of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS is likely to limit the 
use of intangibles as a means of profit shifting and will therefore reduce bilateral royalty 
exchange. 
As discussed in section 4.4.1, this study employs data aggregated on a country-pair level. For 
this reason, one direction for future research is the use of firm-level information to estimate tax 
sensitivity of royalty payments on a company level. Furthermore, it could also be informative 
to distinguish between different types of royalty payments, such as royalty fees for the use of 
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other assets. If different kinds of intangibles have different 
tax elasticities, our results may not be representative of the various types of intellectual 
property. Finally, our findings are based on the average effect of the fifty-nine countries that 
are included in our study. It is possible that the royalty flows between countries that we do not 
analyze are more or less elastic to changes in tax rates. Therefore, further analysis that includes 
a greater coverage of countries, particularly of countries that are either developing or emerging, 
could potentially enhance the findings of our study. 
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Chapter 5 
Corporate Taxation and the Location of Intangible 
Assets: Patents vs. Trademarks  
5.1  Introduction 
Nowadays the ownership of intangible assets183 is transferable within a corporate group. 
Though one affiliate within the group may develop an intangible asset, another affiliate could 
become this asset’s owner through a sale of an intangible, a cost sharing agreement, or a contract 
research project. Moreover, a corporate group might strategically relocate its research and 
development facilities to a certain affiliate. In this case, a new company within a group would 
not only register but also develop an intangible asset. 
There are several reasons why a corporate group might be willing to strategically choose the 
locations where its intangibles are developed and where they are held afterwards. Aside from 
various operational and financial motives, taxation could serve as an explanation for the 
strategic location or relocation of intangible assets. For instance, if an affiliate in a low-tax 
jurisdiction owns an intangible asset, other group members that use this asset will have to pay 
royalty fees to the asset’s owner. As a result of this, the royalties are taxed at a low rate and the 
tax bases of affiliates in high-tax countries decrease. This leads to profits being shifted from 
high-tax group members to the low-tax members, which ultimately reduces the overall tax 
burden of a corporate group. 
                                                          
183.According to the OECD (2013b), an intangible asset is “something which is not a physical asset or a financial 
asset, which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer 
would be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances.” 
Examples include patents, trademarks, copyrights, know-how, franchises, and many others. Source: OECD 
(2013b), p. 14. 
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There is plenty of anecdotal evidence which suggests that large multinational companies such 
as Starbucks Corp.184, Apple Inc.,185 or Microsoft Corporation,186 use intangible assets to 
minimize their consolidated tax burdens. To give an example, the world’s largest spirits 
producer Diageo plc has been accused of relocating its famous trademarks including Johnnie 
Walker Scotch, J&B Rare, and Gilbey's Gin for the purposes of profit shifting.187 Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011) note that the central brand management of Royal Dutch Shell plc is located 
in Switzerland, from where it charges royalties to operating subsidiaries that use the company’s 
valuable trademarks. Moreover, many business consultancies help multinational enterprises to 
strategically allocate their intangible assets. For example, the British consultancy Brand 
Finance plc states in its report that “[…] companies increasingly need to look at brand values 
[…] to most effectively gain value from their intangible assets while minimizing tax 
payments.”188 Numerous academic studies have also provided empirical evidence on the 
strategic use of intangible assets by multinational enterprises (see as examples: Ernst and 
Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014), 
Alstadsæter et al. (2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Bradley et al. (2015), Dinkel and Schanz (2015)). 
The findings of these authors support the argument that firms use intangible assets for tax 
planning. 
Previous empirical literature on the strategic use of intangible assets is largely focused on 
patents. Researchers usually assume that findings on patents represent all other types of 
intangibles, including trademarks, brand names, copyrights, computer software, trade secrets, 
formulas, know-how, franchises, customer lists, and many others. The focus of earlier studies 
on patents might constitute a research gap for the following two reasons. First, there are many 
kinds of intangibles and firms may use them either alongside or instead of patents for profit 
shifting, as the Diageo plc example shows. Secondly, patents only represent a fraction of total 
intangible assets in most countries, which suggests that there is a high possibility that companies 
are able to shift profits through other types of intangibles. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that in 2013 
only 49% of royalty outflows from Germany were royalty payments for the use of patents. The 
                                                          
184 See Economist (2012) and Campbell and Helleloid (2016). 
185 See Forbes (2013). 
186 See Business Insider (2013). 
187 See The Guardian (2009a). 
188 See Brand Finance (2008), p. 4. 
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rest included royalties for the use of trademarks, brand names, copyrights, know-how, 
franchises, and other intangible assets. 
Figure 5.1 Patent Royalties as a Share of Total Royalty Outflows, 2013 
 
Notes: This figure is based on the data on royalty exchange with the rest of the world. In the cases of the UK and 
the US, only royalty exchange with the EU28 is taken into consideration due to data availability issues. Sources: 
OECD, database Trade in Services – EBOPS 2002; Eurostat, database International Trade in Services 
[bop_its6_det]. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether corporate taxation influences the location of 
different types of intangible assets within a corporate group, and if so, to what extent. 
Answering this research question could contribute to estimating the true magnitude of profit 
shifting through the channel of intangible assets. The focus of this study is on an empirical 
comparison of the strategic use of two kinds of intangibles – patents and trademarks.  
There are several reasons for the differences in tax elasticities of patent and trademark location 
choices. As we explain in the next section, patents often belong to patent families which consist 
of multiple related patents. Such agglomeration of patents implies that they are more likely to 
be registered in the same country where the first patent within the patent family is held. By 
contrast, trademarks are more often registered independently or belong to smaller families. 
Furthermore, the research and development (R&D) process related to the development of a 
patent usually relies more on the human and physical endowment of a country than designing 
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a trademark. Apart from this, in the case of a patent relocation, a company might be subject to 
an exit tax on capital gains. The dependency of patents on a country’s endowment and the exit 
taxation lower their transferability and therefore makes them less responsive to taxation 
compared to trademarks. It is also worth noting that the majority of expenses related to the 
development of a patent occur before it is actually granted. This idea is important when 
considering taxation, since a firm may be tempted to locate a patent in a high-tax country in 
order to deduct large research and development expenditure from its tax base. By contrast, the 
main marketing expenses on a trademark arise after its registration, in which case a firm seeks 
to optimize its marketing costs and income from a trademark during the same period of time 
and might therefore prefer a low-tax location. In addition, the development of a patent requires 
detailed documentation of who has invented the patent and who has covered the costs. Again, 
there are usually no such requirements for trademarks, which gives companies a greater leeway 
for tax planning through a cost sharing agreement or a contract R&D project. Finally, it takes 
longer and costs more to develop and register a patent than a trademark. A patent protection is 
granted only for a limited number of years, whereas a trademark grant can be extended for an 
unlimited period of time. Thus, if a company considers using its intangible assets for profit 
shifting, trademarks provide a faster, cheaper, and longer lasting solution than patents. 
According to these arguments, trademarks seem to be a more flexible and more mobile means 
of profit shifting than patents. Therefore, we expect trademarks to be more responsive to 
changes in corporate taxation than patents. 
We would ideally approach this research question by using information on patent and trademark 
ownership within corporate groups. However, since most firms do not publicly report such data, 
we follow the example of previous studies in this field and employ data on patent and trademark 
applications. As Ernst and Spengel (2011) note, the applicant of an intangible asset is its legal 
owner, since only an asset’s legal owner is entitled to apply for its registration at an international 
office.189 Therefore, we use the Orbis database provided by the Bureau van Dijk to gather data 
on trademark and patent applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), the European 
Union Intellectual Property Office (EuIPO), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) over the period between 1996 and 2012.  
                                                          
189 Ernst and Spengel (2011) refer to the European Patent Office. Therefore, in the case of the European intangibles, 
we consider the applicant to be the legal owner. In data from the US Patent and Trademark Office, we observe 
both the legal owner and the applicant of intangible assets. 
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Our empirical approach closely follows Griffith et al. (2014). In line with the authors, our 
sample includes intangibles’ applications filed by companies located in fifteen countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.190 Our 
sample comprises 624,801 trademark and 1,696,332 patent applications filed by 162,640 firms. 
Referring to Griffith et al. (2014), we apply a mixed logit model in a fixed-effects framework, 
which enables us to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in intellectual property 
location191 choices. This identification strategy also allows us to calculate the own and cross-
country tax elasticities of patent and trademark locations. Our main empirical finding is that the 
tax elasticity192 of a patent location choice is between -0.1 and -1.4, while the tax elasticity of 
a trademark ranges between -1.4 and -2.3. This implies that increasing a country’s tax rate on 
royalty income by one percent will on average result in a -0.1% to -1.4% decrease in patent 
applications and a -1.4% to -2.3% drop in trademark applications, holding other factors 
constant. 
Our contribution to the previous literature is twofold. First, we extend the analysis of the 
strategic use of intangible assets to trademarks. Earlier studies either focus exclusively on 
patents (see as examples: Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. 
(2014), Griffith et al. (2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Bradley et al. (2015), 
Dinkel and Schanz (2015)) or do not distinguish between different types of intangibles and 
instead treat them as a whole (see as examples: Huizinga et al. (2008) and Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011)). In the first part of the analysis, this study confirms the results of the previous literature 
by establishing a negative correlation between taxation and the choice of location for patents. 
We then go one step further by comparing the tax elasticity of trademark location choices with 
the tax elasticity of patent location choices. This allows us to draw conclusions about the 
relative importance of these two types of intangibles for tax planning. Secondly, by focusing 
on trademarks we contribute to Mendonca et al. (2004), Greenhalgh and Longland (2005), 
Graham and Somaya (2006), von Graevenitz (2007), Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012), and Crass 
                                                          
190 Further following Griffith et al. (2014), we include only companies with parent firms in one of the following 
fourteen states: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Appendix C2 shows the results after additionally 
including firms with parent companies that are located in the United States. 
191 In this study, the location of an intangible asset equals the country of ownership. The terms location, country, 
jurisdiction, and state are used interchangeably. 
192 Elasticity is defined as a percentage change in the dependent variable in response to a percentage change in the 
independent variable. 
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and Peters (2014), who carry out empirical analyses of different aspects of trademark 
ownership. These authors express concerns about the relative neglect of the non-patent 
intellectual property (IP) research. While they examine the empirical association between 
trademarks and a firm’s value, profitability, or innovation, we analyze the impact of corporate 
taxation on trademark location choices. 
Our study closely relates to Griffith et al. (2014), since we apply the same identification strategy 
and use similar data. Therefore, we replicate the main findings of Griffith et al. (2014) in 
appendix C1 and explain the two differences between our data samples. To begin with, Griffith 
et al. (2014) use statistics on patent applications which have been filed at the EPO, whereas 
applications from the USPTO are also included in our data sample. A further difference is the 
period of observation. Griffith et al. (2014) employ data on patent applications filed between 
1985 and 2005, whereas we use a sample of the years between 1996 and 2012. Despite these 
differences, the replication outcomes and the main results of our study are very similar to 
Griffith et al. (2014). Namely, Griffith et al. (2014) argue that the tax semi-elasticity193 of patent 
location choice varies between -0.5 and -3.9. Our baseline results point to an average tax semi-
elasticity for a patent location choice that is equal to -2.8. This implies that increasing the tax 
rate on royalty income by one percentage point leads to a decrease in the country’s patent 
applications on average by -2.8%, holding other factors constant. Expanding on the work 
carried out by Griffith et al. (2014), we conduct an analogous analysis for trademarks and 
subsequently compare the obtained tax elasticities of trademark and patent location choices. 
We find that the average tax semi-elasticity of a trademark location choice is equal to -6.5, 
which means that on average a one percentage point increase in a statutory tax rate on royalty 
income leads to a decrease in the country’s trademark applications by -6.5%. Moreover, our 
empirical analysis shows that the difference in the tax sensitivity of patents and trademarks 
might be explained by an agglomeration effect. Patents appear to be located more often than 
trademarks in countries where their owners already hold intangible property and are therefore 
less responsive to changes in corporate taxation. 
The results of our study can also be compared with the literature on the impact of taxation on 
the quantity or quality of patent applications filed by a firm (see as examples: Ernst and Spengel 
(2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014)). These authors conduct empirical 
                                                          
193 Semi-elasticity is defined as a percentage change in the dependent variable in response to a unit change in the 
independent variable. 
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analyses at the firm level, usually taking the number of a company’s patents as the dependent 
variable and a country’s statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate as the main independent 
variable of interest. Despite the fact that our methodology differs, our results are still 
comparable to this strand of literature. For example, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) find that the 
tax semi-elasticity of patents is equal to around -3.5. The average tax semi-elasticity of patent 
location choices in our study is -2.8. Thus, the tax semi-elasticity found in our analysis is 
slightly smaller in absolute terms than the one reported by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and the 
difference might be explained by the use of a different time period or a different estimation 
approach.194 
Furthermore, our results are in line with the literature on the impact of taxation on the share of 
intangible assets held by an affiliate. For instance, Huizinga et al. (2008) and Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) do not distinguish between different types of intangible assets, such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, know-how, but rather treat them all as a whole. Their findings are 
similar to the literature on patent location choices. Huizinga et al. (2008) and Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) claim that the group affiliates that are located in low-tax jurisdictions have a 
higher intangibles-to-total-assets ratios than their counterparts in high-tax countries. Our results 
support this finding and we come to the conclusion that an increase in a country’s tax rate on 
royalty income negatively influences the patent and trademark ownership of group affiliates 
located in the given country. Moreover, our findings suggest that the tax rate differential 
between the country of an affiliate and the country of its parent firm affects the number of 
patents and trademarks held by the affiliate as well.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 5.2 presents the development of our two hypotheses. 
Section 5.3 describes the baseline model of our empirical analysis and explains the 
identification strategy. In section 5.4, we describe the data sources and the construction of key 
variables. Some descriptive statistics will also be given in this part of the paper. Section 5.5 
gives a summary of the main findings and presents a few robustness checks and extensions to 
the baseline estimation. The last section summarizes our main findings and concludes drawing 
policy implications. 
                                                          
194 As a robustness check, we use the methodology of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and find results that are similar 
to the outcomes reported by these authors and other studies who carried out analysis at a firm level (see Table 5.7).    
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5.2  Hypothesis Development 
According to Griffith et al. (2014), intangible assets are more mobile than other kinds of 
physical or human capital. This implies that they can be transferred relatively easily from one 
affiliate to another within a corporate group. In addition, intangibles are often unique, which 
hinders the determination of their true price in the case of selling or licensing. Thus, Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011) conclude that a firm can strategically use intellectual property for tax 
planning by either relocating an intangible asset itself or distorting the royalty price charged to 
other group affiliates that use this asset as an input factor. Indeed, Ernst and Spengel (2011), 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015), 
Böhm et al. (2015), Bradley et al. (2015), and Dinkel and Schanz (2015) find that corporate 
taxation influences patent location choices. They argue in line with Huizinga et al. (2008) and 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011) that more intangible assets are located in the low-tax affiliates of 
multinational groups than in the high-tax ones. At the same time, Hines (1995), Collins and 
Shackelford (1998), and Dudar et al. (2015) find evidence that highlights the negative impact 
that taxation has on the direction and volume of international royalty flows. These authors argue 
that more payments for the use of intangible assets are flowing into low-tax countries than into 
high-tax jurisdictions and attribute this development to the tax planning by multinational 
enterprises.  
In this study, we concentrate on the first method of using intangible assets for tax planning, 
namely their strategic allocation within a corporate group. As described by Endres and Spengel 
(2015), companies may employ various schemes to strategically locate and relocate their 
intellectual property. For example, there may be an incentive for firms that operate in several 
countries to relocate their real research and development units to low-tax jurisdictions. In 
addition, they may decide to carry out cost sharing agreements, contract R&D projects, or to 
sell the existing IP from one affiliate to another in order to minimize the eventual taxation of 
royalties and license fees. Following this argumentation and the findings of earlier studies, 
Hypothesis 1 of this study states: 
The location of patents and trademarks is sensitive to the taxation of income generated 
by these intangibles. 
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However, there are a few important differences between patents and trademarks, which might 
influence the magnitude of their tax elasticities. According to the Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), a patent is the right granted by a government to an 
inventor for the exclusive usage of a certain invention during an agreed period. In contrast, a 
trademark usually refers to the right to exclusive use of a word, a symbol, or other logo that 
distinguishes a firm’s products or services from those offered by the others.195 The main 
objective of a patent is to protect a company’s technological investments, whereas a trademark 
aims to protect a firm’s marketing assets. 
According to Parchomovsky and Wagner (2005), patents usually belong to a family of a number 
of different but related inventions. Hence, if the first patent has been registered in a particular 
country, any following patents that belong to the same family will be typically registered in the 
same location. By contrast, trademarks are more often registered independently or belong to 
smaller families and are therefore less likely to trigger subsequent trademark applications in the 
same country. The agglomeration of patents in the same location implies that firms are more 
limited in choosing a location for a patent as compared to deciding on a trademark’s country of 
ownership, which predicts a more negative tax elasticity of trademarks than patents. We find 
empirical evidence that supports this argument in section 5.5.3. 
In addition, the development of a patent usually involves greater physical and human capital 
compared to trademarks. For example, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012) argue that gaining a 
patent requires an item to be novel, non-obvious, as well as being able to embody a sufficiently 
large inventive step. The development of such an invention often requires substantial R&D 
expenditure. Apart from this, in certain industries the R&D facilities and human capital required 
for the development of a patent are country-specific. Germany can be taken as an example to 
support this argument, as it has a long history and the necessary large stock of research 
personnel and tangible assets needed for innovative activity in the automotive industry. By 
contrast, creating a trademark simply involves selecting a word or designing a symbol of a non-
generic nature that is not identical or similar to existing trademarks. Marketing expenses related 
to this procedure are usually of a smaller scale and do not depend on a country’s endowment. 
Finally, in the case of a patent relocation, a company might be subject to an exit tax on capital 
gains, even under a contract R&D project. Since designing a trademark involves fewer 
                                                          
195 See OECD (1993), p. 83. 
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expenses, relies less on the availability of particular research resources in a country, and its 
relocation might be implemented without exit taxation, its location might be more elastic to 
taxation than a patent location decision.  
From a tax point of view, there is another important difference between patents and trademarks. 
The majority of expenses connected with the development of a patent are undertaken before the 
patent is actually registered. According to Sandner and Block (2011), this is different in the 
case of trademarks, where a large share of marketing expenses occurs only after the trademark 
is granted. Therefore, a firm faces R&D expenditure during the first period of the research 
process but receives income from the resulting patent during the second phase. Moreover, there 
is also a possibility that an R&D project fails and as an outcome triggers R&D expenses but 
does not yield any income. This could result in a company viewing the development of a patent 
in a high-tax country as a more attractive option. By doing so, the related R&D expenses are 
deducted from the tax base and diminish a firm’s tax liability in the high-tax country. These 
considerations make patens less sensitive to taxation than trademarks. 
Another key difference between patents and trademarks is the documentation requirements 
during their development. Many countries have laws similar to the German Employee Invention 
Act that requires the precise identification of a patent’s inventor.196 In the case of trademarks, 
there are usually no such regulations. Hence, if affiliates of a corporate group undertake a cost 
sharing agreement or a contract R&D project to develop a patent, they have to clearly document 
which party invented it and which party covered the costs. By contrast, designing a trademark 
does not usually involve such strict documentation requirements and as a result companies are 
given a larger leeway for the strategic allocation of trademark rights.  
Finally, obtaining a patent is more costly in terms of fees and time spent than registering a 
trademark. Applying for the European protection of a trademark at the European Union 
Intellectual Property Office costs 900 EUR, whereas filing a patent application at the European 
Patent Office incurs a fee of 1,405 EUR. Not only does it cost more, but also it usually takes 
longer to grant a patent. While the granting process for a trademark takes on average two to 
three years at the EuIPO, an equivalent procedure for a patent at the EPO requires on average 
four to five years. Furthermore, patents are only granted for a limited period, which is typically 
                                                          
196 See Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (2009). 
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up to twenty years.197 At the same time, the protection of a trademark can be extended over an 
unlimited period of time.198 This implies that if a corporate group decides to strategically locate 
or relocate its intangible assets, trademarks provide a cheaper and faster as well as a longer 
lasting solution compared to patents. Once again, this suggests that trademarks have a more 
negative tax elasticity than patents. 
There are several reasons for the differences in the tax elasticities of patent and trademark 
location choices. Some of these explanations are based on differences in the very nature of 
patents and trademarks and the others arise from differences in the administrative procedures 
required for developing and registering these two types of intangible assets. Based on the above 
argumentation, Hypothesis 2 of this study states: 
The location choice for trademark ownership is more elastic to taxation than the location 
choice for patent ownership. 
5.3 Identification Strategy 
Our identification strategy is based on Griffith et al. (2014) and we replicate their analysis in 
Table C.1 (see appendix C1), which enables us to compare their findings with the results 
obtained in our study. In line with the authors, we assume that the latent variable payoff, which 
firm f obtains from choosing location j for the ownership of its intangible asset p, is described 
as follows: 
π 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗 =  α𝑖 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 +  𝛽 𝑿𝑗  +  𝜗𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗 (5.1) 
In equation 5.1, π 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗 represents the payoff generated by the intangible asset p belonging to the 
idea i owned by firm f in country j. The idea i represents a patent or trademark family and 
implies that the intangibles within one family are correlated. The term 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 denotes a statutory 
income tax rate which applies to the payoff generated by the intangible asset p in country j.199 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 is substituted by the corporate income tax rate of the parent company in the case that the 
                                                          
197 See World Intellectual Property Organization (2016). 
198 See European Union Intellectual Property Office (2017). 
199 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 is intangible-specific (as denoted by the subscript p) because some IP Boxes apply only to patents and 
the others include trademarks as well. This implies that in some countries income generated by a trademark is 
taxed at a regular corporate income tax rate and income generated by a patent is taxed at the reduced IP Box tax 
rate. See Evers et al. (2015a), p. 508 for details. 
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controlled foreign company rules apply.200 The vector 𝑿𝑗 and the error term  𝜀𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗 represent all 
other observable and unobservable factors that might have an impact on the payoff  π 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗. For 
instance, 𝑿𝑗 includes the quality of country j’s intellectual property rights protection, its market 
size, and R&D expenditure. The benchmark estimation also contains 𝜗𝑟𝑗, which denotes 
country fixed effects as well as fixed effects at the industry-firm size level r. Firm f will choose 
location  j for the ownership of its intangible asset if 
π 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗  >  π 𝑝𝑖𝑓ℎ,      ∀  h ∈ (1, …, H), h ≠ j (5.2) 
the probability of which is given by 
P(π 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑗  >  π 𝑝𝑖𝑓ℎ) =  
exp(α𝑖  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 +  𝛽 𝑿𝑗  +  𝜗𝑟𝑗)
∑ exp(α𝑖  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ +  𝛽 𝑿ℎ  +  𝜗𝑟ℎ)
𝐻
ℎ=1
 (5.3) 
In equation 5.2, H indicates the number of potential location choices h. In equation 5.3, 
parameters  α𝑖   and 𝛽 can be estimated by means of a mixed logit model. Furthermore, in our 
baseline specification we refer to Griffith et al. (2014) and randomize the coefficient on  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 
by defining α𝑖 as follows: 
α𝑖  =  α𝑖
′ +  𝜑𝑟 µ𝑖, (5.4) 
where parameter α𝑖
′ indicates the mean marginal effect of tax on the payoff and 𝜑𝑟 shows the 
standard deviation of the tax effect on the payoff. µ𝑖 is a random term in the tax parameter α𝑖. 
Equation 5.4 implies that we relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. In other words, by randomizing the coefficient on 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 we allow for the 
correlation between payoffs of different location choices. According to Nevo (2001) and Train 
(2009), this step results in a more realistic model design because it enables a greater degree of 
flexibility in the substitution patterns between different locations. In line with Hypothesis 1 of 
this study, we expect a negative value of  α𝑖, as it would imply that affiliates of a corporate 
group that are located in high-tax countries are less likely to own intangible assets than the 
affiliates in low-tax countries. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, α𝑖   should hold a more 
                                                          
200 We assume that controlled foreign company rules apply to a given affiliate if the country of the parent firm 
applies the rules with respect to the country of the affiliate. 
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negative value in the case of trademarks compared to patents. This would imply that trademark 
location choices are more elastic with respect to taxation than patent location choices. 
5.4 Data  
5.4.1    Data on Patents and Trademarks 
In order to test the hypotheses described in section 5.2, we carry out an empirical analysis in 
which patent and trademark ownership choices constitute the dependent variable. It is worth 
noting, however, that most companies do not disclose information on the ownership of 
intangible assets within their groups. Therefore, we refer to previous literature201 and use data 
on patent and trademark applications as a proxy for patent and trademark ownership choices. 
As Ernst and Spengel (2011) note, an intangible’s applicant is its legal owner because only the 
asset’s legal owner is entitled to apply for its registration at an international office. 
The data on patent and trademark applications was obtained from the Bureau van Dijk and 
includes patent and trademark applications filed at the European Patent Office, the European 
Union Intellectual Property Office, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. In 
comparison, most previous studies on patent applications only use the EPO statistics. Our 
sample includes patent and trademark applications made by 162,640 firms located in one of the 
following fifteen countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.202 In total, these enterprises applied for 1,696,332 patents and 624,801 
trademarks in the period between 1996 and 2012 (see Table 5.1). 
In order to control for the industrial heterogeneity among firms, we divide all patents and 
trademarks of our sample into three industry classes.203 In line with Griffith et al. (2014), the 
three sectors used in the baseline estimations are chemical, engineering, and electrical. The 
chemical industry includes patents and trademarks connected to pharmaceutics, agriculture, the 
                                                          
201 See as examples: Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014), Griffith et al. 
(2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015), Bradley et al. (2015). 
202 Following Griffith et al. (2014), we include only companies with parent firms in one of the following fourteen 
states: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Appendix C2 shows the results after additionally including 
firms with parent companies that are located in the United States. 
203 For industry identification, we employ the intangible-level data. In the cases where this data is missing, we use 
the industry classification of a firm. 
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extraction and processing of raw materials, chemicals, metals, and natural resources. The 
engineering category primarily comprises intangibles related to the engineering and 
manufacturing sectors. Finally, the electrical industry includes patents and trademarks in the 
areas of technology and telecommunications, electronics, computers, research, and similar 
fields.  
Table 5.1 shows the exact number of patents (Panel A) and trademarks (Panel B) in each 
industry class. According to this table, companies located in Germany own the greatest number 
of patents while firms that reside in the United States hold the largest portion of trademarks in 
our dataset. As for industry classification, around 37% of all patents in our sample stem from 
the engineering sector and around 36% of all trademarks originate in the electrical industry. 
Furthermore, in order to take into account differences across firms of different sizes, we refer 
to Griffith et al. (2014) and split each industry into two size groups. Large companies are those 
with the number of IP applications above the 80th percentile of their industrial sector, whereas 
the remaining firms are classified as either medium or small and are assigned to the non-large 
category.  
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics on the Number of Patents and Trademarks by Country  
Panel A. Patents 
  
No. of 
Applications 
% of Total, by Industry: 
Chemical Engineering Electrical 
Belgium 20,116 49.25 22.05 28.70 
Denmark 21,460 44.76 26.03 29.22 
Finland 46,729 26.90 21.13 51.98 
France 146,420 29.39 36.05 34.56 
Germany 844,890 28.73 39.73 31.54 
Ireland 5,460 14.98 34.93 50.09 
Italy 95,610 40.31 42.74 16.95 
Luxembourg 2,549 29.27 34.68 36.05 
Netherlands 84,471 22.36 25.87 51.77 
Norway 12,661 43.57 29.65 26.78 
Spain 29,665 34.12 37.72 28.16 
Sweden 71,156 25.42 26.66 47.91 
Switzerland 76,819 18.86 54.54 26.60 
UK 91,903 27.17 30.74 42.09 
US 146,423 30.85 33.88 35.27 
Total 1,696,332 29.19 36.99 33.81 
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Panel B. Trademarks 
 No. of 
Applications 
% of Total, by Industry: 
Chemical Engineering Electrical 
Belgium 8,938 45.50 30.28 24.22 
Denmark 10,833 40.28 36.20 23.52 
Finland 5,956 33.63 38.13 28.24 
France 41,856 42.35 27.92 29.73 
Germany 134,341 35.08 33.65 31.27 
Ireland 5,747 39.93 29.34 30.73 
Italy 54,074 37.52 42.27 20.21 
Luxembourg 4,122 23.68 30.49 45.83 
Netherlands 26,784 31.61 33.21 35.19 
Norway 2,409 35.16 33.17 31.67 
Spain 39,420 35.77 37.05 27.18 
Sweden 16,944 32.58 36.78 30.64 
Switzerland 28,240 41.48 28.79 29.73 
UK 57,819 26.52 26.53 46.95 
US 187,318 22.92 30.61 46.47 
Total 624,801 31.65 32.48 35.87 
It is sometimes the case that intangibles that are generated by the same company in the same 
industry are closely related to each other in terms of their underlying idea and innovation 
process. We apply the approach used by Griffith et al. (2014) and allow for the correlation 
between such assets. As a result, intangibles that emerge from the same firm within the same 
sector within a period of one quarter and share a network of common inventors are grouped 
into one idea. According to our data, approximately 80% of ideas include just one intangible. 
5.4.2    Tax Data 
Tax Rate is the main independent variable of interest, which was constructed by gathering 
information from a series of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Global 
Corporate Tax Handbook204 as well as the IBFD Research Platform.205 We use the statutory 
corporate income tax rates in the main specification, since these rates apply to the income 
generated by intangible assets and are therefore relevant for tax planning strategies of corporate 
groups. If a country offers an IP Box, the reduced tax rate is used.206 
                                                          
204.See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1995-2012). 
205 Available at:  http://www.ibfd.org/ 
206 Information on IP Boxes was taken from Evers et al. (2015a) and extended through our own research. 
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Furthermore, in accordance with Griffith et al. (2014) the tax rates in our benchmark estimations 
incorporate controlled foreign company (CFC) rules.207 These rules endeavor to hinder profit 
shifting by corporate groups that place their intangible assets in low-tax countries to minimize 
their consolidated tax liabilities. According to CFC regulations, passive income of a subsidiary 
in a tax haven is to be taxed at the rate of its parent company. Passive income is defined 
differently in each country that implements the rules, although it typically refers to royalty 
payments and other income that is not associated with real economic activity. Table 5.2 
provides an overview of the CFC rules that exist in the countries relevant for our analysis. 
According to Table 5.2, the strictness of the controlled foreign company regulations varies from 
country to country. In addition to the standard regulations, some countries have introduced a 
so-called “Black List” which usually contains tax havens. By contrast, Sweden has developed 
a “White List” which includes countries that are not considered to support profit shifting 
activities.  
Table 5.2 Countries with CFC Rules in Place 
Country Introduction Conditions under which CFC Rules are Binding 
Belgium - - 
Denmark 1995 Always binding 
Finland 1995 Effective tax rate is < 60% of Finnish tax or on the “Grey List” 
France 1980 Effective tax rate is < 50% of French tax 
Germany 1972 Effective tax rate is < 25% 
Ireland - - 
Italy 2000 Effective tax rate is < 50% of Italian tax or on the “Black List” 
Luxembourg - - 
Netherlands - - 
Norway 1992 Effective tax rate is < 66% of Norwegian tax or on the “Black 
List”1 
Spain 1995 Effective tax rate is < 75% of Spanish tax 
Sweden 1990 Effective tax rate is < 55% of Swedish tax, except a country is on 
the “White List” 
Switzerland - - 
UK 1984 Effective tax rate is < 75% of British tax 
Notes: 1The rules do not apply if a tax treaty exists. Since the European Court of Justice Cadbury Schweppes case 
of 2006, CFC rules do not apply within the European Economic Area except for special cases. Sources: Karkinsky 
and Riedel (2012) and our own research. 
                                                          
207 Data on CFC rules was obtained from Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and extended through our own research. 
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It should be noted that since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Cadbury Schweppes208 case 
of 2006, the CFC rules are not applicable within the European Economic Area (EEA).209 
Controlled foreign company rules apply to approximately 10% of intangible assets in our 
sample. Incorporating these regulations in our analysis is of great importance, since profits 
generated from patents and trademarks are typically classified as passive income and therefore 
have to be taxed according to controlled foreign company rules if they apply. Aside from this, 
taking into account the parent company’s taxation in the calculation of tax rates provides 
another source of variation in the main independent variable of interest, as Griffith et al. (2014) 
note. 
5.4.3    Other Control Variables  
In addition to tax rates, our benchmark model includes several other independent variables. For 
example, in line with Griffith et al. (2014) we take into consideration the quality of patents and 
trademarks. A patent or trademark idea is considered to be of high quality if the majority of its 
applications have been filed at the European, US, and Japanese registration offices. In addition, 
we control for Real Activity in the case of patents.210 This is a binary variable that is equal to 
one if at least one inventor of a patent resides in the given country and to zero otherwise (see 
Table 5.3).  
In line with Griffith et al. (2014), our baseline model includes information on a country’s 
intellectual property rights protection, which is measured with an index developed by the 
Heritage Foundation.211 This index ranges from zero to 100 and we define a country as having 
a high level of intellectual property rights protection if it scores above the median of countries 
in our sample. In addition, with reference to Griffith et al. (2014) along with other related 
studies such as Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014), 
we control for the effect of a country’s market size and its total R&D expenditure on the 
intellectual property location choices. Hence, we include gross domestic product (GDP) in our 
regression estimation as a proxy for a country’s market size. Data on GDP was collected from 
                                                          
208 See Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-
196/04 (2006). 
209 Denmark is the only exception in this case. After the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes case in 2006, Denmark did not 
relax the CFC rules for EU member states as other states did but instead enhanced them to include domestic 
companies. See Schmidt (2014) for more information. 
210 We do not have data on this variable in the case of trademarks.  
211 Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
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the World Bank’s Development Indicators.212 BERD measures country j’s business expenditure 
on research and development (BERD) as a percentage of its GDP and represents its level of 
innovative activity. Statistics on BERD are from the OECD database Main Science and 
Technology Indicators.213 Table 5.3 contains descriptive statistics on all variables used in the 
regression analysis. Panel A summarizes data for patents and Panel B shows statistics for 
trademarks.  
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Patents 
     
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax Rate 25,444,980 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.45 
Quality 25,444,980 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Real Activity 25,444,980 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
High IP Rights Protection 25,444,980 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
GDP 25,444,980 1.76 3.21 0.02 14.41 
BERD 25,444,980 22.83 1.47 19.55 26.42 
Panel B. Trademarks 
          
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax Rate 9,372,015 0.31 0.08 0.06 0.45 
Quality 9,372,015 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
High IP Rights Protection 9,372,015 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
GDP 9,372,015 1.70 3.09 0.02 14.23 
BERD 9,372,015 22.83 1.47 19.55 26.42 
Notes: The samples include 1,696,332 patent applications and 624,801 trademark applications. 
Multiplying the number of patent and trademark applications by 15 (the number of country choices) gives 
the number of observations in each sample (25,444,980 for patents and 9,372,015 for trademarks). Tax 
Rate stands for a host country’s statutory tax rate levied on the income from intangible assets and 
incorporates taxation under IP Boxes and CFC rules. Quality is a dummy variable that indicates intangible 
assets of high quality (applications filed at multiple offices). Real Activity is a binary variable, which is 
equal to one if at least one of the intangible’s inventors resides in the given country and takes on the value 
of zero otherwise. High IP Rights Protection represents an indicator of a country’s level of intellectual 
property rights protection. GDP stands for gross domestic product. BERD denotes a country’s business 
expenditure on research and development in relation to its GDP. 
Moreover, in line with Griffith et al. (2014), we include location-industry-firm size fixed effects 
into the regression estimations. They control for the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
                                                          
212 See World Bank (2015). 
213 See OECD (2016d). 
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across countries, industries, and firm sizes. For example, companies might prefer to register an 
intangible asset in a particular country due to its geographical or historical characteristics. 
Alternatively, firms in certain industries may face specific rules concerning the development 
and registration of intangible assets. Various kinds of restrictions or benefits could be relevant 
for companies of particular sizes. Such regulatory and operational peculiarities of each country, 
industry, and firm-size category could result in unobserved heterogeneity, which is taken into 
account by the corresponding fixed effects. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1    Baseline Results 
The outcomes of the regression analysis described in section 5.3 are presented in Table 5.4 (see 
Panel A for patents and Panel B for trademarks). In all estimations, intellectual property location 
choice is a dependent variable. The final samples include 1,696,332 patent applications and 
624,801 trademark applications. The results are shown separately for each industry and in 
accordance with different firm sizes. All estimations include location-industry-firm size fixed 
effects.214  
According to Table 5.4, the mean marginal impact of a statutory tax rate on the intellectual 
property location choice is negative and statistically significant across all industries and firm-
size groups. This finding is in line with the Hypothesis 1 of our study discussed in section 5.2. 
There appears to be a more negative effect of taxation on patent location choices for small and 
medium companies in comparison to large firms. Moreover, the tax impact seems to be more 
pronounced in the engineering sector than in the chemical and electrical industries. In the case 
of trademarks, intangibles owned by non-large companies appear to be more sensitive to 
taxation than those held by large enterprises. Here, the effect is more pronounced in the case of 
the electrical industry than in other sectors. A comparison of the results shown in Panels A and 
B of Table 5.4 suggests that taxation has a more negative effect on the location of trademarks 
than patents. This result confirms Hypothesis 2 of this paper, as it implies that in the case of 
trademarks firms are more sensitive to the taxation of royalty income than in the case of patents.  
 
                                                          
214 Detailed results on the fixed-effects’ coefficients are available upon request.  
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Table 5.4 Estimated Parameters 
Panel A. Patents 
Industry Electrical   Engineering   Chemical 
Size Large Non-Large   Large Non-Large   Large Non-Large 
Tax Rate -2.122*** -2.779***   -4.362*** -4.969***   -3.657*** -3.197*** 
  (0.111) (0.065)   (0.137) (0.074)   (0.099) (0.081) 
Tax Rate*Quality -1.739*** -2.488***   -2.918*** -2.804***   -0.280** -2.493*** 
  (0.119) (0.101)   (0.142) (0.113)   (0.134) (0.114) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 5.851*** 3.749***   4.018*** 4.233***   4.604*** 2.441*** 
  (0.108) (0.092)   (0.173) (0.102)   (0.142) (0.168) 
Real Activity 4.772*** 6.427***   5.781*** 8.362***   7.777*** 8.872*** 
  (0.027) (0.037)   (0.036) (0.063)   (0.107) (0.092) 
Real Activity (Std.Dev.) 1.661*** 2.911***   2.076*** 4.273***   4.527*** 4.373*** 
  (0.036) (0.034)   (0.033) (0.049)   (0.104) (0.068) 
High IP Rights Protection 0.190*** -0.151***   -0.424*** 0.963***   -0.253*** -0.044 
  (0.041) (0.036)   (0.078) (0.036)   (0.067) (0.046) 
GDP -0.499*** 0.465***   -0.564*** 1.128***   1.108*** 0.659*** 
  (0.019) (0.017)   (0.028) (0.019)   (0.029) (0.019) 
BERD -0.934*** 2.962***   1.243*** -0.517***   5.478*** 0.970*** 
  (0.062) (0.049)   (0.086) (0.053)   (0.087) (0.055) 
 
Panel B. Trademarks 
                
Industry Electrical   Engineering   Chemical 
Size Large Non-Large   Large Non-Large   Large Non-Large 
Tax Rate -5.592*** -8.305***   -5.451*** -7.217***   -6.620*** -7.444*** 
  (0.163) (0.111)   (0.159) (0.114)   (0.152) (0.111) 
Tax Rate*Quality -3.253*** -4.828***   -0.865*** -3.085***   -6.330*** -2.683*** 
  (0.287) (0.216)   (0.310) (0.262)   (0.231) (0.261) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 6.240*** 6.247***   4.940*** 6.235***   5.224*** 7.055*** 
  (0.185) (0.133)   (0.207) (0.139)   (0.196) (0.127) 
High IP Rights Protection 0.347*** 0.363***   0.321*** 0.176***   0.212*** 0.158*** 
  (0.070) (0.044)   (0.058) (0.041)   (0.056) (0.043) 
GDP 0.058*** -0.009*   0.010 0.001   -0.053*** -0.018*** 
  (0.008) (0.005)   (0.008) (0.006)   (0.009) (0.006) 
BERD -0.236*** 0.485***   0.413*** 0.203***   0.041 0.174*** 
  (0.055) (0.039)   (0.052) (0.036)   (0.052) (0.037) 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The samples include 1,696,332 patent applications 
and 624,801 trademark applications (the number of observations is 25,444,980 for patents and 9,372,015 for trademarks). 
The dependent variable is location choice in one of the countries shown in Table 5.1. Location-industry-firm size fixed 
effects are included in all estimations. Large stands for companies with a total number of applications above the 80 th 
percentile in their industry; Non-Large companies are enterprises of other sizes. Tax Rate stands for a host country’s tax 
rate levied on the income from intangible assets and incorporates taxation under IP Boxes and CFC rules. Quality is a 
dummy variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality (applications filed at multiple offices). Real Activity is a 
binary variable, which is equal to one if at least one of the intangible’s inventors resides in the given country and takes 
on the value of zero otherwise. High IP Rights Protection represents an indicator of a country’s level of intellectual 
property rights protection. GDP denotes a country’s gross domestic product. BERD stands for a country’s business 
expenditure on R&D in relation to its GDP. 
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Furthermore, Table 5.4 shows that patents and trademarks of high quality are more sensitive to 
taxation than the low-quality intangibles. This effect is more pronounced in the case of 
trademarks compared to patents across almost all industry-firm size categories with the 
exception of large companies in the engineering sector. In addition, patents tend to be owned 
in countries where real R&D activity takes place. This is reflected by the positive coefficient 
on Real Activity in Panel A. As for the effects of other control variables shown in Table 5.4, 
stronger intellectual property rights protection seems to play a positive role in making a location 
decision across almost all industry groups and firm sizes. This result is in line with Karkinsky 
and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), and other studies that find a positive association 
between a country’s governance and its number of patents. A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on GDP in most categories implies that more patents and trademarks are 
located in economies with large markets. However, the coefficient on GDP turns out to be 
negative in some cases, which implies that companies of these categories tend to locate their 
intangibles in stagnating economies with shrinking markets. 
Moreover, Table 5.4 shows that BERD, which denotes a country’s total business expenditure 
on research and development in relation to its GDP, has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the location of patents and trademarks across almost all corporate groups. This 
implies that a greater share of investment in research and development positively affects the 
number of patent and trademark applications in the given country. However, the effect appears 
to be reversed in the case of large firms in some industries. 
The regression results presented in Table 5.4 support Hypothesis 1 of this study. Namely, they 
show that taxation has a negative and statistically significant impact on the location choices of 
both patents and trademarks. However, these outcomes say little about the magnitude of the 
effects. In order to determine the scale of the impact and to address Hypothesis 2 in more detail, 
we calculate the own and cross-country tax elasticities of patent and trademark location choices 
using equation 5.5. 
𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ =
∆𝑃𝑝𝑗
∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑃𝑝𝑗
 (5.5) 
In equation 5.5, 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ is the elasticity of the probability that an intangible asset p belonging to 
an idea i is located in country j with respect to a marginal change in the tax rate in location h. 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ denotes a statutory tax rate in country h that is levied on the profits generated by 
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intangible assets owned by firm f .215 𝑃𝑝𝑗 represents the predicted probability that an intangible 
asset p will be located in country j.216 Equation 5.3 describes the formulation of 𝑃𝑝𝑗 in more 
detail. We aggregate the elasticities of the location choices that arise within each country and 
report the corresponding findings in Table 5.5. Panel A presents the outcomes for patents and 
Panel B shows the results for trademarks.  
Panel A of Table 5.5 contains the elasticities of patent location choices with respect to a 
corporate income tax rate. The diagonal values depict the own tax elasticities, which are 
negative in all locations. The lowest (in absolute terms) own tax sensitivity of -0.1 is observed 
in Ireland and the highest, of -1.4, in the United States. This means that on average a one percent 
increase in the Irish tax rate leads to a -0.1% decrease in patent applications that arise from this 
country. A one percent rise in the US tax rate results on average in a -1.4% decrease in patent 
applications from the United States. The cross-country tax elasticities are positive, which 
implies that alternative locations experience a positive change in their number of patents once 
one country increases its tax rate on royalty income. 
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents tax elasticities in the case of trademarks and in comparison to the 
tax elasticities of patent location choices, these values appear to be more negative. For instance, 
a one percent tax rate increase in Ireland leads to a -1.4% decrease in trademark applications. 
In the case that the Danish tax rate increases by one percent, its number of trademarks will 
likely experience a -2.3% drop. Relatively low tax elasticities (in absolute terms) in some low-
tax countries such as Ireland or Switzerland could result from the controlled foreign company 
rules. CFC rules often apply to these jurisdictions because many high-tax countries see them as 
tax havens. If this is the case, then a change in the tax rate in these low-tax countries does not 
attract additional ownership of intangible assets because the tax rate of the parent company 
applies to the income from the intangible assets anyway.  
                                                          
215 ∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ equals the standard deviation of the residuals of 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ divided by 1000. This implies that ∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ is 
close to the smallest possible change in the tax rate. Using a change of 1% instead does not alter the results. 
216 ∆𝑃𝑝𝑗 is calculated through subtracting the predicted probabilities of the location choices before and after a tax 
change. 
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Table 5.5 Own and Cross-Country Elasticities of Location Choices with Respect to Changes in the Tax Rate 
Panel A. Patents 
  Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy 
Luxem-
bourg 
Nether-
lands 
Norway Spain Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
UK US 
Belgium -0.88 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Denmark 0.01 -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Finland 0.03 0.03 -0.80 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
France 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.66 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Germany 0.69 0.69 0.54 0.69 -0.64 0.45 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.54 0.69 0.54 0.35 0.69 0.71 
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 -1.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.77 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Norway 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.85 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Spain 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.93 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Sweden 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.81 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Switzerland 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.44 0.04 0.04 
UK 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.96 0.06 
US 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 -1.35 
Notes: Elasticity represents a percentage change in the patent location relative to a percentage change in the tax rate. Each cell shows the elasticity of patent applications in the country 
in column 1 with respect to the tax change in country in row 1.  
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Panel B. Trademarks 
  Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy 
Luxem-
bourg 
Nether-
lands 
Norway Spain Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
UK US 
Belgium -2.14 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Denmark 0.04 -2.31 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Finland 0.02 0.03 -2.20 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
France 0.14 0.19 0.18 -2.05 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.12 
Germany 0.40 0.54 0.52 0.41 -1.69 0.55 0.45 0.62 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.33 
Ireland 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -1.44 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Italy 0.18 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.25 -2.07 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.15 
Luxembourg 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -1.86 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Netherlands 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.15 -2.19 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.08 
Norway 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -2.24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Spain 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.17 -2.14 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.11 
Sweden 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 -2.17 0.09 0.08 0.05 
Switzerland 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12 -1.54 0.11 0.06 
UK 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.29 -2.07 0.18 
US 0.58 0.74 0.72 0.60 0.53 0.65 0.64 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.65 0.72 0.64 0.74 -1.48 
Notes: Elasticity represents a percentage change in the trademark location relative to a percentage change in the tax rate. Each cell shows the elasticity of trademark applications in the 
country in column 1 with respect to the tax change in country in row 1.  
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Finally, we calculate tax semi-elasticities of patent and trademark location choices in order to 
compare our results with the previous literature. Semi-elasticity represents a percentage change 
in the share of intangibles in a country in response to a one percentage point change in that 
country’s tax rate. According to Table 5.6, the average tax semi-elasticity of a patent location 
choice is -2.8, whereas the average tax semi-elasticity of a trademark location is equal to -6.5. 
These findings are in line with Hypothesis 2 of our study, according to which trademarks are 
more sensitive to taxation than patents. The tax semi-elasticity of patents that we observe is 
very similar to the findings of the previous literature. For instance, Griffith et al. (2014) 
conclude that the tax semi-elasticity of a patent location choice is between -0.5 and -3.9, while 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) find this value to equal around -3.5. This implies that our results 
are within the range identified in earlier studies, even though the samples differ in terms of the 
years and countries which they cover.217  
Table 5.6 Semi-Elasticities of Location Choices with Respect to a Tax Rate Change 
 Patents Trademarks 
Belgium -3.4 -5.9 
Denmark -3.4 -7.9 
Finland -2.7 -7.7 
France -3.1 -5.8 
Germany -1.7 -4.6 
Ireland -0.6 -6.7 
Italy -3.3 -6.1 
Luxembourg -3.4 -7.7 
Netherlands -3.2 -7.1 
Norway -2.8 -7.6 
Spain -3.3 -6.4 
Sweden -2.7 -7.5 
Switzerland -1.7 -6.3 
UK -3.2 -7.0 
US -3.4 -3.8 
Notes: Semi-elasticity represents a percentage change in the patent or 
trademark applications relative to a unit (i.e. percentage-point) change 
in the tax rate. The average tax rates of the whole time period were used 
for these calculations. 
                                                          
217 One difference is that our paper considers a more recent period of observation compared to the existing literature 
on patent location choices. In addition, earlier studies mainly concentrated on patent applications filed at the 
European patenting office, whereas we analyze the US patents and trademarks as well. 
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5.5.2    Robustness Checks  
In order to check the robustness of our baseline results, we conduct a few tests and extensions 
and report the outcomes in Tables 5.7-5.9. This part of the analysis is carried out using only 
non-large firms of the engineering sector as a representative sample.218 The results of all 
robustness checks are reported simultaneously for patents and trademarks in order to facilitate 
a direct comparison between the two types of IP. 
As previously discussed, our benchmark estimations are carried out using the mixed logit 
model. In order to check the robustness of these findings, columns I-IV of Table 5.7 display the 
outcomes of applying two alternative multinomial logit models. In line with the benchmark 
model, the dependent variable in these estimations is a location choice for an intangible asset 
in one of the fifteen countries shown in Table 5.1. In addition, these specifications include 
location fixed effects. Columns I and II show the results of using a conditional logit model, in 
which the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives is not relaxed. For this 
reason, the alternative location choices are assumed to be uncorrelated here. The outcomes of 
this alteration are similar to the baseline findings.  
Columns III and IV present the results of a nested logit estimation. According to Hensher et al. 
(2005), this model relaxes the IIA assumption by clustering similar alternative location choices 
into nests. Hence, we divide our fifteen locations into five clusters according to their 
geographical region. To illustrate this point further, let us consider the possibility where a firm 
wants to place a patent in Sweden, but this country increases its statutory corporate tax rate. 
The company thus chooses an alternative location for the patent and we assume that it views 
other Nordic countries as preferred alternatives to Sweden and all other locations become 
inferior options. Allowing for such a correlation between alternative locations leads to more 
negative effects of taxation on location choices than the effects found in our baseline 
estimations. 
                                                          
218 This industry-firm size category was chosen as a representative sample because it contains the largest number 
of observations compared to other industry-firm size groups. The results for other industry-firm size types are in 
line with the outcomes obtained using the representative sample. 
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Table 5.7 Robustness Tests 
Panel A Conditional Logit   Nested Logit   Negative Binominal   OLS 
Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks 
I II   III IV   V VI   VII VIII 
Tax Rate -4.896*** -7.801***   -5.213*** -10.590***   -0.347*** -2.008***   -0.605*** -2.948*** 
  (0.065) (0.129)   (0.063) (0.496)   (0.063) (0.079)   (0.0566) (0.0830) 
Tax Rate*Quality -2.655*** -2.720***   -0.532*** 0.686   -0.022 -0.130*   -1.293*** -0.744** 
  (0.120) (0.245)   (0.206) (0.738)   (0.07) (0.077)   (0.134) (0.323) 
Quality             0.432*** 2.835***   1.884*** 2.886*** 
              (0.025) (0.027)   (0.0475) (0.111) 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects             Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects             Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes       
Number of Intangibles 413,274 135,512  413,274 135,512       
Number of Observations 6,199,110 2,032,680  6,199,110 2,032,680  1,246,253 1,918,535  1,246,253 1,918,535 
  
                       
 Panel B No Controls   Only Firms with Both   Simple CIT   CIT Difference 
Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks   Patents Trademarks 
IX X   XI XII   XIII XIV   XV XVI 
Tax Rate -1.960*** -7.326***   -0.954*** -4.470***   -1.546*** -2.874***   -4.801*** -7.217*** 
  (0.048) (0.105)   (0.150) (0.188)   (0.116) (0.162)   (0.076) (0.114) 
Tax Rate*Quality       -0.188 -2.212***   -2.532*** -5.903***   -2.264*** -3.085*** 
        (0.174) (0.393)   (0.166) (0.440)   (0.093) (0.262) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 6.654*** 6.207***   8.242*** 8.986***   10.970*** 20.310***   4.313*** 6.235*** 
  (0.056) (0.133)   (0.136) (0.232)   (0.152) (0.216)   (0.101) (0.139) 
Controls No No   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Intangibles 413,274 135,512  212,695 48,659  413,274 135,512  413,274 135,512 
Number of Observations 6,199,110 2,032,680  3,190,425 729,885  6,199,110 2,032,680  6,199,110 2,032,680 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robustness tests are shown only for non-large firms of the engineering sector. In columns I-
IV and IX-XVI, the dependent variable is location choice in one of the countries shown in Table 5.1. In columns V-VIII, the dependent variable is the number of 
intangibles held by a firm in the given year. Tax Rate in columns I-XII stands for a host country’s tax rate levied on the income from intangible assets and incorporates 
taxation under IP Boxes and CFC rules. In columns XIII-XIV, it represents a simple CIT rate without taking IP Boxes and CFC rules into consideration. In columns 
XV-XVI, it represents the tax differential between the tax rate of the firm’s host country and the tax rate of the country of its parent company. Quality is a dummy 
variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality (applications filed at multiple offices). Controls includes High IP Rights Protection, GDP, BERD, and Real 
Activity (for patents). Columns XI-XII show the results for firms that have at least one patent and one trademark. 
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Several previous papers on patent location choices adopted a different identification strategy 
from Griffith et al. (2014) and this study. For example, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) conduct 
an analysis at a firm level rather than at the level of an intangible asset by applying estimators 
such as the negative binominal and ordinary least squares (OLS) models. In order to compare 
our results with this strand of literature, we implement an alternative identification strategy and 
display the results in columns V-VIII of Table 5.7. The dependent variable in these estimations 
is the number of patents or trademarks held by a firm in the given year. Columns V-VI display 
the results of using a negative binominal estimator and columns VII-VIII show the outcomes 
of the OLS estimation. Both firm and year fixed effects are included in these regressions, and 
as the findings suggest, the main effects remain negative and statistically significant under the 
new framework. The tax rate is negatively associated with the number of intangible assets 
owned by a firm. In addition, companies with patents and trademarks of high quality appear to 
be more sensitive to changes in taxation than firms with low-quality intangibles. The results we 
obtain using the negative binominal and OLS estimators are slightly lower in absolute terms 
but still of the same magnitude as the effects reported by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and other 
existing studies.219  
Columns IX and X of Table 5.7 show the baseline results presented in Table 5.4 after the 
exclusion of all control variables and the inclusion of the main independent variables of interest 
only. It becomes apparent that this modification almost does not influence the main findings, 
leaving the coefficient on tax rate both negative and statistically significant. The effect of 
taxation remains more negative in the case of trademarks than in the case of patents. 
Furthermore, columns XI and XII show the results of considering only the firms that hold at 
least one patent and one trademark during the period of observation. The main effects for these 
companies seem to be less negative in comparison with the baseline estimations. 
Finally, columns XIII-XVI of Table 5.7 modify the main independent variable of interest, 
namely the tax rate. Columns XIII-XIV include as the main independent variable of interest the 
statutory corporate income tax rate without incorporating a country’s IP Box or controlled 
foreign company rules. The magnitude of the results appears to be smaller in absolute terms 
compared to the baseline model. Furthermore, estimations in columns XV-XVI include the tax 
differential between an affiliate and its parent firm as the main independent variable of interest. 
                                                          
219 See as example: Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Table 3 on p. 183 (columns 1-3 for OLS and columns 12-14 for 
negative binominal). 
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This alteration causes almost no change in the main regression outcomes and the impact of tax 
variables remains negative and statistically significant. Once again, the effect is more negative 
for trademarks than for patents. 
5.5.3    Agglomeration of Patents vs Trademarks 
In section 5.2, we give a few explanations for why the tax elasticity of trademark location 
choices might be different from the tax elasticity of patent location choices. Some of these 
explanations are based on differences in the nature of patents and trademarks and others arise 
from differences in the administrative procedures related to developing and registering these 
two types of intellectual property. In this section, we empirically test whether an agglomeration 
effect could serve as one of the explanations for a lower mobility of patents within a corporate 
group compared to the transferability of trademarks. In line with the robustness checks shown 
in the previous section, this part of the analysis is carried out using non-large firms of the 
engineering sector as a representative sample. 
According to our argumentation in section 5.2, patents are more likely to be held together in a 
bundle, since multiple patents often belong to one family. In the baseline specification, we allow 
for some degree of correlation between related patents by grouping them into ideas. However, 
it may be the case that several ideas belong to one patent family and will therefore be registered 
in the same country where the first patent of the family is held. By contrast, trademarks are 
more often held independently or belong to smaller families and because of this are expected 
to depend less on the location of previous trademarks. We test this idea empirically and present 
the outcomes in Table 5.8. These specifications include New Location, which is a binary 
variable that acquires the value of one if a firm has never applied for an intangible asset220 in 
the given country and equals zero otherwise. This variable turns out to be negative and 
statistically significant for both patents and trademarks, as columns I and III show. What this 
result suggests is that intangibles are indeed more likely to be registered in the countries where 
a company already holds some assets and are less likely to be located in completely new 
locations from a firm’s point of view. Moreover, the coefficient on New Location is more 
negative in the case of patents compared to trademarks.  
                                                          
220 Here, we consider previous patent applications in the same industry for patents and previous trademark 
applications in the same industry for trademarks.  
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Table 5.8 Extended Analysis: Agglomeration Effect 
Furthermore, columns II and IV of Table 5.8 include an additional interaction term between 
New Location and the tax rate. The coefficient on this term is positive and the effect seems to 
be more pronounced in the case of patents than trademarks. The tax sensitivity of trademarks 
in new and old locations is almost the same. By contrast, patents appear to be substantially more 
sensitive to taxation in old locations compared to the new sites. This finding confirms our 
hypothesis of the agglomeration effect and shows that the agglomeration is stronger for patents 
than for trademarks. However, the results in Table 5.8 indicate that the agglomeration does not 
fully explain the gap between the tax elasticities of patents and trademarks. This implies that 
there are may be other factors that cause this gap, some of which are discussed in section 5.2. 
 Patents Trademarks 
  I II III IV 
Tax Rate -4.611*** -8.313*** -7.785*** -11.490*** 
  (0.107) (0.128) (0.118) (0.236) 
Tax Rate*Quality -1.973*** -1.534*** -3.714*** -3.529*** 
  (0.193) (0.194) (0.267) (0.269) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 7.929*** 7.639*** 6.223*** 6.343*** 
  (0.108) (0.111) (0.141) (0.141) 
New Location -7.291*** -9.315*** -2.445*** -3.809*** 
 (0.034) (0.057) (0.017) (0.078) 
Tax Rate*New Location  6.782***  3.994*** 
  (0.135)  (0.221) 
Real Activity 5.394*** 5.350***   
  (0.026) (0.025)   
Real Activity (Std.Dev.) 1.748*** 1.717***   
  (0.024) (0.023)   
High IP Rights Protection 1.111*** 1.084*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.042) (0.042) 
GDP 0.477*** 0.517*** -0.006 -0.004 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) 
BERD -0.210*** -0.110 0.213*** 0.217*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.037) (0.037) 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Intangibles 413,274 413,274 135,512 135,512 
Number of Observations 6,199,110 6,199,110 2,032,680 2,032,680 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Results are based on non-large 
firms of the engineering sector. The dependent variable is location choice in one of the countries shown 
in Table 5.1. Tax Rate stands for the corporate income tax rate and incorporates taxation under IP Boxes 
and CFC rules. Quality is a dummy variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality (applications 
filed at multiple offices). New Location is a binary variable and acquires a value of one if a firm has 
never applied for intangible assets in the given country and zero otherwise. Real Activity is a binary 
variable, which is equal to one if at least one of the intangible’s inventors resides in the given country 
and takes on the value of zero otherwise. High IP Rights Protection represents an indicator of a country’s 
level of intellectual property rights protection. GDP denotes a country’s gross domestic product. BERD 
stands for a country’s business expenditure on R&D in relation to its GDP. 
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5.5.4    Legal vs. Economic Ownership  
The empirical analysis of this study employs data on patent and trademark applications filed at 
several international application offices. These patent and trademark applications contain 
information about their legal owners and we have assumed until now that the legal owner of a 
patent or a trademark is the only possible owner. However, according to Markham (2005), 
several OECD members provide a few different IP ownership options. The author argues that 
the legal owner of an intangible asset is usually the recognized owner in law on the basis of the 
legal registration of patents, trademarks, designs, copyrights, and other intangibles. By contrast, 
the economic owner is the one that bears the greatest share of the development expenses as well 
as the greatest risk, should an intangible fail to deliver value.221 In some countries, it is the 
economic owner who is entitled to the income attributable to intangible assets and is therefore 
relevant from a taxation point of view.222 
The issue of legal and economic ownership of an intangible asset is regulated in many countries 
on a national level and there are also attempts being made to settle this issue on an international 
level. As an example, the OECD (2010) has addressed the separation of IP ownership in its 
transfer pricing guidelines, arguing that the economic owner is the correct owner of intellectual 
property. This is because the economic owner bears the costs and risks associated with the 
development of an intangible asset. Similar conclusions have been made in the OECD Action 
Plan on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).223 According to Actions 8-10 of this plan, the 
functional or economic owner of an intangible asset should be entitled to the returns which 
remain after the legal owner has been remunerated for its own functions, assets, and risks related 
to the R&D process. Table 5.9 provides a detailed overview of the treatment of economic and 
legal ownership concepts in the countries analyzed in this study. According to Table 5.9, most 
countries in our dataset distinguish between legal and economic ownership concepts and the 
majority of them follow the transfer pricing guidelines and the Actions 8-9 of the Action Plan 
on BEPS. 
                                                          
221 Please note that different ownership options exist not only for patents but also for other types of intangibles, 
including trademarks. 
222 van Gorp (2012) gives a thorough review of further IP ownership types such as contract-based ownership, 
control ownership, functional ownership, and beneficial ownership. These are similar to the concept of economic 
ownership. 
223 See OECD (2015b). 
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Since this study investigates the influence of taxation on the location of intangible assets, we 
are interested in identifying the economic owner of patents and trademarks. If this owner 
receives returns generated by intangibles, it is also subject to taxation on those returns. 
However, since we observe only the legal and not economic owners in our data, we have to 
assume in the baseline analysis that they are the same. This assumption is plausible, since a 
separation of the two types of ownership may be difficult and unwanted due to the potentially 
high costs. To give an example, if there is a court dispute involving an intangible asset, then all 
of its owners must not only participate in legal proceedings but also have to reach an agreement 
regarding the case.  
Furthermore, in most countries tax authorities require thoroughly documented evidence for 
granting an ownership status. They might also challenge this status, as demonstrated in the DHL 
and H Group Holding court cases. Foreign subsidiaries of DHL224 and H Group Holding225 
contributed to the promotion and maintenance of the parent companies’ intellectual property. 
In the DHL case, the tax court decided that the legal owner (which was the parent company) is 
entitled to income generated by IP. However, the court of appeal overruled this decision by 
stating that the subsidiary must be considered as the intangibles’ true owner, since it performed 
excessive development activities and covered substantial costs and risks related to the IP 
development. By contrast, in the H Group Holding case, the court did not recognize the 
subsidiary as the ultimate beneficiary of income generated by IP, as the development and 
maintenance costs that the subsidiary covered were not extraordinarily. Hence, the subsidiary 
was entitled to compensation for its services and the parent was recognized as the sole owner 
of intellectual property. These court cases show that the separation of IP ownership might be 
risky and therefore unwanted from a multinational’s point of view. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
224 See United States Tax Court (1998). 
225 See United States Tax Court (1999). 
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Table 5.9 Legal vs. Economic Ownership of Intangible Assets 
Country 
Separation 
Exists Details 
Belgium Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Denmark No Denmark gives preference to legal ownership but refers to 
the control ownership when it is difficult to determine a 
legal owner of intellectual property.  
Finland Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
France No Does not recognize economic ownership concept, only 
recognizes legal ownership. 
Germany Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Ireland Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Italy  No Does not recognize economic ownership concept, only 
recognizes legal ownership. 
Luxembourg Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Netherlands Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Norway No There is no distinction between economic and legal 
ownership written in the civil and tax law. 
Spain No Under Spanish CIT law, there is no specific regulation on 
the treatment of IP ownership (in terms of legal/economic 
ownership). 
Sweden Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Switzerland Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
UK Yes Recognizes legal and beneficial ownership but gives 
preference to economic ownership. 
US Yes Adopts the OECD TP guidelines on economic and legal 
ownership. 
Notes: See OECD (2010) for OECD TP guidelines. TP stands for transfer pricing. CIT stands for corporate 
income tax rate. IP means intellectual property. Sources: van Gorp (2012) and our own survey of the Big 4 
taxation experts. 
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In order to evaluate the importance of the distinction between legal and economic ownership in 
our data, we carry out a further robustness check. More precisely, we generate a binary variable 
Separation, which is equal to one if a country recognizes legal and economic ownership and 
takes on the value of zero otherwise. We interact this variable with the tax rate and include it in 
our baseline specification.226 The results are displayed in Table 5.10 and according to columns 
I-II of this table, the coefficient on the interaction Tax Rate*Separation is positive and 
statistically significant for patents and trademarks. Based on these results, the existence of 
economic ownership significantly diminishes the tax sensitivity of legal ownership. For 
example, the marginal effect of taxation on a patent location choice is -14.4 if no distinction 
between ownership concepts is made and -4.2 if a separation exists. In the case of trademarks, 
these effects are equal to -16.6 and -7.3 respectively. This implies that the legal ownership 
which we observe in our data is less sensitive to changes in taxation in countries that recognize 
the concept of economic ownership. This result could be due to firms that separate their 
economic and legal ownership in response to taxation, since changes in the economic ownership 
are not documented in our dataset. Hence, the estimates of our benchmark analysis might 
represent only a lower bound of the true impact of taxation on the location of patents and 
trademarks. 
Moreover, in columns III and V of Table 5.10 we control for the agglomeration effect and the 
distinction between ownership concepts at the same time. According to these findings, the 
impact of ownership separation remains almost unchanged once we simultaneously control for 
the agglomeration effect. Finally, columns IV and VI add a triple interaction term between the 
tax rate, the separation dummy, and the new location variable to the benchmark model. 
According to the regression outcomes, a distinction between different IP ownership concepts 
in new locations further decreases the tax sensitivity of patent location choices. This might 
indicate that companies tend to separate economic and legal ownership of their patents more 
often in new locations than in the old sites. At the same time, no statistically significant effect 
of the interaction between taxation, Separation, and New Location is observed in the case of 
trademarks, as column VI shows. 
                                                          
226 In line with the robustness checks and extended analysis shown above, this part of the study is carried out using 
only non-large firms of the engineering sector as a representative sample. 
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Table 5.10 Extended Analysis: Legal vs. Economic Ownership 
  Separation of Ownership    Separation and Agglomeration 
  Patents Trademarks  Patents Trademarks 
  I II  III IV V VI 
Tax Rate -14.430*** -16.590***  -13.410*** -14.470*** -20.680*** -21.160*** 
  (0.195) (0.297)  (0.211) (0.265) (0.367) (1.027) 
Tax Rate*Quality -2.694*** -3.060***  -1.566*** -1.389*** -3.490*** -3.470*** 
  (0.110) (0.262)  (0.193) (0.196) (0.269) (0.268) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 3.683*** 6.212***  7.478*** 7.669*** 6.349*** 6.248*** 
  (0.104) (0.137)  (0.111) (0.110) (0.138) (0.139) 
Tax Rate*Separation 10.260*** 9.293***  6.137*** 6.535*** 8.955*** 9.678*** 
  (0.184) (0.269)  (0.192) (0.269) (0.272) (1.031) 
New Location    -9.270*** -8.685*** -3.884*** -4.290*** 
    (0.056) (0.077) (0.078) (0.337) 
Tax Rate*New Location    6.690*** 7.149*** 4.246*** 4.792*** 
    (0.134) (0.247) (0.222) (1.015) 
Separation*New Location     -1.667***  0.581* 
     (0.077)  (0.342) 
Tax Rate*Separation*New Location     1.903***  -0.824 
      (0.261)  (1.028) 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Intangibles 413,274 135,512  413,274 413,274 135,512 135,512 
Number of Observations 6,199,110 2,032,680  6,199,110 6,199,110 2,032,680 2,032,680 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Results are based on non-large firms of the engineering sector. The dependent 
variable is location choice in one of the countries shown in Table 5.1. Tax Rate stands for the corporate income tax rate and incorporates taxation under 
IP Boxes and CFC rules. Quality is a dummy variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality (applications filed at multiple offices). Separation 
is a binary variable and it is based on information in Table 5.9; it is equal to one if the separation between the concepts of legal and economic ownership 
exists in a country and to zero otherwise. New Location is a binary variable and acquires a value of one if a firm has never applied for intangible assets 
in the given country and zero otherwise. Controls includes High IP Rights Protection, GDP, BERD, and Real Activity (for patents). 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the strategic allocation of different types of intangible assets 
within corporate groups. As presented in section 5.2, Hypothesis 1 states that corporate groups 
register a greater number of intangibles through their subsidiaries that are located in countries 
with low statutory corporate income tax rates, rather than through affiliates in countries with 
high tax rates. This idea has already been supported by numerous empirical studies, such as 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014), Alstadsæter et al. 
(2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Bradley et al. (2015), and Dinkel and Schanz (2015). The main 
contribution of this analysis to the previous literature is its ability to distinguish between 
different types of intangible assets – patents and trademarks – and to compare their tax 
elasticities. Trademarks are usually easier to register and are less costly to develop in 
comparison to patents. Their creation does not typically require detailed documentation and 
they are less likely to depend on the location of other intangibles in the same family, as it can 
often be the case with patens. Therefore, according to Hypothesis 2 of this study, trademark 
location choices are more responsive to taxation than patent location choices. 
In order to empirically test these hypotheses, we employ the Orbis database provided by the 
Bureau van Dijk. It contains information on all patent and trademark applications filed at the 
European Union Intellectual Property Office, the European Patent Office, and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. These patent and trademark applications provide information on 
their owners, which allows us to determine the location of patents and trademarks within 
corporate groups. Our sample includes patent and trademark applications filed by 162,640 firms 
during the period between 1996 and 2012. These enterprises are located in one of the following 
fifteen countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. In total, they applied for 1,696,332 patents and 624,801 trademarks during our period of 
observation. 
The main findings of our empirical analysis support the initial hypotheses of the study, as we 
find a negative relationship between tax rates and the location of intangible assets. Moreover, 
the tax elasticity of a trademark location choice is more negative than that of a patent location 
choice. Our key findings suggest that on average a one percent increase in the tax rate leads to 
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a decrease of -0.1% to -1.4% in the number of patents and a drop between -1.4% and -2.3% in 
the number of trademarks held in the given country. 
Our findings are comparable to the prior literature on the impact of taxation on patent location 
choices. For example, we use the same identification strategy as Griffith et al. (2014), who find 
that the tax semi-elasticity of patent location choices varies between -0.5 and -3.9. We replicate 
the results reported by Griffith et al. (2014) in appendix C1 and show that extending the sample 
to include additional years of observation and the USPTO data does not change the main 
findings. Namely, our empirical analysis indicates that an average tax semi-elasticity of patent 
location choices is equal to -2.8. Furthermore, the results of this study are in line with the 
findings of Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), and Ernst et al. (2014), 
who analyze the connection between a country’s taxation of royalty income and the quantity or 
quality of patents held in that country. The main difference between the empirical approach of 
these studies and the one used by Griffith et al. (2014) is that they carry out analyses at a firm 
level. By contrast, Griffith et al. (2014) as well as this paper both carry out an investigation at 
the level of an intangible through the application of a multinomial choice model. Despite using 
different identification strategies, our results are still comparable to those found in this area of 
literature. For example, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) argue that a one percentage point increase 
in the tax rate on royalty income leads to a decrease of -3.5% to -3.8% in the country’s patent 
applications. According to our findings, on average a one percentage point increase in the tax 
rate on royalty income leads to a -2.8% drop in patent applications and a -6.5% decrease in 
trademark applications in the given country, holding other factors constant. 
Moreover, we conduct a further empirical analysis in an attempt to explain the gap between tax 
elasticities of patents and trademarks. In accordance with our results, the less negative tax 
elasticity of patents compared to trademarks might be at least partially due to the agglomeration 
effect. In other words, patents may be less sensitive to taxation than trademarks because they 
are more likely to be registered in the country where the rest of the patent family is located. In 
addition, we show that our results might represent only the lower bound of the true profit 
shifting by means of intangible assets because multinationals might separate the economic and 
legal ownership of their IP, which is not always reflected in the intangibles’ applications. 
However, further research is needed in order to investigate the magnitude of this issue and its 
exact influence on the elasticity of patent and trademark location choices. 
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As for the policy implications of this study, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, companies 
seem to use intangible assets as a means of base erosion and profit shifting, which is why 
effective international regulations are necessary to ensure that taxation is based on real 
economic activity and value creation. Secondly, the differences between various types of 
intangible assets should not be ignored. The very nature of a trademark makes it more mobile 
within a corporate group than a patent and for this reason trademarks have a greater potential 
to be used as a means of profit shifting in comparison to patents. Therefore, tax regulations and 
policies should take into consideration the differences between intangible assets and should be 
designed or adjusted in accordance with these differences. This would, for example, imply that 
current IP Boxes that allow a preferential tax treatment for both patents and trademarks (Cyprus, 
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta) should be reconsidered and follow the example of the IP Boxes 
that concentrate on patens only (Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK).
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Chapter 6 
Tax Incentives for Research and Development and 
Their Use in Tax Planning 
6.1 Introduction 
State support of research and development (R&D) is not only economically justified in 
numerous theoretical and empirical studies but is also enforced in many countries around the 
world. Fiscal incentives constitute one of the key instruments of state support of R&D, as they 
are easier to implement and are less complex to monitor than, for example, direct R&D grants 
or subsidies. There are various types of fiscal incentives for research and development, some 
of which focus on supporting the development or input phase of a research process, whereas 
others concentrate on the income-generating output phase. The first group of R&D tax 
incentives includes tax credits and tax super-deductions, which are more widely distributed on 
an international level than the second category. However, in recent years output-oriented fiscal 
incentives, which include intellectual property (IP) Boxes, seem to have been gaining 
popularity, especially in Europe. Fourteen European countries currently have IP Box regimes 
and several others are considering their introduction.  
Even though R&D tax incentives have already been analyzed in the previous literature, the main 
aim of this study is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of R&D tax 
incentives, including not only well-researched issues but also topics which have been studied 
to a lesser extent. The focus of this study is on the potential use of R&D tax incentives for tax 
planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We distinguish between input- und output-
oriented fostering of R&D and concentrate on those incentives that apply to large companies, 
as opposed to the incentives which are available to small and medium enterprises. The study 
also focuses on those incentives that are available in member states of the European Union (EU) 
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and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland. 
The methodology of our analysis is diverse. First, we carry out a thorough review of the existing 
R&D tax incentives and find that Germany, Estonia, and Sweden are currently the only 
countries in Europe that do not offer any R&D tax incentives. Secondly, we examine the 
empirical literature on the outcomes of an implementation of R&D tax incentives. According 
to the literature review, numerous studies find that input-oriented tax incentives boost firms’ 
innovation and performance. However, there is no such strong evidence on the role of output-
oriented fiscal incentives in supporting real R&D activity. Thirdly, we use the Devereux and 
Griffith (1999, 2003) approach to compute the effective average tax burden in the EU and EFTA 
member states in 2012. Furthermore, we follow the conceptual framework of Spengel and 
Elschner (2010) and Evers et al. (2015a) to incorporate various types of R&D tax incentives in 
the Devereux and Griffith model. In addition to a domestic investment scenario, a cross-border 
investment is introduced into the model in order to show that R&D tax incentives may be used 
by multinationals for tax planning. Finally, we test this hypothesis in an empirical analysis by 
employing data on international collaboration in patents provided by the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). This data contains information on patents 
that have been developed in one country and relocated to another one afterwards. According to 
our main findings, a negative correlation exists between taxation and the probability of 
countries entering into a co-operation in patent development. In addition, the probability and 
the intensity of collaboration in patents increases with a growing generosity of R&D tax 
incentives, which further supports our hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that input-oriented R&D 
tax incentives, such as tax credits and tax super-deductions, constitute a more suitable 
instrument for fostering research and development than output-oriented fiscal incentives, such 
as IP Boxes. 
The study is organized as follows: section 6.2 presents the economic justification behind the 
state support of R&D and introduces the main types of R&D tax incentives. In addition, an 
overview of the existing incentives in the EU and EFTA member states in 2012 is given. Section 
6.3 includes a review of empirical literature on the outcomes of an implementation of R&D tax 
incentives. Section 6.4 explains the standard case of the Devereux and Griffith model and 
presents its extension to include input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives. Moreover, this 
section further develops the model to demonstrate the role of fiscal incentives in tax planning 
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strategies of multinational firms. Section 6.5 presents our empirical analysis and discusses the 
key results, with the final section summarizing the main findings of our study and drawing 
several conclusions. 
6.2  State Support of Research and Development 
6.2.1    Economic Justification  
According to the OECD (2002), research and development can be defined as “creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge […] and the use 
of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.”227 There is an established view among 
policy makers and in academia that R&D leads to technological development, which in turn 
stimulates economic growth. Solow (1956) was among the first economists to develop a 
theoretical model that illustrates this idea. According to the author, technological progress 
increases a country’s productivity and proves to be more effective in fostering economic growth 
than other factors of production, such as labor and capital. Since technological progress plays 
an important role in the economic development of a country, it is natural that governments have 
an interest in supporting research and development, as Arginelli (2015) notes.  
The two major economic justifications for the state support of research and development are 
positive spillovers from R&D and an existence of asymmetric information. According to 
Mankiw and Taylor (2014), positive spillovers from R&D occur because companies may use 
outcomes of research and development without there being rivalry or exclusion. As an example, 
different firms may apply research findings in product development at the same time while 
avoiding the possibility of limiting each other’s research. This results in a lack of rivalry 
occurring between the firms. All companies can typically take advantage of the knowledge 
acquired through R&D, which implies that there is no exclusion. Spengel and Wiegard (2011) 
argue that positive spillovers from R&D may occur even in the case of a patent protecting the 
research outcomes, because firms could imitate new products or production processes of their 
competitors even if they are patented. Furthermore, companies may also benefit from hiring 
experienced employees who have previously worked for their competitors and have gained the 
required knowledge needed to imitate these products. In addition, even if the outcomes of 
research and development are not successful and no new inventions result from a research 
                                                          
227 See OECD (2002), p. 30. 
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project, there is still a positive spillover effect for the industry. Namely, other firms can learn 
from unsuccessful attempts made by their competitors and either avoid repeating the same 
mistake in the future or plan their research differently from the very beginning. Hence, the 
social benefits from research and development might exceed the private returns. Hansson and 
Brokelind (2014) investigate the consequences of introducing R&D incentives in the European 
Union, placing an emphasis on Sweden. The authors argue that the EU should subsidize only 
R&D projects which have a potential to yield higher social benefits than private returns. 
According to Hansson and Brokelind (2014), firms are likely to undertake projects with high 
private return regardless of any support measures which are available. 
The second justification for the state support of research and development is the existence of 
asymmetric information. According to Spengel and Wiegard (2011), the problem of asymmetric 
information is typical for credit markets where some economic agents have better access to 
information than the others. This is particularly true in the case of financing R&D, because 
investments in this area are often deemed to be high-risk and creditors do not have the sufficient 
information to decide whether or not they should finance them. This results in adverse selection, 
whereby it is only low-risk R&D projects that receive financing with the other projects being 
overlooked, even if their potential returns are high. In addition, Arginelli (2015) argues that the 
issue of asymmetric information in capital markets may be selective and only give a 
disadvantage to certain types of firms. For example, small companies might have to pay higher 
interest rates and may have narrower access to the capital market compared to large firms. State 
support of research and development cannot prevent the problem of asymmetric information, 
but it can reduce the need for external means in R&D financing.  
6.2.2    Types of R&D Support 
State support of research and development can take various forms and target different phases 
of an R&D process. For example, governments may support R&D either directly or indirectly 
and in the case of direct measures, these may be taken in the form of subsidies, allowances, and 
grants. Even though this type of R&D support has a direct influence on the liquidity of an 
investing firm, its application process is often bureaucratic, complex, and lengthy. In addition, 
Cunningham et al. (2013) note that the provision of direct R&D funding might be quite 
subjective and based on certain characteristics of a firm, such as its age or experience in a certain 
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field of research. Indirect measures include fiscal incentives for research and development and 
it is this type of state support of R&D which this study will focus upon. 
Furthermore, R&D support can be classified according to the phase of the research process to 
which it applies. According to Arginelli (2015), a research project typically has two major 
stages. During a so-called input phase, a firm plans and conducts the research and it is during 
this stage where the majority of costs related to an R&D process arise. After an intangible asset 
has been created, the output phase begins which includes managing the profits that an intangible 
generates or dealing with the losses that have occurred in the case of an unsuccessful 
investment. This study analyzes both input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives. 
6.2.2.1    Input-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
R&D tax incentives that apply to the first phase of the research process aim to alleviate the 
financial burden of a company as R&D expenses occur but income is yet to be generated or is 
completely uncertain. There are different approaches to support companies in this phase of 
investment. Some of the support measures aim to reduce a firm’s tax liability, while others 
target its tax base. The first category includes an R&D tax credit, which can be defined as a 
direct offset against the amount of a company’s tax liability.228 The second group comprises a 
tax super-deduction and an accelerated depreciation of assets used in research and development. 
The OECD (2014a) defines a tax super-deduction as a tax measure that reduces a firm’s tax 
base by allowing for an inflation of the R&D expenditure base.229 An accelerated depreciation 
scheme is defined as a tax incentive that permits fixed assets used in R&D to be depreciated at 
higher rates than usual in the first years of their useful life.230 As the OECD (2014a) notes, this 
type of R&D support decreases the overall taxable income of a company and provides it with 
some additional liquidity in certain periods of an R&D process. However, the payment of taxes 
in this case is not completely repealed but rather postponed. According to Spengel and Wiegard 
(2011), the attractiveness of R&D tax incentives that target a company’s tax base rises as a 
country’s statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate increases. This is due to a larger effect of 
the fiscal incentives on the tax base when a tax rate is higher. 
                                                          
228 See OECD (2017a). 
229 See OECD (2014a), p. 51-52. 
230 See OECD (2014a), p. 52. 
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These R&D tax incentives can be further divided according to their attributes. Arginelli (2015) 
gives a detailed overview of input-oriented R&D tax incentives with respect to their targeting 
dimensions, such as the type of income which they support as well as intangible assets, business 
sectors, and firm sizes they apply to. For example, some countries offer incremental tax credits 
and tax deductions, which depend on the volumes of R&D expenses in previous periods and 
therefore should intensify an increase in a firm’s spending on research and development. 
Moreover, R&D tax incentives may differ according to the type of expenses they support. For 
example, some of them target current expenses such as labor costs or maintenance expenditure, 
while others support capital expenses such as costs associated with the construction of a 
laboratory or a building. As a concluding point, it should be taken into account that the 
incentives may vary based on their treatment of losses that result from an R&D process. Some 
countries allow unused tax incentives to be carried forward, while other countries offer a refund 
in the case of losses, which is equal to a cash grant. 
6.2.2.2    Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
In addition to the input-oriented R&D incentives, there are also tax incentives that target the 
second stage of research and development. In particular, they aim to provide a favorable tax 
treatment for the income generated from intangible assets. IP Boxes serve as a prominent 
example of this type of R&D incentives. Atkinson and Andes (2011) define an IP Box as a tax 
incentive that allows corporate income from the sale or licensing of intangible assets to be taxed 
at a lower rate than other types of income.231 
In their overview of the existing IP Boxes, Evers et al. (2015a) demonstrate a great variety of 
these regimes. For instance, IP Boxes differ according to the type of income, intangible assets, 
and R&D expenses that they cover. Some regimes allow a deduction of current R&D 
expenditure from the tax base of a reduced tax rate, which is known as a net approach. By 
contrast, other IP Boxes permit the deduction from the tax base of a standard statutory tax rate, 
defined as a gross approach. The latter method is to the benefit of the investing companies, 
since here the profits generated by an intangible are taxed at the reduced tax rate, although the 
expenses associated with its development are deducted at the higher statutory tax rate. In 
addition, IP Boxes may differ in their treatment of the R&D expenditure that occurred in the 
                                                          
231 Atkinson and Andes (2011), p. 3. 
Chapter 6: Tax Incentives for R&D and Their Use in Tax Planning           183 
 
past. For example, the past expenses on research and development may be ignored (a no 
recapture approach) or it may be necessary to reconsider them (a recapture approach). In the 
case of a recapture approach, it may either be required to deduct the past expenses at the reduced 
IP Box tax rate (a threshold method) or to capitalize them (a capitalization method).232 
Furthermore, some IP Boxes only apply to intangible assets that have been developed within a 
country’s borders, whereas others support IP acquired from abroad as well. In the case of the 
latter, an IP Box does not have to foster domestic research and development but might rather 
be used by multinational enterprises for tax planning. The OECD has attempted to fix this 
problem by imposing the Nexus Approach in 2015.233 According to this regulation, all current 
and new IP Boxes should facilitate the taxation of profits from the transfer or use of intangible 
assets in the place of their creation. However, the enforcement of this requirement still depends 
on the willingness of individual countries to co-operate.  
Spengel (2016) identifies that another issue related to the lawfulness of IP Boxes is their 
potentially selective treatment of certain companies or industries. The author argues that IP 
Boxes give an advantage to multinational enterprises compared to the purely domestic firms. A 
multinational might develop an intangible in a high-tax country and afterwards strategically 
relocate it to a subsidiary in a country with an IP Box, whereas a domestic firm does not have 
this opportunity. Moreover, IP Boxes distort competition by giving an unfair advantage to 
companies that operate within certain industries. As an example, firms within some industries 
may develop an intangible asset and then license it to other related and non-related companies, 
whereby the resulting license fees will typically be eligible for beneficial tax treatment under 
an IP Box regime. By contrast, companies within other industries may use their intangible assets 
only themselves and are not able to license them to other parties. As a result, forms in the second 
category are not able to benefit from using an IP Box in comparison to their counterparts in the 
first category. Therefore, Spengel (2016) concludes that the selective treatment of IP Boxes 
does not comply with the state aid principles of the European Union. 
 
                                                          
232 See Evers et al. (2015a) for more information. 
233 See OECD (2015a). 
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6.2.3    An Overview of R&D Tax Incentives in Europe 
This section gives an overview of the current input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives in 
the 28 member states of the European Union and four countries that are non-EU members but 
belong to the European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland).234 
Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of the R&D tax incentives across these countries in 2012 
and what is evident from this figure is that the majority of European countries offer either input- 
or output-oriented fiscal incentives. It is worth noting that some countries have even 
implemented both types of R&D tax incentives. For example, France offers both a generous tax 
credit on R&D expenditure and an IP Box. By contrast, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, 
Slovakia, and Sweden were the only countries in Europe that did not offer any kinds of R&D 
tax incentives in 2012. However, Greece, Latvia, and Slovakia have introduced super-
deductions for R&D expenses in the years that followed, which resulted in Estonia, Germany, 
and Sweden currently remaining the only countries in Europe without fiscal incentives for 
research and development. 
6.2.3.1    Input-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the existing input-oriented R&D tax incentives in Europe. It 
focuses on the incentives that are available for large corporations; however, many countries 
have special R&D tax incentives for small and medium enterprises as well. In addition, it is 
worth noting that Table 6.1 summarizes fiscal incentives available for internal R&D spending, 
since in our further analysis we assume that a company conducts research itself and does not 
outsource it to other parties (which would result in external R&D spending). 
According to Table 6.1, only a few European countries such as Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, and Sweden do not offer any input-oriented incentives for 
R&D. In addition to input-oriented incentives, most countries do not require an immediate 
capitalization of self-developed intangible assets for tax purposes. However, a few countries 
such as Cyprus, Norway, and Slovakia enforce this requirement and thereby create a liquidity 
disadvantage for firms that carry out research and development. 
 
                                                          
234 In what follows, we refer to the EU and EFTA members as Europe. 
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Figure 6.1 Existing Input- and Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives in Europe, 2012 
 
Table 6.1 shows that most European countries offer either a tax credit or a tax super-deduction 
for R&D expenditure. In line with Spengel and Elschner (2010), we distinguish between current 
and capital expenditure on research and development and observe that the majority of countries 
in Table 6.1 offer tax incentives for both current and capital expenses. Furthermore, almost half 
of the countries under analysis allow for an accelerated depreciation of machinery, buildings, 
intangibles, and other types of assets used in research and development. As discussed in section 
6.2.2.1, accelerated depreciation gives firms a liquidity advantage in the first years of research 
and development. In the case of losses, most countries permit their tax incentives to be carried 
forward and only a few of them offer a refund. A few countries offer both options for the 
treatment of losses. 
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Table 6.1 An Overview of Input-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives in Europe, 2012 
 
Tax 
Credit, % 
Super-
Deduction, 
% 
Qualifying Expenses Accelerated 
Depreciation 
Losses 
 Current  Capital 
Carry 
Forward 
Refund 
Austria 101 - x x - - x 
Belgium 13.52 13.52 x - - - - 
Bulgaria - - - - x16 - - 
Croatia - 10013 x x - - - 
Cyprus - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 
- 10014 x x - x - 
Denmark -3 - - - x - x 
Estonia - - - - - - - 
Finland - - - - x - - 
France 304 - x x x17 x x22 
Germany - - - - - - - 
Greece - - - - - - - 
Hungary -5 100 x x - - - 
Iceland 206 - x x - - - 
Ireland 25 - x x x16 x - 
Italy -7 - - - x16 x - 
Latvia - - - - - - - 
Liechtenstein - - - - - - - 
Lithuania - 200 x x x x - 
Luxembourg - - - - x18 - - 
Malta 158 508 x x - x - 
Netherlands - 40 x x - x - 
Norway 189 - x x - - x 
Poland - -15 - - x19 - - 
Portugal 32.510 - x x - x - 
Romania - 20 x x x20 x - 
Slovakia - - - - - - - 
Slovenia - 40 x x - x - 
Spain 2511 - x x x16 x - 
Sweden - - - - - - - 
Switzerland - - - - x21 - - 
UK -12 30 x x x16 x x 
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Notes: 1Approval of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency is required. 2These R&D incentives are available 
only for green investments and are mutually exclusive. 3Tax credit is capped and is available only for firms 
encountering R&D-related losses. 430% up to 100 million EUR, 5% above. The rate is increased to 40% in the 
first year and to 35% in the second year for companies that benefit from the tax credit for the first time or did not 
benefit from it during the five years before they request the credit. 5A tax credit of up to 80% for investments in 
underdeveloped regions and free entrepreneurial zones is available. 6An approval of the Icelandic Centre for 
Research is required; minimum 1 million ISK, maximum 100 million ISK per project and firm. 7There is no 
general tax credit, although there is a 10%-credit on R&D expenses that do not exceed 50 million EUR. 8Not 
allowed if an IP box applies. 9The credit is generally given to small and medium companies but may also apply 
to other firms upon an approval of the Research Council of Norway. 10An additional incremental credit of 50% 
applies if expenses exceed the average R&D expenditure of the previous two fiscal years. 11If expenses exceed 
an average amount of the previous two years, a rate of 25% applies to the average amount and a rate of 42% 
applies to the exceeding amount. 12A taxable 11%-tax credit is available in certain cases but not for the expenses 
on patents. 13This amount ranges between 100% and 150% depending on a type of research. 14The rate increases 
to 110% for incremental R&D expenses. 15Application is possible if certain conditions are fulfilled. 16An 
immediate write-off. 17Degressive instead of straight-line depreciation is possible if a resulting asset stays in the 
enterprise for at least 3 years. 18Accelerated depreciation for machinery and equipment; buildings are excluded. 
19Accelerated depreciation is not limited to assets used in research and development. 20A write-off of 50% in the 
first year is available for machinery and equipment if the resulting IP stays in Romania. 21Varies on the cantonal 
level, with most cantons offering an immediate or accelerated depreciation for machinery, buildings, and 
intangible assets. These tax incentives are not limited to the assets used in R&D. 22A unutilized tax credit may be 
carried forward for three years, afterwards a refund is available.  
     
x17 
6.2.3.2    Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the output-oriented R&D tax incentives represented by IP 
Boxes. Similarly to the input-oriented instruments, the scope of Table 6.2 includes countries of 
the European Union and the European Free Trade Area in 2012. The output-oriented R&D 
incentives have become rather popular in recent years, as shown by the fact that ten European 
countries offered them in the year 2012. Four more countries have introduced IP Boxes in the 
years following on from 2012 (Ireland in 2016, Italy in 2015, Portugal in 2014, and the United 
Kingdom in 2013) and several others are considering the possibility of doing so. 
According to Table 6.2, all IP Boxes significantly decrease taxation of profits generated by 
intangible assets. For example, in Malta the standard corporate income tax rate reaches 35%, 
while the reduced IP Box tax rate equals 0%. As shown in Table 6.2 and as discussed in section 
6.2.2.2, before the implementation of the OECD Nexus Approach in 2015, the majority of IP 
Boxes were open for acquired IP as well. Furthermore, according to Table 6.2, some IP Boxes 
enable a preferential tax treatment of the existing intangibles in addition to the newly created 
ones. Belgium and Hungary are the only two countries that permit a gross approach in the 
treatment of current R&D expenses. As described in section 6.2.2.2, this method is beneficial 
from a company’s point of view, since it allows firms to deduct R&D expenditure at a regular 
tax rate.  
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Table 6.2 An Overview of Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives in Europe, 2012 
 
 
Date of 
Implem
entation 
IP Box 
Tax 
Rate, % 
Statutory 
Tax 
Rate, % 
Type of Eligible IP  Treatment of Expenses 
Acquired Existing Current 
Occurred in the 
Past 
Austria 
 
- - 25 - - - - 
Belgium 2007 6.8 33.9 N N Gross No recapture 
Bulgaria - - 10 - - - - 
Croatia - - 20 - - - - 
Cyprus 2012 2.5 10 Y Y Net 
Recapture 
(Capitalization) 
Czech 
Republic 
- - 19 - - - - 
Denmark - - 25 - - - - 
Estonia - - 21 - - - - 
Finland - - 24.5 - - - - 
France 2000 15.5 34.4 Y3 Y Net No recapture 
Germany - - 29.8 - - - - 
Greece - - 20 - - - - 
Hungary 2003 9.5 19 Y Y Gross No recapture 
Iceland - - 20 - - - - 
Ireland1 - - 12.5 - - - - 
Italy1 - - 31.4 - - - - 
Latvia - - 15 - - - - 
Liechtenstein 2011 2.5 12.5 Y N Net 
Recapture 
(Threshold) 
Lithuania - - 15 - - - - 
Luxembourg 2008 5.9 28.8 Y3 Y Net 
Recapture 
(Capitalization) 
Malta 2010 0 35 Y N 
Not 
deductible 
Not if costs were 
deducted 
Netherlands 2007 5 25 N N Net 
Recapture 
(Threshold) 
Norway - - 28 - - - - 
Poland - - 19 - - - - 
Portugal1 - - 25 - - - - 
Romania - - 16 - - - - 
Slovakia - - 19 - - - - 
Slovenia - - 18 - - - - 
Spain 2008 11.2 30 N Y Net No recapture 
Sweden - - 26.3 - - - - 
Switzerland2 2011 8.8 18 Y Y Net No recapture 
UK1 - - 24 - - - - 
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Notes: 1Ireland has introduced an IP Box in 2016, Italy in 2015, Portugal in 2014, and the UK in 2013. 2Only 
in Nidwalden. 3In France and Luxembourg acquired IP is admitted to the IP Box only under certain 
circumstances. The statutory tax rates correspond to corporate income tax rates including any surcharges, local 
taxes, or other taxes. Abbreviations: Y: yes, N: no. 
As for the research expenses that occurred in the past, around half of the existing IP Boxes do 
not require a recapture of previous R&D expenses, as Table 6.2 shows. By contrast, in 
Liechtenstein and the Netherlands they have to be recaptured in accordance with the threshold 
approach and in Cyprus and Luxembourg they have to be reconsidered following the 
capitalization method. In Malta, R&D expenses are not allowed to be deducted if an IP Box 
regime applies. In this case, a company has to decide whether to deduct its R&D expenditure 
and benefit from the input-oriented R&D tax incentives or to apply for an IP Box and achieve 
a full tax exemption of profits generated by intangible assets. 
6.3  A Review of Empirical Literature on the Effectiveness of R&D Tax 
Incentives 
6.3.1    The Impact of Input-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
Numerous empirical papers have evaluated the effectiveness of input-oriented R&D tax 
incentives. Table 6.3 presents an overview of studies conducted in this field of research between 
2002 and 2016. These studies make use of different data samples and econometric techniques 
and nevertheless all of them identify a positive correlation between input-oriented R&D tax 
incentives and the private sector’s innovative activity. Panel A of Table 6.3 shows an overview 
of papers that evaluate an influence of the user costs of R&D or the B-Index on research and 
development, whereas Panel B focuses on literature that estimates the outcomes of reforms that 
have introduced input-oriented tax incentives.  
6.3.1.1    The Impact of User Costs and B-Index 
In studies shown in Panel A, the dependent variable – a private sector’s innovative activity – is 
often proxied by firms’ R&D expenditure or a number of new patent registrations. The main 
independent variable of interest in these papers is expressed either through the user costs of 
R&D or the B-Index. Jorgenson (1963) introduced the first of the two measures and Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967) further developed it. The user costs of R&D reflect the breakeven cost- 
benefit ratio of a marginal R&D investment after tax. Hence, this measure incorporates the 
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reduction in a firm’s corporate tax liability associated with each euro invested in R&D. Warda 
(2001) introduced the B-Index, which is an alternative measure of R&D costs. 
𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  =
1 −  (𝐴 𝜏)
(1 −  𝜏)
 (6.1) 
In equation 6.1, τ denotes statutory corporate income tax rate, whereas A represents a combined 
net present value of allowances and tax credits applied to R&D expenses. If an R&D investment 
is fully expensed in a fiscal year, both A and the 𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 are equal to one. Tax credits, tax 
deductions or any other kind of input-oriented tax incentives increase A, which results in the 
𝐵_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 being smaller than one. Consequently, the lower the B-Index, the more attractive the 
tax system is for R&D investment and vice versa.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 6.3, one of the first studies to estimate the effect of increasing 
user costs on innovation was Bloom et al. (2002). The authors use data from nine OECD 
countries over the years 1979-1997 and develop a measure for the user costs of R&D that 
contains depreciation allowances on R&D investments, net present value of R&D tax credits, 
and corporate income tax rates. In the empirical part of their analysis, Bloom et al. (2002) 
estimate a model in which the dependent variable equals the aggregate R&D expenses, while 
the independent variables include user costs of R&D, output, time- and country-specific fixed 
effects. In the baseline specification, the authors apply an instrumental variable approach and 
find a significant impact of fiscal incentives on R&D expenditure with a short-term elasticity 
of -0.1 and a long-term elasticity of -1.0. This implies that on average a 1% reduction in R&D 
user costs leads to a 0.1% increase in the R&D expenses in the short run and a 1% increase in 
the long run.  
A positive impact of decreasing user costs on R&D expenditure has been confirmed in 
numerous further studies using country- and firm-level data (see as examples: Baghana and 
Mohnen (2009), Wilson (2009), Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), Mulkay and Mairesse (2013), 
Thomson (2015)). Some authors have taken a step further by investigating the heterogeneity of 
this effect for different firm sizes and industry classes. For example, Baghana and Mohnen 
(2009) argue that the positive impact of decreasing R&D user costs on R&D spending is larger 
for small firms than for large companies.  
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Table 6.3 An Overview of Empirical Studies on the Effectiveness of Input-Oriented R&D Tax 
Incentives 
Panel A. The Impact of User Costs and B-Index 
Paper Sample 
Empirical 
Model Results 
Authors Year Countries Time Period 
Bloom et al.  2002 9 OECD 
countries 
1979-1977 OLS, IV A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on the level of R&D. 
The effect is larger in a long run 
than in a short run. 
Falk 2006 21 OECD 
countries 
1975-2002 GMM A positive effect of decreasing 
B-Index on business R&D 
spending. 
Baghana and 
Mohnen 
2009 Canada, Quebec 
Manufacturing 
Firms 
1997-2003 OLS, GMM A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on the level of R&D. 
The effect is larger in a long run 
than in a short run. In addition, 
the effect is larger for small 
firms than large companies. 
Wilson 2009 the United 
States 
1981-2004 OLS A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on the level of a 
state’s R&D. 
Corchuelo and 
Martínez-Ros 
2010 Spain 2002 PSM, IV A positive effect of decreasing 
B-Index on the level of R&D. 
Large firms in tech sectors 
benefit most from tax incentives 
for innovation. 
Ernst and 
Spengel 
2011 20 EU countries 1998-2007 OLS, Logit, 
Negative 
Binominal 
A positive effect of decreasing 
B-Index on the probability to 
invest in R&D. 
Lokshin and 
Mohnen 
2012 Netherlands 1996-2004 IV A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on a firm’s 
investment in R&D. 
Mulkay and 
Mairesse 
2013 France 2000-2007 GMM A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on a firm’s 
investment in R&D. 
Westmore 2013 19 OECD 
countries 
1983-2008 mean-group 
estimator 
A positive effect of decreasing 
B-Index on R&D expenditure 
and the number of new patent 
applications. 
Ernst et al. 2014 members of the 
EPO 
1995-2007 OLS, Diff-
in-Diff 
A positive effect of decreasing 
B-Index on the quality of 
patents. 
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Thomson 2015 26 OECD 
countries 
1987-2006 OLS A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on R&D financed by 
the business sector. 
 
A Meta-Study 
Gaillard-
Ladinska et al. 
2015 16 articles, 82 
effect estimates 
Studies 
published 
between 1990 
and 2014 
A meta-
regression 
analysis 
A positive effect of decreasing 
user costs on a firm’s stock of 
R&D capital and flow of R&D 
expenditure. 
Notes: OLS stands for ordinary least squares, IV stands for instrumental variable, GMM denotes generalized 
method of moments, PSM stands for propensity score matching, Diff-in-Diff denotes a difference-in-difference 
estimation, EPO stands for the European Patent Office. 
Panel B. Evaluation of a Treatment Effect 
Paper Sample 
Empirical 
Model Results Authors Year Countries Time Period 
Klassen et al. 2004 Canada, the 
United States 
1991-1997 OLS A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on R&D spending. The 
impact is stronger in the US than 
in Canada. 
Haegeland and 
Moen 
2007 Norway 1993-2005 GLS, Diff-
in-Diff 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D investment. 
Lee 2011 Canada, 
Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, 
China, India 
1997 GMM, IV A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D investment. 
The effect varies across firms, 
industries, and country 
characteristics. 
Yang et al. 2012 Taiwan 2001-2005 OLS, Logit, 
IV, GMM 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on a firm’s R&D 
spending. 
Bozio et al. 2014 France 2004-2010 Logit, Diff-
in-Diff, 
PSM 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D investment 
but a possible lower impact on 
its innovation than could have 
been expected. 
Kasahara et al. 2014 Japan 2000-2003 GMM A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the level of R&D. 
Kobayashi 2014 Japan 2009 Probit, 
PSM 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D spending of 
SMEs. 
Guceri 2017 UK 2003-2012 Logit, Diff-
in-Diff, 
PSM 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D spending. 
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A Meta-Study 
Castellacci and 
Lie 
2015 34 articles, 
404 effect 
estimates 
Studies 
published 
between 1991 
and 2013 
A meta-
regression 
analysis 
 
 
A positive effect of a tax credit 
reform on the R&D investment. 
The effect is stronger for SMEs, 
firms in service sectors, and 
firms in low-tech sectors in 
countries with an incremental 
scheme. 
Notes: OLS stands for ordinary least squares, GLS stands for generalized least squares, IV denotes instrumental 
variable, GMM means generalized method of moments, PSM stands for propensity score matching, Diff-in-Diff 
denotes a difference-in-difference estimation, SME stands for a small or medium enterprise. 
Falk (2006), Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2010), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Westmore (2013), 
Ernst et al. (2014) find a positive impact of decreasing B-Index on a firm’s R&D expenses and 
its probability to invest in research and development. Westmore (2013) argues that the declining 
B-Index has a positive effect not only on R&D expenditure but also on its innovation, measured 
as a number of new patent applications. Ernst et al. (2014) develop this idea further and state 
that the B-Index is negatively correlated with both the number of patent applications and also 
their quality. Finally, Gaillard-Ladinska et al. (2015) conduct a meta-study that analyzes 82 
estimates from 16 empirical studies within this field of literature. The authors argue in favor of 
a positive effect of decreasing user costs on a firm’s stock of R&D capital and its R&D 
expenditure. In addition, the effects found in the earlier and more recent studies are of 
approximately the same magnitude. 
6.3.1.2    Evaluation of a Treatment Effect 
Panel B of Table 6.3 presents an overview of empirical studies that evaluate effects of the 
reforms that have introduced input-oriented R&D tax incentives. These papers differ from those 
described in the previous section mainly through their identification strategy. Namely, they 
focus on a particular reform that changed (or introduced) fiscal incentives and compare the 
outcomes for treated and non-treated firms. However, many of the earlier studies in this area 
disregard the problem of a selection bias, according to which the recipients of R&D tax credits 
or super-deductions might systematically differ from the non-recipients. For this reason, recent 
studies such as Yang et al. (2012), Bozio et al. (2014), Kobayashi (2014), Guceri (2017) have 
estimated the effect of R&D tax incentives after meticulously correcting a possible selection 
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bias using the propensity score matching (PSM) technique. This strategy helps to identify 
comparable companies and to classify and divide them into treatment and control groups. 
A recent study by Guceri (2017) estimates the effect of R&D tax incentives in a quasi-
experimental setting. The author exploits a recent reform in the UK, which increased a threshold 
for small or medium enterprises (SMEs) from 250 to 500 employees. This reform changed the 
composition of companies that were eligible for an R&D tax credit and therefore created a 
suitable design for an empirical investigation of the treatment effect. Using firm-level data from 
the UK over the period between 2003 and 2012, Guceri (2017) argues that tax incentives help 
to increase R&D spending at a company level. The author finds a user costs elasticity of -1.2, 
which implies that an introduction of an R&D tax incentive that decreases user costs by 1% 
leads to a 1.2% increase in R&D spending. Comparable results were found by other authors 
who conducted similar empirical analyses employing data on different countries and years of 
observation, such as Klassen et al. (2004), Haegeland and Moen (2007), Lee (2011), Yang et 
al. (2012), Kasahara et al. (2014), Bozio et al. (2014), and Kobayashi (2014). In addition, the 
effects found in the earlier and more recent studies are of around the same magnitude. 
Castellacci and Lie (2015) conduct a meta-study using 404 effect estimates from 34 empirical 
papers in this field of research. The authors are able to identify a positive effect of tax credit 
reforms on R&D investment. In addition, they argue that on average R&D tax credits have a 
stronger impact on SMEs, firms in service sectors, and firms in low-tech industries in countries 
with an incremental credit scheme. 
6.3.2    The Impact of Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
As discussed in section 6.2.3.2, several European countries have introduced IP Boxes to 
encourage innovation. An IP Box significantly reduces the taxation of income generated by 
qualifying intellectual property and in some cases it offers a beneficial treatment of R&D 
expenditure. Evers et al. (2015a) give a detailed overview of the current IP Boxes in Europe 
and show the tax reductions they cause. Since in most cases IP Boxes are fairly new regulations, 
the empirical research on their effectiveness or outcomes is rather scarce. A few papers that 
attempt to evaluate the influence of IP Boxes on a firm’s innovative activity are presented in 
Table 6.4. 
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Ernst et al. (2014) incorporate IP Boxes into their measurement of the taxation of royalty 
payments and argue that they contribute towards attracting patent ownership. Similar results 
are found by Griffith et al. (2014) who ex-ante estimate the impact of IP Boxes with data 
running until 2005 (most current IP Boxes have been introduced afterwards). The authors 
conclude that even though a greater number of patent applications are to be expected in 
countries with IP Boxes, these regimes likely lead to substantial revenue losses not only in 
countries where they have been introduced but also in the neighboring jurisdictions. 
Bradley et al. (2015) employ country-level data on patent applications filed at all major 
international patent offices and investigate the impact of an IP Box implementation on a 
country’s innovation. The authors find that on average a one percentage point decrease in the 
tax rate on patent income leads to a 3% increase in the new patent applications. However, 
Bradley et al. (2015) note that an increase in patent applications following an implementation 
of an IP Box does not necessarily imply an increase in innovation. They argue that an IP Box 
may encourage the patenting of pre-existing unpatented intangibles in addition to incentivizing 
new research activity.  
Alstadsæter et al. (2015) and Dudar et al. (2015) segregate various attributes of IP Boxes and 
investigate their potential effects. Dudar et al. (2015) conclude that IP Boxes that recognize 
acquired intellectual property are indeed likely to attract royalty inflows into the countries of 
their implementation. However, the authors do not find a similar result for the IP Boxes 
applicable exclusively to self-developed intangibles and therefore they argue that 
multinationals might use certain types of IP Boxes as a means of profit shifting rather than a 
tool for boosting their innovation. Alstadsæter et al. (2015) conduct a detailed empirical 
investigation of the effects that IP Boxes have on a firm’s patenting and its actual R&D activity. 
In line with previous studies, they find that IP Boxes have a strong effect on attracting patents, 
especially those of high quality. Consistent with Dudar et al. (2015), the authors find that the 
effect is stronger for IP Boxes that are applicable to acquired intangible assets. Furthermore, 
Alstadsæter et al. (2015) find that the existence of an IP Box encourages multinationals to 
relocate their patents without a corresponding increase in the number of inventors or a shift in 
research activities. Once again, this implies that IP Boxes do not provide enough incentives for 
companies to conduct local research and multinationals might view them as a means of profit 
shifting instead. 
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Table 6.4 An Overview of Empirical Studies on the Effectiveness of Output-Oriented R&D 
Tax Incentives 
Paper Sample 
Empirical 
Model Results 
Authors Year Countries 
Time 
Period 
Ernst et al. 2014 members of 
the EPO 
1995-2007 OLS, Diff-
in-Diff 
IP Boxes contribute to 
attracting patent ownership. 
Griffith et al. 2014 14 EU 
countries 
and the 
United 
States 
1985–2005 Ex-ante 
analysis, 
Mixed 
Logit 
IP Boxes are likely to have a 
positive effect on the number 
of patent registrations. They 
could also lead to a substantial 
reduction in tax revenues. 
Alstadsæter et 
al. 
2015 33 
countries 
worldwide 
2000-2011 Negative 
Binomial 
Logit 
IP Boxes attract intangibles, 
especially high-quality patents. 
The effect is stronger for IP 
Boxes that are applicable to 
acquired IP. However, the 
existence of an IP Box 
incentivizes multinationals to 
shift the location of their 
patents without a 
corresponding increase in the 
number of inventors or a shift 
of research activities. 
Dudar et al. 2015 61 
countries 
worldwide 
1990-2012 Poisson IP Boxes that are applicable to 
acquired IP seem to attract 
royalty inflows. However, IP 
Boxes that are applicable only 
to self-developed IP do not 
appear to affect international 
royalty flows. 
Bradley et al.  2015 71 
countries 
worldwide 
1990-2012 OLS IP Boxes lead to an increased 
patenting activity in a country 
of their implementation. 
Notes: OLS stands for ordinary least squares, Diff-in-Diff denotes a difference-in-difference estimation, and 
EPO stands for the European Patent Office. 
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of IP Boxes shows that this type of R&D tax 
incentives is likely to be used for profit shifting rather than to increase real R&D activity. 
However, it is worth noting that one of the largest loopholes in the construction of IP Boxes is 
about to change. This is because the misuse of IP Boxes for profit shifting is possible primarily 
in the cases where not only self-developed but also acquired intangibles are eligible for a 
preferential tax treatment. Hence, companies may develop an intangible in a high-tax country 
and then register it in a country with an IP Box just to take advantage of the reduced taxation 
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of income generated by this asset. However, as mentioned in section 6.2.2.2, the OECD now 
requires all existing and planned IP Boxes to follow the Nexus Approach, according to which 
IP Boxes should favor only intangible assets that were locally developed.235 
In summary, the empirical evidence on input-oriented R&D tax incentives, such as tax credits 
or tax super-deductions, is extensive and has a long history. The authors in this field of research 
find a strong positive effect of introducing or changing input-oriented fiscal incentives on the 
innovative activity of companies and this effect is of around the same magnitude in the earlier 
and more recent studies. In contrast, the literature on output-oriented R&D tax incentives is 
rather limited, because IP Boxes are fairly new regulations. Here, the authors usually find a 
positive effect of IP Boxes on a number of patents held in a country. However, as yet there is 
no robust evidence to show that an increase in the real R&D activity is caused by the 
introduction of an IP Box. Therefore, multinationals might view output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives not only as a way of fostering research and development but also as a means of tax 
planning. 
6.4 The Use of R&D Tax Incentives in Tax Planning: A Theoretical Analysis 
The previous two sections have introduced the main types of R&D tax incentives and discussed 
the outcomes of their implementation. The primary aim of this part of the paper is to analyze a 
less researched aspect of R&D tax support; namely, its potential use by multinational 
enterprises for tax planning. Thus, this section initially explains a standard set-up of the 
Devereux and Griffith model236 and goes on to incorporate input- and output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives into the model, following the framework developed by Spengel and Elschner (2010) 
and Evers et al. (2015a). Furthermore, two main settings are identified in our theoretical 
analysis: to begin with, a domestic investment case is presented, in which an intangible asset is 
developed and afterwards kept in the same country. Following on from this, a cross-border 
investment scenario is introduced, where an intangible asset is developed in one country and 
then sold to another one. The scope of our analysis covers the EU and EFTA member states in 
2012. 
                                                          
235 See OECD (2015a). 
236 See Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003). 
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6.4.1    Domestic Investment 
6.4.1.1    Devereux and Griffith Model for Calculating Effective Tax Burden 
Statutory corporate income tax rates are usually inadequate in capturing the true tax burden that 
an investing company faces. Therefore, there are several theoretical approaches to measure 
effective tax rates. For example, Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) expand on the earlier work 
by Jorgensen (1963), Hall and Jorgensen (1967), as well as King and Fullerton (1984) and 
formulate a model that incorporates various aspects of a tax system and therefore reflects a 
country’s effective corporate tax burden. 
The key assumptions of the Devereux and Griffith model comprise perfect capital mobility 
under certainty and a successful outcome of real investment. Furthermore, the Devereux and 
Griffith approach is based on the assumption of a hypothetical investment that takes place in 
one period and generates returns in the next period. In a standard setting of the model, it is 
assumed that the investment flows into five different assets such as machinery, industrial 
buildings, financial assets, inventory, and intangible assets. However, in line with Evers and 
Spengel (2014) this study focuses only on the investment in an intangible asset, namely a self-
developed patent. 
Furthermore, a standard case of the Devereux and Griffith approach incorporates three different 
sources of investment financing such as retained earnings, borrowed capital, and new equity. 
Referring to Evers and Spengel (2014) and for reasons of simplification, this study assumes 
that a patent is financed only by the means of equity. Moreover, it is assumed that R&D 
expenditure only consists of current R&D expenses, such as costs of R&D personnel. This 
assumption is plausible, since according to the OECD data on R&D spending, during the last 
few years current expenses constituted the majority of the total expenditure on research and 
development in most OECD countries.237 Table 6.5 summarizes the most important 
assumptions of the Devereux and Griffith model and gives an overview of economic parameters 
applied in our study.238 
 
                                                          
237 See OECD (2016c). 
238.The robustness of the economic parameters in the Devereux and Griffith model has been tested in several 
studies (see European Commission/ZEW (2016)). 
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Table 6.5 Summary of the Assumptions 
Assumption on  Value 
Legal form 
 
 Corporation 
Industry  Manufacturing industry 
Economic good  A self-developed patent  
Source of financing  Equity  
Economic depreciation  𝛿 Declining 15.35% 
Real market interest rate r 5%  
Inflation rate 𝜋 2%  
Nominal interest rate 𝑖 7.1%1  
Real pre-tax return 𝑝 20% 
Useful life of an asset 𝑢𝑙 10 years 
Notes: 1i  (1  r) (1  )  1. The assumptions about economic parameters and depreciation rules are based on 
the ZEW work on effective tax rates.239 
The Devereux and Griffith approach allows us to calculate several measures of the effective tax 
burden. For instance, the cost of capital and the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) show an 
effective taxation of a marginal investment. The net present value (NPV) of a marginal 
investment is equal to zero, which implies that the returns from this investment are just 
sufficient but do not exceed the returns of an alternative capital-market investment.240 However, 
since this study concentrates on modelling tax planning opportunities of profitable 
multinational firms, we assume that a company’s investment is lucrative. Therefore, we rely on 
calculating and comparing the effective average tax rates (EATRs), which show an effective 
tax burden on profitable investments and are relevant for a firm’s investment location decisions. 
As shown in equation 6.2, EATR is calculated as a percentage difference between the net 
present value of an investment in the absence and in the presence of taxation.  
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =  (𝑅∗ − 𝑅)/ (
𝑝
(1 + 𝑟)
) (6.2) 
In equation 6.2, 𝑅∗ represents the net present value of an investment in the absence of taxes and 
𝑅 shows its NPV in the presence of taxation. The denominator represents the NPV of a total 
pre-tax income stream net of the rate of return. The net present value in the presence of taxation 
𝑅  is in turn calculated as follows:241 
                                                          
239 See ZEW (2016). 
240 In this study, an alternative capital-market investment is a financial asset that yields a real market interest rate 
(which is equal to 5%, as shown in Table 6.5). 
241 For more details regarding the model, see Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), Spengel and Lammersen (2001), 
Schreiber et al. (2002), and Evers et al. (2015a). 
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R =  −( 1 − A) +  
(𝑝 +  𝛿)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝑖)
 (1 − 𝜏) +
(1 −  𝛿)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝑖)
 (1 − 𝐴) 
 
 
(6.3) 
As noted above, the Devereux and Griffith model is based on the assumption of a hypothetical 
investment that lasts two periods. The first term of equation 6.3 reflects the investment 
implemented in the first period, with A denoting the tax allowances. The next two terms 
represent the changes in the second period of a hypothetical investment. Hence, the second term 
shows the returns from the investment, whereby 𝑝 represents a real return on investment, 𝛿  
stands for the cost of depreciation, 𝜋  denotes the rate of inflation, 𝑖 denotes the interest rate, 
and 𝜏 represents the tax rate. Finally, the third term shows a reduction in the capital stock to its 
initial level, so that the stock of capital remains unchanged between the two periods. After the 
calculation of the after-tax net present value of an investment, we compute the effective average 
tax rate using equation 6.2. 
Furthermore, in Belgium and Liechtenstein a notional interest deduction (NID) for equity 
capital is available. This tax instrument allows companies to deduct a certain percentage of the 
qualifying equity capital from their taxable profits. The objective of NID is to even out the tax 
treatment of two major sources of investment financing – equity and debt. From a tax point of 
view, debt might be seen as a preferable financing way compared to equity, because interest 
payments are tax deductible in most countries and therefore minimize a company’s overall tax 
liability. NID gives a similar kind of advantage to equity financing. This tax measure is 
incorporated into the Devereux and Griffith model by adding 𝑁𝐼𝐷 expressed in equation 6.4 to 
equation 6.3. In equation 6.4, 𝑖𝑁𝐼𝐷represents the notional interest rate, with other terms 
corresponding to the ones in equation 6.3. 
𝑁𝐼𝐷 =
(1 − 𝐴)(𝑖𝑁𝐼𝐷𝜏)
1 + 𝑖
 (6.4) 
Figure 6.2 summarizes effective average tax rates in Europe in 2012, which we have calculated 
using the Devereux and Griffith model. These tax rates represent the effective tax burden that 
a large company faces when developing and subsequently holding a patent. The results 
presented in Figure 6.2 were calculated without the consideration of any available R&D tax 
R&D expenses, tax 
depreciation 
Returns generated 
by a patent 
Reduction in capital stock 
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incentives. According to Figure 6.2, the EATRs of the EU and EFTA member states range from 
7.2% in Liechtenstein to 25.8% in France and 26.3% in Malta. The Eastern European countries 
along with Liechtenstein, Ireland, and Switzerland (Kanton Nidwalden) offer the lowest tax 
burden for companies developing a patent in Europe. By contrast, the western and northern 
European countries along with Malta appear to have comparatively high effective tax rates. 
Figure 6.2 Effective Average Tax Rates in Europe, Domestic Investment, 2012, % 
Notes: The rates represent an effective tax burden of developing and holding only one asset – a patent. A regular 
tax system, no R&D tax incentives are considered here. Country codes and the corresponding country names are 
in the list of country abbreviations. 
6.4.1.2    Incorporating R&D Tax Incentives into the Devereux and Griffith Model 
This section covers the conceptual framework developed by Spengel and Elschner (2010) and 
Evers et al. (2015a) to incorporate input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives from Tables 
6.1 and 6.2 into the Devereux and Griffith model. It is assumed in the model that a large 
multinational corporation carries out a hypothetical investment and for this reason only R&D 
tax incentives for large firms are considered here. In addition, we assume that a hypothetical 
investment is profitable and thus the R&D tax incentives in the case of losses are not taken into 
account. Furthermore, it is assumed that the investment only consists of current and not capital 
expenditure and therefore only the incentives that apply to current expenses on research and 
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development are taken into consideration. As discussed in section 6.4.1.1, this type of expenses 
constitutes the majority of R&D spending in the OECD countries.242 
We incorporate the input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives into the Devereux and 
Griffith methodology through the alterations of factor  A, which represents tax allowances on 
an asset. As mentioned in section 6.2.3.1, most countries do not require a mandatory 
capitalization of self-created intangible assets for tax purposes and allow an immediate 
deduction of R&D expenditure at the regular corporate income tax rate. For simplification 
reasons, we assume that this rule applies to all countries under consideration243 and on this basis 
factor A is defined in the absence of R&D tax incentives as follows: 
𝐴 =  𝜑0 𝜏 (6.5) 
In equation 6.5, 𝜑0 represents a share of R&D expenses that are immediately deductible. In all 
countries analyzed in our study, it is equal to 100%. 𝜏 denotes statutory tax rate on corporate 
income. 
6.4.1.2.1    Input-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
As previously mentioned, this study is based on the assumption that R&D expenses of a model 
company consist of current and not capital expenditure. Therefore, this section focuses on using 
the framework developed by Spengel and Elschner (2010) to include input-oriented R&D tax 
incentives that apply to current expenses such as tax credits and tax super-deductions in the 
Devereux and Griffith model. For example, if a tax credit applies, A in equation 6.3 is defined 
as follows: 
𝐴 =  𝜑0 𝜏 +  𝜙 (6.6) 
Equation 6.6 is similar to equation 6.5, except it includes factor  𝜙, which represents the amount 
of a tax credit. As a result, a tax credit is subtracted from the company’s tax liability. In the case 
of a tax deduction that exceeds the usual 100% (also known as a super-deduction), tax 
allowance A can be expressed this way in equation 6.3: 
                                                          
242 In addition, we do not consider incentives that have incremental character. 
243 This assumption has also been made by Evers and Spengel (2014). 
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𝐴 =  𝜑0 𝜏 (1 +  𝛾) (6.7) 
where γ represents a factor of super-deduction. In contrast to a tax credit, a tax super-deduction 
reduced not the company’s tax liability but rather its taxable income. If a country offers both 
types of input-oriented tax incentives, namely a tax credit and a tax super-deduction, they are 
combined as follows:244 
𝐴 =  𝜑0 𝜏 (1 +  𝛾)  +  𝜙 (6.8) 
6.4.1.2.2    Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
This part of the analysis incorporates IP Box regimes into the Devereux and Griffith model 
following the approach suggested by Evers et al. (2015a). The presence of an IP Box in a 
country alters equation 6.3 in two ways. First, the reduced IP Box tax rate 𝜏𝐼𝑃 applies to the 
profits generated by an intangible asset instead of the statutory CIT rate 𝜏. Secondly, it changes 
tax allowance A in a similar way as the input-oriented R&D incentives. Factor A in equation 
6.3 depends on how the R&D expenditure is treated within an IP Box. According to Table 6.2, 
some countries require a recapture of the R&D expenses which occurred in the past, whereas 
other countries do not. If no recapture is enforced, factor A is defined through equation 6.5. By 
contrast, if a recapture mechanism is present, the past R&D expenses cannot be deducted at the 
standard CIT rate and have to be either capitalized or deducted in accordance with the threshold 
approach. If R&D spending is recaptured according to a threshold approach, then factor A is 
defined through equation 6.5; however, instead of the standard CIT rate 𝜏, a reduced IP Box tax 
rate 𝜏𝐼𝑃 enters the formula. In some countries, previous R&D expenses have to be capitalized 
and amortized over the useful life of an intangible, in which case A is defined as follows: 
A = φ0 𝜏 − φ0 𝜏 + τ
IPφ ∑ (
1
1 + i
)
tul
t=1
 (6.9) 
In equation 6.9, R&D expenses are capitalized at the IP Box tax rate 𝜏𝐼𝑃 in accordance with 
factor 𝜑, which represents the percentagewise amortization rate in period t. As shown in Table 
                                                          
244 See Spengel and Elschner (2010) for further details on modelling input-oriented R&D tax incentives in the 
Devereux and Griffith model. 
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6.5, we assume that the useful life of a patent 𝑢𝑙 equals 10 years. Since 𝜑 is defined as 1/ 𝑢𝑙, 
this parameter amounts to 10% in our analysis. 
6.4.1.2.3    A Combination of Input- and Output-Oriented R&D Tax Incentives 
According to Evers et al. (2015a), all countries except Malta allow the application of both input- 
and output-oriented R&D tax incentives.245 If this is the case, factor A in equation 6.3 depends 
simultaneously on a country’s tax credit, super-deduction, as well as on its IP Box. For example, 
if an IP Box does not require a recapture of the past R&D expenses, parameter A is equal to the 
one defined in equation 6.8. If the recapture is implemented in line with a threshold approach, 
it is also calculated as the one defined in equation 6.8 with the statutory CIT rate 𝜏 being 
replaced by a reduced IP Box tax rate 𝜏𝐼𝑃. If a recapture of the previous R&D expenditure 
occurs through their capitalization, equations 6.8 and 6.9 are combined as shown in equation 
6.10. 
A = φ0 𝜏 − φ0 𝜏 + (τ
IP (1 + 𝛾)  +  𝜙) φ ∑ (
1
1 + i
)
tul
t=1
 (6.10) 
Figure 6.3 presents the results of using the Devereux and Griffith model to calculate the 
effective average tax rates in the EU and EFTA member states in 2012. In contrast to Figure 
6.2, Figure 6.3 illustrates not just a tax burden under the regular tax system but rather an 
effective taxation after incorporating all existing input- and output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives. If a country offers both input- and output-oriented incentives, they are combined as 
described above.246 Figure 6.3 shows substantially lower effective average tax rates than Figure 
6.2 in all countries with R&D tax incentives. There are exceptions to this, whereby the effective 
tax burden remains the same in Germany and Estonia, where no fiscal incentives are in place. 
Hence, Italy and Germany become countries with the highest effective tax rates once R&D 
incentives are considered.247 Moreover, it is worth noting that some countries acquire a negative 
EATR when tax incentives are incorporated into the model. The negative values of the effective 
                                                          
245 See Evers et al. (2015a), p. 512. 
246 Since Malta is the only country that does not allow a combination of input- and output-oriented incentives, we 
assume that a hypothetical firm opts for an IP Box in this country. This is because an IP Box leads to a lower 
effective tax burden than the Maltese input-oriented tax incentives. 
247 Italy has introduced an IP Box in 2015, which implies that Germany currently has the highest effective taxation 
of R&D once fiscal incentives for research and development are considered in the Devereux and Griffith model. 
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average tax burden imply that the tax treatment provides a subsidy for developing and holding 
a patent. 
Figure 6.3 Effective Average Tax Rates in Europe (with R&D Tax Incentives), Domestic 
Investment, 2012, % 
 
Notes: The rates represent an effective tax burden of developing and holding only one asset – a patent. Input- and 
output-oriented R&D tax incentives are included. Country codes and the corresponding country names are in the 
list of country abbreviations. 
Our measure of the effective tax burden after the consideration of R&D tax incentives is 
comparable to the B-Index discussed in section 6.3.1.1. Warda (2001) has developed this 
measure and multiple research papers have calculated it for various countries, industries, firm 
sizes, and time periods (see as examples: Ernst and Spengel (2011), Thomson (2013), and Chen 
and Dauchy (2015)). As Spengel and Elschner (2010) note, the OECD also uses the B-Index in 
order to compare the attractiveness of OECD countries for R&D investment. The B-Index is 
calculated using the formula presented in equation 6.1. As explained in section 6.3.1.1, if an 
R&D investment is fully expensed in a given fiscal year, then the B-Index is equal to one. 
However, if a country offers a super-deduction which allows a double deduction of the actual 
R&D expenditure, the B-Index will be smaller than one. Therefore, the B-Index reflects the 
costs of research and development and its lower values correspond to a more attractive tax 
system for R&D investment. The main difference between the B-Index and our measure of an 
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effective tax burden after the consideration of R&D tax incentives is the coverage of R&D tax 
incentives. The B-Index concentrates on input-oriented R&D tax incentives, whereas the 
approach used in this study also incorporates output-oriented incentives and additionally allows 
for a combination of the two. Furthermore, we rely on the theoretical framework of Devereux 
and Griffith (1999, 2003), in which a transaction of a patent from one firm to another can be 
modelled in a cross-border investment case in addition to the domestic investment scenario 
reflected in the B-Index.  
6.4.1.3    The Impact of R&D Tax Incentives on Effective Tax Burdens 
Figure 6.4 shows how much the effective average tax rates are reduced by once input- and 
output-oriented R&D tax incentives are introduced in the Devereux and Griffith Model. 
According to Figure 6.4, R&D tax incentives lead to the largest decrease (in absolute terms) in 
effective tax rates in Lithuania, France, Slovenia, and Spain. It should be pointed out that France 
and Spain offer generous R&D tax credits as well as IP Boxes. The combination of these input- 
and output-oriented R&D incentives results in a large tax shield for companies and leads to 
EATRs acquiring negative values. Lithuania and Slovenia have relatively low EATRs under 
their regular tax systems, as Figure 6.2 shows. However, taking into account the R&D super-
deductions of 300% in Lithuania and 140% in Slovenia leads to an even further decrease of the 
effective tax rates in these countries. The EATR reduction in Malta is solely due to an IP Box 
regime, since the input-oriented incentives are not taken into consideration in this country, as 
discussed in the previous section. In summary, Figure 6.4 demonstrates that a significant 
reduction in the effective tax rate can result from either input- or output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives as well as from their combination. 
Some countries do not show any decrease in the effective average tax rates after the R&D tax 
incentives are considered. Germany, Greece, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Sweden did not 
offer any fiscal incentives in 2012, which means that their EATRs under a regular tax system 
are equal to the EATRs that are calculated after taking R&D tax incentives into consideration. 
In addition, Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Finland, and Poland offer input-oriented R&D tax 
incentives, which are not taken into account by the model presented in this study because these 
incentives either apply to capital expenses (Bulgaria and Finland), have a purely incremental 
character (Italy), or are not available for all firms (Denmark and Poland).  
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Figure 6.4 Reductions in EATRs after Including R&D Tax Incentives into the Devereux and 
Griffith Model, Domestic Investment, Percentage Points 
 
Notes: The figure shows the differences between EATRs in Figure 6.2 and EATRs in Figure 6.3. It illustrates how 
much the effective tax rates are reduced by when R&D tax incentives are introduced in the Devereux and Griffith 
model. Country codes and the corresponding country names are in the list of country abbreviations. 
6.4.2    Cross-Border Investment 
6.4.2.1    Devereux and Griffith Model for Calculating Effective Tax Burden 
The calculation of effective average tax rates across the EU and EFTA member states in the 
case of a domestic investment has been discussed in the previous section. It was assumed that 
the input and output phases of an R&D process occur in the same country. However, the main 
aim of this study is to investigate whether R&D tax incentives can be used as a means of tax 
planning. According to Arginelli (2015), input-oriented R&D tax incentives do not always lead 
to an increase in a company’s taxable income, productivity, or its employment. The author 
argues that this is because intangibles created in a country that provides generous input-oriented 
tax incentives might be transferred abroad or be used in the production process in other 
countries. Fuest et al. (2013) give an overview of profit shifting and its main financial and non-
financial channels. The authors argue that a strategic location or relocation of intangible assets 
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plays an important role in tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning248 of multinational firms. 
For this reason, this section focuses on calculating the effective tax burden in the case of a 
cross-border sale of an intangible asset. The sale of a patent implies a transfer of its economic 
and legal ownership from one company to another.249 If the effective tax burden of a 
multinational firm decreases after it sets apart the location where the patent was created from 
the location where its profits are generated, an MNE might use various input- and output-
oriented R&D tax incentives for tax planning. 
Figure 6.5 demonstrates the structure of a model company, whose effective cross-border tax 
burden is calculated using the extended Devereux and Griffith approach. The assumption is that 
the parent company and its subsidiary are located in two different countries (A and B). The 
input phase of an R&D process occurs at the parent firm in country A, which develops a patent 
and therefore bears the associated R&D expenditure and financial risks. Once the patent has 
been created, it is registered and sold to a subsidiary in country B. In most countries, it is a 
general requirement that a capital gains tax is paid on the transfer price that the parent firm 
receives. This tax rate usually equals a country’s statutory corporate income tax rate. 
Figure 6.5 Structure of a Model Multinational Company  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of the transaction shown in Figure 6.5, the output phase of an R&D process takes 
place at the subsidiary in country B. Hence, if a patent generates royalties or license fees, the 
                                                          
248 See Piantavigna (2017) for the definition and discussion of these terms. 
249.It is assumed that dividends are exempt from withholding and corporate income taxes. This assumption is made 
towards countries in the EU and EFTA due to the EU Parent and Subsidiary Directive (see European Commission 
(2003a)). 
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subsidiary receives these payments and includes them into its tax base. From a tax perspective, 
this procedure gives the multinational an incentive to develop a patent in a high-tax country, 
where it can reduce its tax liability by deducting the R&D expenditure. The patent can then be 
transferred to the subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, which would profit from a beneficial 
taxation of the profits generated by the intangible. Such a separation of the places where a patent 
is developed and held could lead to a significant reduction in the MNE’s overall tax liability. 
In order to calculate an effective tax burden of the multinational company presented in Figure 
6.5 by using the Devereux and Griffith model, we have to adjust equation 6.2. The adjustment 
should reflect the deduction of R&D expenses by the parent, the taxation of profits generated 
by an asset at the subsidiary, as well as the taxation of a transactional sale. This is done in 
equation 6.11. 
                 R =  − ( 1 − AP − AS 
TP)  +  
(p+δ) (1+π)
(1+i)
 (1 − τs)  −  τp TP + 
+ 
(1−δ) (1+π)
(1+i)
(1 − AP − AS
TP +  τpTP) 
(6.11) 
 
Equation 6.11 mirrors equation 6.2 and includes a few new components at the same time. For 
instance, the first term of the equation reflects not only the treatment of R&D expenses at the 
parent’s level AP but also the tax depreciation of the patent at the subsidiary AS 
TP, since acquired 
intangible assets have to be capitalized in countries under analysis. As shown in Figure 6.5, the 
parent sells the patent to the subsidiary after it has been developed. Therefore, the second term 
of equation 6.11 shows the treatment of the returns generated by a patent in the country of the 
subsidiary. For example, τs represents the income tax rate that applies in the subsidiary’s host 
country and corresponds to the ordinary CIT rate in most cases. However, if a subsidiary’s 
country offers an IP Box that is applicable to acquired intangibles, then a reduced tax rate 
applies to the income generated by the acquired patent.  
Furthermore, the sale of a patent triggers capital gains taxation, which is reflected in the third 
term of equation 6.11. Here,  τp  stands for the capital gains tax in the parent’s country and 𝑇𝑃 
represents the transfer price on this transaction. Table 6.6 summarizes the effective capital gains 
tax rates that apply in the countries under analysis. According to Table 6.6, the statutory 
corporate income tax rate is levied in most countries on the sale price of a patent. However, a 
R&D expenses, tax 
depreciation 
Capital gains 
taxation 
Returns generated 
by a patent 
Reduction in capital stock 
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reduced capital gains tax applies in some countries that offer an IP Box. As for the transfer 
price 𝑇𝑃, it is defined following Evers and Spengel (2014) as: 
𝑇𝑃 = 𝛼(𝑝 + 𝛿)
(1 + 𝜋)
(𝑖 + 𝛿 ∗ (1 + 𝜋) − 𝜋)
 (6.12) 
Equation 6.12 includes economic parameters of the Devereux and Griffith model shown in 
Table 6.5 and an additional parameter 𝛼, which stands for the share of fair value. If 𝛼 is larger 
or smaller than one, the transfer price 𝑇𝑃 is higher or lower than the fair price according to the 
arm’s length principle. In this study, it is assumed that 𝛼 is equal to one and so that the transfer 
price is fair.250 The last term of equation 6.11 represents a reduction in the stock of capital, 
which is similar to equation 6.2. All other parameters of equation 6.11 are the same as those 
described in the previous section. 
Table 6.6 An Overview of Capital Gains Tax Rates on Selling a Patent, 2012 
 Tax Rate, %  Tax Rate, % 
Austria 25 Latvia 15 
Belgium 33.9 Liechtenstein 2.5 
Bulgaria 10 Lithuania 15 
Croatia 20 Luxembourg 5.9 
Cyprus 2.5 Malta 35 
Czech Republic 19 Netherlands 5 
Denmark 25 Norway 28 
Estonia 21 Poland 19 
Finland 24.5 Portugal 25 
France 34.4 Romania 16 
Germany 29.81 Slovakia 19 
Greece 20 Slovenia 18 
Hungary 02 Spain 303 
Iceland 20 Sweden 26.3 
Ireland 12.5 Switzerland 8.84 
Italy 31.4 UK 10 
Notes: 1Includes 15% CIT, 14% trade tax rate, and 5.5% solidarity surcharge. 2Capital gains from intangible 
assets of Hungarian taxpayers are tax exempt if reported to tax authorities and after holding for a period of 1 
year (does not apply for repurchased intangibles that are already subject to an exemption). 3The reduced rate of 
11.2% applies if transfer is carried out between independent entities and if there are valid business reasons for 
the transaction. 4The rate refers to the canton of Nidwalden.  
The input-oriented R&D tax incentives are included in our model solely through factor  AP in 
equation 6.11. In contrast, output-oriented R&D incentives may enter equation 6.11 multiple 
                                                          
250 See Evers and Spengel (2014) for the discussion on variations in this assumption. 
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times. For example, an IP Box may affect AP if a parent firm is located in a country with an IP 
Box and is therefore able to benefit from a preferential tax treatment of its R&D expenditure. 
In addition, a reduced IP Box tax rate may enter the second term of equation 6.11 if an IP Box 
applicable to acquired intangibles exists in a country of the subsidiary. Lastly, if an IP Box 
offers beneficial capital gains taxation, a reduced tax rate will be used in the third term of 
equation 6.11. 
Notional interest deduction is incorporated by adding 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑆 to equation 6.11 if the parent 
company resides in Belgium or Lichtenstein. If the subsidiary is allowed to deduct notional 
interest, the calculation of 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑆 is based on a subsidiary’s expenses on the acquisition of a 
patent instead of the parent’s R&D expenditure. Hence, in line with equation 6.3, 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑆 is 
expressed as follows: 
𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑆 =
(1 − 𝐴𝑆
𝑇𝑃)(𝑖𝑁𝐼𝐷𝜏𝑆)
1 + 𝑖
 (6.13) 
Table 6.7 presents the effective tax rates that apply in the EU and EFTA member states in 2012 
in the case of a cross-border investment. Since R&D tax incentives are not considered here, the 
effective tax burden represents taxation under a regular tax system. The countries listed in the 
first column of Table 6.7 represent the location of a parent firm that conducts R&D, while 
countries in the top row show the location of a subsidiary that receives profits generated by an 
intangible. To give an example, the EATR of 34.2% between Austria and Belgium implies that 
a parent develops a patent in Austria and sells it to a subsidiary in Belgium. A capital gains tax 
on this transaction is then paid in Austria. The effective average tax rates which are indicated 
through the diagonal line highlighted in red in Table 6.7 show the effective taxation in the case 
when a parent firm keeps the patent. These values correspond to the domestic investment 
scenario shown in Figure 6.2. 
Table 6.7 shows the effective taxation under a regular tax system, which implies that no fiscal 
incentives are included in the calculation of these rates. For example, if an Austrian firm 
conducts R&D and keeps the asset afterwards, its effective tax rate amounts to 18.8%. If a 
cross-border scenario is considered, as shown in Figure 6.5, the countries where a patent is 
developed and where it is possessed will differ. For instance, if an Austrian parent develops an 
intangible and proceeds to sell it to the subsidiary in Belgium, the effective tax burden amounts 
to 34.2%. The sale of a patent to a subsidiary in Bulgaria will result in an EATR of 24.1% and  
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Table 6.7 Effective Average Tax Rates in Europe, Cross-Border Investment, 2012, % 
  AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK 
AT 18.8 34.2 24.1 28.3 24.1 28.9 34.6 32.0 29.9 34.7 31.8 37.0 31.5 29.4 29.4 28.9 25.4 29.4 35.4 23.3 26.7 34.1 26.7 37.4 32.0 33.6 28.9 32.0 27.3 32.7 28.3 28.9 
BE 35.7 22.5 27.8 32.0 27.8 32.6 38.3 35.7 33.6 38.4 35.5 40.7 35.2 33.1 33.1 32.6 29.1 33.1 39.2 27.0 30.4 37.8 30.4 41.1 35.7 37.3 32.6 35.7 31.0 36.4 32.0 32.6 
BG 20.8 23.0 7.5 17.1 12.8 17.6 23.4 20.8 18.7 23.5 20.5 25.8 20.3 18.1 18.1 17.6 14.1 18.1 24.2 12.1 15.5 22.8 15.5 26.1 20.8 22.4 17.6 20.8 16.0 21.5 17.1 17.6 
CH 26.8 29.0 18.8 13.5 18.8 23.6 29.4 26.8 24.7 29.5 26.5 31.8 26.3 24.1 24.1 23.6 20.1 24.1 30.2 18.1 21.5 28.8 21.5 32.1 26.8 28.4 23.6 26.8 22.0 27.5 23.1 23.6 
CY 15.8 18.0 7.9 12.1 7.5 12.7 18.4 15.8 13.7 18.5 15.6 20.8 15.3 13.2 13.2 12.7 9.2 13.2 19.2 7.1 10.5 17.9 10.5 21.2 15.8 17.4 12.7 15.8 11.1 16.5 12.1 12.7 
CZ 27.5 29.7 19.6 23.8 19.6 14.2 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 24.4 20.9 24.9 30.9 18.8 22.2 29.6 22.2 32.9 27.5 29.1 24.4 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 24.4 
DE 35.7 37.8 27.7 31.9 27.7 32.5 22.4 35.7 33.5 38.3 35.4 40.7 35.1 33.0 38.3 32.5 29.0 33.0 39.1 26.9 30.3 37.7 30.3 41.0 35.7 37.3 32.5 35.7 30.9 36.4 31.9 32.5 
DK 32.0 34.2 24.1 28.3 24.1 28.9 34.6 18.8 29.9 34.7 31.8 37.0 31.5 29.4 29.4 28.9 25.4 29.4 35.4 23.3 26.7 34.1 26.7 37.4 32.0 33.6 28.9 32.0 27.3 32.7 28.3 28.9 
EE 29.0 31.2 21.1 25.3 21.1 25.9 31.6 29.0 15.8 31.7 28.8 34.0 28.5 26.4 26.4 25.9 22.4 26.4 32.4 20.3 23.7 31.1 23.7 34.4 29.0 30.6 25.9 29.0 24.3 29.7 25.3 25.9 
ES 35.8 38.0 27.8 32.1 27.8 32.6 38.4 35.8 33.7 22.5 35.5 40.8 35.3 33.1 33.1 32.6 29.1 33.1 39.2 27.1 30.5 37.8 30.5 41.1 35.8 37.4 32.6 35.8 31.0 36.5 32.1 32.6 
FI 31.7 33.8 23.7 27.9 23.7 28.5 34.2 31.7 29.5 34.3 18.4 36.7 31.1 29.0 29.0 28.5 25.0 29.0 35.1 22.9 26.4 33.7 26.4 37.0 31.7 33.3 28.5 31.7 26.9 32.4 27.9 28.5 
FR 39.1 41.3 31.1 35.4 31.1 35.9 41.7 39.1 37.0 41.8 38.8 25.8 38.6 36.4 36.4 35.9 32.4 36.4 42.5 30.4 33.8 41.1 33.8 44.4 39.1 40.7 35.9 39.1 34.3 39.8 35.4 35.9 
GB 31.3 33.5 23.3 27.6 23.3 28.1 33.9 31.3 29.2 34.0 31.0 36.3 18.0 28.6 28.6 28.1 24.6 28.6 34.7 22.6 26.0 33.3 26.0 36.6 31.3 32.9 28.1 31.3 26.5 32.0 27.6 28.1 
GR 28.3 30.5 20.3 24.6 20.3 25.1 30.9 28.3 26.2 31.0 28.0 33.3 27.8 15.0 25.6 25.1 21.6 25.6 31.7 19.6 23.0 30.3 23.0 33.6 28.3 29.9 25.1 28.3 23.5 29.0 24.6 25.1 
HR 28.3 30.5 20.3 24.6 20.3 25.1 30.9 28.3 26.2 31.0 28.0 33.3 27.8 25.6 15.0 25.1 21.6 25.6 31.7 19.6 23.0 30.3 23.0 33.6 28.3 29.9 25.1 28.3 23.5 29.0 24.6 25.1 
HU 27.5 29.7 19.6 23.8 19.6 24.4 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 14.2 20.9 24.9 30.9 18.8 22.2 29.6 22.2 32.9 27.5 29.1 24.4 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 24.4 
IE 22.7 24.8 14.7 18.9 14.7 19.5 25.2 22.7 20.5 25.3 22.4 27.7 22.1 20.0 20.0 19.5 9.4 20.0 26.1 13.9 17.4 24.7 17.4 28.0 22.7 24.3 19.5 22.7 17.9 23.4 18.9 19.5 
IS 28.3 30.5 20.3 24.6 20.3 25.1 30.9 28.3 26.2 31.0 28.0 33.3 27.8 25.6 25.6 25.1 21.6 15.0 31.7 19.6 23.0 30.3 23.0 33.6 28.3 29.9 25.1 28.3 23.5 29.0 24.6 25.1 
IT 36.8 39.0 28.9 33.1 28.9 33.7 39.4 36.8 34.7 39.5 36.6 41.8 36.3 34.2 34.2 33.7 30.2 34.2 23.6 28.1 31.5 38.9 31.5 42.2 36.8 38.4 33.7 36.8 32.1 37.5 33.1 33.7 
LI 20.5 22.7 12.5 16.8 12.5 17.3 23.1 20.5 18.4 23.2 20.3 25.5 20.0 17.9 17.9 17.3 13.9 17.9 23.9 7.2 15.2 22.5 15.2 25.8 20.5 22.1 17.3 20.5 15.7 21.2 16.8 17.3 
LT 24.5 26.7 16.6 20.8 16.6 21.4 27.1 24.5 22.4 27.2 24.3 29.5 24.0 21.9 21.9 21.4 17.9 21.9 27.9 15.8 11.3 26.6 19.2 29.9 24.5 26.1 21.4 24.5 19.8 25.2 20.8 21.4 
LU 20.6 22.8 12.7 16.9 12.7 17.4 23.2 20.6 18.5 23.3 20.4 25.6 20.1 18.0 18.0 17.4 14.0 18.0 24.0 11.9 15.3 21.6 15.3 25.9 20.6 22.2 17.4 20.6 15.8 21.3 16.9 17.4 
LV 24.5 26.7 16.6 20.8 16.6 21.4 27.1 24.5 22.4 27.2 24.3 29.5 24.0 21.9 21.9 21.4 17.9 21.9 27.9 15.8 19.2 26.6 11.3 29.9 24.5 26.1 21.4 24.5 19.8 25.2 20.8 21.4 
MT 39.5 41.7 31.6 35.8 31.6 36.4 42.1 39.5 37.4 42.2 39.3 44.5 39.0 36.9 36.9 36.4 32.9 36.9 42.9 30.8 34.2 41.6 34.2 26.3 39.5 41.1 36.4 39.5 34.8 40.2 35.8 36.4 
NL 32.0 34.2 24.1 28.3 24.1 28.9 34.6 32.0 29.9 34.7 31.8 37.0 31.5 29.4 29.4 28.9 25.4 29.4 35.4 23.3 26.7 34.1 26.7 37.4 18.8 33.6 28.9 32.0 27.3 32.7 28.3 28.9 
NO 34.3 36.5 26.3 30.6 26.3 31.1 36.9 34.3 32.2 37.0 34.0 39.3 33.8 31.6 31.6 31.1 27.6 31.6 37.7 25.6 29.0 36.3 29.0 39.6 34.3 21.0 31.1 34.3 29.5 35.0 30.6 31.1 
PL 27.5 29.7 19.6 23.8 19.6 24.4 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 24.4 20.9 24.9 30.9 18.8 22.2 29.6 22.2 32.9 27.5 29.1 14.2 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 24.4 
PT 32.0 34.2 24.1 28.3 24.1 28.9 34.6 32.0 29.9 34.7 31.8 37.0 31.5 29.4 29.4 28.9 25.4 29.4 35.4 23.3 26.7 34.1 26.7 37.4 32.0 33.6 28.9 18.8 27.3 32.7 28.3 28.9 
RO 25.3 27.5 17.3 21.6 17.3 22.1 27.9 25.3 23.2 28.0 25.0 30.3 24.8 22.6 22.6 22.1 18.6 22.6 28.7 16.6 20.0 27.3 20.0 30.6 25.3 26.9 22.1 25.3 12.0 26.0 21.6 22.1 
SE 33.0 35.2 25.0 29.3 25.0 29.8 35.6 33.0 30.9 35.7 32.8 38.0 32.5 30.4 30.4 29.8 26.4 30.4 36.4 24.3 27.7 35.0 27.7 38.3 33.0 34.6 29.8 33.0 28.2 19.7 29.3 29.8 
SI 26.8 29.0 18.8 23.1 18.8 23.6 29.4 26.8 24.7 29.5 26.5 31.8 26.3 24.1 24.1 23.6 20.1 24.1 30.2 18.1 21.5 28.8 21.5 32.1 26.8 28.4 23.6 26.8 22.0 27.5 13.5 23.6 
SK 27.5 29.7 19.6 23.8 19.6 24.4 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 24.4 20.9 24.9 30.9 18.8 22.2 29.6 22.2 32.9 27.5 29.1 24.4 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 14.2 
Notes: The rates represent an effective tax burden of developing a patent in country indicated in the first column and afterwards selling it to the country shown in the top row. Values on the diagonal 
correspond to the domestic investment scenario presented in Figure 6.2. A regular tax system implies that no R&D tax incentives are considered here. Country codes and the corresponding country 
names are in the list of country abbreviations. 
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a sale to a subsidiary in Switzerland will result in a rate of 25.5%. In all countries, effective 
taxation is higher in the cross-border case compared to a domestic investment (diagonal line of 
Table 6.7). This is due to the capital gains tax, which is paid when a patent is sold from one 
country to another and which is why a multinational firm under a regular tax system profits the 
most if it keeps a patent in the country where it was developed. 
6.4.2.2    Incorporating R&D Tax Incentives into the Devereux and Griffith Model 
Table 6.7 contains the effective tax rates that are due under a regular tax system. By contrast, 
Table 6.8 presents the results of calculating the effective cross-border taxation of patent 
development and sale after taking into consideration R&D tax incentives shown in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2. The difference between these two cases represents a reduction in the effective tax 
burden caused by the R&D tax incentives. It is important to note that in a cross-border case the 
input-oriented fiscal incentives are only relevant for a parent firm which conducts R&D, 
whereas the output-oriented incentives are relevant not only for a parent firm but also for its 
subsidiary which receives profits generated by a patent in the output phase. This is especially 
true if the country of a subsidiary offers an IP Box that is applicable to an acquired IP, therefore 
enabling the patent to be developed elsewhere while still receiving the benefits of a local 
preferential tax treatment. 
In line with Table 6.7, the diagonal line highlighted in red in Table 6.8 shows the effective tax 
rates under the domestic investment scenario. The only difference is the inclusion of R&D tax 
incentives in Table 6.8. Hence, the values on the diagonal correspond to the ones shown in 
Figure 6.3. The EATRs that are not represented on the diagonal line reflect the effective taxation 
in a cross-border case. Here, countries where a patent is developed are shown on the left and 
countries where it is held afterwards are depicted on the top. As an example, if a patent has 
been developed in Austria and kept there afterwards, the EATR in this domestic investment 
scenario equals 8.6%. If an Austrian firm has a subsidiary in Belgium, for instance, and sells a 
patent to this company, then the effective tax burden in this cross-border case will amount to 
24%. The sale of a patent to Bulgaria will result in an EATR of 13.9% and the sale to 
Switzerland in an EATR of 13.3%. 
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Table 6.8 Effective Average Tax Rates in Europe (with R&D Tax Incentives), Cross-Border Investment, 2012, % 
  AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK 
AT 8.6 24.0 13.9 13.3 9.9 18.7 24.4 21.9 19.7 24.5 21.6 26.9 21.3 19.2 19.2 1.9 15.2 19.2 25.3 9.4 16.6 23.9 16.6 8.6 21.9 23.5 18.7 21.9 17.1 22.6 18.1 18.7 
BE 31.3 3.3 23.3 22.7 19.3 28.1 33.9 31.3 29.2 33.9 31.0 36.3 30.8 28.6 28.6 11.3 24.6 28.6 34.7 18.9 26.0 33.3 26.0 18.0 31.3 32.9 28.1 31.3 26.5 32.0 27.6 28.1 
BG 20.8 23.0 7.5 12.2 8.8 17.6 23.4 20.8 18.7 23.5 20.5 25.8 20.3 18.1 18.1 0.8 14.1 18.1 24.2 8.4 15.5 22.8 15.5 7.5 20.8 22.4 17.6 20.8 16.0 21.5 17.1 17.6 
CH 10.5 12.7 2.6 6.6 -1.4 7.3 13.1 10.5 8.4 13.2 10.3 15.5 10.0 7.9 7.9 -9.4 3.9 7.9 13.9 -1.9 5.2 12.6 5.2 -2.8 10.5 12.1 7.3 10.5 5.7 11.2 6.8 7.3 
CY 13.9 16.1 6.0 5.3 2.6 10.7 16.5 13.9 11.8 16.6 13.7 18.9 13.4 11.3 11.3 -6.1 7.3 11.3 17.3 5.2 8.6 16.0 8.6 0.6 13.9 15.5 10.7 13.9 9.1 14.6 10.2 10.7 
CZ 8.2 10.4 0.2 -0.4 -3.8 -5.1 10.8 8.2 6.1 10.9 7.9 13.2 7.7 5.6 5.6 -11.8 1.6 5.6 11.6 -4.2 2.9 10.2 2.9 -5.1 8.2 9.8 5.0 8.2 3.4 8.9 4.5 5.0 
DE 35.7 37.8 27.7 27.0 23.7 32.5 22.4 35.7 33.5 38.3 35.4 40.7 35.1 33.0 38.3 15.7 29.0 33.0 39.1 23.2 30.3 37.7 30.3 22.4 35.7 37.3 32.5 35.7 30.9 36.4 31.9 32.5 
DK 32.0 34.2 24.1 23.4 20.1 28.9 34.6 18.8 29.9 34.7 31.8 37.0 31.5 29.4 29.4 12.1 25.4 29.4 35.4 19.6 26.7 34.1 26.7 18.8 32.0 33.6 28.9 32.0 27.3 32.7 28.3 28.9 
EE 29.0 31.2 21.1 20.4 17.1 25.9 31.6 29.0 15.8 31.7 28.8 34.0 28.5 26.4 26.4 9.1 22.4 26.4 32.4 16.6 23.7 31.1 23.7 15.8 29.0 30.6 25.9 29.0 24.3 29.7 25.3 25.9 
ES 10.4 12.5 2.4 1.7 -1.6 7.2 12.9 10.4 8.2 -17.0 10.1 15.4 9.8 7.7 7.7 -9.6 3.7 7.7 13.8 -2.1 5.0 12.4 5.0 -2.9 10.4 12.0 7.2 10.4 5.6 11.0 6.6 7.2 
FI 31.7 33.8 23.7 23.1 19.7 28.5 34.2 31.7 29.5 34.3 18.4 36.7 31.1 29.0 29.0 11.7 25.0 29.0 35.1 19.2 26.4 33.7 26.4 18.4 31.7 33.3 28.5 31.7 26.9 32.4 27.9 28.5 
FR 8.6 10.7 0.6 0.0 -3.4 5.4 11.1 8.6 6.4 11.2 8.3 -18.9 8.0 5.9 5.9 -11.4 1.9 5.9 12.0 -3.9 3.3 10.6 3.3 -4.7 8.6 10.2 5.4 8.6 3.8 9.3 4.8 5.4 
GB 24.0 26.1 16.0 15.4 12.0 20.8 26.5 24.0 21.8 26.6 23.7 29.0 -19.5 21.3 21.3 4.0 17.3 21.3 27.4 11.5 18.7 26.0 18.7 10.7 24.0 25.6 20.8 24.0 19.2 24.7 20.2 20.8 
GR 28.3 30.5 20.3 19.7 16.3 25.1 30.9 28.3 26.2 31.0 28.0 33.3 27.8 15.0 25.6 8.3 21.6 25.6 31.7 15.9 23.0 30.3 23.0 15.0 28.3 29.9 25.1 28.3 23.5 29.0 24.6 25.1 
HR 7.9 10.1 0.0 -0.7 -4.0 4.8 10.5 7.9 5.8 10.6 7.7 12.9 7.4 5.3 -5.4 -12.0 1.3 5.3 11.3 -4.5 2.6 10.0 2.6 -5.4 7.9 9.5 4.8 7.9 3.2 8.6 4.2 4.8 
HU 8.2 10.4 0.2 -0.4 -3.8 5.0 10.8 8.2 6.1 10.9 7.9 13.2 7.7 5.6 5.6 -2.5 1.6 5.6 11.6 -4.2 2.9 10.2 2.9 -5.1 8.2 9.8 5.0 8.2 3.4 8.9 4.5 5.0 
IE -2.8 -0.6 -10.7 -11.4 -14.7 -6.0 -0.2 -2.8 -4.9 -0.1 -3.0 2.2 -3.3 -5.4 -5.4 -22.7 -16.1 -5.4 0.6 -15.2 -8.1 -0.7 -8.1 -16.1 -2.8 -1.2 -6.0 -2.8 -7.6 -2.1 -6.5 -6.0 
IS 7.9 10.1 0.0 -0.7 -4.0 4.8 10.5 7.9 5.8 10.6 7.7 12.9 7.4 5.3 5.3 -12.0 1.3 -5.4 11.3 -4.5 2.6 10.0 2.6 -5.4 7.9 9.5 4.8 7.9 3.2 8.6 4.2 4.8 
IT 36.8 39.0 28.9 28.2 24.9 33.7 39.4 36.8 34.7 39.5 36.6 41.8 36.3 34.2 34.2 16.9 30.2 34.2 23.6 24.4 31.5 38.9 31.5 23.5 36.8 38.4 33.7 36.8 32.1 37.5 33.1 33.7 
LI 14.7 16.9 6.7 6.1 2.7 11.5 17.3 14.7 12.6 17.4 14.4 19.7 14.2 12.0 12.0 -5.3 8.0 12.0 18.1 1.4 9.4 16.7 9.4 1.4 14.7 16.3 11.5 14.7 9.9 15.4 11.0 11.5 
LT -6.0 -3.8 -14.0 -14.6 -17.9 -9.2 -3.4 -6.0 -8.1 -3.3 -6.2 -1.0 -6.5 -8.6 -8.6 -26.0 -12.6 -8.6 -2.6 -18.4 -46.5 -4.0 -11.3 -19.3 -6.0 -4.4 -9.2 -6.0 -10.8 -5.3 -9.7 -9.2 
LU 14.8 17.0 6.8 6.2 2.9 11.6 17.4 14.8 12.7 17.5 14.6 19.8 14.3 12.2 12.2 -5.2 8.2 12.2 18.2 2.4 9.5 6.3 9.5 1.5 14.8 16.4 11.6 14.8 10.0 15.5 11.1 11.6 
LV 24.5 26.7 16.6 15.9 12.6 21.4 27.1 24.5 22.4 27.2 24.3 29.5 24.0 21.9 21.9 4.6 17.9 21.9 27.9 12.1 19.2 26.6 11.3 11.2 24.5 26.1 21.4 24.5 19.8 25.2 20.8 21.4 
MT 13.3 15.5 5.3 4.7 1.3 10.1 15.9 13.3 11.2 16.0 13.0 18.3 12.8 10.6 10.6 -6.7 6.6 10.6 16.7 0.9 8.0 15.3 8.0 0.0 13.3 14.9 10.1 13.3 8.5 14.0 9.6 10.1 
NL 15.0 17.2 7.0 6.4 3.0 11.8 17.6 15.0 12.9 17.7 14.7 20.0 14.5 12.4 12.4 -5.0 8.4 12.4 18.4 2.6 9.7 17.0 9.7 1.7 1.7 16.6 11.8 15.0 10.2 15.7 11.3 11.8 
NO 16.0 18.1 8.0 7.4 4.0 12.8 18.5 16.0 13.9 18.6 15.7 21.0 15.4 13.3 13.3 -4.0 9.3 13.3 19.4 3.5 10.7 18.0 10.7 2.7 16.0 2.7 -20.8 16.0 11.2 16.7 12.3 12.8 
PL 27.5 29.7 19.6 18.9 15.6 24.4 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 7.6 20.9 24.9 30.9 15.1 22.2 29.6 22.2 14.3 27.5 29.1 14.2 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 24.4 
PT -1.0 1.1 -9.0 -9.6 -13.0 -4.2 1.5 -1.0 -3.2 1.6 -1.3 4.0 -1.6 -3.7 -3.7 -21.0 -7.7 -3.7 2.4 -13.5 -6.3 1.0 -6.3 -14.3 -1.0 0.6 -4.2 -14.3 -5.8 -0.3 -4.7 -4.2 
RO 22.0 24.2 14.1 13.4 10.1 18.8 24.6 22.0 19.9 24.7 21.8 27.0 21.5 19.4 19.4 2.1 15.4 19.4 25.4 9.6 16.7 24.1 16.7 8.7 22.0 23.6 18.8 22.0 -26.1 22.7 18.3 18.8 
SE 33.0 35.2 25.0 24.4 21.1 29.8 35.6 33.0 30.9 35.7 32.8 38.0 32.5 30.4 30.4 13.0 26.4 30.4 36.4 20.6 27.7 35.0 27.7 19.7 33.0 34.6 29.8 33.0 28.2 19.7 29.3 29.8 
SI 19.5 21.6 11.5 10.9 7.5 16.3 22.0 19.5 17.3 22.1 19.2 24.5 18.9 16.8 16.8 -0.5 12.8 16.8 22.9 7.0 14.2 21.5 14.2 6.2 19.5 21.1 16.3 19.5 14.7 20.2 -26.6 16.3 
SK 27.5 29.7 19.6 18.9 15.6 24.4 30.1 27.5 25.4 30.2 27.3 32.5 27.0 24.9 24.9 7.6 20.9 24.9 30.9 15.1 22.2 29.6 22.2 14.3 27.5 29.1 24.4 27.5 22.8 28.2 23.8 14.2 
Notes: The rates represent an effective tax burden of developing a patent in country indicated in the first column and afterwards selling it to the country shown in the top row. Values on the diagonal 
correspond to the domestic investment scenario presented in Figure 6.3. Input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives are included. Country codes and the corresponding country names are in 
the list of country abbreviations. 
Chapter 6: Tax Incentives for R&D and Their Use in Tax Planning           215 
 
6.4.2.3    The Impact of R&D Tax Incentives on Effective Tax Burdens 
In order to see the magnitude of the advantage that R&D tax incentives are giving companies, 
Table 6.9 presents the differentials between the EATRs shown in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. They 
can be interpreted as the reductions in the effective tax burden caused by R&D tax incentives. 
Parallel to Tables 6.7 and 6.8, the diagonal values of Table 6.9 show the decreases in the 
effective taxation under a domestic investment scenario. The non-diagonal values represent 
reductions in a cross-border case. For example, if an Austrian firm develops a patent and keeps 
it afterwards, the Austrian R&D tax credit reduces its effective tax rate by 10.2 percentage 
points. If this firm decides to sell the patent to a company in Belgium or Bulgaria, the effective 
tax burden decreases by 10.2 percentage points as well. However, if it sells the intangible to a 
subsidiary in Switzerland, the EATR decreases by 15.1 percentage points.  
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 6.9. First, R&D tax incentives in the country 
of a patent’s development (shown in the first column of Table 6.9) reduce the effective taxation 
of a cross-border investment. This reduction mitigates the unfavorable effect of the capital gains 
tax on a cross-border sale of a patent. Therefore, the separation of a patent’s development from 
the location of its further ownership becomes more attractive for multinational enterprises when 
R&D tax incentives are in place. However, these incentives do not fully make up for the capital 
gains tax and because of this a domestic investment remains more favorable for a company than 
a cross-border one, as demonstrated in the case of an Austrian parent and its Belgian subsidiary. 
Even though the effective tax burden of a cross-border investment between Austria and 
Belgium is reduced by 10.2 percentage points after the introduction of an R&D tax credit (see 
Table 6.9), the effective tax rate in this cross-border case is 24% and is therefore still higher 
than the EATR of 8.6% under a domestic investment scenario (see Table 6.8). 
Secondly, IP Boxes in the countries of a patent’s final owner (shown in the top row of Table 
6.9) might further reduce the effective tax burden of a cross-border investment. This occurs 
when the beneficial tax treatment applies to both the self-developed and acquired patents. 
According to Table 6.2, countries which offer such IP Boxes include Cyprus, Hungary, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, and Switzerland. These IP Boxes are so generous that the total reduction 
of the EATR in cross-border investment often exceeds the one in a domestic investment case. 
For example, if an Austrian firm decides to sell a patent to its Hungarian subsidiary, the 
consideration of R&D tax incentives in both countries reduces the EATR by 27 percentage  
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Table 6.9 Reductions in EATRs after Including R&D Tax Incentives into the Devereux and Griffith Model, Cross-Border Investment, Percentage Points 
  AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK 
AT 10.2 10.2 10.2 15.1 14.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 27.0 10.2 10.2 10.2 13.9 10.2 10.2 10.2 28.8 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 
BE 4.5 19.1 4.5 9.4 8.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 21.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 8.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 23.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
BG - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
CH 16.3 16.3 16.3 6.9 20.2 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 33.1 16.3 16.3 16.3 20.0 16.3 16.3 16.3 34.9 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 
CY 1.9 1.9 1.9 6.8 4.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 18.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 20.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
CZ 19.3 19.3 19.3 24.2 23.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 36.1 19.3 19.3 19.3 23.0 19.3 19.3 19.3 37.9 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 
DE - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
DK - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
EE - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
ES 25.4 25.4 25.4 30.3 29.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 39.5 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 42.2 25.4 25.4 25.4 29.2 25.4 25.4 25.4 44.1 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 
FI - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
FR 30.5 30.5 30.5 35.4 34.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 44.7 30.5 30.5 30.5 47.3 30.5 30.5 30.5 34.2 30.5 30.5 30.5 49.1 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 
GB 7.3 7.3 7.3 12.2 11.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 37.5 7.3 7.3 24.1 7.3 7.3 7.3 11.0 7.3 7.3 7.3 25.9 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
GR - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
HR 20.4 20.3 20.3 25.2 24.3 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.3 20.3 20.4 37.1 20.3 20.3 20.4 24.1 20.4 20.4 20.4 39.0 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.3 20.4 20.4 
HU 19.3 19.3 19.3 24.2 23.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 16.8 19.3 19.3 19.3 23.0 19.3 19.3 19.3 37.9 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 
IE 25.4 25.4 25.4 30.3 29.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 42.2 25.4 25.4 25.4 29.2 25.4 25.4 25.4 44.1 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 
IS 20.4 20.3 20.3 25.2 24.3 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.3 20.3 20.3 37.1 20.3 20.4 20.4 24.1 20.4 20.4 20.4 39.0 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.3 20.4 20.4 
IT - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
LI 5.8 5.8 5.8 10.7 9.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 22.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 24.4 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
LT 30.5 30.5 30.5 35.4 34.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 47.3 30.5 30.5 30.5 34.2 57.7 30.5 30.5 49.1 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 
LU 5.8 5.8 5.8 10.7 9.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 22.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 9.5 5.8 15.3 5.8 24.4 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
LV - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
MT 26.3 26.3 26.3 31.1 30.2 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.2 26.2 43.0 26.3 26.2 26.2 30.0 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 
NL 17.0 17.0 17.0 21.9 21.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 33.8 17.0 17.0 17.0 20.7 17.0 17.0 17.0 35.6 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
NO 18.3 18.3 18.3 23.2 22.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 35.1 18.3 18.3 18.3 22.0 18.3 18.3 18.3 36.9 18.3 18.3 51.9 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 
PL - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
PT 33.1 33.1 33.1 38.0 37.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 49.9 33.1 33.1 33.1 36.8 33.1 33.1 33.1 51.7 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 
RO 3.3 3.3 3.3 8.1 7.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 20.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 7.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 21.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 38.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 
SE - - - 4.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
SI 7.3 7.3 7.3 12.2 11.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 24.1 7.3 7.3 7.3 11.0 7.3 7.3 7.3 25.9 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 40.1 7.3 
SK - - - 4.9 4.0 - - - - - - - - - - 16.8 - - - 3.7 - - - 18.6 - - - - - - - - 
Notes: Table shows the differences between EATRs in Table 6.7 and EATRs in Table 6.8. It illustrates how much the effective tax rates are reduced by when R&D tax incentives are introduced 
in the Devereux and Griffith model. Values on the diagonal correspond to the domestic investment scenario shown in Figure 6.4. Country codes and the corresponding country names are in the list 
of country abbreviations. 
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points (see Table 6.9). The effective tax burden then becomes 1.9%, which is lower than the 
EATR of 8.6% under a domestic investment scenario (see Table 6.8).  
In summary, the analyses presented in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 show that R&D tax incentives 
lower the effective tax burdens of firms. This is particularly true in relation to the domestic 
investment scenario, where a patent is developed and afterwards held in the same country. If a 
patent is sold or transferred to another country (a cross-border investment), a capital gains tax 
applies on this transaction to compensate for the separation between the intangible’s place of 
development and the location of where its profits are taxed. However, even with the capital 
gains taxation, a multinational may still take advantage of R&D tax incentives to minimize its 
effective tax burden in a cross-border investment scenario. For example, input-oriented tax 
incentives in a parent firm’s country might mitigate the unfavorable effect of a capital gains tax 
by lowering the effective tax burden in a cross-border investment case. Moreover, the effective 
tax rate in a cross-border case might total an even lower rate than the EATR in a domestic 
investment scenario. This occurs when both the country of a patent’s developer and the country 
of its final owner offer generous R&D tax incentives, such as IP Boxes for acquired intangible 
assets. As a result, these R&D tax incentives may not only contribute to fostering research and 
development in the countries of their implementation but could also be used by multinational 
enterprises for tax planning. However, as mentioned in section 6.2.2.2, the OECD Nexus 
Approach might close this loophole in tax regulations. Countries such as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Spain have already implemented this approach within the scope of their IP 
Boxes and as a result they now permit preferential tax treatment only for self-developed and 
not acquired intellectual property. 
6.5 The Use of R&D Tax Incentives in Tax Planning: A Quantitative 
Analysis 
6.5.1    Literature Review 
The previous section has pointed out that R&D tax incentives might substantially reduce 
effective taxation of developing and relocating a patent. As a result, these incentives provide 
two major advantages for companies: the first advantage is that they reduce the costs of 
conducting research and development. The second advantage these incentives provide is the 
use they have in strategically relocating intangible assets with the purpose of reducing a 
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multinational’s overall tax liability. We test this hypothesis in this section by empirically 
analyzing whether R&D tax incentives are used by multinational enterprises for profit shifting 
and in doing so we contribute to two strands of empirical literature. The first one includes 
studies on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives and their influence on a firm’s productivity 
and innovation. The second strand of literature comprises empirical papers on profit shifting by 
multinational enterprises, in particular by means of intellectual property. 
As described in section 6.3, Bloom et al. (2002), Baghana and Mohnen (2009), Ernst and 
Spengel (2011), Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), Thomson (2015), and many other studies have 
found a positive effect of decreasing user costs or the B-Index on R&D expenditure using firm-
level or country-level data. These authors conclude that input-oriented fiscal incentives for 
R&D effectively foster research and development. Yang et al. (2012), Bozio et al. (2014), 
Kobayashi (2014), and Guceri (2017) confirm this finding by evaluating the effects of the 
reforms that have introduced input-oriented R&D tax incentives. By contrast, the literature on 
output-oriented tax incentives establishes that they have a positive effect on a firm’s number of 
intangibles but does not confirm a simultaneous increase in real R&D activity, as Alstadsæter 
et al. (2015) conclude. While these studies investigate the impact of fiscal incentives on a 
company’s innovative activity, we contribute to this literature by examining in more detail the 
use of tax incentives in profit shifting. 
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies investigate the use of intangible assets in profit 
shifting. These studies argue that multinational enterprises strategically allocate intangible 
assets at low-tax subsidiaries in order to shift profits via royalty payments from high-tax to low-
tax group members. Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. 
(2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015), Böhm et al. (2015), Dinkel and Schanz (2015), and Bradley 
et al. (2015) investigate the association between corporate taxation and the location of 
intangible assets using data on patent applications at the international patent registration offices. 
This data contains information on companies that apply for an international protection of their 
inventions and therefore reveals patents’ legal owners. According to these studies, an increasing 
statutory corporate income tax rate negatively influences the probability of patent ownership at 
MNE affiliates in this country. Our analysis closely relates to these studies and contributes to 
them by focusing not just on the strategic allocation of intellectual property but rather on the 
separation of IP ownership. Thus, we analyze whether, and if so, to what extent regular 
corporate tax systems and tax incentives for research and development influence the 
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international collaboration in patents, which is defined as a patent’s development in one country 
and its subsequent registration abroad. 
6.5.2    Data 
Our empirical analysis employs the OECD database International Co-Operation in Patents,251 
which includes bilateral data on the number of patents developed in one country and registered 
in another one afterwards. Following the qualitative analysis presented in the previous part of 
the paper, we focus on the 28 member states of the European Union and four members of the 
European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). 
Therefore, our sample includes 992 country-pairs and we observe the co-operation in patents 
between these countries in 2012 and compare it with the year 1995. Figure 6.6 presents 
descriptive statistics on international co-operation in patents in 2012.  
Figure 6.6 A Ratio of Patents Developed Abroad in Relation to Total Patents, 2012, % 
 
Notes: Country codes and the corresponding country names are in the list of country abbreviations. Source: OECD, 
database International Co-operation in Patents. 
                                                          
251 See OECD (2016c).  
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Figure 6.6 shows a ratio of patents developed abroad in relation to total patents registered in a 
given country. What becomes apparent from the figure is that over 80% of the total patents held 
in Malta, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Cyprus were developed elsewhere and over 40% of 
patents located in Ireland, Switzerland, and Belgium originated abroad. We investigate the 
relationship between taxation and the country’s co-operation in patents further in our empirical 
analysis using information on international collaboration in patents as a dependent variable. 
Since in our dataset there is no exchange of patents between country-pairs in 65% of cases, we 
are interested in analyzing the extensive margin of the co-operation in patents. Hence, the 
dependent variable in this case is equal to one if there is any relocation of patents between two 
countries and equals zero otherwise. In order to investigate the intensive margin, we 
additionally use a total number of patents relocated from one country to another as a dependent 
variable. In addition, we normalize this variable by building a ratio of patents relocated from 
one country to another in relation to a total number of foreign patents held by a host country. 
The effective tax rates with and without considering R&D tax incentives serve as the main 
independent variables of interest. We extract them from Tables 6.7 and 6.8 for 2012 and 
additionally calculate the corresponding values for 1995. Section 6.4 describes in detail the 
calculation of effective tax burden using the Devereux and Griffith model. Apart from this, we 
include a few further controls into our estimation. For example, in line with Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), and Griffith et al. (2014), we control for the level 
of innovation in a country where a patent is registered. This variable is proxied by a country’s 
total R&D expenditure, the information on which comes from the OECD database called Gross 
Domestic Expenditure on R-D by Sector of Performance and Source of Funds.252 Following 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst 
et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014), we also control for a country’s market size, its wealth, and 
governance situation. This is done by including into the estimation Log(Population), 
Log(GDP/capita), and Property Rights respectively. We collected statistics on gross domestic 
product (GDP) per-capita and population from the World Bank’s Development Indicators253 
and for data on intellectual property rights protection we consulted the Heritage Foundation.254 
                                                          
252 See OECD (2016a).  
253 See World Bank (2015).  
254 See Heritage Foundation (2017).  
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Table 6.10 presents the key descriptive statistics of the variables that enter the regression 
estimation. The table is divided into two panels: Panel A shows statistics for the sample of 1995 
and Panel B presents a summary for the sample of 2012. The first three variables are used as 
dependent variables in different specifications. As it can be seen from the table, the first one is 
a binary variable and the other two are strictly positive. The maximum number of patents 
developed in one country and registered in another one amounts to 374 in 1995 and 1,056 in 
2012, while the average equals 4.21 in 1995 and 12.17 in 2012. What these results suggest is 
that international co-operation in patents seems to have grown during these years.  
Table 6.10 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Sample of 1995 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dummy Patents 992 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Number of Patents 992 4.21 20.19 0.00 374.00 
Ratio of Patents 992 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00 
EATR_regular 992 0.42 0.12 0.07 0.69 
EATR_with_incentives 992 0.40 0.12 0.05 0.69 
Log(R&D Exp.) 992 6.96 2.09 2.41 10.82 
Log(GDP/capita) 992 9.92 0.85 8.24 11.27 
Log(Population) 992 15.54 1.72 10.34 18.22 
Property Rights 992 68.63 16.78 30.00 90.00 
Panel B. Sample of 2012 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dummy Patents 992 0.39 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of Patents 992 12.17 57.12 0.00 1,056.00 
Ratio of Patents 992 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.50 
EATR_regular 992 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.45 
EATR_with_incentives 992 0.15 0.12 -0.26 0.42 
Log(R&D Exp.) 992 7.75 1.85 4.18 11.32 
Log(GDP/capita) 992 10.31 0.71 8.86 11.85 
Log(Population) 992 15.59 1.69 10.51 18.20 
Property Rights 992 72.40 18.23 30.00 90.00 
Notes: EATR stands for effective average tax rate. R&D stands for research and development. GDP denotes 
gross domestic product. 
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As for the main independent variables of interest, EATR_regular represents the effective tax 
burden on a cross-border collaboration in patents. The values of this variable in 2012 are shown 
in Table 6.7 and discussed in section 6.4.2.2 and the values for 1995 were calculated separately. 
EATR_with_incentives represents the effective tax burden on a bilateral co-operation in patents 
after the consideration of R&D tax incentives. The values of this variable are shown in Table 
6.8 for 2012 and were additionally calculated for 1995. According to Table 6.10, the average 
regular EATR decreased from 42% in 1995 to 27% in 2012. The effective tax burden after the 
consideration of R&D tax incentives fell from 40% in 1995 to 15% in 2012. Hence, we conclude 
that taxation under a regular system substantially decreased between 1995 and 2012. However, 
fiscal incentives for research and development have contributed to an even greater fall in the 
effective corporate tax burden. As for the other control variables, the average spending on R&D, 
GDP per-capita, population, and a level of property rights protection all increased between 1995 
and 2012. 
6.5.3    Estimation Approach 
The identification strategy of our empirical analysis is based on a difference regression. In other 
words, we estimate the influence of the change in taxation between 1995 and 2012 on the 
change in the bilateral co-operation in patent development. This method enables all factors that 
have remained constant between the two years (such as the distance between countries, their 
common language, history, culture, and other factors) to be effectively controlled for and is 
therefore comparable with a country-pair fixed effects estimation. 
6.5.3.1    Extensive Margin 
As mentioned in the previous section, in 65% of cases there is no exchange of patents between 
country-pairs in our sample. Hence, we are interested in analyzing the extensive margin of co-
operation in patents, which is done using the following specification: 
𝐵𝑖𝑗2012 −  𝐵𝑖𝑗1995 =  𝛽1(EATRij2012 −  EATRij1995) +  𝛽2 (𝑿
′
ij2012 − 𝑿
′
ij1995) + 
                                                +  (𝜀𝑖𝑗2012  −  𝜀𝑖𝑗1995) 
(6.14) 
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In equation 6.14, Bijt is a binary variable that equals one if there is any co-operation in patents 
between country i and j in year t (t = 1995, 2012) and zero otherwise. EATRijt represents either 
EATR_regular or EATR_with_incentives, which measure an effective tax burden on co-
operation in patents between country i and j. The first variable reflects taxation under a regular 
tax system without considering R&D tax incentives and the second one denotes an effective tax 
burden after incorporating input- and output-oriented fiscal incentives for research and 
development. The calculation of these variables is described in detail in section 6.4. X’ij is a 
vector of the host country’s characteristics such as Log(R&D Exp.), Log(Population), 
Log(GDP/capita), and Property Rights. Finally, ɛij is an error term. 
6.5.3.2    Intensive Margin 
As a next step, we exploit the continuous information on co-operation in patents. In this part of 
the analysis, the model of estimation is defined as follows: 
             𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗2012 −  𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗1995 =  𝛽1(EATRij2012 − EATRij1995) +  
                                                                 + 𝛽2 (𝑿
′
ij2012 −  𝑿
′
ij1995) +  (𝜀𝑖𝑗2012  −  𝜀𝑖𝑗1995) 
(6.15) 
In equation 6.15, the dependent variable Patentsij takes one of the following two forms: in the 
first form the variable equals the number of patents developed in country i and registered 
afterwards in country j. In the second form the variable equals the ratio of patents developed in 
i and registered in j in relation to the total number of patents that arise from international co-
operation in patents in country j.255 All other variables are identical to the ones included in 
equation 6.14. 
6.5.4    Results 
Table 6.11 presents results of our empirical analysis. In all specifications shown in this table, 
the units of observation are country-pairs. Panel A shows the outcomes of estimating equation 
6.14, which examines the extensive margin of co-operation in patents. Panel B displays the 
results of estimating equation 6.15 and focuses on the intensive margin of international 
collaboration in patents. Since the dependent variable in the regressions of Panel A is binary, a 
                                                          
255 This ratio is analyzed by employing the total number of patents that arise from international co-operation in 
patents in country j as an exposure variable. 
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Logit estimator is applied here. Columns I and II of Panel A present the outcomes of solely 
including the main independent variables into the estimation, while columns III and IV add 
further controls. According to the results, there is a negative correlation between taxation and 
the probability of two countries co-operating in patent development. The magnitude of the 
impact of regular taxation seems to be more pronounced than the influence of effective taxation 
after taking R&D tax incentives into account. This implies that country-pairs place greater 
emphasis on a regular tax system than on available R&D tax incentives when choosing a partner 
for collaboration in patent development. This outcome is in line with Ernst and Spengel (2011), 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), Böhm et al. (2015), Dinkel and Schanz 
(2015), Bradley et al. (2015), and other previous studies which establish a significant negative 
impact of corporate income taxation on the location of intangible assets within multinational 
groups. 
Panel B of Table 6.11 presents the results of analyzing the extensive margin of co-operation in 
patents. These calculations are carried out using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) estimator, which suits an estimation of data concentrated at zero, as Wooldridge (2002) 
and Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) note. Columns V-VIII show the outcomes of defining 
the dependent variable as a number of patents developed in country i and registered in country 
j. Columns IX-XII present the outcomes of employing a ratio of patents originated in  i and held 
in  j in relation to a total number of patents of foreign origin registered in  j as the dependent 
variable. In both cases there appears to be a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between taxation and the intensity of collaboration in patents. However, the economic and 
statistical importance of tax variables decreases once other controls are added to the 
specifications (see columns VII-VIII and XI-XII of Table 6.11). In addition, the coefficient on 
EATRwith_incentives appears to be more negative than the coefficient on EATRregular once other 
controls are included (see columns VIII and XII). This implies that fiscal incentives play an 
important role in determining the intensive margin or, in other words, the intensity of co-
operation in patents. As for the other control variables, expenses on research and development 
seem to play a significant role in determining international collaboration in patents. GDP per-
capita turns out to be statistically significant only in determining the extensive margin of the 
co-operation and the level of property rights protection appears to matter only for the intensive 
margin. The size of the population does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
international collaboration in patents. 
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Table 6.11 Empirical Results 
Panel A. Extensive Margin 
  I II III IV 
EATR_regular -9.342***  -3.789**  
 (1.198)  (1.497)  
EATR_with_incentives  -6.487***  -2.655** 
   (0.820)  (1.105) 
Log(R&D Exp.)   1.040** 0.928* 
    (0.511) (0.515) 
Log(GDP/capita)   2.393* 2.373* 
    (1.298) (1.284) 
Log(Population)   0.567 0.207 
    (2.636) (2.600) 
Property Rights   -0.015 -0.019 
   (0.018) (0.017) 
Observations 992 992 992 992 
 
Panel B. Intensive Margin Number of Patent Applications Ratio of Patent Applications 
  V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
EATRregular -4.500***  -0.909*  -4.480***  -0.963**  
 (0.618)  (0.484)  (0.603)  (0.473)  
EATRwith_incentives  -3.353***  -1.115***  -3.321***  -1.125*** 
   (0.285)  (0.367)  (0.275)  (0.353) 
Log(R&D Exp.)   1.007*** 0.894***   1.001*** 0.893*** 
    (0.329) (0.305)   (0.330) (0.304) 
Log(GDP/capita)   0.793 0.505   0.726 0.441 
    (0.672) (0.650)   (0.679) (0.648) 
Log(Population)   0.809 0.682   0.843 0.733 
    (0.963) (0.839)   (0.925) (0.808) 
Property Rights   0.025*** 0.025***   0.025*** 0.025*** 
   (0.008) (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Logit model is applied in Panel A and Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator is used in Panel B. Observational units are country-pairs. The dependent variable in Panel A is binary; it equals one if there is co-operation in patens between a given 
country-pair and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns I-IV of Panel B is the number of patents that were developed in country i and registered in country j. The dependent 
variable in columns V-VIII of Panel B is the ratio of patents developed in country i and registered in country j in relation to a total number of patents with foreign origin registered in country 
j; this ratio is analyzed by employing the denominator as an exposure variable. EATR_regular and EATR_with_incentives are average effective tax rates on developing a patent in country i and 
holding it in country j afterwards; the first one does not include R&D tax incentives, whereas the second one does. Log (R&D Exp.) is a logarithm of a country’s R&D expenditure. Log 
(GDP/capita) measures GDP per-capita. Log (Population) denotes a logarithm of total population. Property Rights represents a level of intellectual property rights protection. 
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6.6  Conclusion 
The main objective of this study is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of diverse aspects of 
R&D tax incentives. To begin with, we examine the economic justification for the state support 
of research and development and conclude that this type of R&D fostering is necessary because 
of at least two following reasons. First, R&D causes positive spillovers, since companies may 
use outcomes of research and development without the possibility of any rivalry or exclusion 
happening. Even if the outcomes of an R&D process are not successful, there is still a positive 
spillover effect. Namely, other firms can learn from the unsuccessful experience and either 
avoid repeating the same mistake in the future or plan their research differently from the very 
beginning. Secondly, the issue of asymmetric information makes it difficult for creditors to 
finance risky R&D activities. As a consequence, it may only be low-risk R&D projects that 
receive financing with the other projects remaining overlooked, even if their potential returns 
are high.  
In addition, the study concludes that fiscal incentives constitute an important part of the state 
support of R&D. This is because they are easier to implement and are less complex to monitor 
than, for example, direct R&D grants or subsidies. R&D tax incentives can be divided into two 
categories according to the stage of an R&D project that they support. Input-oriented incentives 
comprise tax credits, super-deductions, and other incentives that apply during the development 
phase of a research project. Output-oriented incentives include IP Boxes and apply during the 
second phase of an R&D process, which includes managing the profits that an intangible 
generates or dealing with the losses that have occurred in the case of an unsuccessful 
investment. We give a detailed overview of the existing input- and output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives in the EU and EFTA member states. The majority of these countries offer either 
input- or output-oriented tax incentives, while some countries have even implemented both 
types of incentives. By contrast, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden are currently the only countries 
in Europe that do not offer any R&D tax incentives.  
Furthermore, the study presents a review of empirical literature on the outcomes of the 
implementation of input- and output-oriented R&D tax incentives. The empirical evidence on 
input-oriented R&D tax incentives usually points to a strong positive effect of their introduction 
on the innovative activity of companies. By contrast, the literature on output-oriented R&D tax 
incentives does not find robust evidence for an increase in the real R&D activity following an 
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IP Box introduction. According to the literature review, multinationals might see output-
oriented R&D tax incentives as a means of tax planning rather than a tool for boosting their 
research and development.  
Moreover, we apply the Devereux and Griffith model to calculate effective average tax rates 
with and without the inclusion of R&D tax incentives in the EU and EFTA member states in 
2012. With the help of this model, we analyze two cases of an R&D investment. First, the 
effective tax burden in the case of a domestic investment is calculated. Here, intellectual 
property is assumed to be developed and afterwards held by the same company, so that the input 
and output phases of an R&D process take place in the same country. Secondly, the effective 
taxation in the case of a cross-border investment is determined. In this case, it is assumed that 
an intangible asset is developed in one country and then sold abroad and because of this the 
input and output stages of an R&D process occur in different countries. The calculation of 
effective tax rates using the Devereux and Griffith model shows that R&D tax incentives 
substantially lower a firm’s total tax burden. This is particularly the case in a domestic 
investment scenario. If a patent is sold or transferred to another country (a cross-border 
investment), a capital gains tax applies. However, even in this case input-oriented tax incentives 
mitigate the capital gains taxation by lowering a multinational’s overall effective tax burden. 
Moreover, output-oriented R&D tax incentives might lower the EATR in the cross-border case 
even below the EATR value in a domestic investment case. This occurs when a country allows 
an IP Box to apply to both the self-developed and acquired intangible assets. Therefore, 
multinational enterprises might use IP Boxes for tax planning in addition to viewing them as a 
means of fostering their research and development. 
Finally, we employ the OECD data on international co-operation in patents to test whether 
taxation has an influence on the probability (and intensity) of patents to be developed in one 
country and subsequently registered in another. According to our main findings, both a regular 
tax system and R&D tax incentives contribute to the determination of the extensive and 
intensive margins of the international collaboration in patents. These findings are in line with 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), Böhm et al. 
(2015), Dinkel and Schanz (2015), and Bradley et al. (2015) and support the main hypothesis 
of our study showing that firms respond to taxation and fiscal incentives by strategically 
allocating their patents. This once again implies that some of the R&D tax incentives might be 
used for tax planning rather than fostering research and development. 
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As for the policy applications of this study, it can be concluded that R&D tax incentives 
constitute a vital part of supporting innovation and research and that the design of these 
incentives is crucial for their economic outcomes. For example, numerous empirical studies 
have found that input-oriented incentives have a positive impact on real R&D activity. 
However, this result was not confirmed in the case of output-oriented tax incentives. Output-
oriented incentives might substantially reduce the effective tax burden of a cross-border R&D 
investment and may therefore be used for tax planning purposes by multinational enterprises. 
On that account, input-oriented R&D tax incentives should be seen as a preferred instrument 
for fostering research and development. As for the output-oriented incentives, thorough 
supervision and management are required to ensure that they are used properly by multinational 
firms and effectively reach their aim of boosting R&D.
Chapter 7: Conclusion  229 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis qualitatively and quantitatively examines different aspects of base erosion 
and profit shifting by multinational enterprises, focusing on research areas such as the 
substitution between profit shifting channels, the effectiveness of anti-avoidance legislation, 
and the role of intangible assets in BEPS. The thesis consists of five self-contained chapters, 
the key findings and policy implications of which are summarized in this section. 
Chapter 2 defines profit shifting and related concepts, gives an overview of the empirical 
literature in the field of profit shifting, and discusses the main reform proposals which aim to 
improve the existing corporate tax system. The key conclusions of this chapter are the 
following: 
 Corporate tax revenues represent a rather small part (around 5%-10%) of total tax revenues 
in most high-income countries and this trend has remained unchanged for years. Eliminating 
profit shifting by multinationals could increase this share, although there must be substantial 
changes in tax regulations in order to bring about a sizable rise in corporate tax revenues. 
 The statutory and effective corporate tax rates have been steadily decreasing over the past 
few decades. However, tax rate decreases and tax policy changes have not been 
homogeneous in all countries. Nowadays European low-tax countries either have low 
statutory corporate income tax rates or offer tax regulations and legal arrangements that 
facilitate profit shifting. Thus, in comparison to members of the Benelux Union or 
Switzerland, Germany can be still considered a high-tax country.  
 Numerous empirical studies confirm the existence of profit shifting by multinational 
enterprises and identify the main channels of BEPS to include a strategic use of internal 
debt and intra-firm trade. However, most empirical studies find a rather low (in absolute 
terms) tax elasticity of reported profits, which suggests that the magnitude of profit shifting 
is not large. 
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 There are multiple reform suggestions which aim to eliminate base erosion and profit 
shifting. While the OECD Action Plan on BEPS and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package 
attempt to fix the loopholes in the existing tax system, the CCCTB proposal and a few other 
initiatives support its fundamental change. 
Chapter 3 empirically analyzes the substitution between two profit shifting channels: a 
strategic use of intra-firm trade and related-party debt. The chapter concludes with the following 
findings: 
 An enforcement of strict transfer pricing regulations in high-tax countries leads to an 
increase in earnings reported by its resident companies. At the same time, an introduction 
of strict interest deduction limitations in high-tax countries reduces firms’ interest 
payments. These results confirm the effectiveness of these two types of anti-avoidance 
regulations when they are considered apart from each other.  
 There is a substitution between proﬁt shifting via debt and proﬁt shifting via intra-firm trade. 
Policy makers should consider the substitution between different profit shifting channels 
when introducing new reforms, since one set of anti-avoidance regulations can prove to be 
ineffective if other profit shifting channels are left unrestricted. 
 In line with Beer and Loeprick (2015), we conclude that IP-intensive companies can engage 
more easily in base erosion and profit shifting, because the arm’s length price on the use of 
intangibles is often hard to determine and can therefore be more easily manipulated than 
transfer prices on other transactions or intra-group interest payments. However, the 
magnitudes of the tax elasticities of both profit shifting channels are rather low, even for 
IP-intensive firms. 
Chapter 4 empirically tests the influence of taxation on bilateral royalty flows and draws the 
following conclusions and policy implications: 
 Corporate taxation negatively influences bilateral royalty flows. In addition, we find that 
both statutory tax rates and tax differentials between countries affect international royalty 
exchange. This implies that royalty payments for the use of intellectual property are used 
by multinational enterprises to shift profits. 
 We analyze several reform suggestions within the scope of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS 
and quantify their potential outcomes. According to our key findings, both rewarding and 
punitive tax policies suggested by the OECD appear to have an impact on bilateral royalty 
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flows. While an introduction of strict anti-avoidance regulations decreases bilateral royalty 
payments, a lack of input-oriented R&D tax incentives seems to encourage royalty outflows 
and some output-oriented fiscal incentives (such as IP Boxes that are available for acquired 
intellectual property) appear to attract royalty inflows. Therefore, we conclude that the 
OECD Action Plan on BEPS is likely to limit the strategic use of intellectual property for 
profit shifting and will therefore reduce bilateral royalty flows. 
Chapter 5 empirically analyzes and compares a strategic allocation of two different types of 
intangible assets – patents and trademarks. Referring to the differences between these two types 
of intellectual property, the chapter draws the following conclusions: 
 There is a negative relationship between taxation and the location of intangible assets. This 
outcome confirms the findings of the prior literature in this area of research, suggesting that 
companies use intangible assets as a means of base erosion and profit shifting. Therefore, 
effective international regulations are necessary to ensure that taxation of MNEs is based 
on real economic activity and value creation. 
 Moreover, in line with our hypothesis we identify that the tax elasticity of a trademark 
location choice is more negative than that of a patent location choice. This result confirms 
that the differences between various types of intangible assets should not be ignored in tax 
policy considerations. The very nature of a trademark makes it more mobile within a 
corporate group than a patent and for this reason trademarks have a greater potential to be 
used as a means of profit shifting in comparison to patents. Therefore, tax regulations and 
policies should take into consideration the differences between intangible assets and should 
be designed or adjusted in accordance with these differences. This would, for example, 
imply that current IP Boxes that allow a preferential tax treatment for both patents and 
trademarks (Cyprus, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta) should be reconsidered and follow the 
example of the IP Boxes that concentrate on patens only (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, the UK). 
 We analyze several factors that might contribute to the differences in tax elasticities of 
patent and trademark location choices. For instance, trademarks are usually easier to register 
and are less costly to develop in comparison to patents. Their development does not 
typically require detailed documentation and they are less likely to depend on a country’s 
endowment in physical or human capital. In addition to this, we find empirical evidence 
which suggests that the less negative tax elasticity of patents in comparison to trademarks 
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might be at least partially due to the agglomeration effect. In other words, patents may be 
less sensitive to taxation than trademarks because they are more likely to be registered in 
the country where the rest of the patent family is located. 
Chapter 6 qualitatively and quantitatively examines diverse aspects of fiscal incentives for 
research and development. The main findings and policy implications of this chapter can be 
summarized as following: 
 Economic justification for the state support of research and development includes the 
existence of positive spillovers from R&D and the presence of asymmetric information in 
the credit markets. 
 Fiscal incentives constitute an important part of the state support of R&D and can be divided 
into input-oriented and output-oriented incentives, depending on the stage of an R&D 
process that they foster. A detailed overview of the existing fiscal incentives in the EU and 
EFTA member states shows that the majority of these countries offer either input- or output-
oriented tax incentives, with some countries having implemented both. By contrast, 
Germany, Estonia, and Sweden are currently the only countries in Europe that do not offer 
any R&D tax incentives.  
 A review of literature on the outcomes of R&D tax incentives indicates that the empirical 
evidence on input-oriented R&D tax incentives points to a strong positive effect of their 
introduction on the innovative activity of the corporate sector. By contrast, the literature on 
output-oriented R&D tax incentives does not find robust evidence for an increase in the real 
R&D activity following the introduction of IP Boxes. 
 We apply the Devereux and Griffith model to calculate effective average tax rates with and 
without R&D tax incentives in Europe in 2012. According to our calculations, R&D tax 
incentives substantially lower a firm’s effective tax burden. This is particularly evident in a 
domestic investment scenario. If a patent is sold to another country (a cross-border 
investment), a capital gains tax applies and input-oriented tax incentives appear to mitigate 
the negative effect of the capital gains taxation by lowering a multinational’s overall 
effective tax burden. Moreover, output-oriented R&D tax incentives might lower the EATR 
in the cross-border case even below the EATR value in a domestic investment case. This 
occurs when a country allows an IP Box to apply to both the self-developed and acquired 
intangible assets. 
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 Finally, we empirically analyze the effects of fiscal incentives for research and development 
and find that both a regular tax system and R&D tax incentives contribute to the 
determination of the extensive and intensive margins of the international collaboration in 
patents. This finding indicates that firms respond to taxation and fiscal incentives by 
strategically allocating their patents, which implies that some types of R&D tax incentives 
might be used for tax planning.  
In summary, the findings of this doctoral thesis point to the existence of profit shifting by 
multinational enterprises and confirm that intellectual property plays an important role in 
enabling BEPS. However, the tax elasticities found through multiple literature reviews and own 
empirical analyses are relatively small (in absolute terms) and therefore suggest that the 
magnitude of profit shifting might be over-estimated by policy makers. The conclusions of the 
thesis yield several valuable policy implications. The first implication suggests that the 
introduction of strict anti-avoidance rules in the European Union might prove to be less 
effective if one takes into consideration their negative influence on real investment in addition 
to their impact on profit shifting. As a second implication, the effectiveness of anti-avoidance 
legislation might be diminished through a substitution between profit shifting channels, which 
implies that there is an interdependency between different anti-avoidance rules. The third 
implication identifies that countermeasures against profit shifting are less effective in the case 
of IP-intensive firms. Royalty payments, IP rights, and even some types of R&D tax incentives 
might be used by IP-intensive multinationals for profit shifting, despite the existence of anti-
avoidance legislation. These conclusions raise doubt about the effectiveness of tightening anti-
avoidance rules in the European Union and indicate the need for rethinking the fundamentals 
of the current international tax system. 
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A    Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A.1 Country Statistics 
  Full Sample IP  Non-IP  
Country Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
Austria 9,017 1.67 6,129 1.88 2,888 1.34 
Belgium 24,799 4.58 12,040 3.70 12,759 5.91 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1,177 0.22 634 0.19 543 0.25 
Bulgaria 3,625 0.67 1,882 0.58 1,743 0.81 
Croatia 5,525 1.02 3,044 0.94 2,481 1.15 
Czech Republic 22,997 4.25 12,333 3.79 10,664 4.94 
Denmark 10,766 1.99 4,956 1.52 5,810 2.69 
Estonia 4,502 0.83 1,841 0.57 2,661 1.23 
Finland 11,011 2.03 7,089 2.18 3,922 1.82 
France 99,863 18.45 70,775 21.74 29,088 13.48 
Germany 35,339 6.53 24,395 7.49 10,944 5.07 
Hungary 2,850 0.53 1,938 0.60 912 0.42 
Iceland 106 0.02 37 0.01 69 0.03 
Ireland 581 0.11 229 0.07 352 0.16 
Italy 54,878 10.14 45,782 14.07 9,096 4.21 
Latvia 102 0.02 57 0.02 45 0.02 
Luxembourg 2,160 0.40 1,112 0.34 1,048 0.49 
Malta 6 0.00 5 0.00 1 0.00 
Montenegro 15 0.00 9 0.00 6 0.00 
Netherlands 8,437 1.56 3,456 1.06 4,981 2.31 
Norway 21,620 3.99 15,117 4.64 6,503 3.01 
Poland 20,952 3.87 11,751 3.61 9,201 4.26 
Portugal 9,086 1.68 4,686 1.44 4,400 2.04 
Romania 20,764 3.84 10,595 3.26 10,169 4.71 
Serbia 6,248 1.15 2,909 0.89 3,339 1.55 
Slovak Republic 5,675 1.05 3,311 1.02 2,364 1.10 
Slovenia 3,310 0.61 2,298 0.71 1,012 0.47 
Spain 55,495 10.25 34,309 10.54 21,186 9.82 
Sweden 24,177 4.47 9,515 2.92 14,662 6.79 
Switzerland 15 0.00 7 0.00 6 0.00 
Ukraine 7,084 1.31 2,552 0.78 4,532 2.10 
UK 69,141 12.77 30,701 9.43 38,440 17.81 
Total 541,323 100 325,494 100 215,827 100 
Notes: This table shows a distribution of observations across countries in the full sample as well as the sample of IP-
intensive firms and the sample of non-IP firms. IP intensity is defined in section 3.5.3. 
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Table A.2 An Overview of Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirements 
Country  Formal Informal 
Austria  - All Sample Years 
Belgium  - All Sample Years 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
 
- Since 2008 
Bulgaria  - Since 2006 
Croatia  Since 2005 - 
Czech 
Republic 
 
- All Sample Years 
Denmark  Since 2006 All Sample Years 
Estonia  Since 2007 - 
Finland  Since 2007 All Sample Years 
France  Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Germany  Since 2003 All Sample Years 
Hungary  Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Iceland  - - 
Ireland  Since 2011 - 
Italy  Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Latvia  - Since 2007 
Luxembourg  - Since 2005 
Malta  - - 
Montenegro  - All Sample Years 
Netherlands  Since 2002 - 
Norway  Since 2008 All Sample Years 
Poland  Since 2001 - 
Portugal  Since 2002 - 
Romania  Since 2007 All Sample Years 
Serbia  - All Sample Years 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
Since 2009 All Sample Years 
Slovenia  Since 2005 - 
Spain  Since 2009 All Sample Years 
Sweden  Since 2007 All Sample Years 
Switzerland  - All Sample Years 
Ukraine  - - 
UK  Since 2008 All Sample Years 
Notes: Formal refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements that are explicitly 
stated in the national law. Informal refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements 
that are not explicitly introduced in the national law but are required to exist in practice. 
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Table A.3 An Overview of Debt-To-Equity Ratios under Thin Capitalization Rules 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Croatia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Czech Republic 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Denmark  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
France 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Germany 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 - - - - - 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy 5 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Latvia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Lithuania 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Romania 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Serbia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Slovenia 0 8 8 8 6 6 6 5 4 
Spain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Table A.4 Special Requirements Regarding Interest Deduction Limitations 
Country Rules 
Belgium 7:1 debt-to-equity ratio if interest is tax-exempt or taxed at a reduced rate at the 
level of a lender. 
France 2004-2006: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies that are 
not resident in one of the treaty-exempted countries. 
Luxembourg 85:15 debt-to-equity ratio if debt is used for the funding of participations or 
real estate located in Luxembourg. 
Portugal  2006-2012: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies. Before: 
an escape possible if a debt-to-equity ratio is considered to be at arm’s length. 
Spain 2004-2011: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies. 
Sweden No deduction of interest paid on intra-group debt relating to the intra-group 
acquisition of shares if there are no justifying business or commercial reasons 
and the income is not subject to tax of at least 10%. 
Ukraine Interest deductible up to a firm’s own interest income and 50% of other income 
if paid to a foreign company. 
UK Included in transfer pricing regulations; generally a 1:1 ratio is used as a 
guideline. 
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Table A.5 Three-Stage Indicator of Interest Deduction Restrictions 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Croatia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Serbia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: The three-stage variable measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. It is denoted as follows: 0: no 
specific interest deduction restrictions; 1: a special rule or a thin capitalization rule with broad exceptions or a debt-to-
equity ratio above 3; 2: thin capitalization rules without broad exception and a debt-to-equity ratio of 3 or lower or 
earnings stripping rules. 
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Table A.6 Descriptive Statistics: Panel Data Analysis 
 
 Full Sample IP  Non-IP  
 Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max 
EBIT 541,323 4,605.62 0.00 9,535,506 325,494 5,127.08 0.00 6,219,053 215,829 3,819.23 0.00 9,535,506 
Fixed Assets 541,323 25,631.88 0.00 5.06E+07 325,494 28,875.49 0.00 5.06E+07 215,829 20,740.31 0.00 3.52E+07 
Costs of Empl. 541,323 7,689.78 0.00 7,336,624 325,494 8,792.55 0.00 7,336,624 215,829 6,026.75 0.00 6,041,358 
             
Interest Paid 375,573 1,480.30 0.00 1.94E+08 238,004 1,755.68 0.00 1.94E+08 137,569 1,003.81 0.00 6,567,206 
Sales 375,573 78,082.02 0.00 1.15E+08 238,004 80,777.43 0.00 5.00E+07 137,569 73,418.77 0.00 1.15E+08 
Net PPE/Assets 375,573 0.18 0.00 79.64 238,004 0.17 0.00 79.64 137,569 0.19 0.00 1.96 
EBITDA/Assets 375,573 0.17 0.00 585.70 238,004 0.16 0.00 329.39 137,569 0.16 0 585.70 
             
Intangibles 541,323 2,665.22 0.00 1.80E+07 325,494 3,722.45 0.00 1.80E+07 215,829 1,055.35 0.00 3,762,855 
Intangibles/Assets  541,323 0.01 0.00 0.99 325,494 0.02 0.00 0.99 215,829 0.00 0.00 0.00 
             
CIT 541,323 0.29 0.09 0.40 325,494 0.30 0.09 0.40 215,829 0.28 0.09 0.40 
TP Doc Years 541,323 1.53 0.00 11.00 325,494 1.46 0.00 11.00 215,829 1.63 0.00 11.00 
TP Doc Binary 541,323 0.49 0.00 1.00 325,494 0.49 0.00 1.00 215,829 0.51 0.00 1.00 
TP Doc Years +  
Doc Required in Practice 
541,323 2.51 0.00 12.00 325,494 2.45 0.00 12.00 215,829 2.6 0.00 12.00 
TC 3-stage 541,323 1.24 0.00 2.00 325,494 1.28 0.00 2.00 215,829 1.18 0.00 2.00 
TC 1/ (1+ σ) 375,573 0.18 0.00 0.50 238,004 0.21 0.00 0.50 137,569 0.16 0.00 0.50 
             
Corruption 541,323 1.18 -1.03 2.56 325,494 1.15 -1.03 2.56 215,829 1.23 -1.03 2.56 
Unemployment Rate 541,323 8.57 2.30 31.80 325,494 8.63 2.30 31.80 215,829 8.45 2.30 31.80 
Inflation 541,323 2.74 -1.71 25.20 325,494 2.61 -1.71 25.20 215,829 2.94 -1.71 25.20 
GDP 541,323 1.09E+12 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 325,494 1.15E+12 2.18E+09 2.55E+12 215,829 9.88E+11 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 
GDP/capita 541,323 25,751.01 1421.18 70,569.24 325,494 26,021.74 1,421.18 70,569.24 215,829 25,342.54 1,421.18 70,569.24 
GDP Growth Rate 541,323 1.47 -14.80 12.10 325,494 1.37 -14.80 12.10 215,829 1.63 -14.80 12.10 
Growth Options 375,573 0.06 -0.99 140.86 238,004 0.06 -0.99 140.86 137,569 0.06 -0.99 23.57 
Notes: The number of observations is 541,323 in the regressions with Log(EBIT) as a dependent variable (see section 3.6.1.1) and 375,573 in the regressions with Log(Interest Paid) as a 
dependent variable (see section 3.6.1.2). EBIT denotes earnings before interest and taxes. Fixed Assets represents total fixed assets. Cost of Empl. stands for the cost of employees. Interest 
Paid denotes a firm’s interest payments. Sales stands for a company’s total turnover. Net PPE/Assets is a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. EBITDA/Assets 
is a ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Intangibles shows total intangible assets of a company. Intangibles/Assets represents a mean of the 
MNE’s intangibles to total assets. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP-variables measure the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC-variables measure the strictness of interest 
deduction limitations. Corruption represents a corruption index. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Inflation denotes a country’s rate of inflation. GDP denotes 
a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per-capita. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. 
Growth Options denotes the median annual sales growth per industry and country. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of 
all other companies. 
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Table A.7 Descriptive Statistics: Difference-In-Difference Estimation 
Panel A. Full Sample       
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 120 8,377.94 3,373.41 11,857.69 156.30 53,744.78 
Costs of Empl. 120 15,506.77 9,793.83 20,690.72 851.26 110,785 
Fixed Assets 120 55,012 11,621.67 136,975.80 78.09 704,268.70 
       
Control Group       
EBIT 5,508 11,893.03 718.48 106,761.80 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 5,508 16,833.22 2,011.11 73,509.92 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed Assets 5,508 39,757.99 1,007.44 265,506.80 0.00 4,920,454 
       
All Firms       
EBIT 5,628 11,818.08 745.51 105,632.60 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 5,628 16,804.94 2,075.49 72,784.34 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed Assets 5,628 40,083.24 1,039.74 263,423.90 0.00 4,920,454 
       
Panel B. IP-Intensive Firms 
     
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 60 10,025.57 4,050.25 13,793.34 209.69 53,744.78 
Costs of Empl. 60 21,617.45 11,612.07 26,851.96 851.26 110,785 
Fixed Assets 60 81,250.91 16,460.96 186,250.40 321.64 704,268.70 
       
Control Group       
EBIT 2,976 15,668.66 1,274.36 135,135.90 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 2,976 21,241.59 3,739.15 59,276.42 2.78 641,069 
Fixed Assets 2,976 56,932.31 2,097.93 332,521.40 0.00 4,920,454 
       
All Firms       
EBIT 3,036 15,557.14 1,337.52 133,809.60 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 3,036 21,249.02 3,869.67 58,806.89 2.78 641,069 
Fixed Assets 3,036 57,412.92 2,166.21 330,258.10 0.00 4,920,454 
Notes: EBIT stands for earnings before interest and taxes. Cost of Empl. stands for the cost of employees. Fixed Assets 
represents total fixed assets. IP-intensive firms are defined in section 3.5.3 
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Table A.8 Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of Anti-Avoidance Legislation: 
Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
TP Measure: TP Doc Years TP Doc Binary 
TP Doc Years + TP 
Doc required in 
practice 
TC Measure: 
1/ (1 )  
   TC D/E Ratio TC 3-stage TC 3-stage 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -1.207*** 0.345 -0.103 0.970*** -1.018*** 0.203 
 (0.291) (0.319) (0.250) (0.301) (0.285) (0.348) 
TP 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT*TP 0.999*** 0.915*** 0.677** 0.366 0.557*** 0.453*** 
 (0.122) (0.139) (0.267) (0.314) (0.101) (0.119) 
TC 0.036 0.066 0.016* 0.068*** 0.027*** 0.077*** 
 (0.096) (0.109) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
CIT*TC 1.761 -1.572 0.025 -0.518*** 0.177 -0.566*** 
 (1.184) (1.351) (0.146) (0.176) (0.161) (0.194) 
TP*TC -0.188*** -0.275*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT*TP*TC -2.729*** -2.325*** -0.761*** -0.680*** -0.264*** -0.180*** 
 (0.400) (0.472) (0.169) (0.201) (0.056) (0.068) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.085*** 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.414*** 0.385*** 0.400*** 0.386*** 0.399*** 0.385*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.016 0.053* -0.000 0.006 -0.010 0.012 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) -1.048*** -1.760*** 0.718*** 0.345 0.118 -0.315 
 (0.306) (0.367) (0.263) (0.311) (0.273) (0.322) 
Log(GDP/capita) 1.097*** 1.890*** -0.578** -0.259 0.110 0.528* 
 (0.288) (0.338) (0.238) (0.278) (0.260) (0.297) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 57,719 42,163 60,732 42,981 60,729 42,980 
No. of Observations 280,267 201,728 325,494 215,827 325,417 215,757 
R2 (within) 0.094 0.085 0.092 0.082 0.092 0.082 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures 
the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. 
Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a 
company’s fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate 
of unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP 
growth. Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands 
for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per-capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-
intensive firms as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table A.9 Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of Anti-Avoidance Legislation: 
Log(Interest Paid) as a Dependent Variable 
TP Measure: TP Doc Years TP Doc Binary 
TP Doc Years + TP Doc 
required in practice 
TC Measure: 
1/ (1 )  
   TC D/E Ratio TC 3-stage TC 3-stage 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -0.788 3.344*** 0.837 2.875*** 0.371 3.177*** 
 (0.862) (0.930) (0.635) (0.783) (0.649) (0.818) 
TP 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.012 0.022** -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.026) (0.029) (0.011) (0.013) 
CIT*TP 1.636*** 0.920*** 3.911*** 1.601** 0.910*** 0.176 
 (0.273) (0.314) (0.536) (0.669) (0.184) (0.231) 
TC -0.584** -0.579** 0.113*** 0.051** 0.036* -0.007 
 (0.255) (0.248) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) 
CIT*TC -3.291 -13.268*** -2.108*** -2.367*** -2.323*** -2.989*** 
 (3.247) (3.447) (0.366) (0.428) (0.373) (0.443) 
TP*TC -0.265*** -0.277*** -0.095*** -0.071*** 0.014*** 0.017** 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.016) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) 
CIT*TP*TC -6.338*** -3.957*** -2.909*** -1.332*** -0.511*** -0.092 
 (0.948) (1.103) (0.346) (0.429) (0.104) (0.130) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.172 1.469*** 0.217 1.426*** 0.214 1.421*** 
 (0.198) (0.078) (0.229) (0.075) (0.227) (0.075) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.008 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Log(Sales) 0.615*** 0.609*** 0.632*** 0.600*** 0.635*** 0.603*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Corruption 0.051 0.033 0.170*** 0.111* 0.156*** 0.148** 
 (0.054) (0.064) (0.046) (0.062) (0.048) (0.064) 
Inflation -0.004 -0.027*** 0.004 -0.027*** -0.006 -0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Growth Options -0.006 -0.203*** -0.007 -0.193*** -0.005 -0.165*** 
 (0.006) (0.033) (0.007) (0.033) (0.006) (0.033) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 49,536 32,282 52,761 33,188 52,759 33,187 
No. of Observations 197,496 125,963 238,004 137,569 237,995 137,558 
R2 (within) 0.062 0.069 0.061 0.064 0.062 0.064 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(Interest Paid), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s interest payments. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction limitations. Net PPE/Assets, 
EBITDA/Assets, and Log(Sales) are firm-level controls and represent a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets, its ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, and 
a natural logarithm of its sales respectively. Corruption represents a corruption index and indicates the level of 
governance and political risk in a country. Inflation stands for a country’s rate of inflation. Growth Options denotes 
the median annual sales growth per industry and country. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-
intensive firms as defined in section 3.5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies.  
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Table A.10 Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of IP Intensity: Log(EBIT) as a 
Dependent Variable 
 IP2 Non-IP2 IP3 Non-IP3 IP4 Non-IP4 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -0.450* 0.353 -0.525* 0.046 -0.581** 0.647** 
 (0.270) (0.285) (0.274) (0.298) (0.261) (0.298) 
TP 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT*TP 0.613*** 0.431*** 0.513*** 0.528*** 0.617*** 0.379*** 
 (0.108) (0.116) (0.112) (0.120) (0.107) (0.118) 
TC 0.007 0.044*** 0.011 0.044*** 0.008 0.043*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT*TC -0.143 -0.531*** -0.044 -0.348** -0.073 -0.655*** 
 (0.152) (0.159) (0.154) (0.166) (0.148) (0.165) 
TP*TC -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT*TP*TC -0.275*** -0.187*** -0.248*** -0.222*** -0.298*** -0.131* 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.062) (0.068) (0.059) (0.068) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.399*** 0.387*** 0.405*** 0.375*** 0.401*** 0.382*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.014 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) 0.096 -0.288 0.292 -0.301 0.130 -0.275 
 (0.287) (0.300) (0.298) (0.316) (0.279) (0.311) 
Log(GDP/capita) 0.149 0.509* 0.016 0.507* 0.130 0.543* 
 (0.274) (0.278) (0.290) (0.288) (0.266) (0.287) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 52,985 50,728 66,842 68,459 60,389 43,324 
No. of Observations 284,806 256,515 278,859 261,107 323,655 217,666 
R2 (within) 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.093 0.081 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural logarithm 
of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness 
of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log(Fixed Assets) and 
Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the cost 
of employees respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents 
a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of 
a country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per-capita. 
FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other 
companies. 
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Table A.11 Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of IP Intensity: Log(Interest Paid) 
as a Dependent Variable 
 IP2 Non-IP2 IP3 Non-IP3 IP4 Non-IP4 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -0.140 2.971*** 0.664 2.343*** -0.380 2.055** 
 (0.743) (0.726) (0.669) (0.782) (0.686) (0.831) 
TP 0.018 -0.010 0.014 -0.005 0.032** 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) 
CIT*TP 0.750*** 0.336 0.814*** 0.171 0.998*** 0.661** 
 (0.271) (0.274) (0.258) (0.287) (0.256) (0.305) 
TC 0.009 -0.022 0.033 -0.030 0.034 0.008 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
CIT*TC -1.685*** -3.107*** -2.336*** -2.308*** -1.667*** -2.674*** 
 (0.423) (0.387) (0.375) (0.428) (0.382) (0.434) 
TP*TC 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
CIT*TP*TC -0.331** 0.016 -0.324** 0.035 -0.376*** -0.113 
 (0.150) (0.153) (0.143) (0.160) (0.140) (0.165) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.178 1.459*** 0.195 1.517*** 0.638*** 0.597*** 
 (0.196) (0.068) (0.206) (0.071) (0.017) (0.017) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.045* -0.001 -0.051* -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.028) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
Log(Sales) 0.645*** 0.602*** 0.626*** 0.624*** 0.197 1.411*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.216) (0.071) 
Corruption 0.114** 0.159*** 0.060 0.213*** -0.011** -0.034*** 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.059) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.009* -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.023*** 0.051 0.050 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.051) (0.064) 
Growth Options -0.006 -0.141*** -0.006 -0.189*** -0.006 -0.137*** 
 (0.006) (0.036) (0.006) (0.033) (0.006) (0.037) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 46,763 39,186 56,802 52,005 52,370 33,569 
No. of Observations 212,641 162,932 210,033 164,672 236,230 139,328 
R2 (within) 0.063 0.063 0.060 0.064 0.061 0.066 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(Interest Paid), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s interest payments. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction limitations. Net PPE/Assets, 
EBITDA/Assets, and Log(Sales) are firm-level controls and represent a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets, its ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, 
and a natural logarithm of its sales respectively. Corruption represents a corruption index and indicates the level of 
governance and political risk in a country. Inflation stands for a country’s rate of inflation. Growth Options denotes 
the median annual sales growth per industry and country. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-
intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table A.12 Regression Results Using the Sample with Ultimate Owners 
Dependent variable:  Log(EBIT) Log(Interest Paid) 
 Full  IP  Non-IP  Full  IP  Non-IP  
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -0.008 -0.426* 0.378 0.718* 0.121 2.069*** 
 (0.175) (0.236) (0.269) (0.432) (0.586) (0.686) 
TP 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.005 0.020* -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) 
CIT*TP 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.515*** 0.799*** 1.142*** 0.172 
 (0.073) (0.099) (0.109) (0.170) (0.218) (0.274) 
TC 0.027*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.011 0.024 -0.025 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) 
CIT*TC -0.337*** -0.107 -0.534*** -2.162*** -1.979*** -2.456*** 
 (0.100) (0.135) (0.152) (0.244) (0.333) (0.378) 
TP*TC -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.028*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT*TP*TC -0.235*** -0.261*** -0.202*** -0.289*** -0.449*** 0.031 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.063) (0.095) (0.122) (0.153) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.082***    
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)    
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.394*** 0.405*** 0.378***    
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)    
Net PPE/Assets    0.355 0.230 1.371*** 
    (0.305) (0.237) (0.071) 
EBITDA/Assets    -0.005* -0.011 -0.002 
    (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) 
Log(Sales)    0.607*** 0.635*** 0.575*** 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Unemployment Rate -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010***    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
GDP Growth Rate 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Log(GDP/capita) 0.185 -0.115 0.482*    
 (0.183) (0.251) (0.270)    
Log(GDP) 0.086 0.376 -0.139    
 (0.193) (0.261) (0.292)    
Corruption 0.003 -0.003 0.018 0.095*** 0.080* 0.119** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.044) (0.058) 
Inflation    -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.035*** 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Growth Options    -0.012* -0.006 -0.174*** 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.036) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Frim FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 114,918 66,877 48,041 95,225 58,499 36,726 
No. of Observations 605,489 362,482 243,007 423,342 268,919 154,423 
R2 (within) 0.089 0.095 0.082 0.059 0.062 0.062 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Units 
of observation are firms. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC 
measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and 
represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the cost of employees respectively. Net PPE/Assets, EBITDA/Assets, 
and Log(Sales) are firm-level controls and represent a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets, its 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, and a natural logarithm of its sales 
respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP 
growth. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per-capita. Corruption represents a corruption index. 
Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Inflation stands for a country’s rate of inflation. 
Growth Options denotes the median annual sales growth per industry and country. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a 
sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
Appendices            271 
 
 
 
B    Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix B1. Theoretical Considerations: An Alternative Setting 
The baseline model presented in section 4.2.2 assumes a non-deductibility of profit shifting 
costs. This assumption is valid if we consider shifting costs related to concealment, tax 
penalties, negative publicity, or economic inefficiency. However, there might also be costs 
related to legal and accounting services that arise from profit shifting. If we refer to Hines 
(1995) and assume that these costs are tax deductible at the level of a shifting subsidiary, 
equation 4.1 takes on the following form: 
𝛱 = (1 − τs )(𝑆(𝑅, 𝑅
∗, 𝜑) – 𝑅∗ −  𝛼
(𝑅 − 𝑟)2
𝑅
) + (1 − τr)𝜋𝑟 + (τs − τ𝑟)𝑟 (B.1) 
The first term of equation B.1 represents the after-tax profits of the subsidiary. As mentioned 
above, it is assumed that this affiliate is allowed to deduct shifting costs for tax purposes. The 
rest of the equation is analogous to equation 4.1. Hence, the second term shows the after-tax 
profits of the parent firm and the third term describes the after-tax royalty payments transferred 
from a source country S to the recipient country R. τs represents the statutory corporate income 
tax rate in a source country and τr denotes the statutory CIT rate in the recipient country. The 
first order condition of 𝛱  describing the optimal choice of royalties then reads: 
∂Π
𝜕r
= (1 − τs)
2𝛼 (R − r)
𝑅
 +  (τs − τ𝑟) = 0 (B.2) 
which yields 
𝑟 =  𝑅 (1 −  
(τ𝑟  −  τs)
(1 −  τs)2𝛼
 ) (B.3) 
As shown in equation B.3, the corporate income tax rates of the source and recipient countries 
appear to influence optimal royalty payments under the assumption of a tax deductibility of the 
expenses related to profit shifting; however, the tax terms that arise under this assumption are 
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less straightforward to interpret than in the case of our benchmark analysis.256 We calculate the 
main independent variables of interest assuming the tax deductibility of shifting costs and 
present the estimation results in Table B.1.  
Table B.1 Results under an Alternative Assumption Regarding Shifting Costs 
 Dep. Variable.: Royalty Intensity Dep. Variable.: Royalty Flows 
 I II III IV 
τs /(1-τs ) 1.220*** 1.355** 1.174** 1.252* 
(0.432) (0.625) (0.538) (0.709) 
Tsr/(1-τs ) 
  
-3.896*** -4.057*** -3.783*** -3.767*** 
(1.365) (1.130) (1.286) (1.130) 
Log(R&D Exp.)  0.883***  0.882*** 
   (0.133)  (0.134) 
Log(GDP/capita)  -1.612*  -1.768** 
   (0.854)  (0.796) 
Log(Population)  2.325  1.907 
   (1.616)  (1.604) 
Property Rights  0.035***  0.034*** 
   (0.012)  (0.012) 
Log(Trade btw. S and R)  0.219  0.472*** 
   (0.177)  (0.175) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Three-Way Cluster ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Pseudo R2 0.873 0.939 0.871 0.938 
Observations 61,596 61,596 61,596 61,596 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Three-Way Cluster implies that standard 
errors are clustered at (and may be correlated within) base groups (source country S, recipient country R, and 
year) as well as every combination of the three. Pseudo R2 represents the likelihood ratio index, also known as 
McFadden’s R2. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model is applied in all estimations. Observational units are 
country-pairs. The dependent variable in columns I-II is the ratio of Royalty Flows in relation to Output in S (total 
value added of firms in country S); the ratio of royalties to output is analyzed by employing output as an exposure 
variable. The dependent variable in columns III-IV is Royalty Flows, which denotes total royalty flow from 
country S to R. Tsr is a tax rate on royalty flows from S to R. τs represents statutory corporate income tax rate in 
S. Log (R&D Exp.) is a logarithm of total R&D expenditure in R. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per-capita in 
R. Log (Population) denotes a logarithm of country R’s total population. Property Rights represents a level of 
intellectual property rights protection in R. Log(Trade btw.S and R) depicts a logarithm of total trade in goods 
between S and R. 
According to Table B.1, assuming tax deductibility of shifting costs produces results that are 
similar to the baseline findings. For example, taxation of royalty flows appears to have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the intensity and the amount of bilateral royalty 
flows. The tax elasticity of royalty intensity is equal to -1.7 and therefore is slightly lower in 
                                                          
256 The benchmark estimations are based on evaluating the effects of τs and Tsr on the intensity of bilateral royalty 
flows. By contrast, this strategy leads to estimating the effects of τs /(1- τs ) and Tsr/(1- τs ), which are the ratios of 
tax rates on royalties in relation to a source country’s taxation. 
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absolute terms than our benchmark estimate of -2.3. However, this value is still more negative 
than the tax elasticity of -1.0 reported by Hines (1995), whose methodology we closely follow 
in Table B.1. The major difference between our baseline results and the outcomes shown in 
Table B.1 is a statistically significant coefficient on the source country’s taxation, which turned 
out to be insignificant in our baseline specification (see Table 4.5). The positive effect of a 
source country’s taxation on royalty flows is in line with our theoretical considerations 
presented in equations B.1-B.3. 
Appendix B2. Complementary Tables 
Table B.2 A List of Countries Included in the Study 
Argentina Finland Latvia Russian Federation 
Australia France Lithuania Singapore 
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovakia 
Belgium Greece Malaysia Slovenia 
Brazil Hong Kong Malta South Africa 
Bulgaria Hungary Mexico Spain 
Canada Iceland Morocco Sweden 
Chile India Netherlands Switzerland 
China Indonesia New Zealand Thailand 
Croatia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Nigeria Turkey 
Cyprus Ireland Norway United Kingdom 
Czech Republic Israel Philippines United States 
Denmark Italy Poland Uruguay 
Egypt Japan Portugal Venezuela 
Estonia Korea (Republic of) Romania  
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Table B.3 Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source Unit 
Royalty Intensity Royalty Flows/ Output Own calculation A ratio, % 
Royalty Flows Payments for the authorized use of 
intangibles, non-produced, non-financial 
assets, and proprietary rights (such as 
patents, trademarks, industrial processes, 
franchises) and the use, through licensing 
agreements, of produced originals or 
prototypes (such as manuscripts and 
films). 
OECD database Trade 
in Services.EBOPS257 
and Eurostat database 
International Trade in 
Services.bop_its6_det
258 
Million 
USD, 
current 
prices  
Output  Total revenues of firms measured as the 
value added of the corporate sector. 
Value added is the net output after adding 
up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. 
World Bank259 Million 
USD, 
current 
prices 
τs and τr Statutory corporate income tax rates in a 
source country S and a recipient country 
R. 
Global Corporate Tax 
Handbook260 
% 
ws  A withholding tax rate on royalty 
outflows in country S. 
Global Corporate Tax 
Handbook, the IBFD 
Research Platform261 
% 
Tsr The effective tax rate on royalty transfers 
from country S to country R. It 
incorporates all possible taxes on royalty 
payments in both countries (e.g. a 
withholding tax at source, a statutory tax 
on royalty income in the recipient 
country, and any other taxes on royalties). 
Own calculation  % 
τr – τs 
 
The unweighted difference between the 
tax rates on royalty income in recipient 
country R and source country S.  
 
Own calculation % 
                                                          
257 See OECD (2002, 2010). 
258 See Eurostat (2010). 
259 See World Bank (2016a) and World Bank (2016b). 
260 See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) (1995-2012). 
261 For more information see http://www.ibfd.org/ 
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τr – τj 
 
The unweighted average of tax differences 
between the tax rate on royalty income in 
R and tax rates on royalty income in the 
remaining fifty-eight countries J. 
Own calculation % 
τr – τj (affil.weight) The weighted average of tax differences 
between the tax rate on royalty income in 
R and tax rates on royalty income in the 
remaining fifty-eight countries J; the 
weight represents a number of R’s foreign 
affiliates in each country J. 
Own calculation, 
micro-level data on 
the number of foreign 
affiliates is from the 
Orbis database, 
Bureau van Dijk. 
% 
τr – τj 
(assets.weight) 
The weighted average of tax differences 
between tax rate on royalty income in R 
and tax rates on royalty income in the 
remaining fifty-eight countries J; the 
weight represents the total assets of R’s 
foreign affiliates in each country J. 
Own calculation, 
micro-level data on 
the assets of foreign 
affiliates is from the 
Orbis database, 
Bureau van Dijk. 
% 
τr – τj (FDI weight) The weighted average of tax differences 
between tax rate on royalty income in R 
and tax rates on royalty income in the 
remaining fifty-eight countries J; the 
weight represents country R’s FDI in each 
country J. 
Own calculation, data 
on FDI is from OECD 
database FDI 
Positions by Partner 
Country 262 
% 
R&D Exp. A total amount of a country’s expenditure 
on research and development. 
OECD database Gross 
Domestic Expenditure 
on R-D by Sector of 
Performance and 
Source of Funds263 
Million 
USD, 
current 
prices 
GDP/capita Gross domestic product per-capita. World Bank 
Development 
Indicators264 
USD, 
current 
prices 
Population Total population. World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
Total 
Property Rights An index ranging from 1 to 100. It 
represents the level of property rights 
protection in a country. 
Heritage 
Foundation265 
An index 
                                                          
262 See OECD (2014b). 
263 See OECD (2014c). 
264 See World Bank (2015). 
265 For more information see http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
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Trade Bilateral trade in goods. OECD database STAN 
Bilateral Trade in 
Goods266 
Thousand 
USD, 
current 
prices  
IP_BoxAcq A dummy variable, which is equal to one 
if an IP Box regime is applicable to 
acquired IP and to zero otherwise. 
Evers et al. (2015a) 
and our own research 
1/0 
IP_Box A dummy variable, which is equal to one 
if an IP Box regime is applicable to self-
developed IP and to zero otherwise. 
Evers et al. (2015a) 
and our own research 
1/0 
B_Index An index. The lower the B-Index, the 
more attractive the tax system is for R&D 
investments. 
Ernst and Spengel 
(2011), Thomson 
(2013), Chen and 
Dauchy (2015), and 
our own research 
An index 
CFC Rules A dummy variable, which acquires the 
value of one if controlled foreign 
company rules apply between S and R 
and the value of zero otherwise. 
Karkinsky and Riedel 
(2012) and our own 
research 
1/0 
TP Rules  An index which indicates on a scale from 
0 to 5 the presence and strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations in a country. 
Zinn et al. (2014) and 
our own research 
An index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
266 See OECD (2014d). 
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Table B.4 Countries with IP Boxes in Place, 2012 
Country 
IP Box Tax 
Rate 
Statutory Tax 
Rate 
Type of IP allowed 
Acquired Existing 
Belgium 6.8 33.9 N N 
China 0-12.51 25 N2 N 
Cyprus 2.5 10 Y Y 
France 16.2 34.4 Y Y 
Hungary 9.5 19 Y Y 
Liechtenstein 2.5 12.5 Y N 
Luxembourg 5.8 28.9 Y3 Y 
Malta 0 35 Y N 
Netherlands 5 25 N N 
Spain 12 30 N Y 
Notes: 1The exact rate depends on the income size. 2IP developed outside of China is not allowed 
to be included in the IP Box. 3In Luxembourg acquired IP is only eligible for the IP Box under 
certain circumstances. The time span of this variable is 1995-2012; the year 2012 was chosen in 
this table because it is the last year of observation in our sample. Please note that since 2012 
countries such as Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK have introduced IP Boxes. Statutory tax 
rates correspond to the corporate income tax including any surcharges (Belgium, France, and 
Luxembourg), local taxes (Luxembourg) and other taxes. Abbreviations: Y: Yes, N: No. Sources: 
Evers et al. (2015a) and our own research. 
Table B.5 B-Index, 2012 
Country B-Index Country B-Index 
Australia 0.808 Luxembourg 1.008 
Austria 0.887 Mexico 1.013 
Belgium 0.798 Netherlands 0.917 
Canada 0.823 New Zealand 0.827 
Chile 1.011 Norway 0.790 
Czech Republic 0.798 Poland 1.011 
Denmark 0.789 Portugal 0.498 
Finland 1.009 Slovakia 1.008 
France 0.944 Slovenia 0.915 
Greece 0.994 Spain 0.485 
Hungary 0.708 Sweden 1.013 
Iceland 1.014 Switzerland 1.007 
Ireland 0.944 Turkey 0.762 
Italy 0.819 UK 0.915 
Japan 0.864 US 0.959 
Korea 0.900     
Notes: The time span of this variable is 1995-2012; the year 2012 was chosen 
in this table because it is the last year of observation in our sample. Sources: 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Thomson (2013), Chen and Dauchy (2015), and 
our own calculations. 
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Table B.6 Countries with CFC Rules in Place, 2012 
Country Conditions, under which CFC Rules are Binding 
Argentina Countries that are not on the “Co-operative States” list 
Australia Countries that are not on the “Co-operative States” list 
Brazil Always binding 
Canada Always binding 
China Effective tax rate is < 50% of Chinese tax and a country is not on the “White 
List” 
Denmark Always binding 
Egypt Effective tax rate is < 75% of the Egyptian tax 
Estonia Effective tax rate is < 33% of Estonian tax and a country is not on the “White 
List” 
Finland Effective tax rate is < 60% of Finnish tax or a country is on the “Grey List” 
France Effective tax rate is < 50% of French tax 
Germany Effective tax rate is < 25%  
Iceland Effective tax rate is < 66% of Icelandic tax 
Israel Effective tax rate is < 15% 
Italy Effective tax rate is < 50% of Italian tax or a country is on the “Black List” 
Japan Effective tax rate is < 20%  
Korea Average effective tax rate is < 15% for most recent consecutive three years 
Lithuania Effective tax rate is < 75% of Lithuanian tax or a country is on the “Black 
List” 
Mexico Effective tax rate is < 75% of Mexican tax  
New Zealand Countries that are on the “Grey List” 
Norway Effective tax rate is < 66% of Norwegian tax or a country is on the “Black 
List”1 
Portugal Effective tax rate is < 60% of Portuguese tax or a country is on the “Black 
List” 
South Africa Effective tax rate is < 75% of South African tax 
Spain Effective tax rate is < 75% of the Spanish tax 
Sweden Effective tax rate is < 55% of Swedish tax, except a country is on the “White 
List” 
Turkey Effective tax rate is < 10% 
UK Effective tax rate is < 75% of British tax 
Uruguay Effective tax rate is < 12% 
US Always binding 
Notes: 1The rules do not apply if a tax treaty exists. The time span of this variable is 1995-2012; the year 2012 
was chosen in this table because it is the last year of observation in our sample. Since 2006 the rules do not apply 
within the European Economic Area, except in special cases. CFC stands for controlled foreign company. 
Sources: Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and our own research. 
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Table B.7 Overview of International Transfer Pricing Regulations, 2012 
Country TP Rules Country TP Rules Country TP Rules 
Argentina 5 Hungary 4 Norway 4 
Australia 4 Iceland 1 Philippines 2 
Austria 2 India 5 Poland 4 
Belgium 2 Indonesia 5 Portugal 4 
Brazil 5 Iran 0 Romania 3 
Bulgaria 2 Ireland 3 Russia 3 
Canada 4 Israel 4 Singapore 2 
Chile 1 Italy 4 Slovakia 3 
China 5 Japan 4 Slovenia 4 
Croatia 2 Korea 4 South Africa 3 
Cyprus 0 Latvia 2 Spain 3 
Czech Rep. 2 Lithuania 3 Sweden 3 
Denmark 4 Luxembourg 2 Switzerland 2 
Egypt 3 Malaysia 4 Thailand 2 
Estonia 4 Malta 0 Turkey 4 
Finland 4 Morocco 2 UK 3 
France 3 Mexico 5 Uruguay 2 
Germany 3 Netherlands 4 US 4 
Greece 4 New Zealand 2 Venezuela 4 
Hong Kong 2 Nigeria 0   
Notes: TP stands for transfer pricing. The time span of this variable is 1995-2012; the year 2012 was chosen in 
this table because it is the last year of observation in our sample. The index acquires the following values:  
0: no transfer pricing regulations;  
1: arm’s length principle was introduced in the national tax law;  
2: transfer pricing documentation requirement is not introduced, but documentation is required to exist in practice;  
3: documentation requirement is introduced in the national tax law, but full documentation must be provided only 
upon request;  
4: a short disclosure of transfer pricing documentation is required;  
5: a long disclosure of transfer pricing documentation is required.  
Sources: Zinn et al. (2014) and our own research. 
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C    Appendix to Chapter 5 
Appendix C1. Replication of Griffith et al. (2014)  
This study is based on the identification strategy applied by Griffith et al. (2014). Even though 
the estimation approaches are the same, the two papers slightly differ in their data samples. In 
order to examine these differences in more detail, we replicate the estimation of Griffith et al. 
(2014) as closely as possible in this part of the paper. Table C.1 presents the results of 
replicating Griffith et al. (2014) and gradually moving away from their sample to the one used 
in our paper. Similarly to the robustness checks and extended analysis, all estimations in Table 
C.1 employ data on non-large firms of the engineering sector as a representative sample. 
Column I of Table C.1 presents the results reported by Griffith et al. (2014).267 Column II shows 
the closest replication of these results that we achieve. Column III adds data from the US patent 
and trademark office to the sample (the study by Griffith et al. (2014) is based on data from the 
European patent office only). It becomes apparent from the table that the gradual alteration of 
the original sample does not significantly influence the key findings. The coefficient on the tax 
rate and its interaction with a measure of patent quality remain negative and statistically 
significant.  
The last two columns of Table C.1 present the baseline results of our study. The major 
difference between column III and column IV is the period of observation. The estimation in 
column III uses data on patent applications between 1985 and 2005, whereas the specification 
in column IV employs data on patent applications between 1996 and 2012.268 Another minor 
difference concerns the variable IP Rights Protection. Referring to Griffith et al. (2014), in the 
sample of 1985-2005 this control variable is based on a measure developed by Ginarte and Park 
(1997) and Park (2008). However, as the equivalent data is not available for a later time frame, 
we use statistics from the Heritage Foundation, as described in section 5.4.3, to construct this 
variable for our analysis. As shown in column IV, the change in the time period slightly 
                                                          
267 See Griffith et al. (2014), p. 20. 
268 We use a more recent time period in our benchmark analysis because the information on trademark applications 
between 1985 and 1995 is not available to us. 
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increases (in absolute terms) the coefficient on Tax Rate. Column V displays the key 
contribution of this paper, which is the estimation of the impact of taxation on trademark 
location choices. The coefficient on Tax Rate in column V turns out to be more negative than 
in column IV, confirming Hypothesis 2 of this study. 
Table C.1 Replication of Griffith et al. (2014) 
  1985-2005 
Our Replication 
(1985-2005) 
Our Results  
(1996-2012) 
  
Griffith et 
al. (2014) 
Closest 
Replication 
of Griffith et 
al.(2014)  
Column II + 
USPTO Data 
Patents 
(Column IV, 
but different 
time period) 
Trademarks 
  I II III IV V 
Tax Rate -4.88*** -3.471*** -3.481*** -4.969*** -7.217*** 
  (0.24) (0.049) (0.049) (0.074) (0.114) 
Tax Rate*Quality -0.66** -2.924*** -2.925*** -2.804*** -3.085*** 
  (0.28) (0.059) (0.060) (0.113) (0.262) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 3.17*** 1.766*** 2.859*** 4.233*** 6.235*** 
  (0.27) (0.138) (0.095) (0.102) (0.139) 
Real Activity 7.03*** 8.628*** 8.736*** 8.362***   
  (0.09) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063)   
Real Activity (Std.Dev.) 2.96*** 4.420*** 4.627*** 4.273***   
 (0.08) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)   
High IP Rights Protection 0.19* 0.452*** 0.423*** 0.963*** 0.176*** 
 (0.10) (0.011) (0.010) (0.036) (0.041) 
GDP 0.43*** -0.014* 0.055*** 1.128*** 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) 
BERD 0.09** 3.49e-05 0.004 -0.517*** 0.203*** 
  (0.04) (0.021) (0.021) (0.053) (0.037) 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Results are based on non-large firms of the 
engineering sector. The dependent variable is location choice in one of the countries shown in Table 5.1. Location-
industry-firm size fixed effects are included in all estimations. Tax Rate stands for a host country’s tax rate levied 
on the income from intangible assets and incorporates taxation under IP Boxes and CFC rules. Quality is a dummy 
variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality (applications filed at multiple offices). Real Activity is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if at least one of the intangible’s inventors resides in the given country and 
takes on the value of zero otherwise. High IP Rights Protection represents an indicator of a country’s level of 
intellectual property rights protection. GDP denotes a country’s gross domestic product. BERD stands for a 
country’s business expenditure on research and development in relation to its GDP. 
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In summary, there are two differences between the samples used in Griffith et al. (2014) and 
our study. First, we use USPTO data in addition to the EPO information employed by Griffith 
et al. (2014). Secondly, Griffith et al. (2014) consider the time span between 1985 and 2005, 
whereas we concentrate on the period between 1996 and 2012. Despite these differences 
between the two studies, our key findings are consistent with Griffith et al. (2014), as the 
analysis in Table C.1 shows. 
Appendix C2. Results with Subsidiaries of US Corporations 
Our benchmark analysis is based on the estimation approach of Griffith et al. (2014), and in 
line with the authors, we include in our sample companies with parent firms in one of these 
fourteen countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In this section, 
we additionally include in our sample companies with parent firms in the Unites States and 
show the corresponding estimation results in Table C.2. 
Table C.2 Results with Subsidiaries of US Corporations 
Panel A. Patents 
Industry Electrical   Engineering   Chemical 
Size    Large      Non-Large      Large      Non-Large     Large     Non-Large 
Tax Rate -5.554*** -6.118***   -5.681*** -3.475***   -4.792*** -4.758*** 
  (0.054) (0.048)   (0.063) (0.031)   (0.099) (0.054) 
Tax Rate*Quality -2.052*** -0.478***   -3.351*** -1.429***   -2.066*** 0.297*** 
  (0.067) (0.061)   (0.069) (0.038)   (0.111) (0.067) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 1.584*** 1.809***   3.884*** 1.820***   2.182*** 1.693*** 
  (0.071) (0.058)   (0.065) (0.051)   (0.129) (0.092) 
Real Activity 4.940*** 6.382***   6.116*** 9.872***   6.957*** 8.254*** 
  (0.022) (0.025)   (0.036) (0.059)   (0.096) (0.072) 
Real Activity (Std.Dev.) 2.349*** 2.835***   3.271*** 5.609***   4.714*** 4.535*** 
  (0.025) (0.020)   (0.035) (0.045)   (0.098) (0.058) 
High IP Rights Prot. 0.213*** 0.419***   0.134*** 0.153***   0.453*** 0.098** 
  (0.027) (0.030)   (0.039) (0.019)   (0.063) (0.041) 
GDP 0.471*** 0.221***   -0.035*** 0.266***   -0.057*** 0.281*** 
  (0.008) (0.005)   (0.008) (0.004)   (0.011) (0.007) 
BERD 0.286*** 0.715***   0.459*** 0.139***   0.240*** 0.752*** 
  (0.018) (0.019)   (0.023) (0.012)   (0.037) (0.022) 
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Panel B. Trademarks 
                
Industry Electrical   Engineering   Chemical 
Size Large Non-Large   Large Non-Large       Large     Non-Large 
Tax Rate -9.974*** -10.930***   -9.123*** -10.160***   -8.587*** -8.755*** 
  (0.158) (0.072)   (0.163) (0.079)   (0.147) (0.078) 
Tax Rate*Quality -3.074*** -3.767***   0.522 -2.975***   -4.499*** -2.265*** 
  (0.303) (0.132)   (0.337) (0.179)   (0.205) (0.170) 
Tax Rate (Std.Dev.) 4.780*** -0.604*   4.098*** 3.787***   3.012*** 2.791*** 
  (0.158) (0.318)   (0.182) (0.084)   (0.185) (0.104) 
High IP Rights Prot. 0.039 0.196***   0.352*** -0.012   -0.234*** 0.047 
  (0.089) (0.039)   (0.072) (0.037)   (0.082) (0.037) 
GDP 0.058*** 0.096***   0.042*** 0.076***   0.070*** 0.027*** 
  (0.008) (0.004)   (0.008) (0.004)   (0.009) (0.004) 
BERD -0.578*** 0.274***   -0.105** 0.292***   0.094* 0.159*** 
  (0.049) (0.024)   (0.049) (0.025)   (0.050) (0.026) 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The samples include 3,899,752 patent 
applications and 1,012,287 trademark applications (the number of observations is 58,496,280 for patents and 
15,184,305 for trademarks). The dependent variable is location choice in one of the countries shown in Table 5.1. 
Location-industry-firm size fixed effects are included in all estimations. Large stands for companies with a total 
number of applications above the 80th percentile in their industry; Non-Large companies are enterprises of other 
sizes. Tax Rate represents a host country’s tax rate levied on the income from intangible assets and incorporates 
taxation under IP Boxes and CFC rules. Quality is a dummy variable that indicates intangible assets of high quality 
(applications filed at multiple offices). Real Activity is a binary variable, which is equal to one if at least one of the 
intangible’s inventors resides in the given country and takes on the value of zero otherwise. High IP Rights Prot. 
represents an indicator of a country’s level of intellectual property rights protection. GDP denotes a country’s gross 
domestic product. BERD stands for a country’s business expenditure on R&D in relation to its GDP. 
According to Table C.2, the inclusion of firms with American parents in our sample does not 
influence the main findings. Hence, trademarks (see Panel B of Table C.2) show a more 
negative tax sensitivity than patents (see Panel A of Table C.2). This outcome is observed across 
all industries and firm-size categories. However, the marginal effects for patents and trademarks 
appear to be larger (in absolute terms) than the effects obtained in our baseline estimations (see 
Table 5.4) once American firms are included in the sample. This suggests that companies with 
US parents are even more responsive to changes in taxation than subsidiaries of European 
firms.269 
 
 
                                                          
269 This result is observed across all industries and firm sizes with the exception of patent applications filed by 
non-large companies of the engineering sector. Here, the marginal effect decreases once US companies are added 
to the sample. 
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